An Arab bank for development: Arguments for the establishment of an Arab bank for development by Guecioueur, Adda
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
Theses Digitisation: 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/ 
This is a digitised version of the original print thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 
title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten: Theses 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk 
AN A R A B  B A N K  F O R  D E V E L O P M E N T  
(Arguments f o r  th e  E stab lishm en t o f am Arab Bank fo r  Development
by
ADDA GÜECÏOÏÏEÜH 
Liceneo ES - S ciences Econotklcraos
THESIS
Subî'il.ttod f o r  th e  Dogx’o® o f Doctor o f  H iilosopîiy
to
'Xh@ ïïn i'A jrs ity  o f  SlamgwY
Research conducted in
The Department o f  In te rn a t io n a l  Economic S tu d ies  
F acu lty  o f S o c ia l Sciences
June 197#
ProQuest Number: 10644304
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uesL
ProQuest 10644304
Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
l7 - \C S (S
C o p * ;(  X
T A B L E  OF  C O N T E N T S
Page
ACI®a/JLEDGEI«TS 
LIST OF TABLES 
ABBREVIATIONS 
SUÏMRY
CHAPTER I  Î THE RESOURCES OF THE ARAB -'JORLB
SECTION ONE ; THE ARAB WORLD'S HIIMAN RESOURCES
S ectio n  I~1 ; The Arab !Vor!l.n's Population Dis t r ib u tio n  
S ectio n  I-S î Education, IRjblic Health and. Ernnj.oyment
SECTION TWO ; THE NATURAL RESOURCES Œ THE ARAB RCRL'l
S e c tio n  I I - l  Crude 03.1 and N-iuural Re corves In
’ A 
B
S ectio n  IÏ-R  
A 
B
th e A.ro-b V.brld
D is tr ib u tio n  o f O il between Arab 
C ountries
D is tr ib u tio n  o f Natural Ces tetw oen  
Arab Countri es
The Arab 03.1 Revenues
Causes o f the O il Price In creases
Im p lica tion s o f uhe Increased Arab O il 
Revenues •
Future Arab O il Revenues
CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER I I  ;
I
I I I
VIII
IX
1
3
7
U  
■ U
17
27
PAYING FOR OIL
INTRODUCTION : THE PROBLEM
SECTION ONE ; O.E.C.D. COUNTRIES' POLICIES TO TTR OIL 
INDUCED BALANCE OF PAYÎ-'ENTS DEFICITS : 
1974-1977
29
35
S ectio n I - l  Î The Magnitude o f the O il-induced Balance
S ectio n 1-2  Î
o f Fa,yments D e f ic it s  : .1971-1977  
The Slovf-dovjn of domestic Econoiric
-35
A c tiv ity 3#
S ectio n 1-3  : Use o f Ovmcd In tern a tio n a l Reserves 41
S ectio n I-A : Use o f Drawings from the In tern a tio n a l
Monetary Fund ( I /■'>,?. ) iiii-
T A B L E  O F  C O N T E N T S  (CONTINUED)
Page
S ec tio n  1-5 î Expanding Focporbs to  OPEC C ountries
------------------------  1 9 7 n t9 7 7 ------------------------------- 4 6
A î Adjustment Process and P rice s  Developments
in  O.E.C.D, and Arab C ountries
B s Adjustment Process and Exchange Rates
Developments in  O.E.C.D. and Arab 
C ountries
C Î Adjustment Process and Trade P o licy  in
the  O.E.C.D, Area
D Î Adjustment Process and Terms: of Trade
Developments in  O.E.C.D. and Arab 
C ountries
SECTION TA'O s NON-OIL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' POLICIES TO
T[-TS OIL-INDUCED BALANCE OF PATÎE5NTS DEFICITS 
197A-1977 6 4
S ectio n  IT-1  ; The Magnitude of th e  O il-Induced Balance
of Payments D e f ic its  : 1974-1977 65
S ection  11-2 ; Use of Clmed In te rn a tio n a l Reserves 69
S ection  XI-2 : Use o f Drawings fnem the In te rn a t io n a l
Monetary Fund (T. M.F ,T  71
S ection  I 1-4  : Non -O il Developing C o u n tr ie s '
Adjustment Process 72
SECTION THREE i THE FINANCING CHANELS 79
S ection  I I I - l  ; F inancing Process during  a Trade Cycle :
Case o f Slump 79
S ec tio n  I I I - 2  : The R esh u fflin g  Process Ô3
A Î E x is tin g  Financing Channels
-  In te rn a t io n a l  F in an c ia l I n s t i tu t io n s
-  World Banking Centres.
B Î N ew ly-created Financing Channels
CONCLUSION &Y
CHAPTER I I I  : ARAB DOLLARS RESHUFFLING THOUGH NON-ARAB
FINANCIAL DESTITUTIONS
INTRODUCTION t The West German Proposal : The I . i . B .  9 1
The U nited S t a t e s ’ P roposal -  The
K issin g er Bank 9 I
The B r i t is h  Proposal : The I.M .F . O il
Fund 9 2
T A B L E  O F  C O N T E N T S  {CONTINUED )
P ag e
SECTION ŒE ; COMPOSITION OF THE ARAB WORLD’S 
INTERNATIONAL RESERWS
S ectio n  I - l
S ectio n  1-2 
A 
B
Sec tio n  1-3
Comparison o f  Arab and Hon-Arab
Counti'ies * In tern a tio n a l Reserve:
Inter-A rab Countries Comrariscn
Arab Countries * Gold Rol.ii ngs
Arab Countries.' S.D.R. Moldings
S tru ctu re o f  the Anab O il C ountries' 
Foreign Exchange Res e iv e s
SECTION TWO : ARAB DOLLARS RESHUFFLING TRRXGH INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
S ectio n  I I - l
S ection  I I -2
S ec tio n  XI-3
C h a ra c ter is tic s  o f  the IIM .F. O il 
F a c i l i ty  Schemes. ”
Access to  the I.FRF. Ct.l F a c i l i t y
C o n d itio n a lity  o f the O il F a c i l i t y
I n te r e s t  Rates Charged
The Arab Vbrld 's Contri.butibn to  
1974  and 1975 O il Faoi11t i e s
Arab W orld's Returns R.-rived from 
t h e ir  Contrib u t ion t o the 0:1.1 
F a c i l i ly  Sc' ieams
SECTION THR.E3 s ARAB DOLLARS RESHUFFLING TflROUGM PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
S ectio n  I I I - l  
S ectio n  I I I -2  
A 
B
Deployment o f the P e tro d o lla rs  
Surpluses
Role o f  the Em^ocurren.cy Markets in  
P e tr o io lla r s  R esh u fflin g  .. ..
Arab C ountries' H oldings v i t h  the 
Eurocurrency Markets
The R esh u fflin g  o f Arab C ountries '
Holding TfVith the Eurocurrency î^ rk ets
Arab W orld's Advantages and D isadvantages 
from Eurocurrency Markets R esh u fflin g  
o f P etro d o llars
-  Economic Danger
-  P o l i t i c a l  D isadvantages
93
9.5
9 6
97 
101
102
104
1 0 4
1 0 5
1 0 5
1 0 6
1 0 6
107
111
111
116
T A B L E  O F  C O N T E N T S  (CONTINUED )
Sec t ie n  I I I - 3  _ : The Role of In te rn a tio n a l Boni l'^ rkets
in  Arab D ollars R esh u fflin g  and i t s  
■ l!''^pli e s tio n s
A ; The Role o f the  In te rn a tio n a l Bond 
# r k e t s  in  R eshuffling  Arab D ollars
B Î Returns Derived from th e  In te rn a t io n a l  
Bond Markets * Role in  R eshuffling  Arab 
D o llars
SECTION FOUR î ARAB REAL INVESTMENTS IN WESTERN 
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES
Page
124
Soction  IV-1 Arab D irec t Investm ents in  Western 
C o u n tries .
129
130
A Î Arab D ire c t Investm ents in  the United 
S ta te s
B
C
D
E
S ection  IV-2
Arab D irec t Ihvestnen ts  in  b e s t  Germany
Arab D ire c t Investm ents in  G reat B r i ta in
Arab D ire c t Investm ents in  F ram e
Arab D ire c t Investm ents in  I t a ly
Causes of and. Returns D erived from D irec t 
Investm ents in  Western In d u s tr ia liz e d  
C ountries
CONOLUCICN
CHAPTER IV : m m  DOILAlg _  RR8 TVJPFLINC ?^ ROUG^ T _ARAB
FBLANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
SECTION ONE î D0MF8TZC BANKING SYSTEM'S OF -ARAB COUNTRIES 
AND THEIR ROLE IE  ARAB DOLLARS REStRJFFLING
134
136
lection  I - l The Banking System o f Arab " S o c ia l is t"  
. Economies
Section  1-2 : The Banking System of Arab "Free
Economies”
S ec tio n  1-3 
A
Arab Banking Systems and Arab D o llars  
R eshuffling
Importance and Role of Foreign Banks 
in  th e  Banking System o f Arab "Open'* 
Economies
139
140 
142
B : Jo in t-V en tu res  Banking Schemes
T A B L E  O F  C O N T E  N T S (CŒTTNUED)
SECTION TWO ; DOMESTIC ALLOCATION CF ARAB CIL REVETITES 
S ection  I I - 1 : P ressu res in  Arab 031 C ountries and
A
S ection  I I -2
A
S ection  I I -3
A
B
C
Th e i r  C onseouer es
P ressu res  on Arab Oil C o u n tr ie s ' 
Governments
Conseouences of the P ressu res  on Arab 
O il C o u n tlie s ' Gove?'nrnsnts
A bsorptive C apacity  otf Spending Capa,city 
in  Arab O il C ountries
Time C o n stra in ts  on Arab O il C ountries
Arab 03,1 C ountries ' Indus t r i a l '  and 
A g r ic u ltu ra l Po l ic ie s  and th e i r  
Approach to  the T ransfer of 
Technology Problem
A g ric u ltu ra l S ec to r
Industrd.al S ec to r
Approaches to  the  Problem of T ransfer 
of Technology
SECTION THREE : IIITHODOLI AP.S RESHUFFLING ORROTIGH AR.AB 
BILATERAI, AGENCIES
S ec tio n  I I I - l
A
B
C
S ection  I I I - 2
A
B
S ection  I I I - 3
B i la t e r a l  Agencies o th e r  than the
P ag e
151
151
157
161
166
Kuwait Fund fo r  Arab Economic Development 167
The Abu Dhabi Fund f o r  Arab Economic 
Development
TTie Saudi Development ’ï^und
Tra.qi F'ond fo r  E xternal .Development
Tlie Kuwait Fund fo r  Ar-ab Economic 
Development 169
Î P re se n ta tio n  of the K.F.A.E.D.
: Performance of the K.F.A.E.D.
: Aims and Lim its of Phe B i la te r a l  Aid
Funds
Î Aims and Motives behind Arab Aid
j Some L im its to  th e  Arab B i la te r a l
Aid Funds
172
T A B L E  O F  C O N T E N T S  (CONTINUED )
SECTION FOUR
S ectio n  IV-1 
A
B
C
S ectio n  IT-R
A 
B
CONCLUSION
ARAB AID THROUGH ARAB MLTILATERAI,
AGENCIES
: Resources and O'oeraticn o l Arab
M u lt i la te ra l  Aid. encA es
i M u lt i la te ra l  Aid Agencies fo r Arab
C ountries
1, Arab Fund fo r  Fconono.c and S ocia l 
Development (AFESD)
2. S p ec ia l Fund fo r  Arab Non-Oil 
Exporting C ountries (SFANOC )
! Arab M u lt i la te ra l  Aid Agencies fo r
Islam ic C ountries
1, Islam ic Development Bank or IDB
; Arab M u lt i la te r a l  Aid Agencies fo r
A frican  C ountries
' 1 . Arab Bank foz' Economic Development
in  A frica  (ABSDA)
2, Arab A frican Oil A ssis tance  Fund 
(AFOAF)
3, Arab A frican Technical A ssistance 
Fund (AFTAF)
4* The O rganization of Oil,, E;cport,ing 
C ountries * Fund.
; Motives Behin3 and Performance of A r a b  
M u lt i la te r a l  Aid Agencies
; Motives
: Performance and C ritic ism s  of Arab
M u lt i la te r a l  Aid Agencies
Î C ritic ism s  c f  Az'ab C ountries Aid
Giving Method
CHAPTER V : CREATION OF AN ARAB BANK FOR DWET,ORmT
SECTION ONE : ARGUÏ^ NTS FOR THE CREATION OF AN ARAB BANK
FOR DSTELOPaT
S ectio n  I - l  : Economic Arguments
A : Economic Arguments Derived from the
CdJ. C r is is
P ag e
177
177
1S5
192
194
195 
195
B : Other Economic Arguments
T A B L E  O F  C O N T E N T S  (CONTINUEL)
S ec tio n  1-2 
A 
B 
C
Non-Economic Argumente 
P o l i t i c a l  Arguments 
R e lig io u s  and C u ltu ra l Arguments 
Hum anitarian Argumerta
Page
200
SECTION TldO î STRUCTURE OF TïTI ARAB BANK FOR DEVELOPMENT 
S ection  I I - l
A
S ectio n  II~2 
A 
B 
C
S ec tio n  I I - 3 
A 
B
S ection  I I - 4
A
B
C
S ection  I I - 5 
A 
 ^ B
206
206
207
Previous Attemp ts  to  rinanoe Arab 
■ E c o P o m 3 . c  H e v e l o p m e n t
The B ustani P ro jec t
Aims of th e  Arab Bank fo r  development
J o in t  P ro jec ts
Technical A ssistance
Other F ie ld s  of In ter-A rab  C o-operation 
Investm ent C r i te r ia  and Securit y  211
Investm ent C r i te r ia  
Terms o f Loans
The Arab Development Bank's C a p ita l is a t io n  
and F in a n c ia l S tru c tu re  217
The Case of Other Regional Development 
Banks
The Arab W orld’s C ap ita l Requirements
C a p i ta l is a t io n  of the Arab Development 
Bank
Management of the  Arab development Bank 225
Management
The' Arab Bank fo r  Development's R e la tio n s  
w ith  Other I n s t i tu t io n s
SECTION TFRS5 : lUE UNIT OF ACCOUNT
S ection  I I I - l
A
B
“ C
S ection  IH -2
The U nit o f Account of Other Regional 
Development Banks
The Asian and A frican  Development Banks
The In te rn a tio n a l Bank fo r  Economic 
C o-operation  .
The Case o f  th e  E .E.C , C ountries
The Use o f Arab C urrencies
The Crowing Use of In d iv id u a l Arab 
C urrencies
Basket o f Arab C urrencies
The Gulf S ta te s ' Common Currency
229
230
234
!3 Ô
T A B L E  O F  C O N T E N T S  (CONTBTJSü)
S ectio n  I I B 3  
A 
B 
G
CONCLUSION
Tloe C reation  of ar.- Arab Dinar 
J u s t i f i c a t i o n  of an Arab Dinar 
The Arab Monetary Fund's Arab Dinar 
A S in g le  Arab Currency ; Tne Arab D inar
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
APPENDIX
Page
239
245
247
252
BIBLIOGRAPHY 2S4
A c  K W 0  W L  B D Ct E M E N T s
I  am deeply  g r a te fu l  to  Dr. L. S ire  ( P o l i t i c a l  Economy 
D epartm ent), w ithou t h is  very- a b le  and co n s tan t guidance th is  th e s is  
would have never been f in is h e d .
I  am v o r y  g r a te fu l  to  P ro fesso r A, Move (Head of I .E .S . 
Department) fo r  accep tin g  me in  the  D epartnent, fo r  h is  comments end 
h is  understanding  When I  had problems a t  a c ru c ia l  s ta g e  of my work,
I  am g r a te fu l  to F r. G.C, A bbott, M.A. Hons, ( I .E .S . 
Department) fo r  h is  e a r ly  h e lp .
The p a in stak in g  job of read ing  and commenting on th e  f in a i  
shape of th is  work has been c a r r ie d  out by Mr, R. M ilne, M.A., M .Pnll, 
and Dr. R. Sinha ( P o l i t i c a l  Econony D epartm ent), I  am very g ra te fu l  
f o r  th e i r  v a lu ab le  h e lp ,
■Severaj, people ard  in s t i t u t i o n s  provided me wi.th very u se fu l 
d a ta , I  world l i k e  t o  express my s in c e re  thanks e s p e c ia lly  fjoi
-  Fy fr ie n d  Dr, G.A. Amin and D.B, El-Diri from th e  Kuwait 
Fund fo r  Arab Economic Development5
-  Dr, M, C hatelus from the  U n iv e rs ity  of Grenoble (F rance),
-  Mr. P, Koet<=*rton, M.A., from the B r itish  N ational O il 
Co rpo r a t  ic  n ( Gla sg ow ),
-  The Asian and la  tin-A m erican Development Banks,
-  I  am th an k fu l to the D irec to r  o f the O ffice  N ational do la
Recherche S c ie n tif iq u e  (0 ,N ,E ,S ,) fo r  giv ing me the o p p o rtu n ity  
to  a tten d  the  F i r s t  Congress o f Third. World Economists (A lg iers 
2-7 February 1976 ) #
-  I  am a lso  th an k fu l to  Dr, B, Dasgupta (form erly  in  
U n iversity  of Sussex) fo r h is  encouragement and fo r  in v i t in g  
me to  th e  Colloquium on O il and Developmmt ( I , D M a y  28, 
1976).
Both m eetings helped me to  gath er data and fa sh ion  and improve 
my p ercep tion  o f the problem,
-  I  am th an k fu l to  th e  S ta f f  of the  A lgerian  Embassy (London),
and p a r t ic u la r ] y to  H,E, th e  Embassador L, Brahim i, Mr, L. K h e lif 
The C u ltu ra l Attache^ and Mr. S.A . Arab, M.A., th e  C o n se ille r  
Pédagogique,
I I
Mb, E. H unter and Mis. V. R obertson, w ith t h e i r  e f f ic ie n t  
and 0  m s ta n t  h e lp , made ny work le s s  p a in fu l,  I  am veiy  
th a n k fu l to  bo th  o f them.
F in a l ly  I  am very g r a te fu l  to  Mb, E lisab e th  A. Meldrum, K.A, 
fo r c o rre c tin g  and ty p in g  the f i r s t  d r a f t  and fo r  h e r 
encouragem ents,
L I S T  O F  T A B L E S
I I I
Page
Table 1 s
Table 2 :
Table 3 *
Table 4 :
Table 5 :
Table 6 :
Table 7 ;
Table # ;
Table 9 :
Table 10 ;
Table 11 :
Table 12 î
Table 13 :
Table 14 :
C ountries Mernbers o f the League of Arab 
S ta te s
The Arab World ; P opulation , D ensity , 
P opulation  Growth R ates and Rates of 
Ur b e.ni s a tio n
I l l i t e r a c y  and Unemployment in  th e  Arab World 
Public H ealth in  Five Arab S ta te s  (end 1974) 
Arab World O il and N atu ral Gas Reserves 
(end o f 1 9 7 3 )
Average P ric e  of One B a rre l of O il Paid by 
Consumers a t  OPEC P o rt of D elivery , 1959-1974 
(if I .M  )
Arab World s GNP a t  Market P rices  and GNP 
p er c a p ita  -  1 9 7 4
In te rn a t io n a l  Energy Agency F orecasts  of 
Consumers' O il Demand and Net Import 
(1974-1905)
P ro je c tio n s  of 19#0 OPEC F in a n c ia l 
Accujnulations ( in  b i l l io n s  o f d o l la r s  ) 
Comparison o f Adjustment Processes ;
1947-55 and 1974-#5 (b i l l io n s  o f d o lla r s  in  
1974 P r ic e s )
Payirig fo r  O il s Measures Open to  O il-  
Im porting C ountries
Increased  Cost of O il Imports i n  th e  Mbin 
O . E . C . D .  C ountries : 1974-1977 (b i l l io n s  of 
d o lj.a rs  in  1974 P r ic e s }
Balance o f  Payments o f the Fain O.E.C.D, 
C ountries : 1974-1977 ( b i l l io n s  o f US D o lla rs  
I n d u s t r ia l  P roduction  (A) and Employment (B) 
in  th e  P^in O.E.C.D, C ountries s Fercentage 
Change from th e  Previous Year 1973-1977
4=
Ô
1C
16
21
24
2 6
32
34
35 
37
39
L I S T  O F  T A B L E S  (CONTINUED)
IV
Table 15 : E volu tion  of the In te rn a t io n a l  Reserves of 
U .S .A ., Japan, France, I t a ly ,  CerRvany and.
U.K. : 1972-1977 (b ilT io n s  of US d o l la r s ) .  
Table 16 î Drawings from, the I.M .F . : United S ta te s ,
F rance, Germany, I t a ly ,  U.K., Japan,
1974-1977 (m illio n s  o f S .U .R s .:
Table 17 t O.E.C.D’s ,  In c reased  Exports over 1973 to  
OFEC C o u n tries, 1974-1977 ( b i l l io n s  of 
1 9 7 4  d o l la r s  )
Table 1# : O.E.C.D. C ountries Consumer P rice s  ;
Percentage Changes from Previous Tear : 
1974-1977 (se a so n a lly  ad ju sted )
Table 19 : E volu tion  of Consumer P ric e s  in  Arab C ountries
End of Period Changes R e la tiv e  to  Previous 
Year ; 1973-1977 (%}
Table 20 ; Exchange Rates o f the O.E.C.D. C ountries s
P ercentage Changes from Previous P eriod .
Table 21 î
Table 22a : 
Table 22b : 
Table 23 :
Table 24 :
Table 25 t
1974-1977
Exchange Rates E vo lu tion  between the U.S. 
D o lla r ard Arab and some 01T3C C urrencies. 
Percen tage Changes from Previous P eriod , 
Average Market R ate . 1973-197?
Saudi A rab ia’s Terms of Trade w ith  F ^ jo r 
O.E.C.D. C ountries : 1973-1977 
A lg e r ia 's  Terms o f  Trade wi.th Major O.E.C.D. 
C ountries : 1973-1977
Increm ental c o s t o f  O il Imports f o r  N.O.D.C. 
E s t im te  fo r  1974 and P ro jec tio n s  fo r  1977 
Financing o f Non-Oil Developing Countri.es 
C urrent Account D e f ic its  1974-1976 
Reserves as  a Percentage o f Annual Imports 
o f S ix teen  N.O.D.C. s 1973-1975
Page
41
45
46
49
50
55
5#
62
63
67
6 S
70
L I S T  O F  T A B L E S  (CONTINUED)
V
Table 26 t
Table 27 : 
Table 2# :
Table 29 î 
Table 30 ;
Table 31 ;
Table 32 :
Table 33 f
Table 34 :
Table 35 :
Table 36 :
Table 37 : 
Table 3# :
Table 39 :
Table 40 :
Terms o f Trade of some K.S.A. C ountries 
(E th io p ia , Kenya, and S r i  L inka), Change over 
Previous Year î 1973-1976 
Arab C ountries ' In te rn a t io n a l  Reserves in  
1970 and 1976
O il Revenues Invested  in  Gold and In te rn a tio n a l 
T ran sfe rs
O il Revenues held  in  d o lla rs  and
In te rn a t io n a l  T ransfers  
O il F a c i l i ty  : I n te r e s t  Rates Charged fo r  
1974 and 1975
Borrowing Agreements under the O il F a c i l i ty  
fo r  1974 and 1975 (Lend'Ing C oun tries)
E stim ated  Deployment o f  OPSC*s Surp luses ;■ 
1974-3rd q u a r te r  1977
E x te rn a l P o s itio n  of the Banks o f the Group 
of Ten C ountries and Switzerl'and v is - a - v is  
th e  Arab World in  1975
E stim ated Sources and Uses of Furocurrency 
Funds : December 1973 -  December 1975 
(bn. U.S. d o l la r s ) .
E uro-dollar D eposit Rates and Euro-bonds 
Y ields from 1972 to  1976 
New In te r n a tio n a l Bond Issu es  : 1972-1976 
($ m ill io n s )
Number and N a tio n a lity  o f Local Banks in  
Arab "Free Economies" : 1975/6 
Source o f  Funds o f  Commercial Banks in  
Lebanon : 1970-1972 ( in  m illio n  L.L)
P r in c ip a l A p p lica tion s of Funds o f  Lebanese 
Commercial Banks -  1971-1972 ( in  m illio n  L.L) 
Arab C ountries' Defence Expenditure  
E stim ates (1974)
77
94
99
103
106
10#
113
117
120
125
127
143
146
147 
155
L I S T  O F  T A B  I. E S  (GONTBîirED )
V I
Table 41 * Spending C apacity  of Arab Oil C ountries
1974-1976
Table 42 : S e c to ra l and Geograph Leal D is tr ib u tio n  o f the
Loans Granted by the Kuv^ aii:, V\md fo r  Arab 
Economic Development January 196.2-June 1976 
Table 43 : B i la te r a l  Aid Commitments from Arab to  Non-
Arab A frican  C oun tries, 1974 (I m illj.ons ) 
Table 44 : Economic P rospects  o f T h irteen  Arab Countri.es
P opu la tion , GNP and p e r c a p ita  income :
1970-1934
Table 45 J The R eshuffling  Process in  case c f  t^ e
E xistence of a S ingle Arab Currency
Page
162
171
1#7
204
240
TABLES IN APPENDIX
Tab].e I - l  ;
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
1-2  :
1-3 : 
1-4 :
I I - l  : 
I I - 2  Î 
I I - 3  :
E stim ates  o f Populati.cn, lab o u r Force, 
Employment, Unemployment and. G.D.P. in  South 
West Asia and N orthern A frica  ; 1960-1990 
Labour Force E stim ates  and P ro jec tio n s  in  
Arab C oun tries : 1970-19#5
013. P roduction o f S e lec ted  Arab C ountries and 
P rice s  in  U,S, 8 /b a r r e l  ; 1970-19#0 
R e la tiv e  Importance o f A g ricu ltu re  in  
S e lec ted  Arab C ountries
Arab O il Revenues Compared w ith Some Data of 
the World Economy (1974)
Discount R ates i n  the  Major O.E.C.D, C o u n tries;
1972-1977, Percentage per annum
O.E.C.D. Consumer P r ic e s , Percentage Changes
252/253
?3K
255
256 
257
from Previous P eriod , Not Seasonaxly A djusted, 
Averages fo r  C alendar Years : 1964-1977
25#
259
711
L I S T  O F  T A B  Ï. E S  (CONTINUEL )
Pave
Table I I - 4  : I d e n t i f ic a t io n  o f  the Most S e rio u s ly
A ffected  C ountries 2éO
Table I I -5  : E vo lu tion  o f the Consumer P rices  in  the
N.O.D.C. 1974-1977 {% Change) ?6 l
Table l l l - l a î  Cu’m ila tive  IMrchases under the  O il F a c i l i ty  :
1974 and 1975 26?/?63
Table I l l - l b :  I.M .F , O il F a c i l i ty  î Borrowers p e r  Area :
1974-1975 264
Table 1 7 -1  : Major J o in t  Banking Ventures by Arab and
W estern Banks (1977) 265/276
Table 17-2 % M u lt i la te ra l  Arab Aid fo r  A frica ;
1974 and e a r ly  1975 277
Table 17-3 : T o ta l Commitments and Estim ated Net
Disbursem ents of Concessional A ssistance by 
OAPSC C oun tries in  1974 and 1975 27#
Table 17-4 : Gontributi.ons o f OPEC S ta te s  to  UN Agencies
(In  0 0 0  III : 1973-1975 279
Table 17-5 : Resource Flows from OPEC Member C ountries to
Other Developing C ountries î 1953-1976 2Ô0
Table 17-6 ; OPEC S p ec ia l Fund Balance of Payments
Support Prog?.Vtm 2#1
Table 17-7 : P ro je c t Lending Program. S e c to ra l and
G eographical D is tr ib u tio n  o f Committed Loans 
(us |m .) ' 282
Table V-1 Î The Growing 5se of Arab CuiTo-ois3  2Ô3
V I I I
A B B R E V I A T I O N S
A.D.B, 
Af.D.B.
B .C .P . 
D.A.C, 
G.D.R4 
G.N.P. 
I.B .R .D . 
I .E .A . 
I .F .S .  
I.M .F , 
L.D.Gs, 
L.T,
Fb/d 
M.N.O.C, 
PUT.
M.S.A.Go 
N .I.E .O . 
N.O.D.C.
O.A.P.E.G. 
O.A.Ü. 
OPEC
O.E.C ,D. 
O.F.
R. & D. 
S.D .R. 
S .T .
T.G.T. 
U.A.E. 
U.N.
U.N.D.P. 
Y.A ,R.
Y.P.D.R.
Asian Development Bank.
A frican  Development Banlc.
Balance of Payments.
Development A ssis tance Committee.
Gross Domestic P roduct.
Gross N ational Product.
In tem o -tio n a l Bank fo r  R econstruction  and Development. 
In te rn a t io n a l  Energy Agency.
In te rn a t io n a l  F in an c ia l S t a t i s t i c s .
In te rn a t io n a l  T-bnetary Fund,
Less Developed C cu n trie s .
Long-Teriu
M illio n  B a rre ls  a Day.
M u ltin a tio n a l O il Companies.
Medium-Term.
Most S e rio u s ly  A ffected  C oun tries,
New In te rn a t io n a l  Economic Order.
N on-oil Developing C oun tries.
O rganization o f Arab Petroleum  Exporting C o u n tries, 
O rganization  of A frican  U nity,
O rgan ization  of Petroleum  Exporting C oun tries, 
O rganization  o f Economic C o-operation end Development, 
O il-F ac il i t y .
Research and Development.
S p ec ia l Drawing R ig h t.
Short-Term ,
Terms o f Trade.
United Arab E m irates.
U nited N ations,
United N ations Development Program.
Yemen Arab R epublic.
Yemen P eop le’s Democratic R epublic.
IX
S U M M A R Y
AN ARAB BANK FCR DEVELOPMENT
(Arguments fo r  the estab lish m en t o f an Arab Bank fo r  Development).
Tliis study has been carr ied  out having in mind a c r it ic is m  
QBde during the f i r s t  seminar we attended a t  Glasgow U n iv e r s ity , Tne 
speaker sa id  th at research  stud en ts from Developing C ountries embark 
on so p h is tic a te d  models th a t w i l l  be of no use to th e ir  co u n tr ie s . 
A ccordingly, we s h a l l  not come up w ith  a model. This wor^ comprises 
f iv e  ch ap ters. The aim of the f i r s t  chapter, the resou rces o f  the 
Arab World, i s  to  in trod u ce the region  to  the read er. The economic 
and s o c ia l  needs of the pop ulation  can be perceived through the le v e l s  
o f  education , p u b lic  h ea lth  and unemployment. These problems are 
exacerbated by a high growth ra te  and a geographical m is-d istr ib u te  on 
o f the pop u lation . In th e  second part o f th e chapter we consider the  
e x is t in g  m ineral resources th a t have to  be used to  s a t i s f y  th e abo^o 
requirem ents. These resources are manifold but we s h a l l  focus our 
a tte n t io n  on crude oiJL and, more p r e c is e ly , on the s tr u c tu r a l and 
con jon ctu rel economic and non-economic causes th a t le d  to  the 
quadrupling o f o i l  p r ices  during the la s t  Quarter o f  1973 and e a r ly  
1974* This phenomenon w i l l  be referred  t o  as. the " o il  c r i s i s " .  These 
cau ses w i l l  be a t  n lay  fo r  s e v e r a l yes.rs to  come, Conseouently, Arab 
c o u n tr ie s , a t  l e a s t  un M l o i l  runs o u t, are assured o f  a stea d y  flow  o f  
revenues. The lo g ic a l  q u estion  is^ what are Arab co u n tr ie s  doing  
w ith th e ii' o i l  revenues? However, g iven  the cu rren t in ter n a tio n a l  
f in a n c ia l ,  economic and trade s e t t in g ,  Arab co u n tr ie s  * ways o f u sin g  
th e ir  resou rces are c lo s e ly  re la ted  to  the q u estion  o f how o i l -  
im porting co u n tr ies  are paying fo r  th e ir  o i l  b i l l s .  This problem i s  
trea ted  in  the second ch ap ter . We d iv id e  o il- im p o rtin g  cou n tries  
in to  O.E.C.D. and n o n -o il developing co u n tr ies , N.O.D.C, Each co u n try / 
group o f co u n tr ie s ' response to  the o i l  c r i s i s  i s  a fu nction  o f the  
impact o f the la t t e r  on th e ir  econom ies. The fa c t  i s  th a t fo r  both 
groups the o il- in d u ce d  balance o f  payments d e f i c i t s  have to  be h e a v ily  
fin an ced . In t h i s  fin an cin g  p ro cess , in tern ation al, f in a n c ia l  
in s t i t u t io n s  p lay  a prominent r o le .  As fa r  as tlie o i l  c r i s i s  i s
Xconcerned, the combined a c t iv i t y  o f th ese  in s t i t u t io n s  has come to  be 
known as the r e c y c lin g , or fo r  o th ers , the r e sh u ff lin g  of the 
p e tr o d o lla r s  or Arab d o l la r s .  We opt fo r  the concept o f 
r e s h u ff lin g .
The r e sh u ff lin g  o f Arab d o lla r s  through in te r n a t io n a l o f f i c i a l  
and p r iv a te  f in a n c ia l  in s t i t u t io n s  i s  considered in  the th ird  chapter. 
Amongst the o f f i c i a l  in s t i t u t io n s  we s in g le  out tho case  o f The 
In tern a tio n a l Monetary Fund, Arab investm ents in  r ea l a s s e ts  are a lso  
d e a lt  wibh a t  t h i s  s ta g e . The co n c lu sio n  to  be drawn from th is  
chapter i s  th a t Arab o i l  revenues have been mainly cham eled  to  th e  
major O.E.C.D. co u n tr ies  (United S ta te s , Japan, b e s t  Germany, United  
Kingdom, I t a ly  and France). This s itu a t io n  helped th^n to  fin an ce  
p art o f  t h e ir  o il- in d u ced  balance o f payments d e f i c i t s .  I t  seems 
th a t n o n -o il developing co u n tr ie s  did not b e n e fit  from tr ig  type o f  
r esh u ff lin g  p ro cess , e s p e c ia l ly  the Eurocurrency and Eurobonds markets. 
On the other hand, the way the r e sh u fflin g  occurred dees not senre, on 
economic and p o l i t i c a l  grounds, Arab co u n tries  e i th e r  in d iv id u a lly  or 
c o l l e c t i v e ly .  This fa c t  has been understood by Arab o i l  co u n tr ie s  
and, conseq uently , they s e t  up t^ e ir  own channels to  r e s h u ff le  part of 
th e ir  o i l  revenues to n o n -o il develop ing c o u n tr ie s , Tho wcdcing o f  
th ese  channels i s  tr ea ted  in  the fourth chapter. The la t t e r  i s  opened 
by a survey o f Arab c o u n tr ie s ' dom estic banking system s and t h e ir  r o le  
in  the r e sh u ff lin g  p ro cess . This ro le  has been n e g lig ib le  and, a t  
b e s t ,  Arab owned and organised  banks remain an appendage o f world 
banking cen tres th a t are lo c a te d  in  the major O.E.C.D, c o u n tr ie s . 
Furthermore, because o f the dom estic fa c to r a l d is tr ib u t io n  and the 
b u i l t - in  c o n str a in ts  in  a g r ic u ltu r e , in d u stry , technology and home- 
markets, Arab d o lla r  investm ents, w ith in  in d iv id u a l o i l  c o u n tr ie s , are  
u n lik e ly  to  ach ieve  n o n -o il s e lf -s u s ta in e d  econom ies. On th e contrary, 
th ey  have introduced s o c ia l ,  economic and in s t i t u t io n a l  d is to r t io n s  
which w i l l  impede fu tu re  p ro g ress . Ho'wever, what about th e  new ly- 
created  channels whose aim i s  to  r e s h u ff le  o i l  revenues to  n o n -o il  
d evelop ing cou n tries?  As a m atter o f fa c t ,  from 1973 onwards, se v e r a l  
banks and. funds, w holly  owned and operated by Arab countrj.es, were s e t  
up. They f a l l  under sev e r a l c r it ic is m s ;  th e ir  number, s in c e  th ey  
are over ten ; low paid-up c a p ita l ,  lack  o f f in a n c ia l investm ent
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e x p e r t ise  and absence o f  co n su lta t io n  and co -ord in a tion  between them. 
Without denying th e ir  p o s it iv e  asp ect we can sa y  th a t th ere  i s  room 
fo r  iiiprovement* The id e a l  so lu tio n  would be the c re a tio n  o f  a 
s in g le  Arab Aid Fund by merging those banks and funds th a t d e a l  
s p e c i f i c a l ly  w ith non-Arab developing co u n tr ie s . As for  the Arab 
co u n tr ies  th em selves, th e ir  ca se  i s  treated  in  the f i f t h  chapter.
In th e  Arab World th e  presen t r e a l i t i e s  can be summed up as 
fo llo w s; On top o f th e ir  geograp h ica l u n ity , indi\idu.a.‘) Arab co u n tr ies  
are ch aracter ized  by a common h is to r y , language and r e l ig io n .
However, t h is  i s  not enough in  our current w orld. N onetheless, th ese  
common fea tu res  could p la y  a stren gth en in g  r o le  i f  Arab co u n tries  were 
to  bank on th e ir  com plem entarities in  th e f i e ld s  of a g r icu ltu re , 
in d u stry , labour fo rce , markets and c a p it a l .  In the p a st th ese  
economic and non-economic advantages have not been f u l ly  e x p lo ited .
The reason put forvjard has always been th a t Arab co u n tr ie s  lacked  
c a p ita l  th a t i s  e s s e n t ia l  to  any économ e achievem ent. Now th ey  have 
i t .  F in a lly , one should mention th e t  th ere  arc ventures ths-t no s in g le  
Arab countpy can undertake by i t s  own means; e s p e c ia l ly  Research and 
Development i f  i t  has t o ' le  ad to  a technology more su ita b le  to  dom estic 
economic and s o c ia l  c o n d it io n s . To f u l f i l  th is  puipose we su g g est the 
estab lishm ent o f  an Arab Bank fo r  Development, This in s t i t u t io n  has 
to  be s p e c if ic  all. y  d esign ed  fo r  the Arab World and incj-ude poor and r ich  
co u n tr ie s  a l ik e , Of course we d o  not su ggest ju s t  another bank 
because we have s ta te d  th a t th ere are already too  many. Oar s p e c if ic  
su ggestion  i s  to  merge th e e x is t in g  funds aid banks Wnose aim i s  to  
promote development w ith in  and between Arab c o u n tr ie s . I f  th is  
merging proves t o  be in p o ss ib le  our second b e s t  proposal would be to  
restru ctu re  the Arab Fund fo r  Economic and S o c ia l Development 
(A,F,E.S.D, )  more in  l in e  w ith  the r eg io n 's  needs and f in a n c ia l  
a b i l i t i e s .  The second proposal i s  lo s s  e f f i c i e n t  because i t s  w oiking  
w i l l  be inpeded by the e x is te n c e  o f  the funds and banks w^ich have not  
been merged in to  th e Arab Aid Fund,
This Arab Bank fo r  Development should have more than the 
c la s s i c a l  fianctions norm ally known to reg ion a l development banks and 
should have to  p oo l e x is t in g  Arab banking and investm ent e x p e r t ise  as 
w e ll as tap  oth er sources o f  c a p ita l .  The in p a ct and co n tr ib u tio n  o f  
th e  bank we have in  mind would be g r e a t ly  enhanced i f  the Arab World 
had a t  i t s  d isp o sa l an "inward-looking" f in a n c ia l market and a s in g le  
Arab currency.
1.
C H A P T E R  ï
THE RESOURCES OP THE ARAB WORLD
f 1 ÎWe assume th a t  th e  geograp hical p o sitio n ^  , the p a st and
recen t h:?a3to?.'7’ and th e  p o l i t i c a l  system s o f  the Arab World are Imoim.
This g iv e s  to  us th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  to  focus our a tte n t io n  on the
resou rces o f  the Arab World, That i s  th e  purpose o f  th is  f i r s t
ch ap ter . We ara faced w ith two k inds o f  resources î human and
m ineral resources and th e  atzmcture o f  tho chapter r e f l e c t s  th is
d is t in c t io n ,  l î i  th e  f i r s t  s e c t io n  we deal w ith  the human resou rces;
a concept by Which we mean th e  " en ergies, s k i l l s , ta le n t  and knowledge
o f  people which a r e , or which p o t e n t ia l ly  can or (Should be, app lied  to
(2 )tho production o f  goods or th e  rendering o f  u s e fu l serv ices"  ,
These hcJoan resou rces w i l l  be a ssessed  q u a n t ita t iv e ly  and 
q u a l i ta t iv e ly ,  whenovor p o ss ib le*  This problem, hac^  to  be approached 
bearing in  mind th a t i t  i s  im p o ssib le  to  dxvtw a p r e c is e  balance sh eet . 
Ill Dev\3loping C ountries in  gen era l and e s p e c ia l ly  in  soms co u n tr ie s  
such as both yemens. The aoeond s e c t io n  d e a ls  w ith  th e  m3.n©ral 
resom 'oes o f  the Arab World and more s p e c i f i c a l ly  w ith  crude o i l  and 
tho revenues derived  from i t s  eacports. Tbi*) ciiapt&r puts th e problem  
int-o p r o sp e c tiv e 9 on one s id e  wo have tho needs and on th e  oth er  
p resen t axxi fu tu re  a b i l i t i e s  to  s a t i s f y  th ose vary n eeds,
SECTION I  -  THE ARAB WORLD'S mR%N RESOURCES
The most iirportant resource o f a nation  or a country i s  i t s  
popu3.atlon and e s p e c ia lly  the le v e l  o f education and s ta te  o f health  
o f th e la t t e r .  We s h a ll  deal i^ dLth th ese  is su e s  In th is  f i r s t  s ec tio n .  
However, as the previous map shows, we are concerned with twenty 
co u n tr ies. I t  i s  therefore lo g ic a l  to  present f i r s t  the population
^^^cf, FÊip on Page 2 .
(2 Ï 'Frederick H, Harbison "Human Resources as the Wealth o f N ations",
Oxford U n iversity  P ress, New Yoik, London, Toronto, 1973, Page 3.
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d is tr ib u t io n . This w i l l  be done a t  i"^gional l e v e l  but a ls o  a t  
in d iv id u a l co u n tr ies  l e v e l ,
SECTION X -  I s  ARAB WORLD'S POHJUTIQN D3BTR3BUT10N
As by Table 2 (P opulation , D en sity , Population Gro’.'itb
Rates and Rate o f  U rb a n isa tio n ), the combined pop ulation  o f a l l  Ar*.b
Countries amounts to  ju s t  under 14# m illio n  in h a b ita n ts , spread over  
Z13*5 m illio n  km , This leaves us w ith a population d en sity  o f sisr.
2in h a b ita n ts  por km , However such a f ig u re  conceals  o th e r  f a c ts  
because o f  th e  uneven p o p u la tio n  d is t r ib u t io n  between th e  c o u n tr ie s  
concerned.
The p op ulation  d is tr ib u t io n  v a r ie s  from on© in h a b ita n t per
km  ^ in  Libya, % utdtan ia  and th e Uxiited Arab Eirlrat© (U ,A ,E , ) to  36o
o
in h ab itan ts /Im '"  in  Bahiaj.n,
PurtViennore, the s i tu a t io n  o f the Arab c o u n tr ie s  i s  very  
s p e c i f ic  s in c e  the d e se r t  c o n s t itu te s  the g rea ter  p art o f  them, Fnr 
in s ta n c e , 90^ o f  Egypt i s  d e se r t , g eo g ra p h ica lly  speaking, end i f  on© 
co n sid ers  arable area o n ly , on® i s  l e f t  w ith a p op u la tion  d e n s ity  o f  
1 ,0 0 0  Egyptians per a cre , t^iich i s  one o f  the h ig h es t  f ig u r e s  i c  th e  
World,
I t  i s  witt*th noting th a t in  almost evexy Arab counl.ry part of 
the population i s  Nomad and therefor© moving w ith in  the country or 
between neighbouring countries -  Nomads account fo r  30^ o f  the Libyan 
population. Although, euch a phenomenon i s  very w e ll  Icnovjtn, on® has 
to  bear i t  In  mliid vhen drawing f in a l  conclusions. However, putting  
asid e such elcjm nts, Arab cou n tries can be divided in to  two groups; 
e ith e r  densely or spareely  populated.
The f i r s t  group includes Egypt vAiich accounts fo r  one 
fourth o f the to ta l  Arab population, Lebanon, Morocco and S yria ,
However, according to  the same c r ite r io n , that i s  nuirber o f
2inhabitants per km , one can a lso  add Bahrain and Kuwait. This i s  
iro n ic  because the population o f the f i r s t  country i s  ju s t  under a 
quarter m illio n  Whereas th at o f the second country does not exceed one 
m illion  inhabitants includ ing foreign  workers. On the other hand 
except A lgeria , Sudan, Iraq and the Yemen Arab Republic (Y .A .R ,), a l l  
other countries can be s a fe ly  la b e lled  as sparsely  populated. For
TABLE 2 s Ttie Arab World s P opulation , D ensity  
Population  Growth Ratos and R ates o f  U rbanisation .
4.
Countries Area
■ii.i— III! i i m
Pop.
1974
m il l .
D ensity  
Inhabitants 
per km.
Pop. growth 
rate %
I960 1965 
-72 -72
% o f urban to  
t o ta l  pep. a t  
end of 196 O3.,
A lgeria 2 ,381,741 15.772 6 3.2 3.5 38 in  1974
Bahrain 598 0.224 360 n*a. 2 .5 -3* 59
Egypt 1,001,449 36.000 33 2 .5 2 .5 40
Iraq 424,924 10.412 22 3.2 3 .3 44cl
Jordan 97,740 2.577 24 3 .3 jL5 42.2
Kuwait 16,001 0.833 47 3 .8 10 80
Lebanon 10,400 2.600 268 2.6 2 .7 ■.'•50
Libya 1 ,759,540 2.257 1 3 .7 3 .7 2 4 6 ^
I&uritania 1,030,700 1,180 1 1 .9 1 .9 2 .0
Morocco U 5 ,0 5 0 16.309 35 2 .7 2 .5 n .a .
Oman 212,457 0.750 3 n.a* 2. 3'^ n .a .
Qatar 22,014 0.170 4 n .a . 2.3-3"^ 8 0 ^
S. Arabia 2,149,690 8.443 4 1 .7 1 .7 20*6
Somalia 637,657 2.941 4 n .a . 3-3 .5* 23
Sudan 2,505,813 16.901 6 2 .8 2 .8 6% 5 main towns
Syria 185,180 6.879 34 3 .3 3 .3 37.4
Tunisia 164,150 5.509 31 2 .1 3 .0 17^ e ig h t town::
U.A.E. 51,982 0.655 1 n .a . 3.5* n .a .
Y.A.R. 195,000 6.062 29 n .a . 3* n .a .
T.P.D.R. 287,683 1.590 5 3 .1 2 .9 n .a .
Total Arab V/orld
13,579,758 138.114 10
rough estim ate
X Xon ly  the population o f T rip o li and Benghazi were considered.
o f the population round the c a p ita l c i t y  Doha on ly.
Sources: Galal A. Am3.n ; The Modernization of Poverty, a study on the
p o l i t ic a l  economy o f growth in  nine Arab countries 1945-1970, 
Leiden, E .J . B r i l l ,  1974 Page 96.
*^ The Middle East & North A frica” 1974 -  1975, Europa publ. Ltd.
"the World Bank A tlas "Population per capita  product & Growth Rates", 
the World Bank, 1974, Page 7 .
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instance Jordan could nourish a population tvdee the sis©  o f i t s  
current one* Even Saudi Arabia with around 9 nidllion^^^ inhabitants  
lacks the necessary manpower to  develop i t s  natural resources. Let 
us now consider the population d istr ib u tio n  vdLthin in d iv idu al Arab 
cou n tr ies. We s h a ll  a ssess  i t  by considering the rate of  
urbanisation as shovm in  Table 2 ( la s t  colunri)*. We define the rate  
o f Urbanisation as the percentage o f urban to  t o t a l  population. As 
mcpectod. data i s  not a v a ila b le  from every country* In our opinion  
one can sa fe ly  maintain th at the rate o f urbanisation vaxlos between 
80^ and 2 %  although for  most of the countries the figu re i s  around 
40-50^e I t  i s  v»rth noting th at two towns, and Muhara
c o n stitu te  59% o f the population or Bahrain and that 8C^  o f the pop­
u la tio n  of Qatar i s  spread around the ca p ita l c i t y  which i s  Doha,
Here too one can draw a rough l in e  between o i l  producer and 
non^oil producers. Althougïi the rate of urbanization i s  not over 21% 
in  Saudi Arabia, one casi s a fe ly  s ta te  that the* former are more 
"urbanized" than the la t t e r .  The corre la tio n  between o i l  industry  
and urbanization does e x is t ,  hca\rev@r, on© oar*not a sso c ia te  both 
phenomena very c lo s e ly  and s ta te  that a l l ,  and only a l l ,  o i l  producing 
countries arc very urbanized* I'lui^hermorc, countries l ik e  A lgeria  
and Libya seem to  be aware o f  the phenomenon and b.v*^ undertaking 
prograr a^»©? of adequate re a llo ca tio n  of th e ir  huaoan resources.
I f  the urban population were spretid rao:re evenly between the  
d iffe r e n t regions and the m i’a tovms, the problem would have been le s s  
acute, Thie i s  not the case , s in ce  most of the urban population i s  
concentrated in  tiie c a p ita l c i t i e s .
Almost every Arab country has i t s  primate c ity ;  th is  can be 
defined as being a t  l e a s t  as large and more then tw ice as populated 
as the second most important c i t y .  As a matter o f fa c t , the 
population o f Cairo i s  tw ice as b ig  as the population o f Alexandria the 
second la r g e s t  c i t y .  This r e la tio n  holds true for A lgiers and Oran 
in  A lgeria and in  many other cou n tries.
^There i s  no p rec ise  figu re  for the population of Saudi-Arabia, 
Estim ates put i t  between 5 and 9 m illio n  in h ab itan ts.
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Furthermore, as mentioned e a r lie r , Doha accounts fo r  of 
the e n tir e  population of Qatar,
I f  one lock s moro c lo s e ly  a t the population, d istr ib u tio n  of 
tho U,/uK« one might be in c lin ed  to  la b e l the Emirate as "capital-city™  
countries"^"^^.
The prospects are darker i f  one takes in to  consideration  the 
rate o f  groivth o f the c a p l t a l - c i t ie s .  According to  G.A, Amin during 
the 1960-66 period the annual growth ra tes o f the population o f Cairo, 
Damascus, T r ip o li and Aman were 3.9%, 3,9%* 417% and 6*1% re sp e c tiv e ly .
For others the s itu a tio n  i s  w r se *  During the 1961-65 period the 
annual growth rate o f th e  population of Kuwvilt-eity was 18% per annum.
These f la ir e s  are more disturblrig when we Icnow th at during 
th e ir  f a s t e s t  urban growth at the end o f the n inetsenth  century the 
ra te  o f u îb an ization  was no more than 2.1% per annum for most of the  
Eur-opean co u n tr ies . "Even In such countries as the DeS.A,, A ustralia  
and New ISealand xvhich roeeived a largo number of immigrants, the ra te
( p  )
did not exceed .At2% per year"*
Tlie likely?' reasons explain ing such a s itu a t io n  could be;
™ the b ia s  aga in st rural l i f e ,
”» the absence o f  any r e a l i s t ic  reg ion a l balanced économie 
development in  Arab countries,
-  the concentration of a l l  w elfare am enities in  the main 
tcn*Tis, i f  not jju the cap ita l c i t i e s  as w i l l  be shovn 
in  the fo llow ing part (Section 1 -2 ),
All these problems as w e ll as those deriving from education, 
public health  and tmemployinont are made more acute by the population  
groivth rate represented in  Table 2 . Accoitling to th is  ta b le  the  
population gi'owth rate o f Arab countries 3 s " h ig h .ju s t  l ik e  other  
developing co u n tr ies. During the 1965-72 period i t  varied from 1.7% 
in  Saudi. Arabia to  10% per annum in  Kuwait. The case of Kuwait i s  a 
very sp e c ia l one and the very high population growth rate  i s
^^^The cm tr ib u tio n  to  t o t a l  population of the seven Emirates Is as 
fo llow s:
Abu Dhabi -  95,000 inhabitants ; Dubai * 100,000 inhabitants  
Sharjah -  55,000 inhab itants ; Has el-Khaimah -  45,000 in h ab itan ts, 
Fujairah -  15,000 inhab itants A^ man -  8,000 in h ab itan ts,
Umm o l  Quain -  7,000 in h ab itan ts.
Amin op. c3.t. Page 95.
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e s s e n t ia lly  due to  the large in flow  o f workers from the Indian Sub­
continent and other Arab countries* The average population growth 
rate varies between 3 and 3.5% por annum. Table 2 provides us with  
two s e ts  o f population growth ra tes; fo r  the 1960-72 and 1965-72 
periods* By coirparlng both periods i t  appears th a t percentage-vjis®  
the population growth ra te , already h i^ i, has been in creasin g . This 
i s  the case o f  A lgeria , Iraq, Jordan, ICmvait, Lebanon, T unisia, Tlie 
population growth rate  s ta b il is e d  In the case o f Egypt, Libya, 
Mauritania, Saudi-Arabia, Sudan, and Syria , The population grm th  
rates seem to  have decreased only in  Morocco and th e  Yemen People's  
Democratic Republic* The main a f fe c t  o f  th is  high increasing  
population gro'wth rate i s  th at a l l  our countries are characterized by 
a young populations more than 50% i s  under the age o f 18. As 
outlined  e a r lie r  th is  s itu a t io n  w i l l  worsen the probleBi of education, 
health  and ezplo)%ent.
SECTION I  -  2k EDUCATION, PUBLIC îffiALTH AND EMRLOTMÎNT
Hie performance o f in d iv id u a l Arab countries in  the f ie ld s  
of education, health  and employment i s  outlined  in  the fo llow in g  
ta b le ,
TABLE 3 ® I l l i t e r a c y  and Unemploymont In The Arab World (1)
Items
Count r 3 e t \  
A lgeria
Bahrain
Egypt 
Iraq 
Jordan 
j Kuwait 
i  Lebanon 
! Libya 
MiurJ.tania 
Morocco
Rs,te of 
i l l i t e r a c y  
% of t o ta l  
pop* 1960s
Ô0
i Unemployment 
as % of  
: Labour Force 
197L-72.
I 20 Urban
I 6 0  Rural
V
67 F
75 -  80
55 
38
55
10*2
n .a ,
ÔÔ
n.a*
•i.
6 .4  
n.a*
2 .04
6*38
■f
8.7^
Items!\   Rate o f  ■; Unemployment 
j i i l l i t e r a c y  as % o f
I X I % o f t o t a l  Labom' Force
I Countrlè'04 pop. I 96O3 1971™72.
Oman
Qatar
S. Arabia 
1 Sorimlia 
Sudan 
Syria 
Thnisla 
U.A.E, 
Y.A.R* 
Y.P.D.R*
80
n .a .
95
95
55
64
n .a .
90
n .a .
n.a*
M
F
f
a
îfele Population  
Female Population
D e f ic it  in  manpower but non-available data. 
Surplus in  manpower but non-available data. 
For 1971.
n .a ,
n e g lig ib le
n .a .
4 .3  
15
n .a .
n .a .
Sources: "The Î-Slddle East and North A frica -  1974/75" and "Africa South
o f tîio Sahara 1974-75" published by Europa Publications Ltd,,- 
Londo), 1976 (confer -  Surveys o f  in d iv id u al co u n tr ie s) .
I.L .O . Review, Volume 114 No, 2 , Septembsr-October, 1976, P. 177.
(1 )For further d e ta ils  confer Appendix: Estim ates of Population, Labour
Force, En^loyment, Unemployment and G.D.P. in  South-west Asia and 
Northern A frica: I960 -  1990.
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I t  seems that the rate o f i l l i t e r a c y  i s  veiy  high in  Amb 
co u n tr ies . JSxoept in  the case of Lebanon and Jordan, more than h a lf  
o f to ta l  population i s  i l l i t e r a t e  ixi A lgeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, 
Kuwait, ]%uritanla, dmn, Saudi-Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and the 
United Arab Emirates* As fa r  as the rate  o f i l l i t e r a c y  Is  concerned 
we do not dispose o f information in  the cases o f Libya, Bforocco, Qatar, 
Tunisia and both Yemiens * In our opinion the s itu a tio n  in  Morocco and 
Tunisia could be at b e s t  s im ilar  to  th a t in  A lgeria . In the case of 
Libya one should expect a high ra te  o f i l l i t e r a c y  too because the  
problem of education was not tackled u n t il  the early  1970s „
Furbhermoro, as mentioned e a r lie r . Nomads represent an 
important sectio n  o f the Libyan population, and th is  fa c t  contributes  
in  increasing the rate  o f i l l i t e r a c y *  This ap p lied  to  every Arab 
country with a s i  a cable nomad population and i s  bound to hinder present 
and futur© e ffo r t#  aimer.l a t erad icating  the problem of i l l i te r a c y *
The case o f  Qatar and both Yemens i s  s im ilar  to  th a t of the Arabian 
Peninsula. Furthermore the ra te  of i l l i t e r a c y  i s  higher amongst the  
female population.
I t  seems th at concerning the problem of education the  
problem i s  s im ilar  in  Arab countries e ith e r  w ith or without o i l  
resources. However, u n like other less-d eveloped  countries (or L .D .C s.) 
the Arab countries Liave an a sse t  in  the sense th a t they speak the sa-ms 
language, Arabic. Consequently, provided there i s  a w i l l ,  the 
problem can be tackled a t  reg io n a l le v e l  and by th e  same token i t  
represents a f ie ld  o f co-operation between in d iv idu al Arab co u n tr ies . 
This co-operation has ^d.ready started  with the creation  of a common 
s a t e l l i t e  to  promote education a t regional le v e l ,
I ^ ito r a c y  in  the Arab World has a lso  led  to the appearance 
o f  another phenomenon: a small m igration between Arab cou n tries.
S ince the end o f the 1960s a flow  of teachers developed from n on -o il 
to  o i l  Arab cou n tries. We consider th is  b a s ic a lly  as a p o s it iv e  trend; 
nonetheless i t  does contain soma negative elem ents. For instance i f  
one considers the problems in  terms o f , say, p u p ils/teach er  ra tio  one 
fin d s ty^t the o i l  exporting countries are doing b e t te r . I t  fo llow s  
th at the flow  w i l l  in  the long term occur a t the expense o f n on -o il 
co u n tr ies. Œie can la b e l th is  phenomenon as an " inter Arab V/orld 
brain-drain". A co n tro lled  flow favourable to  both groups has to  bo
10.
worked out*
F in a lly , in  f in a n c ia l terms the problem o f i l l i t e r a c y  
ou tstr ip s  the a b i l i t y  o f  a l l  n o n -o il countries * This i s  another 
f ie ld  o f co-operation between Arab countries* Furthermore, i f  there  
was to  be a regional e f fo r t  to  ta c k le  the p/'oblem o f i l l i t e r a c y  th is  
effort- should focus on correcting the d e f ic ie n c ie s  o f present
education systerris in  Arab co u n tr ies, systems th a t have to  be 
harmonised. Hio d e f ic ie n c ie s  are mainly b ias again st tech n ica l and 
ir r a t io n a l tra in in g , inadequate and low output and brain-drain from 
the Ar&b World to  the Rest o f  the World,
Let us„ ncfï4, turn our a tten tion  to th e  public hea lth  sec to r .  
As in, other Lebeds* on© escpects a poor health  serv ice  in  the whol© 
region vdth the n o n -o il countries In a worse s itu a t io n . In drawing 
our conclusions we sba31 consider the s itu a tio n  in  some o i l  cou n tries, 
as she3v>rn in  the follow ing ta b le ,
TABLE 4 ? Public Health in  Five Arab S ta te s , end 1974
Countries
A lgeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Lebanon
Qatar
Number o f  
Inhabitants 
pe>: H ospital Bed
Number o f  
Inhabitants 
P&T» Doctor,
6632
250
n .a .
250.60
173.46
7886
2000
2500
n .a .
447
Source; Several sources and mainly, "Tho Mî.ddle East and North 
A frica 1974-75", Europa Publications, op. c i t .
I t  seems th a t, even between the so -ca llcd  o i l  exporting  
cou n tries, Œie can w itn ess a wide d isp a r ity . The width o f such a 
gap could be i l lu s tr a te d  by the cases o f Qatar and A lgeria . There 
are on average 6632 Algerians per s in ^ e  h o sp ita l bed whereas the 
xratio i s  173.46 to  one in  Qatar, A lgeria has more than 38 tim es the 
figu re o f  Qatar. F in a lly  there are 7886 Algerians per doctor Whereas 
the figu re I s  447 for Qatar; that i s  18 times l e s s .  However, the
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figu res fo r  Bahrain are very s ig n if ic a n t .  This country Is  
characterized by a r e la t iv e ly  low inhabitant/bed r a t io  -  250, but 
on the other hand, the inhabitants/D oe tor ra tio  amounts to  2 ,000.
In  our opinion the explanation could be th a t, g iven  i t s  f in a n c ia l
resources Qatar has l i t t l e  d i f f ic u l t y  or, indeed, hardly any in  build ing  
and equipping h o sp ita ls , but i t  encounters many d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  
providing them with the adequate s t a f f .  This emphasises our previous 
conclusion th at human resources do co n stitu te  the "A chilles * Heel" of 
the Arab cou n tries, whatsoever th e ir  c la s s i f ic a t io n .
F in a lly  one has to  mention th at o i l  exporting countries are
mald.ng outstanding progress and by early 1978 most, i f  not a l l  o f them,
have secured free medicine fo r  t h e ir  population. For instance in  
the United Arab Emirates free  medicine is  av a ila b le  even to Arab 
n ation als from other co u n tr ies. On the other hand, there i s  no fro© 
access to  medicine and sometimes even to  education in  most other Arab 
cou n tr ies. Furthermore^ e x is t in g  f a c i l i t i e s  fo r  both education and 
h ea lth  are concentrated in  and around the main c i t i e s ,  th is  i s  vei’y  
grave in  countid.es w ith  a s ize a b le  nomad population. According t-o a 
United N ations’ Report tons o f b i l l io n s  of U .S. d o lla rs  are necessary  
to  so lve  the prabiom of i l l i t e r a c y  l e t  alone the problem o f h ea lth . 
Ihirthermore, the consequences o f  a high rate of i l l i t e r a c y  and an 
inadequate end in s u f f ic ie n t  public health  system could be aggravated by 
the number and d istr ib u tio n  o f  jobs in  in d iv id u al Arab cou n tr ies. As 
said  e a r lie r , we consider the problem rather in  terms of unemployment 
and Table 3 g ives us an idea  about the s itu a t io n . According to  
av a ila b le  o f f i c i a l  dat# only four cou n tries, namely Bahrain, Libya, 
Saudi Arabia and U .A .S ., experience a d e f ic i t  in  labour fo rce . A ll  
are o i l  exporting cou n tries vdth massive development p rojects on the  
stream, e sp e c ia lly  in  Saudi Arabia and Libya. We do not have 
av a ila b le  data fo r  Jordan, Oman, Sudan and both Yemens. In our 
opinion a l l  but. Sudan su ffe r  from unemployment. F in a lly , in  the  
remaining countries the ra te  of unemployment i s  very h igh . This 
includes the three Maghreb cou n tries, Iraq, Lebanon and S yria .
The figu res are from 1971-72. I t  means that some progresse, been 
e sp e c ia lly  in  the o i l  countries such as A lgeria . On the other 
hand the rate o f  growth o f  the populations are very h igh . In our 
opinion a l l  in  a l l  the s itu a t io n  could be s im ila r  in  1978 e s p e c ia lly
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in  the labour force surplus co u n tr ies .
F in a lly  one has to  mention the fa c t  th a t those figu res do not 
include A lgerian, Fbroccan and Tunisian workers in  West European 
cou n tries. Had they  been included or had they to  go back a t short 
n o tice  the s itu a tio n  could be worse.
At regional le v e l  the main conclusicn  to  be dravm Is that we 
have a labour force d e f ic i t  in  some count id es aïsd a labour force  
surplus in  oth ers. Hi© ex isten ce  or in ex isten ee  o f o i l  resources i s  
not a d ivid ing l in e  in  th is  ca se . The Ideal so lu tio n  could be a flow  
o f labour force from one group to  another. As a matter o f fa c t  such a 
flow  he# already started  in  the education se c to r  as mentioned e a r lie r .  
Sometimes m igrations might even take the aspect o f "permnent 
aettleciont". In Kuwait and Bahrain a high percentage of the population  
i s  con stitu ted  by c it iz e n s  from other Arab cc iu itr ie s .
F in a lly  i t  i s  worth mentioning the caoe oi' the p i lo t  scheme 
o f egyptian peasant a g r ic u ltu r is ts  being transferred  in  Iraq near 
Baghda»!, This example denotes two elements; on t i'0 one hand th at the 
flow of worker.?, i s  occurring even in  sectors o th er than education, on 
the other hand that ib i s  organized and aimed ai; permanent settlem en ts. 
Up t i l l  now the iMgratory flows have been the main resu lt o f in d iv id u al 
d ecisio n s c In our opinion i t  i s  time tliat i t  occu^  on an o f f i c i a l  
b a sis  w ithin an in s t itu t io n a l framework,
Beforo c lo sin g  th is  sec tio n  we s h a l l  -consider the s e c to r ia l  
employment. I t  seems th a t the primary sector  absorbs most of the 
labour force in. most o f the Arab co u n tr ies. For 5jcstanc©, in  
Mauritania 92 per cent of the labour force i s  engaged in  agricu ltu re .
For other eouhtries the llg u re  i s  not so lew a ince in  13 out of 20 coun­
t r ie s  the Prims.ry Sector occupies th e b ig g est share of employment.
In h a lf  o f  the t o ta l  Arab countries representing  around SCta, 
people, or more than tw o-thirds o f the t o t a l  population, the percentage 
of the labour force in  agricu ltu re to  that o f  the to ta l  labour force  
i s  higher than the average world rate 51%, A« far  as employment i s  
concerned, there i s  no Arab country in  Which the in d u str ia l se c to r  
occupies a promi nent p osition  & Thi s means th a t employment in  serv i ces  
occupies the second p la ce . Hoivever, i t  i s  the most important one in  
only three cou n tr ies, Bahrain, Kuwait and Lebanon. The f i r s t  two are  
o i l  producers with sm all populations engaged in  trade and doing
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adm inistrative jobs, and i t  i s  no se c r e t  that the Lebanese l iv e  from 
trade, banking and tourism .
To the c la s s if ic a t io n  of f l i i s t  ag ii.cu lture, second sei'v iees  
and th ird  industry one could find  a s e t  o f exp lan ation s:-
-  Industry i s  not very developed whm i t  e x is t s .
-  Faced with unemployment but unable to  undertake adeauate 
reforme Arab governments have always tried, to  reso lve  i t  
by duplicating jobs in  public adm inistration. Sometimes 
th is  has been done openly with cen tra l government 
e x p l ic i t ly  asking adm inistrations to o v ersta ff  themselves*
Tills heppensd mainly in  Egypt.
-  Unemployed in d iv id u a ls  w ithout any q u a lif ic a tio n s  engage 
in  sm all trade, as s tr e e t  s e l l e r s ,  and therefore jo in  
the te r t ia r y  sec to r .
-  Agriculture? i s  dominant because most o f  the Arab s ta te s  
can b© label3.ed as su b sisten ce economies * This i s  the 
case o f both lemons, ï% uritania, Somalia, - Sudan and I%rocco*
Even in  countries aueh as A lgeria, 70% of the population l i v e  from 
a g ricu ltu re0
Some ccflintrios from tîi© lower Gulf, given th e ir  harsh natural 
con d ition s, the si'se of th e ir  population, and th e ir  human 
p o te n t ia l i t ie s  can do nothing but develop sei’v i.ces. Some of them fil.3. 
the function of entrepot fo r  other b igger countries such as Saudi 
Arabia or even Iran,
The demographic c h a ra c ter is t ic s  of the Arab World can be 
summrisod as fe llow s
-  High population growth rates w ith  a regional average of  
3% per yesT,
-  High i l l i t e r a c y  ra tes  vd.th a regional average between 60 and 
6Q% o f  t o ta l  population,
-  low le v e ls  o f  education.
-  Poor health  serv ice
"Goals for  î’îankind : A Report to the Club o f Rome", General Editor 
Ervin L asslo , published by Hutchinson o f London, 1977, p . 156.
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« Predominantly rural population, around 60-80%. Hie
nomadic population co n stitu te s  around 5% o f  t o ta l  population.
-  High migration ra tes  to  the main c i t i e s  i f  not to  the  
c a p ita l c i t i e s .
» About 50% of the 138 m illio n  regional, population i s  under 
the age o f 18.
From these ch a ra c ter is t ic s  i t  appears that Arab governments 
are l e f t  with an important challenge to provide th ese popu3.ations t'd.th 
the b asic  s o c ia l  requirements* Their success or fa ilu r e  could be 
p a rtly  due to the means a t  th e ir  d i s p o s i t i o n s T h e s e  means are a 
function  o f  the resources a v a ila b le . A quick appraisa l o f those  
resources i s  presented b e lw .
SECTION II  -  TIE MINERAL RESOURCES Œ THE ARAB WORLD
The Arab World i s  characterised  by a very v a st area th at has 
not been t o t a l ly  prospected. But in  sp ite  of th a t i t  i s  w e ll Icnown 
th a t i t  enjoys severa l raw m aterials such chromium, chromite, 
copper, manganese, cob a lt, iron ores, phosphates, natural gas and 
f in a l ly  crude o i l .  However not a l l  these mineral resources are 
eocploited. Biosphates co n stitu te  the main foreign  exchange earning 
item  in  Morocco, Jordan and IVfeuritanlac The con troversia l Spanish 
Sahara contains vast d ep o sits  to o . However from 1973 onwards i t  i s  
mainly crude o i l  and m arginally natural gas that have ccn atitu ted  the  
main source o f exports and th erefore o f  earning in  most Arab co u n tr ies. 
Consequently we sh a ll focus our a tten tion  on crude o i l .
SECTION II  -  1: CRUDE 03L AND NATURAL GAS RESERVES IN TIE ARAB WCRLD.
There i s  l i t t l e  consent about the exact magnitude of the  
reserv es. Figures advanced by Arab governments are said  to  be 
d e lib e r a te ly  in fla te d  fo r  p o l i t ic a l  purposes and fig u res  published by 
the M ultinational O il Conq)anies (M.N.O.C.) are sa id  to be d e lib e ra te ly  
reduced for economic or p o l i t ic a l  reasons. I t  folloi*:s that every 
source i s  subject to  c r it ic ism  from the other s id e . As fa r  as we are 
concerned we s h a ll  quote the figu re published by N icolas Sark is, an 
expert on Arab o i l .  Who has been advising The Saudi, Iraqi and
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Algerian government on o i l  matters * His estim ates are contained in  
Table 5. Our approach s h a ll  be to  s ta te  the reserves o f each 
country and to consider th at country’s share as a percentage o f t o ta l  
Arab World reserves o f o i l  and natural gas,
A. -  D istribution  o f  O il Reserves Between Arab Countries:
According to Table 5 a l l  the Arab countries except Jordan, 
Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan and both Yemens, have o i l  resources. 
However, as expected, the regional d istr ilx itio n  i s  not even* Saudi 
Arabia, with 17,600 m* tonnes or 41*30% o f th e to ta l  Arab World 
reserves, has the major portion . Apart from th is  count l'y, the "First 
League" could comprise Kuwait, Iraq, Libya and the U.A.E. i^ith 
resp ec tiv e ly  24<>78%, 11.43%, 7^38% and 6*73%. Tie f iv e  countries  
enjoy some 92% o f the to ta l  Arab Wor3d combined reserv es.
In the Second League one could include A lgeria w ith 3,15%, 
Qatar with 1*78% and f in a l ly  Oman with 1.05% o f the combined reserves*  
F in a lly , the l a s t  group could embrace a l l  other countries  
w ith n e g lig ib le  reserves such as Bahrain, %%ypt, Mbrocco, dyria and 
T unisia . The reserves o f th ese f iv e  s ta te s  do not exceed 2.27% o f the  
combined Arab reserves; they ju st s u f f ic e  to  supply th e ir  n ation a l 
needs. But Egypt and Syria expo i t  n e g lig ib le  q u a n titie s  of o i l .  As 
fa r  as natural gas i s  concerned the s itu a tio n  i s  not v e r j  d if fe r e n t ,
S . -  Dis tr ib u tio n  o f Natural Gas between Arab C ountries.
A lgeria enjoys the la r g e s t  reserves; 3*990 bn/m or 39*88% 
of the Arab World reserves:. The follow ing cou n tries could be 
c la s s if ie d  as holding major reserves: Saudi Arabia w ith 16,84%,
Kuwait w ith 12.29%, Libya with 8.13%, Morocco d^Lth 7.07%, Iiaq  with  
6.22%, U.A.E. w ith 4*24% and even Qatar with 2*24% of the combined 
reserves. These cou n tries have combined reserves o f  97% of the Arab 
World. A ll other countries have to  be relegated  to  the second 
league with comprises Egypt, Oman, Bahrain, Tunisia and f in a l ly  Syria .
I t  appears th at by world standards, although not for  
Algeria in  th e case of o i l ,  both products are concentrated w ith in  a 
handful o f Arab cou n tries, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Libya, 
A lgeria and the U.A.E. Both products derive th e ir  importance from 
th e ir  in d u str ia l ap p lica tion s and the extent o f  th e ir  q u a n titie s  s in ce  
the Arab World p ossesses 49.4% and 28.4% r e sp e c tiv e ly  o f world o i l  
and natural gas reserves. Although unevenly d istr ib u ted  among Arab
16,
TABLE 5 g Arab W orld’s  O il and Natural Gas R eserves (end o f  1973)
O I L N A T U R A L  G A S
Reserves % o f the Reserves % to  t o ta l
Countries 1—1—74
M/t*
Arab World 1-1-74 Arab World
Algeria^ 1,341 3.15 3,990 39.88
Bahrain^ 372 0,87 54 0*54
Egypt^ 278 0*65 116 1 .1 7
Iraq*" kp 864 11*43 623 6*22
Jordan — » «»
Kuwait?^ 10,540 24,78 1,230 12.29
Lebanon - - •vt —
Libya^ 3,140 7.38 8 u 8.13
Mauritania — — » —
Morocco 100 0.23 708 7.07
Oman , 448 1.05 71 0 .70
Qatar^ 760 1 .7 8 225 2 .24
S . Arabia^ 17,600"* 41.38 1,685 16 .84
Somalia * «W
Sudan — mm «V mm
Syria^ 168 0*39 20 0.19
Tunisia 56 0,13 41 0 .40
U.A.E.^ 2,864 6.73 425 4 .2 4
X.A.R. - . — - —
Ï.P .D .H .
Total Arab
— — - -
World 
% Total World
42,531
49.4%
100.00 10,004
26*4%
100.00
Source: N icolas Sarkis, pp. 312-313.
M/t -  M illion tonnes - M illion o f
* Excluding the 7 bn* b arrels d ep osit found by ARAMUO during the  
second qu arter of 1976.
^ Countries members o f OAPEC (Organisation of Arab petroleum  
exporting countries ),
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League members. I t  appears th a t, for the time being, o i l  and natural 
gas co n stitu te  the only source o f revenue for the Arab countries as  
a whole. Furthermore a# compared with o i l  revenues, earnings from 
natural- gas apports are. marginal fo r  the time*, Consequently, fo r  
the sake of s im p lif ic a t io n , we s h a ll  r e fer  to  ea m ln g s fr m  both
sources as o i l  revenues.
SECTION I I  -  2? THE ARAB OIL REVENUES
A •“ Causes o f the O il Pidce Increases,
O il revenues are a function o f the p r ic e s  and quantity  so ld .  
As outlined  by the subsequent ta b le  price has. been q u ite  unstable  
during the years.
We sh a ll not consider the causes whir;h led  to the o i l  price  
f lu ctu a tio n s from 1958 to 1973^ but focus our* ^ittention on the end o f  
1973/1974 p e r ia i, because the change was so d r s m tic :  in  three 
months or so o i l  p r ices  quadrupled. I t  i s  t h is  fourfold  increase  
which increased the revenues o f GEEG countries and led  to  the so -ca lle d  
‘b'jJL c r is is " .  The reasons for such an Increa&a weie manifold and we 
s h a ll  l im it  ourselves only to  mentioning them,.
F ir s t  th€' Chang© in  ownership of cm do o il»  The ownerahip 
passed from the M,N,0,C. that discovered, exts-mcted. transported and 
marketed crude o i l  to  the o i l  producing co u n tr ie s . I t  occurred 
e ith e r  through n atio n a liza tio n s (A lgeria , Libya ) or n egotia tion s  
(Kuwait, Saudia Arabia and so on).
Secondly, economic causes. Some vmre of a conjunctural 
nature such as the c lo su res  o f the ta p lin e  in  1969 and 1970, the 
Lib^ a^n production cuts in  1971 and the unforbeen increase in  demand by 
European and Japanese consumers
Structural economic causes were n ot -absent e ith e r ; the main 
one being the in crease in  co st o f production n o t  in  the OPEC countries  
but outside them e s p e c ia lly  in  Alaska and th e  North Sea. As ear ly  as 
1953 the Petroleum Press Service (P .P .S .)  ;iri%es th a t,
f l  1 ^ Up to 1970 demand rose by about 6% yearly  but in  1973 i t  rose by 
13.3% in  Europe and 20% in  Japan.
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"sinô© June 1953, there have been further advances in  the co st o f  
equipment and wages, w hile the in creasin g  e f fo r t  put forth  in  the 
search for new resonfes has lik ew ise  raised  u n it co sts" .
The p er io d ica l continueds
"The US industry i s  today mald.ng ca p ita l outlays in  find ing, 
developing, and producing crude o i l  o f the order o f US(  ^ 4, OOQa, 
a year, o f %'Ailch the buHc has to  be found and developed 
com paratively cheaply in  th e  p a st, a t prices which do not cover 
today’s co s ts  of replacement* I t  cannot continue to  do th is  
in d e f in ite ly " , ^
Miat was the proposed so lu tion?  At th a t time some v o ices  suggested some 
"kiM of correction , a change in  the present climate" and the P .P .S , 
expressed i t s e l f  more (;pe,nly by væ iting that "cm a co st b a s is  . . . .  the 
case for  an increase in  U .S . crude o i l  p rices i s  o u ite  a strong one".'^  ^
Tills trend has been am plified as years went by and i f  we consider the 
whole "world market" the s itu a tio n  i s  worsened by the fa c t  th a t, as world 
consumption increased, more o i l  had to  be mov'ed from one p lace to  another 
and th is  increased transport c o s ts  again; since longer end wider 
p ip e lin es  and larger f le e t s  were needed. Those were the factors
m ilita tin g  for an o i l  p rice  incr^aso,
Tiom have a lso  been non-econondc stru ctu ra l causes. The main 
one being the appearance o f OPEC, O.A.P.E.C, and Arab-national o i l  
companies. This led  to  th e form ulation of a s tra teg y  by OPEC government 
w ith in  and outside the OPEC orga nization. This s tra teg y  was based on 
four fundamental consideration© -
-  OH i s  an exhaustib le resource even though the reserves are v a st  
as in  the case o f Saudia Arabia, say ,
-  O il revenues represent from 50 -  60 to  98% of CPJ*!C countries*  
export revenues. Therefore i t  i s  the cornerstone of th e ir  
economic l i f e ,
-  OPEC countries had no con tro l Whatsoever on tîio o i l  industry and 
before 1973 the3-r revenues con sisted  of taxes and r o y a lt ie s .
f l  )  ^ ^ ^ 'Petroleum Press S ervice (confer A rtic le  crude p rices rise?"}
Ethelburga House, Bishopsgate, London; Volume XXIII No, 5, %.y 1956 
p .p . 184-185.
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In spit© o f  th e ir  o i l  resources OPEC countr5.es were and s t i l l  
are under-developed co u n tr ies. üi the case of Arab cou n tries, as shown 
in  the pi'ovious sec tio n , i t  means high rates o f i l l i t e r a c y  and 
unemployment, lew le v e l  o f  education, absent or poor public health  system, 
unbalanced domestic economy and so on. Penally on© has to  mention that 
in  th e ir  increased p o l i t i c a l  awareness OPSC countries were ju st fo llow ing  
the lead o f West European countri.es  ^ th a t wanted to  withdraw thom selw s  
from the tu telage o f the American o i l  companies.
AH these économie and non-economic, conjunctural and stru ctu ra l 
causes led  to  the fourfold  o i l  p r ices increase * For the OFEC as a whole 
the average pidce of one b arrel o f  o i l  jumped from |2 .6 5  in  1973 to  |9 .1 5  
in  1974-0 From th at day on they kept on in creasin g , a t le a s t  on nominal 
terms* The prime ccnpsquenco o f such a phenomenon i s  t m t  OPEC co u n tr ie s ’ 
export earnixigs rocketed. T}>e magnitude of such an increase i s  simple to  
c a lcu la te , one has ju st  to  m ultip ly the volume exporbed by the p rice of 
one b arrel o f  o i l .  Several c om enta tors did ouch a ca lcu la tio n . We 
sh a ll refra in  to  do so in  order t c  focus our a tten tion  on the wealth of  
individual. Arab cou n tries.
ucations o f the Increased Arab Oil Revenues
Obviously th ‘?ir im plications are world wido and th is  problem w i l l  
be d iscussed  iji the fo llo v in g  chapters. Concerning th& Arab World we 
sh a ll consider the problem from the poin t o f view o.r in d iv id u a l countries*  
wealth as measured by the G.D.P. and G.N.P. per cap ita , Oav approach 
w i l l  be to  consider the to ta l  G.K.P, a t marlcet p rices in  1974. The 
percentage o f to ta l  G.N.P. o f each country th at vA il be compared to  
in d iv idu al countries* percentage of t o ta l  Arab population. F in a lly  we 
sh a ll  a lso  present the percentage change o f G.N.P. 'per cap ita  from 1972 or 
1973 to  1974. Those elements are contained ivi the fo llow in g  ta b le , .
In 1973 the t o ta l  G.N.P. a t marie e t  price was U.S. ÿ 58,334.5  
m illio n s and as a r e s u lt  o f  the fourfold  o i l  p rice in crease i t  reached 
U .S. 109,696 m illio n s  in  1974 th a t i s  an increase o f  88.04 per cen t. 
However in d iv idu al Arab countries did not obtain the same advantage from
(1 )The C.F.P, or Compagnie Française des P etroles was the f i r s t  one to be 
created in  1925. Confer Raymond Vemon, "Sovereignty a t Bay",
Publisher Longman Group L td ., Londcn, 1971, p. 36,
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TABLE 7 s Arab World s G .N.P, at lyàrket P îdce and G.N.P. per ca p ita  -  1974,
C ountries
G.N.P. in  % 
M illion U.S.#  
1974 '
ox t o t a l  
G.N.P* 
1974
% o f to t a l  
population  
mid-1974
G.N.P* per  
c a p ita  in  
U .S. 1 
1974
% change 
in  G .N.P. per 
c a p ita  - 
1974-75
A lgeria 11 ,] 00 l o l i S T o 730 61.86
Bahrain 580 0.53 0.19 2,350 250.74^
Egypt 10,210 9 ,3 26.5 .280 13.82
Iraq 12, COO 10*94 7.86 1,110 66.41
Jordan 1 ,120 1 .02 1 .89 430 22.50
Kuwait 9,330 8*5 0 .7 10,030 2%7.05&
Lebanon 3,290 3 ,0 2.26 1,070 47.38»
Libya 10,430 9 .5 1 .8 4,440 99.7
Mauritania 380 0*3 0 .9 290 67.63»
Morocco 7,070 6*4 11 .9 430 40.06
Oman 1,250 1 ,14 0.56 1,660 213.20»
Qatar 1,380 1*26 0.07 7,240 205.48»
S , Arabia 22,670 20 .7 5 .8 2,830 126.03®-
Somalia 290 0.26 2 .3 0 90 12.50^
Sudan 3,460 3 .20 1 1 .0 230 91.66»
S yria 3,990 3.64 5.2 560 57.30»
T unisia 3, 560 3,25 4 ,0 .650 43.80
U.A ,E . 6,060 5.52 0.16 11,060 251.11»
Y.A.R. 1,160 1.06 4.65 180 100.00»
Y.P.D.R. 360 0.33 1 .2 0 220 120.00»
Arab World 109,696 100.00 100.00 798 66.01
a . -  1972 b . -  1971
Sources; N. Sarkis op. c i t ,» p .p . 310 -  311 and
A. E l. Sherbini and R. Slnha, "Arab Agriculture ; Problems
and Prospects" published in  Food Policy,, April 1978,
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th is  increase and a.s expected i t  concentrated in  the o i l  reporting  
countries* The increase i s  r e fle c te d  in  the G.N.P, per capita  that is  
given by the la s t  column o f Table 7® (page 2 1 ). According to  the la t t e r  
a l l  Arab countries w itnessed an increase in  th e ir  G.N.P. per capita* Tjic 
h igh est occurred in  Bahrain with 250*74%; Kwjait -with 277.05%; Onmn 
w ith 213.20%; Qatar w ith 2 0 5 .4 %  Saudi Arabia w ith  126.03%; U.A.E. 
with 251 o 11%; the Yemen Arab Republic Tilth 100% and f in a l ly  the Yemen 
P eople’s Democratic Republic w ith 120.0%* However, i f  one considers the
rea l s iz e  o f  the G.N.P. per ca p ita , as given in  column 4, one n o tices  that 
the G.N.P* per capita o f th e  l a s t  two countries i s  U .S. ^ISO  and U .S. ^ 220 
r esp ec tiv e ly  and th is  with Soim lia puts them a t the bottom of the le a g r s .  
Furthermore the percentage change in  the average G.N.P* per capita  of the 
Arab World being 86.01% Sudan with 91*66% increase might appear to  be 
amongst the rich  Arab countries* This i s  not so  because i t  i s  considered  
by the International Organisations as on© o f the poorest countries* As 
proof i t s  1974 G.N.P,, per cap ita  was U .S . |  230.wîTereas th at o f  the o i l  
exporting countries i s  measured in  four figures* F in a lly  i t  appears that 
ill terms o f G.N.F-, per capita the rich  Arab countries are Bahrain, Kut '^ait, 
Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. A complementary study 
that confirms the view ju st  exprassed can be found in  the f i r s t  sec tio n  o f  
the f in a l  chapter^^^. Another way to d istin g u ish  between’r ic h ’ and. ’poor’ 
,Arab countries i s  to consider the r e la t io n  between th e ir  share o f the to ta l  
Arab Vforld G.N.P. and t o t a l  population; both item s are given in  columns 
2 and 3 re sp e c t!v s ly . We s h a ll  consider a country rich  When, i t s  share 
of t o ta l  G.N.P. i s  greater than i t s  share o f to ta l  population. Accoî'ding 
to  th is  c r iter io n  the rich  countid.es are Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. Before going further  
l e t  us consider the case of Lebanon which, according to our previous 
c r ite r ia , i s  a rich country. According to Table 5 (page 16) th is  country 
has no o i l  or natural gas. Furthermore the recent c i v i l  war destroyed  
the Lebanese economy and fo r  the time being Lebanon i s  fa r  from being a
^Confer Table 44 "Economic Prospect o f Thirteen Arab Côtïhtries ; 
Population, G.N.P. and G.N.P. per cap ita  (1970 = 1984)".
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r ich  countïy* However th is  i s  the p icture at the end o f 1974 and the  
wealth i s  based on crude o i l  and natural gas. I t  i s  therefore lo g ic a l  
to  take in to  account the reserves of both resources. lire la t t e r  are 
given  in  Table 5 (Pago 16 ) according to  which Bahrain, Oman and Qatar 
have n e g lig ib le  reserves* I f  i t  has to  be based only on the above 
mentioned natural resources the wealth of tbs three c omit i'i es i s  
short-lived*  In our opinion th e r ich  Arab countries arc by order o f  
s iz e  Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, the United Arab ibnirates and even 
Iraq although i t  i s  not always considered to be so . Li our th e s is  we 
s h a ll re fer  to  th is  group of cou n tries as the "have" and a l l  other  
cou n tries, except A lgeria , Bahrain, Dnan and Qatar, as the "have-not".
Let us now turn our a tten tio n  to  the future wealth derived from crude 
o i l  and natural gas,
G -  Putui'8 Arab O il Revenues
The le v e l  o f  p r ices  in  nominal terms depends on severa l 
fa c to r s . The overriding question i s  i f  the causes th at led  to  th e ir  
quadrupling in  1973-74 w i l l  disappear in  the rr.^diutîi-long term* These 
causes have already been d e a lt  Tvith e a r lie r  in  th is  chapter, and in  
our opinion they w i l l  be present in  the medium te m  a t l e a s t .  For 
in stance the change o f  ownership i s  an ir r e v e r s ib le  s te p . I t  i s  veiy  
u n lik ely  th a t the cost o f  production w i l l  d ec lin e  e ith er  in  or outside  
the Middle E ast, Furthennore, apart fmm o i l  production OPEC, and 
th erefore Arab cou n tr ies, w i l l  be present in  other f ie ld s  of the o i l  
industry such as transport and refin ing* I t  i s  estim ated th a t by 
mid-1980s th e ir  o^ wn f l e e t  w i l l  be transporting around tw o-thirds of 
th e ir  own production. By that time one has a lso  to  consider the fa c t  
th a t th e ir  re fin in g  capacity  would bo g rea tly  expanded. On the top 
o f these fa cto rs one ought to  mention that by 1985 th e Arab World w i l l  
be a n et exporter o f  fe r t il iz e r s ^ ^  Exports earnings from natural
gas w i l l  a lso  be very important in  countries such as A lgeria , F in a lly , 
as i t  w i l l  be presented in  Chapter I I I ,  part o f the o i l  revenues are 
being invested  abroad, consequently they are bound to  produce fin a n c ia l
^Arab countries are now cu ttin g  down the se a ls  and number o f th e ir  
f e r t i l i z e r  p lants in  order to  avoid a g lu t by mid-1980s-; but in  
s p ite  o f th at th e ir  share o f the market w H l be la rg er  than th at o f  
the nd.d-1970s.
24,
/■[ )
earn ings^ * The p o l i t i c a l  w i l l  t h a t  le d  to  th e  c re a tio n  OPSG th a t  
p layed an im portan t r o le  in  au ad rap lin g  the p r ic e s  o f  o i l  i s  a 
permanent fe a tu re  of the fu tu re  r e la t io n s  between o i l  producers and 
consuming co u n trie s*  A ll th e se  f a c to rs  led  to  an Increased  b a rg a in in g  
power o f OPEC coun tries*  However th a t  b arg a in in g  power sprung mainly 
from 0P2X: c o u n tr ie s ’ ro le  as main su p p lie rs  of exude o i l  to  tîie U.S.A*, 
Japan and W estern Europe. From 1973-74 onwards th e  l a t t e r  c o u n tr ie s  
took some s te p s  to  l im i t  th o i r  dependence on OVKO o il*  These measures 
wore m ainly conF.icrr'ation, in c reased  p roduction  o f  domestic o i l  and 
promotion o f a l t e r n a t iv e  sources o f energy* Se-veral i n s t i tu t io n s  
and coniTiiiîntators considered  th e  im pact o f such rucasures on OPEC export*
The In te x u a tio n a l Energy Agency; s p e c i f ic a l ly  c re a te d  to  d ea l w ith  th e  
energy problem fo r  th e  0*E,C*D* a re a , ccmss up w itn  the  fo llow ing 
fo re c a s t ,
TABLE 8 s lEA F o recasts  o f Consumers’ OH Demand and Not Import (1974-1985
Period 1974 1980 1985
C ountries Actual (1) (2) (3) (4)
USA
Demand 15,9 1 8 .8 21 .4 18 .7 23 ,7
Imports 5,9 7 .8 8*6 4 .3 10,9
EEC
Demand n . i 11 .3 1 2 .8 11 ,8 13 .7
Imports 11.1 9 ,0 9 .5 8,5 10 .4
OECD P a c if ic Japan
Demand 5 .8 7 .9 10.2 9 .6 12 ,1
Imj')orts 5.5 7 .5 9 .8 9 .0 11 .7
T ota l OECD 
Demand 37.2 43 .7 51.6 46.6 57.3
Imports 25 .1 2 7 .3 32,1 24,1 37 ,8
Other non-com m nist 
Demand 7 .0 9.9 12 .2 12.2 13 .7
Imports 3 .8 4 .6 4 .2 4 .2 5 .7
OPEC Exports 28 ,9 31.3 37.7 27 .7 42.9
Source: The Economist April 10, 1976, pp.107
(1)I t  i s  estim ated th a t Saudi Arabia’s accrued dividends from fin a n c ia l 
investm ents in  OECD countries were  ^ 6-7bn, in  1977,
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The I.E.A* made the fo llow ing assumptions:
(1) OECD annual growth rate 4,3% 1974-80 -  no extra  
conservation*
(2) OECD growth rate 4% 1980-85 ™ no extra cen serrâtion.
(3) OECD annual growth rate 1980«-85 -  4% •» conservation  
prograrane and accelerated  investment in  a ltern a tiv e  
fuels*
(4) OECD growth rate 4»5% 1980-85 -  no extra conservation*
These assumptions seem r e a l i s t ic  tc  us sin ce  o i l  demand i s  a 
function o f three factors:
-  the growth ra te  of the country or group of countries  
concerned*
-  energy conservation prograr.ines,
~ and the a v a ila b le  supply from other sources o f energy.
Given the fo recast the worst th a t can happen to the OPEC would be to  
export by 1985 IMb/d l e s s  than 1974;  ^ and th is  "shock" can be o f f s e t  
by Saudi Arabia very e a s i ly ,  as i t  i s  being dc^c in  1978^^^*
I t  seems th a t, on the volume o f  expoit s id e , the OPEC 
countries are sa fe . In our opinion nominal o i l  p r ices w i l l  not 
decrease in  the medium-term* As a proof severa l coiiMentators 
predicted  that by the end o f the 1980s OPEC v rill break up and that 
means lower o i l  prices* Five years have already passed and nothing 
o f th e kind occurred and by 1978 the o i l  c r i s is  approached in  terms of 
quintupling and not quadrupling of o i l  prices*
Qae can s a fe ly  maintain th at the Arab World i s  assured o f  
increased o i l  revenues for severa l years to  come. How s izea b le  th ese  
revenues w i l l  be i s  a matter of specu lation  end assumptions -  we ©hall 
refra in  from giving a d e f in ite  f ig u re , Cn the other hand we sh a ll  
present in  the fo llow ing ta b le  the p rojection s made by other people 
and in s t i tu t io n s ,
^Confer: Interview of Sheik E, Yamani on B.B.G, "The Money
Programme", "What to do with ^100 n d llion  a Day", # y  13th 1978 
a t 4.40p,mi,
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TABLE 9 s P rojections o f 1980 OPEG F inancia l Accumulations 
( in  b i l l io n s  o f d o llars )
Current
D ollars
Constant 
1974 D ollars
H o llis  Bo Ghenory (January 1975) n ,a . |530D
Edward R, Fried (1974) n ,a . 152
EXXON (Spring 1975) 330-380 200-240
F ir s t  N ational C ity Bank (June 1975) 189 141
IBRD (July  1974) 653 approx*
400
IBRD (Ju ly  1975) 200-400 l2a-250
Irving Trust Case I  (March 1975 ) 248 158
Irv in g  Trust Case I I  (March 1975) 22 14
W alter J , Levy (June 1975 ) 449 286
Mobil O il (Spring 1975/ 303 178
Morgan Guaranty (January 1975) 179 114
OECD (Ju ly  1975) n ,a . 215
TioJîias D, W il le t t  e t  a l ,  (jan-May 1975 ) n .a . 175-250
Source: T.D, W lH ett ’-Tîie Transfer Problem and L ite m a t !  on a l Economic
S ta b ility  ", Essays in  International Finance No. 113, Princeton  
U niversity , U*S.A*, December 1975 p. 6*
As i t  can be seen severa l attempts ware ma.de to  ca lcu la te  
OPEC’s fin a n c ia l accumulations. The common feature of these projections  
I s  th at they do not agree with one another. For instance in  current 
U,S, d o lla rs  the gap i s  very wide between EXXON*s j^330~380 bn, figu re  
and an Irving Trust Case I I  th a t puts thé fin a n c ia l accumulations a t  
^22 bn; though bocîi were made in  Spring 1975. However when i t  comes 
to  p rojection s in  constant 1974 d o lla rs  the gap i s  l e s s  \*dde s in ce  i t  
v a ries  to  ^14 bn, according to  Irving Trust Case H  and the IBRD (July  
1974). Our purpose i s  not to  say which i s  wrong and vhich r igh t  
although they are a l l  accurate w ith in  the assumptions they made.
However as more than four years have already ©lapsed i t  i s  more 
r e a l i s t ic  to  look fo r  the r ig h t projection  in  the top s id e  o f  the 
above-mentioned f ig u r e s . For Instance, according to  Morgan Guaranty
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OPEC Investm esits were around .|200 by th e  end o f 1977* Tlrls i s
w e ll above i t s  own p ro je c tio n  made in  January  1975 th a t  was 179 bn, 
c u rre n t d o lla rs*  Nowadays the  most common f ig u re  advanced i s  ^300 bn , 
of accumulated f in a n c ia l  re so u rc e s . The }:%'eT:ious f ig u re s  have th e  
advantage o f  g iv in g  to  us th e  f in a n c ia l  su rp lus th a t  i s  th e o i l  revenue 
n o t d o m estica lly  sp en t; on the o th^r hand th e i r  d isadvantage I s  th a t  
they  do n o t g ive  se p a ra te  p ro je c tio n s  fo r  the  Arab World, However, as 
seen in  th e  beginning of t h i s  sec tion^  most of OPEC’s o i l  re se rv e s  
and p roduction  a re  co n cen tra ted  w ith in  the A"ab ‘World, th  era fo re  most 
o f th e  f in a n c ia l  accum ulations w i l l  be concen tra ted  in  the  same hand*
Tiiis holds t ru e  when one Imows th a t  th e  m ajor non-Arab c o u n ti le s ,  t h a t  
i s  I ra n , N ig eria , î t e i c o  and Venezuela, s ta r te d  borrowing from th e  
Euro-m arkets as  e a r ly  a s  mid-1977.
CONCLUSIONS ■
Tlie Arab c o u n tr ie s  e i th e r  dense ly  c.i s p a rs e ly  populated , e i th e r  
w ith  or w ithout o:il re se rv e s , a re  s t i l l  under-developed. This i s  a 
f a c t  and i t  i s  obvious in  the rate© o f i l l i t e r a c y  and uneniploymsnt, th e  
s t a t e  o f th e  pub lic  h e a lth  s e c to r  and th e  le v e l  and c h a r a c te r is t ic s  of 
th e  system  of ed u ca tio n . The p o s itio n  o f the a g ricu ltu r& l s e c to r ,  
measured e i th e r  in  i t s  c o n tr ib u tio n  tc  G .D .P,, share  in  a c tiv e  
p o p u la tio n , shows the c h a r a c te r is t ic s  prosenc in  most developing 
c o u n tr ie s ,
On the other hand the Arab World enjoys severa l raw m ateria ls. 
We have focused our a tten tio n  on crude o i l  vjhoso price quadrupled in  the 
space o f three months. We have a lso  shown, that these p r ices , a t le a s t  
in  nominal terms, are u n lilcely  to  d e c lin e , Ihorofcre in  the years 
ahead a steady flow o f  revenues w i l l  be accruing in  the hand of those  
countries that we decided to tr ea t  a© a b lo c .
F inancial Times, c f .  A rtic le  "OPEC’s investment seen a t  p200 bn." 
by Francis G hiles, Sunday-Monday 28-29-X-1977*
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The lo g ic a l  question  i s  iihether th sse  revenues %i?lll be used 
to  s a t i s f y  the b a s ic , s o c ia l  and economic needs o f those 340 milHon 
people. This i s  not an easy task that can, and w i l l  be, complicated 
by the very nature of those revenues. We mean the Vvûy they are kept and 
in vested , Tiiis problem cannot be d isso c ia ted  from the Question of 
how the o i l  consuiïdng countries w il.l be paying for th e ir  increased o i l  
b il l*  This co n stitu te s  the substance o f our next chapter.
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C H A P T E R  I I  
PAYING FOR OIL
INTRODUCTION ; TUE PROBLEM
The 1973 o i l  c r i s i s  liitrod'ccecl pro foim i changea iïito  tVie 
■world GConoiYy and^ , indeed a s itu a t io n  i\’hero most OPEC countries  
vdtnessed sw ollen balance of pajnrnents (B^ O^ P^  ) surplus^ ivhereas o i l -  
importing countries recorded b ig  B«O^P* deficit:-.,, The magnitude o f  
the long term politico-econom ic consequences o f %uch a novel s itu a tio n  
has y e t to bo discerned»
However^ a s itu a tio n  o f B«0»Po d isequilibrium  i s  not new in  
the annals o f history» Ffe,ssiv0 in tern ation a l tran sfers stre tch  from 
the eighteenth  century to  our present time anî in v o lv e  révérai 
countries» The main examples being ;
-  B rita in  which^ from 1773 to  lS l6 .  w itnessed an outflow of funds 
to  her A ll ie s ,
-  France, -vdhich, during th e 1811 -  1.875 period, had to  pay war 
damages to  the Prussian Empire,
-  Geriiiany, a fte r  her defeat during World War I» This case i s  
v e iy  in te r e stin g  because i t  involve^ severa l countrie^j; and
-  The United S ta tes  Wnich, from 1950 to  1963 undertook s ize a b le  
investm ents in  Wêstem Europe» The American case can be 
extended up to the early  1970s by the in c lu sio n  o f  the Vietnam 
War.
I t  goes without sayirg th at those exaiïples boosted the theory 
o f in tern a tio n a l economics. From David Hume on'wards the l i s t  o f  
w riters  whose works focused on th ese to p ics  i s  very long. Amongst 
others i t  in c lu d es, F, I%chelup, D enizet, S ,S . Alexander, H,G, Johnson, 
A,C, Haborger, T. Scitovsky, J.M. Keynes. Cfeviously one does not 
claim  to  have presented an exhaustive l i s t  in  th is  f ie ld .
Whether th e ir  th eo r ies  are applicable to  our case-study w i l l  
not be discussed  here. However, one fact i s  true, mud hence has to  
be mentioned r th e ir  ^ranples were concerned 'vvith countries or groups 
o f countries a t  more or le s s  s im ila r  le v e ls  o f development. For 
in stan ce, concluding h is  in troduction  to  a book containing fourteen  
a r t ic le s  from tw elve econom ists, R.N. Cooper w rites that:
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"most o f  tho essays arc addressed to  the problems facing  
the econom ically advanced cou n tr ies, but many o f the  
p rin c ip les  apply i>o th e  L.D.Cs. as w e ll .  None, however, 
i s  addressed to th e p a rticu la r  problems of the L.D.Gs.
#ior@ foreign  exchange considerations often  exert a 
powerful in flu en ce  on plans and prospects for oconoQiâe 
development » "
The incorporation o f the L.DoOs. in  om? case c o n stitu te s  a new feature
and i s  bound to  com plicate the problem» On the other hand, i f  ono
had to include our case in  a broad th e o r e tica l framewoMc one wou3d
choose the sphero of tra n sfer  theory which s
"has gen era lly  been developed and applied in  the an a lysis
o f sucVi standard problems as reparation payments and
in to îiia tio n a l flow  of long-term  c a p ita l. I t  has, however,
a far  wider ap p lication  in  the f ie ld  o f  B.O«P. theory,
sinco'anÿ' aoti-aX B.OoP* d isequilibrium  in volves a tran sfer
in  some form frov. the surplus to  the d e f ic i t  country (or
countries)^ and the problem o f re c tify in g  the
d isequilibrium  can be framed as the problem o f creating a
1tran sfer  o f equal am unt in  the opposite d irectio n  
However the piVolems Involved are a function of the magnitude o f the 
fin a n c ia l transfer^ Thus, a comparison between o i l  ravenues and other  
data could be u se fu l.
F ir s t  l e t  us compare Arab o i l  revenues to other data ( c f .  
Appendix I I I  Table 1 ) ,  Considering the Arab o i l  revenues a t él.Ôbn» 
d o lla rs  for 1971,, as N icolas Sarkis does, i t  appears th a t such a sum 
i s  tw ice as irach as tJio t o ta l  a sse ts  o f  the M.N.O.C. EXXOî'î by the end 
o f 1974, or ju st  above the French national budget for f i s c a l  1975® 
Compared w ith the space programme o f  both the USSR and the USA up to  
the end o f 1974, the A.O.R, (Arab O il Revenues) do not co n stitu te  210re 
than 39^ o f the la t t e r .
^ ^ .N , Cooper: "International Finance: Selected  Readings", Penguin
^Wem Economics Readings, Middlesex, England, 2nd Bd., 1971, p .21.
Johnson, "The T ransfer Problem and Exchange S ta b il i ty " ,  
c f .  ReN. Cooper, op . c i t .  pp. 77 -78 .
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F in a lly , i f  on© co n sid e rs  o th e r aggregates the Arab o i l  
revenues would appear le s s  im p o rtan t, fo r  th ey  re  pi"© sen t 20.945?, 
19*93% 19*68% 12,87% and 4*41% of the G*N,P* o f  F rance, th e  
T reasury o f  th e  m u ltin a tio n a l companies, the  1974 U,S. budget, the 
G.N.P* o f Japan and the  U.S.A» respectively®  On the o th e r hand, i f  
one co n sid e rs  the 1974 t o t a l  o i l  b i l l  a t  80bn, d o lla r s  and i f  th e  
Whole amount had to  be s h if te d  in  one tim e, i t  would have meanb a 
red u c tio n  o f  Z% and 3% in  th e  O.N.P» o f th e  OECD and Third World 
c o u n tr ie s  re sp ec tiv e ly »
However, th e  1974 o i l  ravenues are ju s t  ^m rt of th e  long 
l a s t in g  flow of funds t o  be p a id  to  OPEC c o u n tr ie s , and oonseouently  
i t  could bo in te r e s t in g  to  co n sid e r the r e la t iv e  im portance o f such 
a flow® Tne oiiLy e th e r  u n i t  of measure invo lv ing  s e v e ra l  co u n tr ie s  
in  rao en t years I s  the U ,S . export of c a p i ta l  a f t e r  World War II* 
Taking the s p e c if ic  r e la t io n s  between OPEC co u n tr ie s  ari'i 
th e  O.E.CcD* count n o  c , H.B» Chennery makes an in te r e s t in g  comparison 
between th a t  case and the s i tu a t io n  c rea ted  by th e  o i l  cr3 ,sis, 
shown In  th e  nex t ta b le ^  LQ
"Case A" co n s id e rs  th e  s i tu a t io n  of the European c o u n tr ie s  
mettbors of th e  O.E.G.D, v is - a - v is  th e  U,S,A» and "Case B" co n sid e rs  
th e  s i tu a t io n  of the former group p lu s  Japan «• oceanie v is - a - v is  the 
OPEC countries®
In  bo th  cases  th e  same e ig h t agg regates  a re  p resen ted  „ Fox- 
obvious reasons th e  C,N»P», e x p o rts , im ports, n e t c a p i ta l  flow, t o t a l  
d eb t and h y p o th e tica l deb t s e rv ic e  a re  o f d i f f e r e n t  magnitude o r , in  
o th e r  words, niora im p crtan t i n  Case B,
However, when th e  s i tu a t io n  i s  approached in  terms of r a t io  
a d i f f e r e n t  p ic tu re  ap p ears . In  both cases th e  debt service/G .N .P» 
r a t io  a re  equal to  0*4% in  base  years (1947 and 1974), b u t  in  Case A 
i t  reaches 3»1% a t  uh© end o f  th e  perd.od under s tu d y  Whereas in  
Case B i t  reaches i t s  peak in  1980 and then d e c lin e s  to  1*6% in  1985,
A sim ila r  trend appears concerning th e debt serv ice /exp ort  
r a t io . In the Case A i t  equals 2.8% in  1947, 4% in  1955 and rockets 
to  13% in  1955* Concerning Case B i t  s ta r ts  a t a lower le v e l  in  1974 
2.2% -  reaches i t s  peak -  9*2% -  in  1980 and then d ec lin es  to  6*5% 
in  1985.
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TABLE 10 g Comparison of Adjustment Processes: 1947-55 and 1974-85 
(b il l io n s  of d o llars in  1974 p r ices)
1947 Adjustment (CECD Europe )
1947 1950 1955
1 , Gross National Product 350 435 578
2 , Exports 51 94 134
3e Imports 75 90 116&
4o Net Capital Inflow 31 11 2
5. Total Debt 31 74 92
6* H ypothetical Debt Service^ 1 .4 3.6 17,9
7 . Debt Serviee/GNP 0,4% 0.8% 3.1%
6, Debt Eerviee/Exports 2.8% 4.0% 13.0%
1974 Adjustment (OECD Europe and Japan-“Oceania)
1974 1980 1985
1 . Gross N ational Px^odact 1,921 2,695 3,082
2 . Exports 361 524 776
3 . Imports 329 460 710
4« Net Capital 40 45 34
5. Total Debt 40 285 500
6. H ypothetical Debt Service^ 8 48 51
7. Debt S erv iee/GNP 0.4% 1.8% 1.6%
6. Debt Sei'vice/kxports 2,2% 9.2% 6.6%
^Actual Imports were reduced to  take account o f the need to  serv ice  
hyp oth etica l debts.
^Hypothetical debt serv ice  ca lcu la ted  a t 5% in te r e s t ,  repayment o f  
each year's borrowing ever s ix  years beginning in  1952 or 1974.
Source: H.B. Chennery "Restructuring the World Economy", Foreign 
A ffa ir s , (East Preston S t .)  Baltim ore, U .S .A ., Vol. 53, No, 2, 
January 1975, p .256.
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I t  appears th at fo r  both r a tio s  the trend i s  d iss im ila r .
In the f i r s t  case the progression i s  continuous Whereas in  cas© B 
th e  Increase i s  very marked during the f i r s t  couple of years and then 
the d eclin e  i s  very obvious * In our opinion the conclusion i s  that 
the burden i s  very important during and ju st a fte r  the o i l  c r i s is  but 
afterwards i t  becomes lighter®  As fo r  Case A the burden required by 
the adjustment pracess grows s te a d ily  b igger,
H*Bc Chennery*s comment on the pravlous tab le  i s  that:
"the adjustment to h igher o i l  prices that i s  now 
required i s  shown to be o f somevhat lower magnitude than 
tho post-war adjustment process"®»,/^
N onetheless, one has to  mention that the 194? adjustment 
process was su ccessfu l because the U.S.A, -  th at i s  the surplus 
country -  opened up c re d it  to  the European countries members of the 
0,6.,G,D, Although our ease i s  more complex th is  could serve as a 
h is to r ic a l precedent® F ir s t  we are in  presence o f three groups 
in stead  of two only, the OPEC countries and the o i l  importing countries  
which have to  be d ivided  in to  0,E,C,D® and Non-oil Developing Ocuntr3.es 
N.O.D.C*
Secondly OPEC countries are part of tîie  1 * 0 ,0 ,, consequently  
together with N.O,D,C, they are a t lower le v e l  of ecmomlc develoîjsnent 
When compared with O.E.C.D* co u n tr ies. These d ifferen ces are bound 
to  coJïiîDlicat© our casc-study* The East European countries w i l l  not 
be considered because o f th e ir  sp e c ia l s itu a tio n  Which made them play 
a small, ro le  In the o i l  c r i s i s .  Therefore they represent a marg'lnal 
case fo r  our peri od under study*
Th  ^ o i l  c r i s i s  and i t s  aftermath led  to  imbalances for each 
one o f  the three groups* As mentioned e a r lier  OPEC countries  
recorded B ,0 ,P , surplus. They w i l l  adjust to  the new s itu a tio n  by 
in creasing domestic spending and in vestin g  the f im n e ia l  surplus 
abroad.
The o i l  importing countries recorded B.O.P, d e f ic i t s ,  
therefore they have to  adjust to  the new s itu a tio n  by d evisin g  ways 
and moans to  pay fo r  th e ir  o i l  b i l l s .  For doing so they are l e f t  
with two options: e ith er  the "pay as you go" option th at requires f u l l
I'eal adjustment to  the new s itu a tio n , or the "take now, pay later"  
option . The la t t e r  means th at o i l  imports w i l l  be ju st  financed or
Xv
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paid for  with "I.OoUs,", However each option comprises severa l 
subsets o f measures# but not a l l  oil-jjitporting countries have the  
same la t itu d e  o f  choice between ava ilab le  measures® S p e c ific  
measures are open to s p e c if ic  cou n tr ies, as outlined the follow ing  
ta b le ,
TABLE 5-1 : Paying for O il; Measures open to  on.-iiîrporting Countries
COimTRïES RANGE 0"' OPINIONS
Germany -  Relending of Ol^G Jnflov'js to  th e weak
United S ta tes  -  A1].owing exchange rates to  r ise  (TYado
Balance to  f a l l )
-  Acquiescing in  import r e s tr ic t io n s  o f  
the weak
-  Controls on Capital Inflows
I ta ly
-  "Soft" Borro‘win,g 
, “ Devaluation
-  Import Controls
-  Recession  
Bangladesh -  Widespread Suffering
Source; G.A. Pollack , "Are the Oil Payments D e f ic its  Pwnageable?", 
International Finance S ection , Princeton U n iversity , New 
Jersey, No, 111 , June 1975, p%24.
I t  seems, then, th at in  th e ir  e f fo r t  to  adjust to  the new 
s itu a tio n  the o i l  importing countries do not have a "unioufn so lu tio n , 
but rather a spectrum o f  p o ss ib le  outcomes ranging from the 
r e la t iv e ly  p a in less  to  the disc:atrous"^^ G.A. Pollack d istin g u ish es  
between weak and strong co u n tr ies. In our opinion th ese concepts 
are q u ite  obscure and consequently, as outlined e a r lie r , o i l  importing 
countries w H l be d ivided in to  developed and developing cou n tr ies.
(1 ) G.A. Pollack , op, c i t .  p,
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SECTION I  «  O.E.C.D. COUNTRIES* POLICIES TO THE OIL
INDUCED BALANCE OF PAMîTT DEFICIT 1974-77,
SECTION I  -  Is THE MAGNITUDE OF THE OIL-INDUCED B .O .P . DEFICIT
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1974-1977
lu  i s  not p o s s ib le  to  presen t the adjustm ent process o f  the 
Whole O.EoC.D® araa, nor th e ca se  of each member o f th e  O rganisation , 
Therefore under O.E.C.D. co u n tr ie s  we s h a l l  d iscu ss  The Uiiited S ta te s ,  
Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, I t a ly  and Franc©.
We chose th e  1974-1977 perio d  because a lthough . most of th e  
d e c is io n s  lead in g  to  th e  o i l  c r i s i s  were taken in  the f in a l  o u a r te r  
o f  1973? t h e i r  im pact was f e l t  from 1974 onwards® F is c a l  1977 wad 
chosen fo r  th e  sake o f p re se n tin g  up to  d a te  In fo rm ation . However 
th e  choice between bh© v ario u s  o p tio n s  i s  a fu n c tio n  o f th e  depth and 
le n g th  o f  th e  c x ls ie  I t s e l f ,  th e re fo re  i t  i s  lo g ic a l  to  p re se n t, f i r s t ,  
th e  im pact o f  tho  fo u rfo ld  o i l  p r ic e s  in c re a se  on th e  economies of 
th e  main O.E.G ,D= c o u n tr ie s .  In doing so w© s h a ll  focus on i t s  
m onetary a sp e c t, o r in  o th e r  words th e  in c reased  c o s t of o i l  im p o rts .
TABLE 12 s Increased c o s t  o f  o il- im p o r ts  in  the Main O.E.G.Ü. C ountries 
197À-77 ( b i l l io n s  o f d o lla r s  in  1974 p r ic e s  ) ,
Period
Country 
or Region
1974 1975 1976 1977^ T otal
United S ta te s 1 5 .0 1 3 ,0 15.5 1 8 .7 62.2
Western Europe^ 34.3 30.5 28 21.2 118
Japan 12 .5 11.3 10.3 10 .4 44.5
T otal 61 .8 54.8 53.8 54.3 224.7
^ estim ates; fo r  the assum ptions con fer  source o f  ta b le .
^Germany, United Kingdom, France and I ta ly ,
Source; Higher O il P r ices  and th e  World Economy : the Problem o f
Adjustment, E d itors Edward R, Fried and Charles L, Schulze, 
The Brookings I n s t i tu t io n s ,  Washington D.G., 1975, p .16.
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The to ta l  increased c o s t  of o i l  imports has been dee].ining 
from 1974, ,^61 *8 b n ,, to  ju st under ^ 5 4 /. bn. in  1976. A s lig h t  
increase i s  ecxpected in  1977, and i t  i s  mainly duo to an tocrease o i l  
consumption in  the U.S.A.
Howewr any sudden and s izea b le  increase in  the p rice o f an 
import item  has an unbalancing e f fe c t  on the balance o f payments 
s itu a tio n  o f the countries importing that very item . I t  i s  the case  
o f crude o i l  and i t s  impact on the balance o f paymmts o f the major 
O.E.G.D. countries i s  shown in  the f o i l  w in g  tab le (  V'«5^ V.V^ \4 f . '67]
By comparing Tables 12 and 13 severa l remarks can be made.
The increased co st o f o i l  imports i s  greater than the current account 
d efic it®  ÏÎMO reason i s  that the cuivent account contains a lso  non­
o i l  trade w>!ich in  our case help  reducing the impact o f o i l  p rices  
in crease . This holds tinxe fo r  every contzy of the sample and fo r  the 
whole 1974-77 period.
The increased c o s t  o f  o i l  imports i s  a lso  d iffer en t from the  
basic B.O .P . as ropresaited  in  Table 13 (Page 37)# i t  i s  bound to be 
so because long-term  ca p ita l flow s are taken in to  consideration . 
Long-term c a p ita l movements can e ith e r  so lve  the current account 
d e f ic i t  by eq u ilib ra tin g  the b asic  B.O .P. or aggravate i t .  F ir s t ,  
one has to mention th at long-term  capital, may include borrcfw3.ng long­
term to  pay for o i l  import. We have p a rticu la r ly  in  mind Great B rita in  
Which borrowed over £1 bn. from Iran in  1974. From th is  point o f view  
i t  i s  worth con s id e lin g  the d ire c tio n  of long-term  c a p ita l movements. 
According to  Table 13, fo r  the 1974-77 period the U .S.A ., Japan, Franco 
and West Germany w itnessed an outflow o f L,T* c a p ita l equal to  
^ 6 5 .6 3 5 b n . that on top of th e ir  increased co st of o i l  imports. The 
conclusion i c  th a t fo r  the above-mentioned countries there was no 
financing o f the o i l  b i l l  through long-term  c a p ita l movements. On the 
other hand I ta ly  and United Kingdom, the worst h i t  by the o i l - c r ic i s  
amongst the sanrple recorded long-term  ca p ita l in flow  of /^9.235bn, th at  
helped cushion th e ir  current account d e f ic i t  caused by the o i l  c r i s i s .  
However such an in flow  was not enough and more funds were required.
As fo r  the U .S .A ., Japan, France and West Germany th e ir  reou ired  sh ort­
term c a p ita l  to  fin an ce th e ir  g lo b a l current account d e f i c i t  and th e  
ou tflow  o f  long-term  c a p i t a l .
However as fa r  a s we are ccsicem ed we s h a l l  assunB th a t B.O.P.
37 e
TABLE 13 : Balance of Payments of the Màln O.E.C.Ü. Countries 
1974-1977 (b il l io n s  of U.S. 0 )
Countries or 
group of 
Countries.
U.S.A,
Japan
End of Periods 
Items
Current Account^ 
I/ong-Term Capital
B.O.P.
Current Account 
^ong-Term C apital
B.O.P,
1974
=  5*000 
- 6.702
-11.702
5*000
3.956
France
I ta ly
Current Account 
I/ong-'j’srm C apital
B.O.P,
C urren t Account 
Long-Term C a p ita l
8.956
5.900
0.182
West Germany
B.O.P.
Current Account 
Long-Term Capital
B.O.P.
-  6,082
-  8.000 
t  0*342
-  7.658
9.700
-  2.272
4. 7.428
U.K,
Current Account -  7.900
Long-Term C apital + 4*238
B.O.P. -  3.662
Western
Europe® B.O.P. 9 .974
1975
Æ .600
-19.011
7*411
0.700
0.820
1.520
0.0
1.044
1.044
-  0.500
■!- a  702
€3~J WJJaxrte wi *"*=v raj . 
-  0.202
t  3.900  
-  6.870
2.970
-  3.800 
4. 1 .090
1976
. 1*400 
-14.168
.977
- 17. 6 0 )
-  5*6oa
-15,
t  3.400
0*728
+10 .000
0.443
+ 2,672
6,000
1*636
7.636
-  2 .9
+ 0,6
2,3
+ 9.557
R, 'w I *W IP: . .If .  «, Ill'll*
-  4.200 
n .a ,
ri.a*
• 3 .2
n.a®
-n.a.
4- 2.803 4- 4 ,6 0 0
0.148
+ 2.652
-  2*500
+ 1.171
-  1.047  
t  3.553
-  2.400 
4* 1.092
2.710 -  1 .471 -  1.308
6.522 -  8.755 n .a .
a -  F ir s t  h a lf  o f  1977. 
b -  Seasonally  adjusted, annual ra te s ,  
c -  France, I ta ly ,  West Germany and U.K.
Sources; 1. I.M .F ., I .F .S , Volume XXX, Number 12, December 1977# 
c f .  countries concerned.
2 . Banlc o f  England Quarterly B u lle tin , Volume 17, Number 4 , 
December 1977, p .417.
38,
d e f ic i t s  are mainly caused by increased p rice  o f o i l  and consequently  
we s h a ll  focus p a i'ticu la r ly  on the to o ls  used to  correct such imbalances» 
According to G.A, Pollack , "», . ,  in  coping with the B ,0 ,P , s tra in s  o f  
expensive o i l ,  the importing countries face a r.uafoer o f a ltera a tIv es, 
each of them su b stitu ta b le  to  some extent for the others® Thqy can 
reduce energy consumption, endeavour to  achieve lower o i l  p r ice s , expand 
exports to  OPEC, finance th e ir  payments d e f ic it s  and adjiust to  resid u a l 
imbalances, ^
However, as outlined  in  Chapter I It- i s  not p o ssib le  to  achieve  
lower o i l  p r ices , a t  l e a s t  in  noiïiinal terms. I t  i s  a lso  not p o ssib le  
to  cut dovÆi d r a s t ic a lly  OFEC«oil imports by reducing domestic 
consumption, promotjuig conservation measures and stim ulating domestic 
sources of eiergy# p a r tic u la r ly  n o n -o il sources, Ihe only way l e f t  
was to  slow down the le v e l  of domestic a c t iv ity ,
SliHTION I  -  2; THE SLOW DOWN OF THE LEVEL OF DOMESTIC ACTIVITY
We s h a ll present the whole 1973-77 period because wo consider  
f i s c a l  1973 as a normal year. We r e ly  on two indicators# namely 
in d u str ia l production and employment. The evolution  of both in d ica tors  
i s  contained in  the fo llow ing tab le (  9. bgj) •
As fa r  as in d u str ia l production i s  concerned we n o tice  from 
the previous ta b le  th a t i t  decreased during 1974 and 1975 con secu tively  
in  U .S .A ,, West Germany, Japan and the U.K„ 3h the case of Germny 
and United Kingdom the figu res fo r  1977 are below those o f  f i s c a l  1977 by 
0.3% and 6,5% re sp ec tiv e ly . For France and I ta ly  a f a l l  in  in d u str ia l  
production was experienced only 1975. Concerning enrplq^ment the 
s itu a tio n  i s  q u asi-sim ilar  because both in d icators are connected.
However, one has to  mention th at in  th is  f ie ld  Japan was the most h i t  
sin ce  unemployment rose during the whole 1973-1977 period and in  19T/ 
i t  was 9 . 1% below i t s  1973 l e v e l ,  AD. in  a l l  i t  seems that 1975 was a 
bad year and th a t the recovery started  from 1976 onwards,
("'G.A. Pollack, "Are the O il Payments D e fic its  Manageable?" 
op, c i t ,  pp.23-4 .
TABDB 14 % In d u str ia l Produc t  Ion (A ) and Employment (B ) 
in  the fe h i OECD Countries# Percentage Changes from 
the Previous Years 1973-1977
39,
End of Period 
Countries
U.S.A,
West Germany
Japan
U.K.
France
I ta ly
•X
B
1973 1974 1975
t  6.1,6
Bl f  4 .33  
f  5.92
f  0 .2 0
A t l5 .6 2  
0.30
A^  4 7 .50
^  4 2 .64
A^  ' <• Ô.10
2B + 1.49
+ 9.68  
3 4 0.78
"0«4
+2,0
-2.4
-2.5
3 .1
• 0.6
3.6
34-0.
42.5
4 340,
+4,5
43,9
-  8 .8
-  1*1
5.4
.976 1977 1973«7
+ 10 
t  3,1
-  6 .1  4 8 ,5
« 6 , 5  4 6o8
2 .7
+ 6.0
A"
.0.1^
n.^.,
-11.1 +13.6 +5.8,b
'0*8a
-  4 .8  4 0 .8  +0*97
0 .6  4 0,59 n .a .
It", w#!Sfaw#i«'vi*us6k*"»-mnwi_:;
■ 9 .0  t  9 .0  43 .2
- 1 .2  + 1 .8  n.a
-  9 ,3  4-12.4 44,0'
+ 0.28 t  0.27 n ,a .
4
+6,0
+6 ,2
-0 .3  
n .a ,
4*3,6
-9 .1
-6 ,5
n ,a ,
4 5.8
n .a .
4  7 ,1
n .a .
3 cas onally  Ad jus te d , 
ï%y 1977
1 » Won-Agriculture Employment ^
2 -  Ind u stria l Employmmt
b3 « Manufacturing Emp3.oyment -  April 1977
4* The la s t  column i s  not the sum of the f iv e  other columns because 
th at tab le  g ives figu res a t end o f periods and not the average 
f ig u r e s .
Source; I .F .S . by I.M .F, Volume XXX lAi, 8 August 1977 & No, 12, X ll -  1977
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OeE.GeDo count r i  em nianaged to c i i î t a i l  the le v e l  of th e ir
( l }domestic a c t iv ity  by in creasing the rate of discount which, except
fo r  U.Ko, reached i t s  peak in  1974 for a l l  our sample countries?
3-3% in  France, 6% in  West Germany, 8% in  I ta ly , 9% in  Japan and
f in a l ly  7.75% per annum in  the UoS.A® These ra tes  are very high when
compared 'with 1972 f ig u r e s . By comparing the rates of discount and
the le v e l  of domestic a c t iv ity  we can say th a t the r e s tr ic t iv e  measures
were talc en in  1974 and th e ir  i  up act was f e l t  in  the subseoucnt year®
What about o i l  impox''ts then? Total O.SoClh Imports of crude o i l  and
semi-processed feedstocks from outside O.E.C*D, area f e l l  from 1,3.35,8
m illio n  m/t in  1973 to  1 ,1 0 8 .4  m illion  ni/t in  1974 and then again to
(? )1,040*0 m illion  m/t in  1975 «. Such developments do not appear on
the BoOoP* nonetheless they remain part o f the adjustment measures 
undertaken by the O.E.G.D, countries* However adjustment through the  
domestic l e v e l  of a c t iv i t y  i s  obviously lim ited . Cutting down o i l  
iiïq^orts I s  ev id en tly  'the b est way to  ’^ svzlt© o ff  the B .O .P, d e f ic it s  but 
tho ap p lica tion  o f  such a remedy requires time and in  present eircum- 
stances i t  would be a p a in fu l process th a t the O.EOG.D. countries cannot 
afford in  p o l i t ic a l  t e r a s . Consequently "the o i l  importing countries  
are l e f t  with the fo llow ing o p tio n s ;-
-  Use o f previous savings, th a t i s  in tern a tio n a l ^wned reserves;
-  Borrowing from the International %netary Fund,
-  And increased exports mainly to  OrEC coun cries in  order to  
achieve a surplus in  th e ir  n o n -o il trade balavice.
These ways and DBans w i l l  be considered in  the follow ing paragraphs 
in  order o f presen tation .
(^^cf. Appendix I I I -2  Discount R ates, end of periods 1972-77# 
(2 * 0 .8 .C.D. "Oil S t a t i s t ic s  s Supply and Disposal", 1975, p.21
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SECTION 1 USE OF OEI®D INTERNATIdlAL RESERVES.
HavJ-Kg recourse  to  p rev ious savings to  pay fo r  p re se n t 
iiïïports i s  a normal r e a c t io n . However even under normal co n d itio n s  
th e  scope of such an o p e ra tio n  i s  l im ite d  in  time and m g n itu d e  because 
in te rn a t io n a l  reserves are  them selves lim ited*  Furtherm ore, given 
th e  suddenness and magnitude o f  th e  o i l  p r ic e  in c re a se s , th e  o il- in d u ce d  
B.O .P. s t r a in s  do n o t re p re se n t anymore a normal s i tu a t io n ,  conseavient3.y 
in te rn a t io n a l  re se rv e s  w i l l  be o f a l e s s e r  help® Tîie fo llow ing  ta b le  
g ives to  us a p ic tu re  of the  ev o lu tio n  o f the in te rn a t io n a l  rasen^es of 
our sample co u n tr ie s  from 1972 to  1977* In  our opin ion  such a ta b Jo  
could  show to  what e x te n t im te rn a tio n a l re se rv e s  were used to  pay f o r  
th o  o i l  b i l l ,
TABLE 15 s E volu tion  of th e  In te rn a t io n a l  Reserves of 
Japan, Franco, I t a ly ,  Germany and U.K.
1972-1977? ( b i l l io n s  of U .S. d o l l a r s ) .
End o f Periods 
Countries
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977*'
United S tates 13.15 14.38 16.06 15.88 18.32 18.79
Japan 18,36 12.24 13.51 12.81 16.60 19.9?
France 10.01 8.52 8.85 12.59 9.72 10.06
I ta ly 6 .08 6 ,43 6.94 4.77 6,65 11.05
West Germany 23,87 33.17 32.39 31.03 34.80 35.69
United Kingdom 5.54 6.47 6.93 5.45 4.23 20.44
T otal 77.01 81.21 84.68 82.53 90.32 116. a .
a . October 1977*
Soui'ce: I.M.F*, I .F .S . Volume XXX, Number 12.
December 1977, c f .  countries concerned.
"What are the conclusions to be drawn from t h is  tab le? The 
f i r s t  remark i s  th a t th e  combined in tern a tio n a l reserves of the s ix  
countries declined only in  1975 as compared with th e ir  previous le v e l .
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However th is  n e g lig ib le  d ec lin e  o f /2,15bn® i s  not commensurate with  
th e ir  ^54<.8bn* combined increased co st o f o i l  imports*
uowever, i f  we take the countries Individual!y,, other remarks 
can be made* For in stan ce the in ternational reserves o f Japan during 
the vJhole 1973-76 period were w ell below th e ir  1972 lev e l»  ib is  has 
to  be linked to  the fa c t  tliat Japan i s  ?. heavy importer c f  OPEC o i l  
and has no immediate a ltern atives*
In 1973 and 1974 France's in ternation al reserves ware a lso  
below th e ir  1972 level® In 1976 they a lso  declined by a t+ ird  
comparatively to  th e ir  1975 le v e ls*  lln the cas© of Italy^ during the 
whole 1972-74 period they s ta b iliz e d  around /^6bn.# however in  1975 they 
were 32% beloi-j th e ir  pravious level® These three countries a lso  had a 
current account d e f ic i t  during almost the en tire  period under study* 
During the v/nole 1974-1977 period West Germany had s iso a b le  in tern ation a l 
reserves# i t  i s  a lso  t h is  country that never record od any current 
account d e f ic it*  The ex isten ce o f high in tern ation a l resenres i s  
therefore comprehensible,
United Kingdom's in tern ation a l reserves increased in  1973 and 
then again 1974 but th ey  declined  during the subseouent two years, and 
again rocketted in  1977 when the p o s it iv e  impact o f North Sea O il was 
being fe lt*
According to  the previous table the in tern ation a l reserves  
were m arginally used by the major 0*E,C.D* countrd.es to pay for  th e ir  
o i l  imports* This i s  very understandable because th is  ta b le  does not 
t e l l  us the Whole story  and i t  a lso  may be due to tho fa c t  th at i t  does 
not and cannot contain a l l  the elements a t p lay . We s h a ll  l i i ïd t  
ourselves to one factor  not u su a lly  referred to# tho mid-Dcoembsr 1974 
Mart.iniq.ue Summit between presidents G® Ford and Giscard D'Estaing and 
i t s  consequences# e sp e c ia lly  as fa r  as the future o f gold p rices were 
concerned. They agreed on "the valuation of countries'gold  reserves a t  
market p r i c e s " T h e  o f f i c i a l  p r ice  o f gold was $3h per ounce as 
fixed  by President Roosvelt in  1934 and ^42*5 per ounce as a r e s u lt  o f
^Financial Times, c f ,  a r t ic le  "Fort de France Summit ha iled  as the
s ta r t  o f a New Era", 16 Deceiifoer 1974, p .6 .
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the Smithsonian Agreement® VAiereas the market p rice rocketted to  ju st
under ^200 per ounce by the end o f December 3.974. TVie F inancial Times
w rites  that as a r e s u lt  of such a d ecision  "the book valu© of French
reserves w il l  r is e  from i t s  present le v e l  of ^4.3bn® to  as much as /^16*3
(l )bn* a t  current market prices"  « Vvhat does t h is  mean in  p r a c t ic a l  
terms fo r  us? I t  means "that co u n tries  with com paratively high 
proportion of gold  in  th e ir  r e se rv e s , lilc e  I ta ly  and Prance, w i l l  be 
much b o tte r  equipped to  d e a l wdth th e ir  payments problems caused by
( p )
th@ quadrupling o f o i l  p rices"  * The OPEG co u n tr ies  were v a r io u s ly
aware o f  th e  Im p lication s o f such an agreement® For in sta n ce  Iraq was
mainly worried i t s  in fla tio n a ry  aspect because i t  w i l l  .increase >?orld 
( 3 1liq u id ity  ' % On the other hand the Shah o f Iran imew that i t  was an 
attempt designed to  cancel part of the o i l  p rice  increase and therefore  
he threatened to r e ta l ia te  by a further increase in  o i l  prices® I t  i s  
hard to  Imow to Miat ext«^nt the valuation o f  gold reserves a t market 
p r i,C Q S  he^pod indiïvidual countries# however nobody can deny that i t  did  
cushion the Impact o f the o i l  p rices by improving the in tern ation a l 
reserves p o sitio n  of oil-im porising countries and e sp e c ia lly  the &m.jor
O.E.CcDo countries s in ce  they were the la rg est holders of gold reserves. 
Another way to consider the extent to  which in ternatio îia l 
reserves were used i s  to  find out the nuiaber o f  countries drai'd.ng on 
th e ir  owned reserves number Which "rose sharply from 2 in  1971 and 3 
iii 1972 bo 6 in  1973, 13 in  1974 . . .  and 16 in  1976"('"’, that Is  w e ll  
over h a lf  o f the 0,E,C,D* countries* I t  seems, then, that sm aller
O.E.C.D, countries had more recourse to  th e ir  iiitern a tio n a l reserves  
during the 1973-75 period , Tiie combined amount drawn was not n e g lig ib le  
e ith e r . Even i f  one excludes th e reseive-currency countries « U,K. 
and the U ,S,A , -  such a drawing: .increased  from j|J0.3bn, in  1971 to
(1) F inancial T:l2igs, c f ,  a r t ic le  "Fort de France Summit hailed  as the 
s ta r t  o f a New Era", 18 December 1974, p .6 .
F inancial Times, c f ,  a r t ic le  "U.S., France Agree on îlarket Value 
fo r  Gold Holdings" 17 December 1974*
( o  1
Financial Times, c f ,  a r t ic le  "Sadasi Husein on Gold and the 
International Ffonetary System" 28th December 1974.
Department of Economic and S ocia l A ffa irs  "Supplement to  World 
Economic Survey, 1975: Fluctuations and Development in  the World 
Economy", United N ations, New Yoik, 1977, p -p .32-3 .
^O.Tbti, in  1972 to  n early  |9bn. in  1973, #4bn. in  1974 and over |Sbn, 
d o lla rs  in  1975"'^^
The f in a l  way to a ssess  the re la tio n  between the o l l - c r i s i s
and the Intern ation al reserves s itu a tio n  of tho ChE.C.D. countries i s
to  consider the inport va3.u6 o f the lattez'® From th is  point o f view,
" .« . . t h e  proportion of developed market économies whose in tern a tio n a l
reserves a t tlie end o f the year (1975 1 were equivalent to  le s s  than two
months' iin^^oi-ts was tw ice as high in  1975 as in  1970? to Denmark,
Finland, Greece, Sweden, United Kingdom and Yugo^lavi-a has been added
Canada, Iceland, I ta ly ,  New Zealand, South Africa and the United 
(  2 )States",^ ' However th is  r e la tio n  could be not so accurate, because 
the f a l l  o f the r a tio  of in tern ation a l resein^cs to imports could be tho 
r e su lt  not only of a f a l l  o f the in tern a tio n a l reserves but a lso  o f an 
in crease in  the value of imports especia l!.y in  the pzdce o f an important 
iteïn rose sharply» In our opinion we think that both factors were a t  
play and i t  i s  hard to  d is so c ia te  them® A ll in  a l l  we can sa fe ly  
advance that in tern a tio n a l reserves were u se i to  pay fo r  part o f the o i l  
li% orts. However, given th e ir  resp ective imgnitude, in tern ation a l 
reserves were not the so lo  option  used otherwise they would have been 
exhausted® Therefore the O.E.C.D» countries had access to  other 
p a r a lle l sources# one o f them was borrotving from tho Into~national 
îfonetary Fund.
SECTION 1 - 4  Ï USE OF DRAhONGS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL MDNITARY FUND (I.M.F J
The I.M .F . has always pro'/ided i t s  raeiribers with funds
to  so lv e  th e ir  B .O .P . d i f f i c u l t i e s .  The use o f  I.M .F. borrowing to  
pay fo r  o i l  im ports i s  not a f in a l  payment because th e  money borrowed 
w i l l  have to  be paid back w ith in  a period  o f 3 -  5 years (an e a r ly  
payment to  the I.M .F . i s  a ls o  p o s s ib le ) .  i t  fo llo w s  th a t the use o f
I.M .F . f a c i l i t i e s  i s  p art o f  th e  fin an cin g  p ro cess . In s p it e  o f  t h is  
i t  i s  in te r e s t in g  to  see  t o  What ex ten t such f a c i l i t i e s  were e x p lo ited  
by o i l  im porting and p a r t ic u la r ly  O.E.C.D. c o u n tr ie s . The fo llo w in g  
ta b le  rep resen ts th e  main in d u s tr ia liz e d  co u n tr ie s  t o t a l  drai\dngs from
(1) Idem# p .33.
(2) Ibid ,
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the IcMoF* during the 1974^-77 period ,
TABLE ? Drawings from the I.M.F * :
United S ta te s , France, Germany, I ta ly , Urdted Kingdom, Japan 1974-77
(F illio n s  o f S.D.Rg. )
End o f Period.s
C ountries or 
Group o f Countries
U.SoA
France
West Germany
1974
45 .0
123.5
1975 1976 1977
78.3
30.4
T otal
123.3
153.9
I t a ly
United Kingdom
1,6 4 2 .8  1 ,030 ,2 90,0  2, 613,0
2 ,400 ,0  2 ,2 5 0 ,0  4 ,6 5 0 .0
Japan
T otal 1,811*3 1 ,110 ,6  2 ,478 .3  2 ,3 4 0 .0  7,740,
World
Ind u stria l Countries 1 ,9 5 5 .1  1 ,1 2 2 .7  2,4?8..3 2 ,389 .4  7 ,945 ,5
4 ,0 5 3 .1  4 ,658 .1  7 ,009 .9  3,218 18 ,939.1
a  -  End o f  th ird quarter of 1977 
-  -  N il
Source; I.M .F., I .F .S , Volume XXX, Number 12, December 1977, p .14
Tl’ie f i r s t  observation i s  that the U.S.A. and Japan did not use 
the I.BLF’s .  f a c i l i t i e s .  This could be due to the fa c t  that both 
countries enjoyed high in tern a tio n a l reserves during th e whole 1974-77 
period* Amongst other th ings i t  means that only four of our sample
(1) Table 16 does not include repayments made by O.E.C.D. countries to  
the I.M.F.
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countries did* Furthermore amongst the la t t e r  loM.F. drawings wore 
mainly made by the United Kingdom and I ta ly . They borrcfwed 95.4% of 
our sample cou n tries' to ta l  borz^ovdng# 93.9% and 34.9% of the combined 
borrowing of the Indus t id a l countries and the World. This means that 
the United Kingdom and I ta ly , the worst h i t  by the o i l  c r i s i s ,  took 
the l io n 's  share of the I.M,F. f a c i l i t i e s *  I t  fo lles;s th at other 
countries had eocess to  other sources of funds or adopted other 
measures to so lve th e ir  o il-induced  B.OoP. d e f ic i t s .  One of the  
lo g ic a l  measures to undert^Hcc in  s im ilar  circumstances i s  to  pursue 
a trade p o licy  aijned at expanding exports OFF G cou n tries.
SECTION 1 -  5 : Fv.PANDINO EXPORTS TO OPEC COiMTRIES: 1974-197?
As a matter o f fa c t  the e f fe c t  of increased exports to OPEC 
countries on the main ÜJ5.0.D. cou n tries' B.O.P» has already been 
presented because we have already presented their- current account, 
c f .  Table 13 (Page 3?)® However th a t table does net re fer  s p e c if ic a l ly  
to  OPEC's import from our sample cou n tries. Tiie folloî-dng tab le  f i l l s  
th is  gap,
TABLE 1? Î O.EoC.b'g Increased T^.ports Over 1973 
to  Ol^C co u n tr ie s , 1974-1977; bn. o f 1974 d o lla r s .
Tears
Countries 1974 1975 1976 1977® T otal
U nited S ta tes 2.6 5.1 S.l 10.1 ■ 25.9
Western FXirope^ 5.3
ag— wfwawinrrwayWB 
10.4 16,5 20.6 52.8
Japan 2.3 4.5 7.0 8.7 22,5
T otal 10.2 20.0 31.6 39.4 101.2
a -  E stim ates; for  assumptions o f  sou rces, 
b -  West Germany, United Kingdom, Franco and I ta ly .
Source; "Higher o i l  p r ic e s  and th e World Economy i the Adjustment Problem' 
ed ited  by E .R . F ried  and C.L, S ch u ltse , op. c i t .  p ,l6
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According to th is  tab le  the sample countries did not take 
equal advantage o f the new markets opened by the o i l  crisis®  However 
i t  seems th at ea,ch one o f them tr ip led  i t s  exports to  OPEC countzdes 
duidng the 1974-76 period^ In 1977 the rate of increased exports was 
expected to slow down. This i s  due to the fa c t that OPEC countries  
revised  dovaiward th+ ir domestic spending, S'areral factors coaid  
esKplain such a change o f heart.
As far as Cc.E«C,D, countries are ooneem ed.their increased  
exports to  0K7' countries was ©jcpected to  reach BlOloSbn, for  the 
1974-77 pemod whereas th e ir  combined increased co st of o i l  imports 
to ta lle d  #224®?bn, for the same period . I t  means th at more than 45% 
of th e ir  o i l  imports were paid for in  commodities, I t  seem  that up 
t i l l  new increased .exports to  OPEG countries has con stitu ted  the most 
important and, e f f ic ie n t  s in g le  option used by our sample cou n tries.
Tîiis holds true e sp e c ia lly  when one compares i t  to  th e ir  recourse to 
owned in ternation al raserves and borrowing f a c i l i t i e s  provided by the
I.M .F.
Before concluding th is  part we shall refer  to  H.G. JohiSison 
who d iv id es the transfer problem in to  two sta g es , The f i r s t  one belong 
"whet'ner the process by z^ Tliich the tran sfer  financed in  the transferor  
country and disposed o f  in  the transferee w i l l  a f fe c t  each eo u n tiy 's  
demand for inports (a t constant p r ices) su f f ic ie n t ly  to create the trade 
surplus and d e f ic i t  necessary to  e f f e c t  the transfer" . As far as 
the U.S.A. are concerned o i l  airports were paid fo r  by printed d o lla r s . 
Consequently there wag no decrease in  th at country's deimnd fo r  imports. 
On the other hand, CPIiU's demand for imports are bom'id to be h igh. Then 
i t  seems th a t the f i r s t  stage vaarked only in  one way. F in a lly  we have 
to  mention that th is  lo g ic a l  drive fo r  imports by OFEC countries i s  
concomitant w ith the p o lic ie s  undertaken by CÆ.C.Ü. countries and aimed 
a t  reducing th e ir  B.O.P, d e f ic i t  through the manipulation o f p r ices , 
exchange ra tes and trade measures. In our opinion those measures v d ll
( l  )H.G. Johnson, "International Trade and Economic Growth ; Studies 
in  Pure Theory", published by G, Allen and Unwin L td ., London,
1958, p .170,
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gen era lly  tend to  inagnify the ii^pact of OHSC'g Imports on O.E.C.D. 
countries* B.O.P. s itu a t io n . Therefore i t  i s  necessary to consider  
those p o lic ieso
A ™ Adjustment Pi’ocess and Price Developments in  OoE.C.D. and Arab 
Countries
Concemlng the ro le  of prioe-changes in  the mechanism o f
tran sfer there are two sch ools o f  thought» The f i r s t  one, led  by
Professor B, Ohlin minimizes "the importance o f price movements .®o
and indeed.a."  con tests  " . . .  the n ecessity  for  the tran sfer  of
(1 )
u n ila tera l payments, o f  any price movement a t  a l l ."  In other
words, i t  maintains that in  both countries with B.O.P. d e f ic i t  and 
surplus, the movement o f p rices w i l l  be p a r a lle l. On the other hand, 
the second sch ool, having J.M. Kejmes as leader;
la y s  great s t r e s s  on the n e c e ss ity  of o p m site  price movements 
in  the two countries concerned» I t  considers th a t under 
unfavourable circunistances these price movements would have to  
be 30 large that serious d i f f ic n l t ie s  might a r is e , rendering 
tra n sfer , in  extreme cases, a b so lu te ly  im possib le.
However, how could such th eories  apply to our ease? Let us, 
then, consider the ev o lu tio n  of domestic p rices in  both o i l  importing 
and ezqporting cou n tr ies. In the îo r m r  group we sh a ll present the 
cas© of th e  U .S .A ., Japan, the United Kingdom, West Germany, France and
I ta ly .  (2)
(1 ) -  G.V. Harbeler, "The Theorj'- of International Trade with i t s
A pplications to  Commercial Policy" , trans3.ated from German by 
A, Stonier and F. Benham, Publ. William Hodge & Co. L td ,, 
London, s ix th  im pression, 1956, p .66,
(2 ) -  For other O.E.C.D. countries confer Appendix I I |-3 ^ î^ S ^ -
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TABLE 18 î O.EoC.D. Countries* Consumer P r ices, Percentage Changes 
from Previous Tear 1974-77 (Seasonally Adjusted)
End of Periods
Countries
1974 1975 1976 1977 1973/77
U.S.A, +11.0 + 9 .0 + 5r-6 +36.6
Japan +22.6 +12,1 + 9 .6 ■c S.2® 4-63.1
United Kingdom +l6 * 0 +24.2 4*16,6 4-15.6^ 4-94.3
West Germany + 7 .0 + 6 .0 + 4 .5 + 4.5® f2 4 .0
France +13.7 +11.7 + 9 .2 4- 81 ? t5 0 .6
I ta ly +11.9 +11,6 +16.7 4-15.8 +88.4
a ™ June 1977 : b -  May 1977
Source? I.M.F®, I.F '.S . December 1977,
The f i r s t  observation i s  th a t consumer p rices increased in  
a].l our sample cou n tries, although the rate o f increase started  d eclin in g  
from 1975 onwards foi' most o f them* I f  one compares 197V and ■ 1973, 
the increase was most important in  United Kingdom with 94*3%, I ta ly  with  
88,4% and Japan w ith 63.1% per annum. (Vi tho other hand i t  was the
le a s t  marked in  West Germany vAiose ra te  of in f la t io n  was no more than 24% 
during the same period .
Such developments have to  be compared with the s itu a tio n  in  the  
o i l  exporting cou n tries. The next tab le considéra the ease of a l l  Arab 
countries plus major non-Arab OPEC meirbers, that i s  Iran, Mexico, N igeria  
and Venezuela,
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TABLE 19 î Evolution o f Consumer Prices in Arab Countries, End of Period 
Changes R els.tive to  Previous Years 1973-197? (%)
Years
Countries
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Oc't
1973-77
A lgeria 6 .10 4.78 8.19 9.45 n .a . 29,580 '
Bahrain 14.29 24.39 16.19 14,91 16.01 92.68
Egypt ""6179'4 .27
14 ,39
10.83
7.50
9.69
7.72
0,33
8,28a
13.03b
43.45
51.63
Iraq (1) 4.594o86
12.52
8.31
10 ZW 
9.45
11.12
10.33
7 . 03d
7.69e
31.39
30.04
Jordan 10.47 20.00 11.98 15.00 31.70d 103,53
Kiïwait "'(TT™ T tTso '8 .40
.k * * &K rgra {II : 1' 1L. i w
1 4 .W ^
13,19
8% 37 
8.96
6.63
5.75
— — 9:%7d—  
9,75 43.17
Lebanon 6.09 10,96 n .a . n,a* n .a . n .a .
Libya 7.65 7.76 9,11 5.0? n,a.o 25.530^'
Mauritania 7.65 12.22 12.31 14.32 9.24b 57*42
Morocco 4.16 17.68 7,93 8.53 n .a . 51,64
Oman n .a . n .a . n .a . n .a . n .a . n .a .
Qatar n .a . n .a . n .a . n .a . n .a . n .a .
Saudi Arabia 16.51 21.41 34.63 31,55 8.89Z 134,17
S o n ^ ia 6.42 18.20 19,43 14,06 9.12a 75,75
Sudan " T r r ~ 15.61 27.2515.30 26.09
15.49
23.98
n .a .
1 .68
n .a ,
7.061
"1 3 . 97(31
70,21
Syria I T ) 33.3619.81
13.41
14.96
7.69
16.43
11 . 86 
14! 70
n .a .
90.708
40:15(27"
68.50
Tunisia 5.324.63 4.25
9. 4T ~
9.51
1.24
5.35
5.05b
9,64
41,11
31.88
Ü.A.E. n .a . n .a . n .a . n .a . n .a . n .a .
Y.A.R. 43.00 26.57 23.75 16.51 n .a . 59. 66(21
Y.P.D.R 35.0719.74
42.18
20.25
17.75
11.95
6.36
3.13
n .a .
n .a .
83 .71(8)  
A3.07(2)
Other O.P.E.C.
Iran ^ . 3 19.81
I6T.^7
14,19
7.1^3
12.78
^9700
11.33
17.33
■31t.86c
61.A8
69,81
ît e ic o " 1 T T ~ 15.6511.16
22.52
22.51
10.51
10.90
2 ' 0 5 ”
16.11
46.79d
29,12d
113.03
114.65
Nigeria 5.36 13.44 33.80 21.48 22. 38b 125.69
Venezuela 4 .14 8.22 10.27 7.57 9.22c 40.23
1 -  Wholesale Prices# 2 -  1973-76 period# 3 -  1973-75 period# 
a -  May 1977; b -  June 1977; c -  September 1977; d -  Augwt 1977; 
© -  July; f  -  Phrch 1977; g -  ApriJ.
Sources I .F .8 . ,  I.M .F. Volume XXT Number 12, December 1977,
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According to  Table 19 (Page 50) consumer prices increased in  
a l l  our sample co u n tr ies . In soma countries such as Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia, Mex3.co and N igeria they more than doubled during the 1973-77 
period® A ll these countries except Jordan are major o i l  exporteras 
and therefore major goods and serv ices  Importers from the O.E.C.D. area. 
Tîi© increase in  consumer p rices was au ite  steep  in  Iran and Bahrain too . 
Let us, now, compare ta b les  18 end 19 iia older to drav; sorb con clu sion s. 
F ir s t  i t  appears thao consumer p ilc c s  increased in  both groups o f  
countries® At f i r s t  s ig h t th is  s itu a tio n  seems to contradict J.M. 
Keynes because, according to  him, they should have fa lle n  in  0 .E,C . 
cou n tries, and increased in  OPEC countries® Let us a lso  taka J.M. 
Keynes' statement at face-va lue and apply i t  to our case-study» I t  
would ntean f i r s t ,  larger  volume of o i l  importing countries* goods w i l l  
be requirad to command the earns barrel of o i l .  In G, Harberler 
terms th is  can be:
•'expressed by saying that the r e a l ra tio  of change or the 
barter tenms of in tern a tio n a l tz'ade has moved against"  ^
the o i l  Importing cou n tries, and th is  addiîig another burden to the  
la t t e r  »
Second, i f  by virtu.e o f the transfer commodity p rices in  o i l  
exporting countries increase the terms o f  trade move further against 
o i l  importing co u n tr ies , th is  adding a third bund on,
however, for  Pro fees orcS.Ohlin, J.M. Key+ies reasons in  to i^ s  
o f unaltered demand, he h im self maintains that fin a n c ia l tran sfer  means 
tran sfer  o f pure basing power. This fa ct coupled with J . Rueff 
"Principle of the Conservation of Purchasing Power" jeads to  the  
conclusion th a t although a t world le v e l  detrardd s constant, i t  has 
nonetheless undergone profound changes. I t  has sh ifted  in  favour o f  
the OPEC cou n tries.
Taking the case o f Germany (B) and tho A llie s  (A) Professor 
B, Ohlin w rites th a t a fte r  the transfer:
"there i s  a market in  A for more B's goods than formerly. On 
the other hand the market in  B for A's goods is  not as b ig  as
/  n \-----------------------------------------------------------
i t  was before."^
(1) -  Ibid , pp. 66-7.
(2 ) -  G.V, Psrberler op. c i t .  p .70.
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Does th is  hold true in  oui' p articu lar case?
F irst o f  a l l  one important point has to  be stressed® Both 
J.M* Keynes and Professor O ilin  raason in  terms of com petitive goods*
In other words they im p lic ite ly  assume that both countrd.es can eou a lly  
produce the same basket of goods and tViat those goods produced in  
e ith e r  country can equally s a t i s f y  den'and in  both countries* I t  i s  
not our case where botîi groups o f  c o m tr ie s  enjoy a monopoly on 
d iffe r e n t  goods: OPEG in  o i l  and o i l  imporbdrig eountries (fo r  tho time
being we do not d istin g u ish  between OcE.C.D, and l.D.C® cou n tries) in  
the f ie ld  o f  technology and know-how*
The second point i s  that both econotîd.sts assume a s itu a tio n  
o f p lenty, whereas our case i s  characterised by s c a r c ity . S ca rc ity
o f o i l  e ith e r  rea l or a r t i f i c i a l  and sca rc ity  of kï'iow-howj each one 
i s  v i t a l  to the o t ie r  group o f countries®
In our case, OFEC countries did in  fa c t  acoulra more 
purchasing power however they cannot produce the goods they need most 
for th e ir  economic development and consequent].y demand for th ose  goods 
w il l  be by n e c e ss ity  greater from the OFEC s id e .
Furthermore J.M. Keynes takes im p lic it ly  the case o f a non- 
in fla tio n a ry  s itu a tio n  whereas our sample countr5.es evolve in  an 
in fla tio n a ry  environment e sp e c ia lly  from 1973 onwardo® Wnen th is  
point i s  considered J.M. Keynes* statement means th a t consumer pidces  
w i l l  increase le s s  in  O.E.C.D, countries than in  OPEC countries*
Such an in terp reta tion  explains the evolution o f consumer p iic e s  in  
both groups of countries that uX tlim tely confirms J.M, Keynes * opinion  
F in a lly  there i s  an Important factor  th at one has to  mention 
wlien considering the p r ice  f ix a tio n  mechanism in  both countid.es; 
namely the bargaining power of each group. As outlined  in  Chapter I 
crude o i l  prices increased p a rtly  because the bargaining power o f OPEG 
a t world le v e l  increased . In our opinion the bargaining power o f each 
group-;- O.E.C.D. and OPEC -  w i l l  p lay an inportant ro le  in  the movement 
o f p rices and consequently the " In v isib le  Hand" o f  Adam Smith might 
not be enough to  explain  th e ir  f lu c tu a tio n s . However the Question o f  
bargaining power d eals with export p rices th at has not and could not be 
d ea lt  with by Professor B, Ohlin and J.M. Keynes, As a matter o f  
fa c t  as fa r  as our case-study i s  concerned the increase o f consumer 
p rices in  o i l  exporting countries cannot be used by the o i l  importing
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countries to  so lv e  th e ir  B.O.P. problem. From t h is  point of view  
consumer p rices evolu tion  in  OPEC and Arab countries can be said to be 
"neutral". Tin© on3.y price which matters for O.E.C.D. countries i s  
that o f  crude o i l .  I t  fo llow s that even in  a s itu a tio n  characterized  
by high rate o f in f la t io n  in  OPEC and Arab cou n tries, e .g .  Table 19 
(Page 50), O.E.C.D. countries s t i l l  have room for rranoeuvre in  order to  
achieve a more sa tis fa c to r y  B.O.P. s itu a tio n  through inerease'i expoi^ts 
to  the former group.
Our case-stu d y has another novel feature that we s h a l l  present 
as a c r it ic ism  to both Professor B. Ohlin and J.M. Keynes. Tliis 
feature has to do with the d is t in c tio n  between domestic p r ices and 
export p rices in  the O.E.C.D. cou n tries. As far as the o i l  c r is is  
i s  concerned l i t t l e  research has been done in  th is  d irec tio n , in  s p ite  
of the fa c t  that the phenomenon i s  not new, Ihe L.D.Cs, have 
conplained for a long time th at the In d u str ia l countries were 
characterized by two s e ts  of p r ices and two d iffer en t rates o f in fla t io n ,  
According to  OPEG countries the d ifferen ces between the two se ts  of 
p rices increased from 1974 onwards. Amongst other th ings such a 
s itu a tio n  explains the fa c t  why OPEG and Western countries never were 
in  agreement when i t  came to  ca lcu la tin g  the ra te  o f in f la t io n  u su a lly  
used by th e former to  increase o i l  princes.
Although a l l  OPEC countries were aware o f th e  fa ct Baud!
Arabia seoim to be the f i r s t  country to  take p ra c tica l steps again st 
What i t  c a l l s ,  " in fla ted  bids s e t  by w esteni co m p a n ies" ^ , In 1977, 
fo r  in stan ce, a major telecommunication contract was estimated a t  
^6,7bn, by P h ilip s \Afnereas tho Saudi's estim ate was S l.lP b n ., that i s  a 
f iv e fo ld  gap. The cm  tra ct was cancelled  and given to  South Asian 
companies (Pakistan, Singapore e t c . ) .  This i s  ju st one example, but 
the practice was very common on the part o f western companies. Cne 
can always say that t h is  shows that there i s  s t i l l  competition wlien i t  
comes to  the supply o f  technology. Nonetheless we have to mention 
th a t the a llo c a tio n  of the contract was not done through the m rket  
but by s ta te -d e c is io n .
(1) -  The F in an cia l Times, March 15, 1977, back page.
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I t  80em th a t contrary to the standard th eory’s view s,
consumer p rices did not even s ta b i l iz e  in  the d e f ic i t  cou n tries.
Furthermore, instead  o f cu ttin g  th e ir  p rices down, the d e f ic i t
countries increased th e ir  export p r ic e s . This can be p a r t ia lly
explained by tlie huge deiïiand o f  OPEC countries as a r e su lt  o f  th e ir
increased revenues but p r in c ip a lly  by the fa c t  that the main 0,E,C,D*
countries hold the sources o f technology. Further, P h ilip s  I s  not
an iso la te d  case because according to  Saudi Arabia "foreign companies
were conspiring to in f la t e  business tenders" . I t  seems that the
increase of export p rices was a d elib erate  and c o lle c t iv e  move
undertaicen by the 0,E,C.D, countries in  order to  adjust more e a s ily
to  the new s itu a t io n . The ex isten ce  o f .a  " d ifferen tia l"  in f la t io n
has a lso  been pointed out by M, Chatelus, He w rites  th a t, "In 1974
p rice  increases in  the main in d u str ia lized  countries suppliers (o f
goods and seind-ces} to OîEC countries vary  betv/een 7  ^ (West Germany )
and 26% ( I t a l y t h a t  i s  an average o f  about 14^ fo r  the O.E.C.D.
cou n tries. Hcweurer i  trip or t  p r ices of OPEC countries increased to  40 
( ? )to  Of course, as he puts i t ,  th is  fa c t  cancels part o f
the o i l  p rice in crea ses , However, before dravdng our conclusions  
l e t  uc consider the exchange rate p o lic ie s  pursued by our sample 
countries because th e ir  e f fe c t s  are sim ilar to those p rice movements*
B -  Adjustment Process and Exchange Rates Development
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The standard theory s ta te s  th a t in  case o f  a B.O.P. 
dl.sequil.ibrlum involving two cou n tries, the country su ffer in g  from the  
d e f ic i t  w in . have to  devalue in  order to  expand i t s  exports to  the  
surplus country. We sh a ll  t)?y to find out Wïiether such a view applied  
to  our G as e-study* However before doing so one has t o  r e c a ll a 
necessary background. As a matter o f fa c t th e  o i l  c r i s i s  c lo se ly  
follow ed the 1971 suppression of the gold cm vert îb i l i t y of the U.S. 
d o lla r . This led  to  sev era l attempts to  create a more f le x ib le ,  although 
s t i l l  s ta b le  exchange ra te  by taking in to  consideration  the economic 
changes Which occurred w ith in  the O.E.C.Ü. i t s e l f ,  Tlie most ambitious
(1) « The D aily Telegraph, Fàrch 5, 1977, p*5.
(2 ) -  M, Chatelus, "From th e Oil rent to Economic Development; "Hold-up 
of the Century" or New Hopes for the Third World", Revue d’Economie 
P o litiq u e , E dition S irey , P aris, January-February 1976, No. 1 . ,  p .34 
(tran slated  from French),
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attonpt has com© to  bo known as th e  Smithsonian Agreemsnt
However, such an attem pt was doomed to  fa ilu m  because o f the  
econoiidc ehajrjges which occurred during the subsequent year* Such a
fru stra tio n  le d  some currencies to  f lo a t  by the end o f  1972s the 
Canadian d o lla r  and the B r it ish  pound and associa ted  cu rren cies«,
However, the ^Bchange ra te s , although ">mrket dotoniiiiaed" were s t i l l  
" o ffic ia iJ.y managed".
The second devaluation  o f the U,8» d o lla r  drove other 
currencies to  th e F loating Exchange Rate System. Hie European Countries 
mnaged to agree on a jo in t  f lo a t  which came to  be known as the  
"European Snake".
The main O.E.C.D. countries "entered" the o i l  c r i s i s  period  
w ith th e ir  currencies f lo a t in g , Tîie evo lu tion  o f th e ir  exchange ra tes  
fox'* the 1974^77 period i s  represented In the next tab le  « The exchange- 
rate changes ax*e ca lcu la ted  in  r e la t io n  to  the S.DJL and not to  the  
U.S. dollar* Tlie reason i s  th a t, given i t s  v e iy  com position, the Sot)JR. 
i s  more stab le*
( 2 )
TABLE 20 Î Exchange Ratos o f th e  O.E.C.D. Countries 
Percentage Changes from Pj'evious Period 1974-7?
End o f  Periods 
Currencies 1974 1975 1976 1977
a -  Period Averages.
Source; I .F .S . op. c i t .  December 1977.
1973/7
U .S . Dollar-®' -1 7 .0
■faTTi in f t v x w d X i i m Wn*
+0.9 -  5 .0 +0.6 -  2 .6
Yen -  9 .1 +3.1 + 4.Ô +8.3 +-7 .6
Pound S ter lin g — 0 .4 -9 .9 -1 5 .3 •>0.7 —23.4
Deutsch Mark + 9 .6 —0.6 +10.6 ->0.7 +16,5
French Franc ■f* 4*2 +3.6 -  8 .1 - 0 .7 -  0 .9
Lira » Ô.4 -6 .4 -2 7 .0 -1 .5 -4 0 .7
(1) -  The Smithsonian Agreement was concluded on December 1971. I t
provides the devaluation of the U.S. d o lla r  by 7.69^ against gold  
and the appreciation  o f the Japanese Yen and German Deutschmark 
by 13.9% and 13.6% resp ec tiv e ly . The reason fo r  such an upward 
adjustment Vtâ.s th at Japan and West Germany were runn:lng the  
la r g e s t  B .O.P. surplus w ith in  the O.E.C.D. group,
(2) -  These countries were ; West Genaany, France, Sweden and the Netherlands,
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I t  would have been more in ter estin g  to  have average changes 
r e la t iv e  to  th e  S.D .R . However ;ln the absence o f such i'- data we 
prefer the end of period changes r e la t iv e  to  the S.D .R . to  average 
changes r e la tiv e  to the U .S. d o lla r , Ihe reason i s  th at th e  la t t e r  
i s  more v o la t i le  as shown in  the previous table* The U.S. d o lla r  
depreciated by 1?% r e la t iv e  to  the £.T)*Ro for  1974; appreciated in  
1975 by 0*9%, depreciated by 5% in  1976 and again was 0.6% higher by 
the end of June 1977* Di s p ite  o f  a2.1 those ups aM do'vms the U.S. 
d o lla r  value depreciated by 2*6% in  1977 ao compared to  i t s  1973 level*  
The s itu a tio n  concerning other currencies i s  not th at d if fe r e n t . Tiie 
yen depreciated only in  1974 by 9.1% and appreicated in  the follow ing  
year and by inid-1977 i t s  value as compared to the S.D.Ro was 7,6% 
higher than that of 1973.
The Deutsch I#rk d ep recia ted  only  to  1975 by a mere 0.9% and 
app reciated  duïi.ng a ll. o th er years in clu d in g  1974, It- has been the  
s tr o n g e st  currency and i t s  inid-1977 value was 16.5% h igh er than i t s  
end-1977 v a lu e .
Til G French Franc appreciated during th e  f i r s t  two years o f  
th e  c r i s i s  and subsequently  dep recia ted  in  1976 and 1977. However by 
mld-1977 i t s  value was low er by no more than 0,9% as comnared to th e  
end o f 1973.
F in a lly , the evolution  of the pound, s te r lin g  and l i r a  has 
been sim ilar; both I'ecorded stoop depreciation from 1974 to  1976 and 
by ndd-1977 they  were s t i l l  depreciating but a t a slower pace. By 
June 1977 the pound s te r lin g  has already lo s t  23.4% o f i t s  recorded end 
of 1973 S.D .R . value. The case of the l ir a  i s  worse s in ce  fo r  the 
same period i t  has lo s t  40.3% o f i t s  value with resp ect to the S.D .R ,
Ibat i s  the p icture o f the s ix  currenc3.es. The main 
observation i s  th at they flo a ted  w e ll beyond the "usual margin". 
Furthermore i f  one ap p lies the standard theory to  our case-stu d y and 
given the impact o f  the o i l  c r i s i s  and consequently the magnitude of 
the required adjustment the o il-im porting  countries would be l e f t  w ith  
no option but devaluation o f the main currencies and e sp e c ia lly  the 
pound s te r lin g ;  the I to lla n  l i r a  and the U .S. dollar* This s itu a tio n
did not occur. Why, then? For some, the main O.E.C.D, co u n tr ie s  used
J\nJ<LcV V\le-CX.VV^0A.\S,<jv^ 
the F loating  Exchange Rate Mechanism ter form e f f e c t iv e  d ev a lu a tio n s and
thus avoid the s o c ia l ,  p o l i t i c a l  and e s p e c ia l ly  econoonc problems Which
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would have arisen  from o f f i c i a l  devaluations* TItI s s ta te  of mind could 
be w ell encouraged by the fa c t  th a t the flu ctu a tio n s were too marked.
As an i l lu s tr a t io n  we s h a l l  take the case of the U*S« d o lla r . Cur 
choice i s  not fo rtu ito u s because the p rice  of crude o i l  I s  fixed  in  th is  
currency on the one hand, and on the other hand, the bulk of th e  
f in a n c ia l surplus of o i l  exporting countîdes i s  denominated in  the U.S. 
currency. Table 21 g ives us the exchange rate re la tio n  between the  
U .S. d o llar  and Arab and major OFEG currencies for the 1973-77 period.
From Table 21 the obvious conclusion is  that the UoS* d o lla r  
depreciated against a l l  our sample countries’ currencies except the 
Syrian and Sudanese pounds and the Mexican Pesos the la t t e r  currency 
was o f f i c ia l l y  devalued* By the end of 197? the U .S. d o lla r  l o s t  more 
than 10% of i t s  1973 value against the Bahraini. Kuwaiti and Libyan 
Dinars, the Saudi R iyal and the U.A.E* Dirham ,^ Those currencies are 
those o f the major Arab 03.1 exporting cou n tr ies. The UoS* D ollar l o s t  
6*1% and 6*77% of i t s  1973 value against the Algerian Dinar and Iranian  
R ial resp ec tiv e ly . ' Those seven OHüC loejrbers represent the major 
source of demand fo r  O.E.C.D, export products* Furthermore i t  i s  a lso  
worthwhile mentioning th a t the depreciation  of the Pound S ter lin g  was 
more marked than th at o f the U.S. currency. The auestioj.* i s  vhy both 
countries did not devalue in  order to  increase th e ir  export to  OPEC 
and Arab countîi.eH, Part o f the explanation has been given when we 
considered the developments whlcli occurred in  the f ie ld  o f consumer 
prices *
Cn the other hand, concerning the manipulation of exchange 
rate as a to o l of adjustment process our opinion i s  th at the 
devaluation o f a s in g le  currency w i l l  achieve no more than an external 
balance a t the expense of other 0,E.O*D, countides. This holds true  
e sp e c ia lly  when wo r e c a ll  th at the bulk of th e ir  trade i s  carried  out 
between them selves. I t  i s  not a c o lle c t iv e  so lu tion  Whereas the new 
s itu a tio n  requires a c o l le c t iv e  slow adjustment.
In p ra c tica l terns a devaluation a lso  means adding a double 
burden on the top o f the in itia l o i l  price in crea se . I t  w i l l  a lso  
have l ik e ly  brought an in crease  in  o i l  p r ices  bj'- OPEC. I t  is  the  
le a s t  the O.E.C.D. countries wanted to achieve. However, one cannot 
c lo se  t h is  pai't without mentioning development Which occurred during 
the second h a lf  o f  1977, and which in volve sm aller O.E.C.D, countries
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TABLE 21 ; Exchange Rate Evolution between the U .S. D ollar and Arab 
and some OREG Currencies, Percentage changes from Previous Period 
Average Market Rate, 1973-1977
Period
C ountries
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Oct
1977-72
A lgerian  Dinars -1 1 .7 1 + 5 .59 -  4 ,54 t  5.4-2 -  0 .84 -  P e l
B ahraini D im rs -  9 .8 5 -  1 .4 5 + 0 .2 0 + 0 .03 t  0.02 -1 0 .8 5
Egyptian Pound - 10 .18 «» 0 .8 4 NIL NIL NIL -1 1 .1 1
Ira q i Dinar -1 0 .1 8 -0 .8 3 NIT. NIL NIL -1 1 .1 1
Jordanian Dinar -  9 .1 0 -  2 .1 2 •»' 0 ,34 + 3 .81 -  1 ,85 -  9 .55
Kuwaiti Dinar -1 1 .3 1 — Op 54 -  1 .11 + 0 .82 -  2 .37 -1 4 .9 1
Lebanese Pound — 4.44 -1 0 .8 3 -  0 .79  +25.72 -  6 ,65 -  1 .5 1
Libyan Dinar -1 0 .1 8 -  0 .1 7 NIL NIL NIC, -1 1 .1 1
Ouguiya ( î t e r i t a n i a ) -1 1 .7 1 — 1 . 42 -  4.42 + 4 ,1 1 + 2 ,64 -  8 .52
Pbroccan Dirham. -1 0 .6 4 + 6 .4 0 -  7.27 + 9 .0 5 + 2 .09 -  1 .8 3
Omani
Q atari
Saudi R iyal -1 0 .7 0 — 4 .1 0 -  0 ,82 + 0 .35 -  0 .2 3 -1 5 .0 3
Somali S h il l in g —10*00 + 0 .2 1 NIL NIL nil -  0 .8 1
Sudanese Pound^ -1 1 .1 1 +17 .11 NH, NIL NIL + 7 .9 0
Syrian  Pound NIL -  2 .5 8 — 0,61 + 5.06 + 1 .6 0 + 3 c 40
Tunisian Dinar -1 1 .9 9 + 3.92 -  7 .84 + 6 ,58 + 0 .3 4 + 9 .8 3
U.A.E. (Diitjâm) -  8 .51 — 0 ,9 4 + 0.05 -  0 .2 1 + 1 ,4 0 -1 1 .1 3
Yemen R ia l 
(Y .A .R .) -  1 .5 7 -  0 .91 -  0 .2 1 -  0 .0 7 NIL -  2 .8 2
Yemen Dinar 
(Y .P .Ü .R .) -  9 .85 — 1 .1 4 NIL NIL NIL NIL
Major OPEC 
Countries
Iranian R ial -  9 .07 — 1 .8 3 + 0.02 + 3 .8 1 + 0.57 -  6 .7 7
Mexican Peso NIL NIL -  0.02 +23.42 +47.01 +81.42
N igerian  Naira -  0 .1 7 — 4.44 -  2.16 + 1 .7 8 + 3 .81 -  1 .0 0
Venezuelian Bolivar© -  2.12 — 0.46 + Z: + 0 .1 1 + 0 .06 -  2 .45
a -  End o f Period (Market Rate); -  ; Very Marginal Appreciation*
Source; International F inancial S t a t is t ic s ,  I .M .F ., Volume TOC,
Number 12, December 1977.
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a s e r ie s  o f  d eva lu a tion s happened In the Scandinavian cou n tries
However those developments were m arginal.
to  our op in ion  the O.E.C.D. co u n tries  understood the fa c t
th a t any d evaluation  -  th a t i s  a l ik e ly  remedy advocated by the
standard theory fo r  a country w ith a B .O .P. d e f i c i t  -  " . . .  would tend
to  r a is e  the lo c a l  currency p r ic e s  o f  a l l  im ports, not ju s t  o i l ,  and
( o }
many in te r n a l p r ic es  as w ell"  ,
Puîr’thermore even i f  a devaluation  vdt!i a l l  th a t I t  means i s
s o c ia l ly  and p o l i t i c a l l y  acceptab le  to the cm n try  ccsiceraed, i t  i s
very  l ik e ly  th a t i t s  major trad in g  partners would n ot accept and
consequently  th ey  would r ea c t e ith e r  by a d eva lu ation  of th e ir  own
cu rren cies  or by using trade c o n tr o ls . However, th ose e f f e c t s  would
not occur i f  the currency devalued were the U.S. d o lla r  because o i l
p r ic es  are fix ed  in  th is  currency. But here again OFEC cou n tries
would f e e l  fru stra ted  and would in crea se  the ncridnal price  o f  o i l  to
m aintain i t s  purchasing power. Some suggested th a t the adjustment
process can be r e a liz e d  through f le x ib le  exchange r a te s . F ir s t ,  the ■
fa c t  i s  th a t exchange r a te s  act on ly  a f t e r  the i n i t i a l  shock and even
a f t e r  secondary B.O .P. e f f e c t s  are f u l ly  f e l t .  These e f f e c t s  vd .ll
e ith e r  app reciate  or d ep recia te  some cu rren c ies .
Second, th e flow  o f OFEG surp lus w i l l  add up to  the pi'evious
e ffe c ts*  The u ltim a te  r e s u l t  w i l l  show some* co u n tries  vjxth current
account surplus and some co u n tr ie s  with d e f i c i t s ;  the cu rren cies o f
the former toJlI  ap p reciate  and th o se  o f  the l a t t e r  id-Jl d e p rec ia te .
The q u estion  then , i s  Whether t h i s  s itu a t io n  can be so lved  through
exchange m te s . Gerald Pollack maintains that;
"the p a r tic u la r  payments s itu a t io n  r e su lt in g  from h i ^  o i l
p rices and OHilC’s lim ited  absor)Dtive capacity provides a
r e la t iv e ly  inausp icious se tt in g  for a so lu tio n  in  which
f  3  )exchange rate adjustn^nt plays an important ro le ."
(1) -  Devaluation o f  the Swedish Krona and the Danish and Norwegian
Krones during the f i r s t  h a lf  of 1977,
(2) -  G.A. PoU-ack, "Are the O il Payments D e f ic its  !%nageable?"
op. c i t ,  p .14.
(3) -  G.A. Pollack; op. c i t .  p .p . 15-6.
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The main reason being that:
"a system o f fuD.y f le x ib le  exchange rate in  wliich ümiicet 
forces were permitted to  work out th e ir  e f f e c t s  would 
u ltim ate ly  "pass " the buck to the nation, b e st  able to  
bear i t ."
G.A. P ollack ’s statement is  confirmed by tliree fa c ts ,  F to s t ,
exchange rates were not "permitted to  work out th e ir  e ffec ts"  in  the
sense that tl'iey were o f f i c i a l l y  "nmmged". Second, there was no 
devaluation during the 1974 to  early  1977 period . T)i.e Scandinavian
countries appear to  be no more than an exception. Third, tho prima
aim o f the 0*SoC.D* economic p o licy  to  avoid "beggar.the 
neighbour" p o licy , or in  other ivords, to  "pass the buck" to  next-door 
neighbours* This i s  a lso  confirmed by the fa ct that they tr ie d  to  
avoid trade r e s tr ic t io n s  as we s h a ll  see when the trade p o licy  of the  
O.E.C.D* countries i^ dLll be considered.
Those are the main points to  be made concerning the exchange 
rates ro le  in  the adjustment process as seen by toe  standard theory.
However, when one considers the o i l  c r i s is  and i t s  aftermath 
from the angle of exchange rates new elements appear e sp e c ia lly  v/hen 
one r e c a lls  that the standard theory did not com pletely apj.xLy to  our 
ca se . I t  seems to  us that the exchange rate re la tio n s  between O.E.C.D, 
OPEC and Arab currencies do not matter that much; the reason being that  
OIEC and Arab co u n tr ie s’ currencies are ju st for domestic u se . In 
p r a c tica l terms th e ir  imports from O.E.C.D. countries are ca lcu lated  ard 
paid for  in  the so -c a lled  hard currencies but mainly in U.S. d o lla r s .
This i s  vexy d ifferen t from the case treated by Professor B, Ghlin and 
J.M, Keynes vhere the currencies o f the two countries were used for  
in tern ation a l tra n sa ctio n s. OPEC countries were worried by the U.S. 
d o lla r  depreciation only with regards to  the rea l va lu e o f  th e ir  o i l  
and the s t a b i l i t y  of th e ir  a s se ts  held in  O.E.C.D. cou n tries.
However, as ou tlin ed  e a r lie r , the adjustment process can be 
undertaken through p r ices  and exchange ra tes manipulation but a lso  through 
trade p o lic y  and each one to o l i s  su b stitu ta b le  to  oth ers. The 
re la tio n  between exchange ra te  and trade p o licy  has been p e r fe c tly
(IJ G.A, Pollack, op, c i t .  p .p . 15-6 .
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i l lu s tr a te d  by an American O ff ic ia l recen tly  stated  th at "eveiy
percentage point in  the fa ll, o f the d o lla r  i s  as good as a percentage
n  1 ■point increase in  U.S. t a r i f f  Walls"^ * I t  i s  therefore necessary
to  consider the trade p o licy  pursued by the O.E.C.D. cou n tries.
C •» AdjustnBnt Process and Trade P olicy  to the O.E.C.D, Area.
In s im ila r  circumstances by trade p o licy  we u su a lly  mean 
quotas and higher t a r i f f  li^ o rb s. Was such a p o licy  put in to  
p ractice  by O.E.C.D. countries? As a matter of fa ct import 
r e s tr ic t io n s  were used by I ta ly  f i r s t  but other countries followed  
s u it  by taking more or le s s  open r e s tr ic t iv e  trade measure^? Denmark, 
Iceland; Finland,, A ustralia , B rita in , France and Portugal, The 
measures varied a great deal in  terms o f form, in te n s ity  and period of 
ap p lica tio n . Borne were s p e c if ic a l ly  designed fo r  1974. In su ite  of 
th at such a trend was worrying in  i t s e l f  and consequently, anxious to  
avoid "beggar the neighbour" p o lic ie s  which pî'evailed dm' t^og arx3. 
p recip ita ted  the Great Depression, the O.E.O.D. countries w ith in  tVte 
context of th e ir  organisation;
"on May 30, 1974 « «, committed themselves to a s ta n d s t i l l  
pledge* They agreed fo r  one year not to  adopt new import
(2 )
r e s tr ic t io n s  or measiu'es to  stim ulate ex.poits a r t i f ic ia l ly ," ^  
Furthermore, as wi.11 be seen in  the next (Tnapter, the I.M.F. came with  
the so -ca lled  " o i l - f a e i l i t y  scheme" for 1974 and 1975, One o f the 
conditions o f having access to  i t  was that tho borrower country would 
undertake not to introduce r e s tr ic t iv e  trade measures. In 1975, the 
O.E.C.D, countries pledged another s ta n d s t i l l  agreement, but by then 
the s itu a tio n  has d eteriorated  for some co u n tr ies. For instance  
" . . .  the United Kingdom renev;al was made conditional on the a v a il-  
a b i l i ty  of finance to  cover B.O.P, d e f ic it s " .
I t  fo llow s th at trade re s tr ic t io n s  were not used because they  
would have harmed inter-O .E .C .D . trade and p recip ita ted  another Great 
Depression without so lv ing th e ir  ind ividual or combined o i l  induced
(1) •» The Guardian, c f .  A rtic le  "America Shrugs o ff  Drop to  the Dollar"  
by B ella  Pick, m nchester, Saturday February 25, 1978.
/ r .  % n  A 1   J. „  nrt(2) -  G.À. Pollack, op. c i t ,  p .18.
(3) -  G.A. Pollack, op, c i t ,  p .18,
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B.O.P o d e f ic i t s .  We have seen the remedy advocated by the standard 
theory in  case o f a B.O.P, d e f ic i t ,  namely the slowing down of domestic 
a cti\d ,ty , the manipulation o f p r ices and exchange ra tes and the s e t t in g  
up o f trade r e s tr ic t io n s .  The la s t  three to o ls  a f fe c t  the terms of 
trade o f  both groups th at i t  i s  worthwhile considering.
D -  Adjustment Pi'ocess and Terms of Trade Developments t 1973-1977.
In our opinion the terms of trade (T.O.T.} between o i l  
exporting and o i l  importing countries w ill, shed more l ig h t  on our 
a n a ly s is . I t  i s  not p o ssib le  to consider tlio T.O.T* of each Arab and 
OPEC country, ooisequently we sh a ll re ly  on the eases o f Saudi Arabia 
and A lgeria which, in  our opinion, are rep resentative of our samole 
cou n tries. The former i s  the major o i l  exporting country with a 
lim ited  absorptive capacity , the la t t e r  i s  a medium o i l  exnorter but 
with huge development needs and a much larger absorptive cap acity  than 
Saudi Arabia on geographical ground. They represent Eastern and 
Western part of the Arab W’orld .
The T.O.T. o f both countries i s  represented in  the subsequent
ta b le .
TABLE 22a s Saudi Arabia’s Terms of Trade with 
Major O.E.C.D, countries ; 1973-77
End of Period 
Countries
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977®
United S tates 144.15 404.44 388.98 401,58 119.71
Japan 126.07 349.83 376.18 410.12 &01.Ü9
Germany 122.28 376.58 389.87 375.66 379.17
United Kingdom 139.33 405 c 47 374.95 407,84 379.52
France 122.03 372.53 337,96 369.60 377.92
I ta ly 131.54 368.22 350.76 397.45 3 7 7 .9 ^
a : September 1977; b Î July 1977.
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TABÏE 22b -  A lgeria’s Terms o f Trade with
Major O.E.C.D. Countries ! 1973-1977 •
Unit ; U .S. (?
End o f Period
Countries
1973 1974
UTH.—KM M&KKmtewm"##
1975 1976 1977®
United S ta tes 181.30 400.62 363.22 360.19 403.23
Japan 158.56 353.45 351.26 389.70 366.50 ,
Germany 153,79 371.39 326.69 356,04 364.27
United Kingdom 175.23 421.74 350.10 366.54 364,6?
France 153.47 376,36 315.56 350.30 363.08^'
I ta ly 167.44 372.03 372.53 376.69 362.9 p
a Î September 1977 ; b s Ju ly  1977.
Source ? I.F .S  * by I.M.F * Volume XXI Number 12  ^ Decevnber 1977 
p .p . 32 and 40-41.
We s h a ll  not comment on the T.O.T. of Saudi Arabia and Algeria  
with each one o f i t s  O.E.C.D, trading partners. We s h a ll  l im it  
ourselves to  th e  general trend* I t  appears th at the T.O.T. o f both 
countries improved by more than 100% in  1974 as compared to  1973. The 
explanation i s  o b v ia is; the quadnipling of o i l  p r ices  Which were f u l ly  
r e fle c te d  in  1974* However, in  average th e ir  terms o f  trade declined  
during 1975 and 1976. This can be explained by the fa c t  th a t o i l  
p rice  increases led  to  a h igher rate o f in f la t io n  in.O .E.C .D , countries  
Which cannot be v h o lly  explained by o i l  p r ices  a lone, Tho second 
explanation i s  th at during 1975 and 1976 OPEC did not d r a s t ic a lly  
increase the p rice o f o i l .  In 1977 the T.O.T. o f both countries  
experienced a s lig h t  improvement but in  sp ite  o f  th at i t  was, in  most 
ca ses , below i t s  1974 l e v e l .  For Saudi Arabia i t  i s  the case o f i t s  
re la tio n  w ith United Kingdom alon e. For Algeria the s itu a t io n  i s  
worse because i t s  1977 T.O.T, with U .S.A ., Germany, France atvi I ta ly  
were below th e ir  1974 le v e l .  I t  happens th at those four countries  
provide i t  vdtii the bulk o f i t s  im ports. In our opinion i t  i s  p o ss ib le  
to  gen eralize such fin d in gs to most OTEC and Arab co u n tr ies. The 
d eterioration  of th e ir  T.O.T, coupled with h ij^ er  import recu iraments
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provide th e  b e s t  way fo r  O.E.C.D. co u n tr ie s  to  achieve th e ir  adjustment 
p rocess by making "goods fo llo w  money". The lo g ic a l  Question i s  
Wïiether O.E.C.D. co u n tr ie s  achieved t h e ir  adjustment p ro cess . For 
th e  tim e being we s h a ll  a s se s s  the ex ten t to  which the measures put 
in to  p r a c tic e  helped so lv e  or cushion th e  impact o f  th e  quadrupling o f  
o i l  p r ic e s ,
Accoi'^ing to  Table 12 (Page 35) the combined increase o f  
o i l  imports for our sample countries to ta lle d  224.7 b i l l io n  in  1974 
U.S. doH.ar3 during the 1974-1977 period, According to  Table 16 
(Page 45) ^7,945,5 bn. or 3.53% of tto combined co st o f  o i l  imports was 
paid for by borror^ng from the I.M.F* As i t  has been said e a r lie r  
45.03% of which was paid by increased exports to OPEC cou n tr ies. Part 
of the o i l  b i l l  was s e t t le d  by using ex istin g  in b ern atiom l revenues 
Whose contribution i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  quantify. I f  one assumes th a t the 
^21 bn, drawn Tjy the developed market countries went to  our sample 
countries during the 1974-77 period th is  would account for no more than 
9*34% of the combined o i l  b i l l .  I t  seems th a t a l l  in  a l l  no moî'B than 
62,79% of the o i l  b i l l  was paid for through the option "pay as you go"<%vvi 
financing through non-Arab co u n tr ies. I t  means th at 37% of the o i l  
b i l l  w i l l  have to be s e t t le d  in  one way or another^ but mainly throu^  
the option "take now -  pay la te r " * Before considering such an option  
we sh a ll consider f i r s t  the case o f the N.O.C.D.
SECTION I I  -  NON-OIL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ POLICIES TO THE OIL-INDUCED 
B .O .P. DEFICIT ; 1974-77,
We s h a ll  use the method p rev io u sly  fo llow ed  to  con sid er  th e  
ca se  o f the N.O.D.C. th a t i s  p resen t the impact o f  th e  quadrupling o f  
o i l  p r ic e s  and then the adjustment process which was put in to  p r a c t ic e .  
However, b efore  con sid erin g  the impact o f  and adjustm ent to the o i l  
c r i s i s  one has to  draw a t  l e a s t  a rough p ic tu re  o f the environment in  
Which the c r i s i s  occurred.
The s itu a t io n  i s  d if fe r e n t  from th a t o f th e  O.E.C.D’s ,  The 
economies o f  th e  L.D.Cs. are f r a g i le  and th e  governments o f th ese  
co u n tr ies  never had any in f lu e n c e  m  ex tern a l shocks ard worldwide 
e v en ts . This h o ld s tr u e , e s p e c ia l ly  in  the c a se  o f  o i l .  They are  
p a r tie s  n e ith e r  a t  the production nor a t  the d is tr ib u t io n  l e v e l s ,  Th^  
have no M.N.O.C. through vh ich  thqy could in te r fe r e  in  th e  "market".
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Cn the other hand, the L.D.G’s expression covers a wide rang© 
of economies vhich d i f f e r  at more than one lev e l*  Consequently they
■will be d iversly  a ffected  by the o i l  c r i s i s .  For instance, not a l l
the L.D.Cs, took advantage of the p r e -c r is is  economic expansion recorded 
by O.E.C.D, cou n tries. Such an expansion led  to higher dernani, and 
consequently higher p rices fo r  some of L.D.C’s ecport commodities.
Howevei', even such an upswing remains to  be seen as a temporary 
c y c lic a l  phenomenon due to higher demand. But th is  does not imean that 
the p rices o f commodities exported by non-L.D.Gs, did not in crease , Th# 
fa c t  is  th at, according to  H.B. Chenery;
"at the peak o f the boom in  early  1974 basic fo o d stu ffs  were
up by 1CX)%, f e r t i l i z e r s  by 170% and petroleum by more than
350%; however, other primary commodities averaged only 25% 
hlghei'.
Fbst o f the L.D.G’s export commodities belong to the la s t  
category. On the other hand, h i^ e r  o i l  p ii.ces do not present s 
temporaxy pxxiblem sin ce the o i l  c r i s i s  introduced stru ctu ra l changes in  
the world econooy, and they are not the so le  burden e ith er , because the  
price o f other major products w i l l  be maintained a t high le v e ls  for many 
years to come. We have to focus on the o i l  c r i s i s  and consequently 'W© 
have to d istin g u ish  between o i l  cr is is-in d u ced  e f fe c t s  and n on -o il 
c r i s i s  induced e f f e c t s .
SECTION II  -  1 : THE MAGNITUDE OF THE OIL-INDUCED BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
DEFICIT Î 1974-1977.
F ir s t , some points have to be c la r if ie d . Although we are 
concerned with a l l  N.O.D.C., for p ractica l reasons we sh a ll focus on 
the Most S eriou sly  A ffected C o u n t r i e s o r  (M .S.A.C.).
Our approach i s  d iffe r e n t  from th a t used for O.E.C.D. countries  
The e f fe c t s  o f the o i l  c r i s i s  w i l l  be analysed in  terms o f  foreign  
exchange earnings.
(1 ) -  H o llis  B. Chennery, "Restructuring the World Econony", op, c i t .
P.244.
(2) -  For the id e n tif ic a t io n  of the M.S.A.C. e f .  Appendix I I -4 .
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Such an approach adopted by Wouter i s  ju s t if ie d  by the
fa c t  that the a v a i la b i l ity  o f  foreign  exchange conditions the import 
capacity  and therefore the development e f fo r t  o f the N.O.D.C. and. indeed 
o f  a l l  the Thiid World cou n tries. Such a fa ct hs-s a lso  been recognised  
by R.N. Cooper (o f. the present Chapter).
To th is  a p o l i t ic a l  element must be added, TTie N.O.D.C. 
backed tho OPSG in  i t s  iiDve| and given the long time proclaimed 
" co lle c tiv e  se lf-r e lia n c e"  of the Third World cou n tries, the N.O.D.C. 
were expecting a more or le s s  quick "red istrl.bntion" of o i l  revenues,
In our opinion the previous upswing in  export earnings combined with the  
1973-4 p o l i t ic a l  euphoria dedramatised the o i l  c r is is  fo r  the N.O.D.C.
This holds txnxe for some Arab countries which la te r  w i l l  be c la s s if ie d  
as M.S.A.C. On the othe'^th© O.E.C.D, reduced th e ir  domestic economic 
a c t iv ity  by taking r e s tr ic t iv e  measures which were re flec te d  on the 
N.O.D.C* The forms mdor.which t h is  repercussion occurred v d l l  be 
presented at a la te r  s ta g e . This being said; one c+rx consider the 
impact of the o i l  c r i s i s  on N.O.D.C, Hov.'©ver, before that we s h a ll  try  
to  elimdnate other commodity e f fe c t s  on the N.O.D.C,
As in  the case o f energy, the N.O.D.C. r e lied  too  much on 
ava ilab le  and to cap fo o d stu ffs  (wheat) and fortill%er&; both being  
imported from the O.E.C.D. group. Consequently; by 1D74:
"the r is e  :ln import requirements combined wltii large p r ice  
r ise s  have had as damaging an e f fe c t  on the grovjth prospects
f f  I
of mai'jy developing countxles as have r is in g  o i l  prices"
Furthermore
"for the poorest people in  these countries the impact o f high 
food p rices and shortages I s  much more ser iou s s in ce  most 
o f th e ir  income i s  spent on food".^^^
For instance, for 1974 alone, the increased p rices o f  food and 
. f e r t i l i z e r s  ad.ded an ad d ition a l 6bn, d o llars to the N,0,D ,C’s import 
b i l l .
However, th is  f ig u re , in  no way dim inishes the e f fe c t  o f higher 
o i l  p rices in  the N.O.D.C, and our in ten tion  i s  not to  do so e ith e r .
Such an impact, for  1974 and 1977 i s  outlined in the fo llow ing ta b le .
(1) « E.R, Fried and C.L. Schultz©, op, c i t .  c f .  Chapter V (p .p . 169-195),
(2) -  H.B. Chennery, "Restructuring the World Economy", op, c i t ,  p .24 4^. 
( j i ) .  i W .
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TABLE 23 î Incremental Cost of Oil Imports fo r  N.OuD.C, 
Estimate fo r  1974 and Projections for  1977
Non-oil
Developing
Countries
1973
Estimated 
Population  
in  M illions
1,797
1974
In B ill io n s  
of 1974 
D ollars
- 10,1
As % o f  
O.N.P.
-  1 .7
1977
In B illio n s  
of 1974 
D ollars
—10.4
As % of 
Projected  
fo r  1971
-  1 .5
Source g Higher Oil Prices and the V/orld Economy î The Adjustment Process, 
Edited by E.R. Fried and C.L, Schultae, op. c i t .  o f  Table 1-11  
p .36.
Then, i t  seems th at u n t i l  the end of 1970s the additional o i l  
b i l l  w i l l  s ta b i l i s e  around .|lObn. a year or about 1.5% o f the N.O*D,C’s 
combined G.N.P, Such a figu re d id  more than o f f s e t  the previous gains 
consequent to  the 1972-73 O.E.C.D. economic boom.
However, o i l  i s  ju st one item  o f the trade r e la tio n s  between 
OPEC and N.O.D.C, According to the Development A ssistance Committee, 
the la t t e r 's  "trade d e f i c i t  v is -a -v is  OPDÎG rose fmm ^|3bn. in  1972 to  
an estim ated |l6bn* in  1975 and in  1976"^^^. The o i l  c r is is  a lso  
a ffec ted  N.O.D.C. by a ffec tin g  th e ir  trade re la tio n s  w3.th O.EoC.D. area. 
As i t  has been mentioned the quadrupling of the p r ices of petroleum led  
to  an economic recession  in  the O.E.C.D. cou n tries. This ræans l e s s  
imports from N.O.D.C.; or in  other words the volume and price o f  
exports o f  K.O.DcC, to  developed economies w i l l  d e c lin e . As a 
consequence th e ir  "trade d e f ic i t  v is -a -v is  0 ,E,C,D,/D ,A ,C, doubled 
from |9bn, in  1973 to |l8 b n . in  1974 and widaied to an estim ated |31bn  
in  1975.” ^^  ^ In 1976 the trade d e f ic i t  was . ju st  over |?.2bn. because 
o f an economic recovery in  the O.E.C.D, area.
The combined current account d e f ic i t  o f  iixe N.O.D.C, jumped 
from |l2 b n , in  1975 to |39bn, in  1974 to an estim ated ^49bn. in  1975;
(1) -"Development and Co-operation ; E fforts  and P o lic ie s  of the I^itfoers 
of the Development A ssistance Committee", Report by ifeurice J , 
W illiams, Chairman of the D.A.C,; O.E.C.D. P aris, November 1976 
p. 38,
U ) -c'ox}-
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and in  1976 i t  was around ^41bn* The problem, then, i s  hcfw they are 
going to  balance such a s itu a tio n ?  In answering th is  Question we shall, 
fo llow  the method used when we tackled the case of the O.E.C.D, co u n tr ies . 
I t  seems th a t the same options are open to that i s  recourse to
in tern ation a l reserves and I.M .F, cred it f a c i l i t i e s .
The la t t e r  and other option'^ are contained in  the follow ing
ta b le ,
TABLE 24 s Financing o f Non-Oil Developing Countries 
Current Account D e f ic its , 19'^4“1976,
Financing Items 1974 1975 1976
1 . O ff ic ia l tra n sfer s . . . . . . . . . . . .
(o f wVdch; Technical
7.81 8.45 9.17
Co-operation ) ............. .. 3.16 3.55 3.80
a) DAC............... .................................. 5.03 5.94 6 ,6o
b ) M u ltila tera l a g e n c ie s ,. . . . . 1 .34 1.48 1 .7 0
c ) OPSC.6 1.37 0*96 0.80
d ) C entrally planned economies 
2, Long-term o f f i c ia l  and private
0,07 0.07 0.07
c a p i t a l . .................... .. 19.07 26,10 25.15
O D A ...C ............ .............. .............. . 5.25 6.11 6 .50
a) DAC......................................... .. 2,46 3.07 3.30
b ) M iltila te r a l agencies 1.02 1.35 1 .50
c) OPEC............................. .. 0 .83 1.07 1.00
d) C entrally planned economies 0.94 0,62 0 .70
OOF...................................................... .. 3.88 7.09 6.65
a) DAC.................................................. 1.31 2.72 1 .50
b) M u ltila tera l agen cies........... 1 .8 4 2.23 3.00
c) OPEC............................ ................... 0.61 1.99 2 .00
d) C entrally planned economies 0.12 0,15 0.15
Private (DAC).................................. 9.94 12,90 12.00
B) D irect investm ent.................... 4 ,50 6. CO 5.50
b) P o rtfo lio  in v e s t m e n t , , , , . . . 3.73 4.60 4 .00
d) Export c r e d i t s . . . . . , , , ......... 1.71- 2.30 2,50
3. Other..................................... . . 9 .43 10.33 8.50
a) IFF Oil F a c il i t y ............. ........ 1 ,15 2,43
b ) Use of other c r e d it . 0.38 0,30 3.50
c ) Euro-cun'ency borrowing,, , , 7 .90 7.60 5.00
4, Change in  reserve p o s i t io n . , . ,
5. Short-term ca p ita l -  errors
+1.52 -3 .5 3 (+5.00)
and o m i s s i o n s , , , . , , . , ........... . +4,21 -0 .5 9 +3,18
Total 1 + 2 + 3 . . . ' ................. .. 36.31 44.88 42,82
Total 1 + 2 + 3 -  4 .......................... .. 34.79 4 8 ,U 37.82
Source; Development and Co-operation ; E fforts and P o lic ie s  o f the D.A.C." 
Report by M.J, W illiams, op, c i t ,  p .40.
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Some of the item s such as I.M .F. o i l  f a c i l i t y  and Euro­
currency borrowing w i l l  be considered in  Chapter I I I ,  For the time 
being we sh a ll  focus only on financing through in tern ation a l reserves  
and use o f I.M.F. c red it  f a c i l i t y  other than Oil F a c il i ty .
SECTION II -  2 Î USE OF OVJNEU INTERNATIONAL RESERVES
I t  i s  a fa c t  that L.D.Cs, have always been characterized by
sinall in tern ation a l reserves as compared to developed cou n tries.
However; in  s p ite  of th iS; N.O.D.C. used part of th e ir  in tern ation a l
reserves to finance ^js-rtlally th e ir  o i l  b i l l .  As outlibied in  the case
of the O.E.C.D, such an operation i s  very lim ited  in  time and in
magnitude. However^ the r ich er of the N.O.D.C. such as Portugal,
Turkey, Peru and Argentina drew as )meh as p ossib le  on th e ir  reserves.
According to the D,.A,C. 1976 annual report "the poorer countries were
forced to  draw down th e ir  reserves in  1975 by about |l.lbn ."^ ^ ^  Such
an operation has had the e f f e c t  of cu ttin g  doi\m th e ir  already meagre
in tern ation a l reso lves and "for the group as a Wîiole reserves covered
only fourteen weeks’ imports a t  end-1975 by comparison w ith twenty-
( Z }three weeks’ imports in  1974* . Furbherinor© to  be more p recise  we
give  the case of N.O.D.C. fo r  the 1973-75 period, (Table 25 ).
According \-,o Table 25 the reserves as a percentage o f annual 
imports o f the N<0,D,C. declined  drasticaD .y , For instance in  1975 they 
represented no more than 5% of annual imports o f Z aire. Tîiey were 7% 
and 9% for the cases o f  Egypt and 8 r i lanka re sp e c tiv e ly .
On the other hand i f  one considers Table (Page one 
n o tices  that the reserve p o sitio n  of the N.O.D.C, moved from +v|l,52bn, 
in  1974 to |-3 .5 3 b n , in  1975. In other words i t  means that from end-
1974 to  end-1975 they drew ^5.03bn, from th eir  in tern a tio n a l reserves.
In s p ite  of th at such a sum did not represent more than 50% o f th e ir
1975 o i l  b i l l  or ju st  above 10% of th e ir  current balance d e f ic i t  for the  
same year. This means th a t in  order to  balance th e ir  d e f ic i t  the  
N.O.D.C, w in  have to use other rem edies, Qie o f  the la t t e r  i s  the  
f a c i l i t i e s  offered  by the I.M ,F,
(1) (2) Ib id .
TABLE 25 î Reserves as a Percentage o f  Annual Imports 
of 16 Non-Oil Developing Countries s 1973-75
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End of Periods
19741973 975
Countries
Argentina
104
Peru
Uruguay
12
Kenya 22
Portugal 103
113
McS oA o Countries
Bangladesh 14
India
Pakistan
S r i Lanka 12
Sierra Leone
Tanzania 10
Zaire 11
b -  Provisional.
Source; "Devolopment Co-operation ; E fforts  and P o lic ie s  o f the Members 
of the Development A ssistance Committee"^ Report by Maurice J . 
W illiams , op. c i t ,  p ,46j p. -(-or ^  5- A C.
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SECTION I I  -  3 ? USE OF DRAWINGS FROM Tf-TE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
The I.M .F, does represent an option but a lim ited  one because 
drawing from the I.M .F. to  finance B.O.P. d e f ic it s  i s  function  o f the  
member's quota in  the Fund, As a im tter of fa c t the L.D.Cs, in  
general and N.O.D.Csi quotas in  particiùLar are small r e la t iv e ly  to  those 
o f the O.E.C.D, member cou n tries.
Being aware o f the magnitude o f the N.O.D.C’s d e f ic i t  the 
I.M .F. was conscious o f the fa c t  that i t s  the^ f a c i l i t i e s  were not able 
to  bridge the financing gap; consequently i t  opened up new sources such 
as th e Special Account and the Oil F a c il ity  Schemes that w i l l  be d ea lt  
w ith in  the next Cîiapter. For the time being we s h a ll  focus on tho 
in crease in  cr ed it  tranches aiid the creation  of the Trust Fund, ï^ etin g  
in  January 1976 in  Kingston (Jamaica} the I.FLF. Interim Committee agreed 
to a 3?-o5  ^ increase in  the members* ouota and more im portantly an 
increase o f 45^ in  c r e d it  tranches. The la s t  increase va.s to  cover 
only the medium-period. Both d ec isio n s w i l l  b en efit  al.l the Fund's 
members. However  ^ two other d ecision s tafcen a t the same meeting were 
s p e c if ic a l ly  designed to  help the N.O.D.C. 'Die fii*st one re3^tes to  
the l ib e r a liz a t io n  o f the compensatory Financing F a c il i t y  which enables 
the I.M .F. to  a s s i s t  a member in  i t s  ear ly  stace o f development in case  
of a shortfall, in  export earnings. Such a shortfal3. was very common 
for N.O.D.C, during the 1974-1975 pextod.
The second d ecision  was more important because i t  refers to the creation  
by the I.M .F, of a "Trust Fund vvlth the s p e c if ic  purpose o f providing 
special, balance o f payments a ss ista n ce  on concessional terms to developing  
I.M .F, member countries w ith per cap ita  income not in  excess o f  S.D.R.
300 (about |375J in  1973, The resources of the Trust Fund are derived  
from s a le s  o f  I.M .F, gold , supplemented by national c o n t r i b u t i o n s .^
The creation  of the Trust Fund led  the N.O.D.C. to  take advantage 
in d ir e c tly  o f the IVbrtinique Summit we evoked at an e a r lie r  stage o f the 
present Chapter. The Trust Fund represents an important boost to  
N.O.D.C*8 a b i l i t y  to  finance th e ir  current account d e f i c i t .  For
( l )  "Development Co-operation j E fforts and P o lic ie s  o f the Members 
o f the Development A ssistance Committee, op, c i t ,  p .51.
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in stance the January 4 , 197& monthly gold auction brought the Trust 
Fund to ta l  to ^1,03 bllllon^^^» Such a figu re i s  not represented in  
Table 19 (Page 50) according to  viiich N.O.D.C. drew |4 .1 0 b n . from the  
I.M .F. to  finance i t s  d e f ic i t  from 1974 to 1975. This represents le s s  
than 3,5% of th e ir  combined current balance d e f ic i t  during the same 
p eriod . As i t  has been seen both sources were not able to  bridge tho 
gap and therefore N.O.D.C. and e sp e c ia lly  M.S.A.C. w i l l  need access to 
other sources of fin an cin g . Apart from the I.M.F. Oil F a c il i ty  
bot'Towing from the market w i l l  a lso  be presented In the next Chapter,
However^ as outlined  in  the previous sec tio n , the O.E.C.D. 
countries managed to cushion the impact of o i l  p r ices by expanding th e ir  
export to  OPEC co u n tr ies. Unfortunately, as i t  has been mentioned 
e a r lie r  J, N .0 .0 .0 ,  recorded trade d e f ic it s  with both OPSG and O.E.C.D. 
countries o Part of th is  s itu a tio n  can be explained by the fa c t  that  
th e ir  terms of trade with OPEC and O.E.G.D. countries d eteriorated .
Then i t  seems that N.O.D.C. were cornered; therefore i t  w i l l  be 
in terestin g  to  study how they adjust to the new s itu a tio n .
SECTION IX -  4 s N.O.D.C, ADJUSTMENT PROCESS 1974-1977
W© sh a ll present the adjustment process o f the N ,0 .0 .0 .  in  
hh© trade, f i s c a l  and monetary f ie ld s .
In the trade f ie ld  most N.O.D.C, tr ied  to  expand exports 
p a rticu la r ly  to  OPEC countries and to cut down imports from both OPEC 
and O.E.C.D. groups. However, as far  as exports to  OPEC are concerned, 
i t  i s  c lea r  th at few N.O.D.C, could take advantage o f the Booming 
Middle Eastern Markets because they did not have the adeouat© in d u str ia l  
cap acity  to do so . But some cou n tries with the economic recession  in  
O.E.C.D, in  mind tr ie d  to  red irec t th e ir  exports from the O.E.C.D, to  
OPEC co u n tr ies. As a matter of fa c t ,  "Pakistan exports to  the Middle 
East in  1974-75 accounted fo r  29% of to ta l  exports, as again st 14% in
1969- 72^^^". On the other hand they introduced measured aimed a t saving  
th e ir  foreign  exchanges, they did so  by passing r e s tr ic t iv e  import law s,
(1) -  I.M .F. Survey, January 9, 197&, p .lO .
(2 ) -  Development Co-operation : E ffo rts  and P o lic ie s  o f  the Menbers of
the D.A.C.", Report by M.J. W illiams, cp. c i t ,  p .46 ,
73.
For in stan ce Sudan, Tanzania aid Zaire tightened th e ir  import c o n tro ls .
Other countries such as Malawi, S ierra Leon© and a lso  Zaire introduced
more severe payment reg u la tio n s. F in a lly  imports surcharges and
imports deposits were put in to  p ractice  e sp e c ia lly  by Pakistan and
Upper V olta, I t  c|oes w ithout saying th a t they did th e ir  b e s t  to
promote domestic sources o f  energy and a lso  to  out down ol3. imports
by introducing conservation measures. Few ever, in  s p ite  o f those
measures, the foreign  exchange earnings o f  most o f the M.S,A,C. decreased
during the 1974-77 period .
I t  i s  not p o ss ib le  to consider the case of a l l  N.O.D.C, We
sh a ll then content ourselves with some ex a mules from the M.S.A.C, ® the
foreign  exchange reserves o f four countries -  Bangladesh, Pakistan, Kenya
( \  )
and Z a ire ; decreased  in  1974 and 1975 . For Sudan, an Arab countny,
th e  decrease was recorded  during  the whole 1977-77 p e r i c i .  By mid 1977
the  fo re ig n  exchange re se rv e s  of P ak istan , Sudan and Z a ire  were
re sp e c tiv e ly  12,4%, 49% and 49,2% lower than  th e i r  1973 le v e l .
The r e a l i t y  i s  worse because those figu res include fin a n c ia l  
tran sfers received from in s t itu t io n s  such as the World Bank, the D.A.C, 
and OPEC,
Wîiat about the measures in  the monetaxv f ie ld ,  and the exchange
rate p o licy  pursued? More a tten tio n  s h a ll  be devoted to the la t t e r .
As in  th e  case o f  the O.E.C.D^ countries we reserve a sp e c ia l
place for exchange ra te  p o l ic ie s .  As a matter o f fa c t  the N.O.D.C.,
and indeed a31 the L.D.Cs, wjere not sa fe  from the developments which
occurred in  th is  f ie ld  in  the early  1970s, developments already ou tlin ed .
Unfortunately th e ir  e f f e c t s ,  although stron gly  f e l t  by the L .D .Cs,,
remained in  the shadow o f  the intexiiationa]. monetary crd.8ic tvhich
p recip ita ted  them. These developments, msdnly the Smithsonian Agreement
and the second devaluation of the U.S. d o lla r , are worthwhile r e c a llin g .
According to  the United N ations, the f i r s t  led  to  an Increase of 7% and 
(? )6% in  L.D.Cs* iiiports and exports co sts  resp ectiv e ly ; the u ltim ate
(1 ) -  The fo llow in g  percentages derive from ca lcu la tio n s  based on 
figu res published by the In tem a ticn a l Abnetar^r Fund, I .F .S .
August 1977 (Volume XXX No. B).
(2J -"United N ations, Department o f  Economic ard S o c ia l A ffa irs , 
Supplement to  World Economic Survey, 1975" ,cp. c i t ,  p ,199.
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r e su lt  being a one per cent poin t deterf.oration in tb e ir  T.O.T, The
(1 )
second led  to  a d eter iora tion  ju st  below one per cent point.
On top of th a t the f lo a t in g  o f the niajor currencies coupled 
with the a b o litio n  of o f f i c i a l  c o n v e r t ib ility  o f the U.S. d o lla r  brought 
other problems to the L .D .C s., problems summarised by the Uixlted Nations* 
Department of Economic and S ocia l A ffa irs as fo llow s;
"the value o f external, a sse ts  and l i a b i l i t i e s  denominated in  
foreign  currencies . . .  became le s s  certa in  and each country 
was faced w ith a new need to  decide the value of i t s  ox  ^
currency and to d ev ise  ways and means o f iraii'italning that 
value. The circumstances o f malcing such d ecision s were 
moreover, p a r tic u la r ly  unfavourable, The value o f every  
currency was be bag eroded by the general in f la t io n  though 
a t d ifferen t r a te s . Like the sm aller developed market 
economies, the  developing countries tended to  f e e l  victim s
(1 )of the changing monetary system rather Üian shapers o f i t .  "
With more or le s s  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  depending on th e ir  e x is t in g  
fin a n c ia l ex p ertise , tlie L.D.Cs, managed to adapt themselves to  the new 
s itu a t io n . They went through dif'forent phases and, gen erally , ended up 
by pegging th e ir  currencies e ith e r  to  th e  S.D.R, or to  a basket of 
"hard currencies", the choice depending on th e ir  resp ective  trade l in k s .  
B a sica lly  i t  means th a t L.D.Cs* currencies were f lo a tin g  along with the 
hard cu rren cies. But fo r  sonB countries very f le x ib le  exchange ra le s  
were not adequate to  cope with the new s itu a tio n  and conseauently they  
opted for forthright d évaluations. For example i t  i s  the case of 
Thailand, Singapore, AÈilaysia and the Republic o f China in  1974. In 
1975 Bangladesh devalued i t s  Taka by 56%; and in  1977 Kenya follorved 
s u it .
Cki the other hand, other monetary devices were used and some 
measures were taken c o l le c t iv e ly .  For instance;
(1) “ United N ations, Department of Econoird.c and S ocia l A ffa irs ,
"Supplement to  World Economic Survey, 1975", op, c i t ,  p. 199
(2) -  United Nations, Department of Economic and S ocia l A ffa irs ,
"Supplement to  World Economic Survey, 1975", op. c i t ,  p .194.
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"as part o f  the general reform o f  the monetary system of the
Franc Area cou n tr ies, the basic  cen tra l banic discount rate
was raised  in  July 1975 to  6% bringing the structure o f
in te r e s t  rates throughout the area, more c lo s e ly  in  l in e  with
World c a p ita l imrke t co n d itio n s . Ihe reform a lso  helped
stem the pressure for c a p ita l outflows associa ted  with
1^1previous in te r e s t  d iffe r e n tia ls ." ^
Let us, then, consider the pidce p o licy  follow ed by N.O.D.C, 
Here again we sh a ll d istin g u ish  two types c f  prices; namely the 
p rices o f  products d om estica lly  consumed and those of the products for  
exp orts.
For the f i r s t  s e t  we s h a ll  consider consumer p rices which,
as a matter of fa c t, are a ffected  by home-produced and "imported"
(p )In f la t io n . Consequently they are bound to  increase '  ^ . However 
th ese  p rices are not very t e l l in g  about foreign  exc^^ange earnings o f the 
N.DoD.Co I t  i s  b e tte r  to consider the pri.C6s o f th e ir  export products 
which are in fluenced .by the d ec isio n s taken by O.E.C.D. countries in  
order to cope w ith t h e ir  d eterioratin g  B.O.P. s itu a t io n .
At th is  stage  a h is to r ic a l  case i s  worth mentioning,
R. Trlff:lii takes the case o f  B rita in  with a payment imbalance leading  
the B r it ish  A uthorities to  tig h ten  th e ir  cred it p o lic y .
In sum, a s itu a t io n  sim ilar to  the one resu ltin g  from the o i l  
cid -sis, but our case i s  more d e lic a te  because instead  of having on© 
country tighten ing i t s  economic p o licy  we have most of the 0 /3 ,0  .D. 
oountri.es. Tfiis w i l l  tend to sw ell or to magnify the e f f e c t s ,
R, T r iff in ;
"conjunctures th at B r ita in , by tigh ten in g  c r e d it , could induce
a favourable movement in  i t s  terms o f  trade, and sin ce i t  was
a heavy purchaser o f  food and m aterials abroad, th is  change
could reduce a d e f ic i t  -  but a t the expense o f primary
(31producing cou n tries o f the World."
(1) -  World Bank "Annual Report, 1976", p p .30-31-
(2 ) -  c f .  Appendix 11-5^-2.61*
(3) -  R. T r iff in , o f .  R.N, Cooper, International Finance, op. c i t ,  p .10.
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Of course on© assumes her© that N.O.D.C. are exporters o f  primary 
products and th at i s  the case .
our opinion, nobody would 4ss>ntest R, T r iffin  *s statement 
and tlierefore we sh a ll  focus, not on the d irectio n , but on the in te n s ity  
o f  the e f f e c t s .  Our case w i l l  be presented w ith in  the th e o r e tic a l  
framewoïk of world economic f lu c tu a tio n s , or, in  other words, the 
business cyxîle.
From th is  point o f view severa l elements have to  be menticned, 
and c la r ifie :!}  the two c h ie f  ones being t ie  N.O.D.G’s propensity to  
import and capacity m export. From th is  point of view and 
comparatively to  developed market economies, one can s a fe ly  assume that 
Third World cou n tries, including N.O.D.C., are characterised by a high 
marginal propensity to iiip ort. The reason being that they have a 
narrow in d u str ia l base and given th e ir  development e f fo r t  and given the 
ex istin g  poles of technology sources, the s itu a tio n  i s  more acute from 
1974 onwards, a period characterized by shortages and h%h p rices of 
foods, o i l  and f e r t i l i z e r s .
On the other hand, th e ir  campacity to  export i s  high to o . They 
have to  re ly  on a handful of products, such as sugar, r ic e , cotton  
(non-processod oi* sem i-processed) to earn foreign  exchanges indS.op'ansable 
to s a t is fy  th e ir  high import requirements, Tiae next lo g ic a l step  is  
to  ask ourselves about the or ig in  of and d estin a tion  o f N.O.D.C’s 
imports and exports r e sp ec tiv e ly . Given the present s itu a tio n  o f  worj.d 
trade and technology there i s  no doubt about the predominance of 
O.E,C.D*s share in  N,0.,D.C's trade. This being sa id , i t  follo^ra th at  
any trade d ec isio n s taken by the O.E.C.D. countries w il.l not only be 
transm itted to  N.O.D.C. but w i l l  g rea tly  a f fe c t  ti^em. In our opinion  
the econoimic measures undertalcen by O.E.C.D, countries during the 
1974^77 pei'iod a f fe c t  both p rices and volumes o f N.O.D.C's imports and 
exports,
The United N ations’ Department of Economic and Socia l A ffa irs  
sums up the e f fe c ts  o f  the c r i s i s  as follc^JS:
"The weakening in  demand for raw m aterials for  developed maricet 
industry in  1974 brought the upswing in  export p rices to  an 
end. By the f i r s t  quarter of 1975 the index o f agr icu ltu ra l 
raw m aterial p r ices  had receded by over a fourth from the
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peak o f a year e a r lie r  and there v/as a further d eclin e  o f  
6% in  1975, And the p rices index of non-ferrous metals 
exported by developing countries was halved between mid- 
1974 and the end o f 1975.
Further, on top of lower p rices came s m lle r  export volume by N.O.D.C. 
to O.E.C.D. cou n tries. On the other hand the cid .sis  did a lso  a f fe c t  
the p iic e s  o f  comrrtodities ocpoi-ted by O.E.C.D. countries to N.O.D.C.
The la t t e r  had to  pay higher p rices for th e ir  imported eouipment goods 
and ser v ic e s , much needed to f u l f i l  th a ir  development ta rg et. These 
in crea ses, although concrete and s ig n if ic a n t  arc d i f f i c u l t  to Quantify. 
The comhimtion o f a l l  these elements led  to a d eter iora tion  o f the  
N.O.D.G’s terms of trade with the r e s t  o f thiO World, In our opinion  
the next tab le g iv es  us a fa ir  idea o f the exten t of th is  d eterioration ,
TABLE 26 s Terms of T r a . d e of  some ihS .A , Countries 
(Ethiopia, Kenya and S r i lanlca), 1973-76. Change Over Previous Year
Country 1973 1974 1975 1976
Ethiopia » 5% -  6.24% -21.7% -20.7%
Kenya — 6.2% -  6,7% -21.2% n .a .
Sri lanlf.a -22,2% -31.5% —45. 4*^ n .a .
Source; I . F .S . c f .  Country s aggregate, Volume XXY No. 6, August 1977.
I t  fo llow s that according to  the previous tab le  the three  
countries have seen tho terms o f  trade (T .O .T ,) with the r e s t  o f the  
Viforld being co n tin u a lly  eroded.
For E th iop ia , Which did n o t take advantage o f  1972/3  
commodity -  p r ic e s  in c r e a s e s , th e  T.O.T, d e ter io ra ted  by 5%, 6.24% in  1973
(1) -  United N a tio n s’ Department of Economic and S o c ia l A ffa ir s ,
"Supplement to  World Economy Survey, 1975", op, c i t ,  p .206,
(2) -  The terms o f trade has been ca lcu lated  by u sin g  the formula;
To ( t  ) -  100 X Px(t)
PM(t‘)
T c(t) rep resen ts  The terras o f  trade a t  period  ( t )  .
R c(t) The index o f  th e  p r ic e s  o f  th e  cou n try’s commodities a t  
«d p eriod  ( t ) .
PM(t) The index o f  th e  p r ic e s  o f cou n try’s commodities imports 
a t
76,
and 1974 and then by 21.7% and 20,7% In 1975 and 1976 resp ec tiv e ly .
Kenjra had a greater d eter iora tion  for 1973 -  62% end fo r  the  
subsequent two years the rates were sitn ilar to  those o f E th iop ia’s 
namely 6.7% in  1974 and 21.2% in  1976 resp ectjv e ly .
F in a lly , the case o f Sri Lanka i s  worse -  i t s  T.O.T, 
deteriorated  by more than a % fth , a!lmost a, tViird and by ju st under a 
h a lf in  1974, 1975 and 1976 re sp ec tiv e ly .
In other terms th is  means th a t the impoi-b value o f  N.O.D.C*s 
exports decreased. With resp ect to  th is  point the World Bank estim ates  
th at,
"the volume of exports which purchased, a d o lla r  of imports
during the year ending June 1973, bought only f if ty -tw o  cents
worth in  Bangladesh, s ix ty - th r e e  cen ts  wo»"th in  S r i Lanka,
seventy cents worth in  India and eighty-four cents worth in
Pakistan during f i s c a l  1975, a fte r  a continuous sharp
Cl )d eter iora tion  in the previous twelve months."
I t  goes w ithout saying th a t those developments a f fe c t  the 
foreign  exchange reserve s itu a tio n  o f the N.O.D.C.
From another point of view, N.O.D.C. had to  stru gg le  against
ex tern a l in f la t io n  Which soared import c o s t s ;  m ainly eap ii.a l eouipment
and s e r v ic e s .  Qa top  o f th a t , w ith  th e ir  newly acauired  f in a n c ia l
resources, the OPSC countries were heavy purchasers o f  those very
products. In o th er  words, i t  means th a t N.O.D.C.had to  compete w ith
OPEC co u n tr ie s  for:
"construction contracts and se r v ic e s . For example the d o lla r
co st per hectare o f ir r ig a t io n  p rojects in  Chad and. Niger have
about doubled in  the past two y'sars, as have the co st of road
(2 )p r o je c ts  a lread y  underway in  Benin, Cameroon and i k l i ." '
These developments combined to  Impede the development progress o f  the 
N.O.D.C. and some of the M.S.A.C, recorded à f a l l  in th e ir  G.N.P, per 
cap ita  growth r a te . For cou n tries Which l iv e  ju st  above, or f l a t l y  
below the absolute l e v e l  of poverty, there w i l l  be grave repercussions 
fo r  th e ir  future w e ll being,
(1) & (2) -  World Bank: Annual Report, 1975(July 1974 to June 1975) p .36.
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I t  seems that the adjustment measures taken by M.O.D.C. and 
especia3.1y the M.S.A.C* range in  the lower end of P.G.A, P ollack ’s 
chart, that i s  devaluation, import co n tro ls, économie recession  and th is  
leads to  a widespread su fferin g  for already poor populations*
On the other hand, by the end o f 1977 O.E.G.D» countries were 
b e tter  o f f  but th is  does not mean that they mnaged to m y in  rea l terms 
for th e ir  o i l  imports* However, one has to mention th at sin ce  1974 
West Germany has been the f i r s t  country to record trade surplus w ith  
OPEC countries as a i4 io le* For other OoEcGoG* as w e ll as N.O,D*C. 
they seem to  have exhausted theÎT short-term  financing f a c i l i t i e s  and 
of course they have done th e ir  utmost oo expand th e ir  exnorts, but i t  
was not enough* Tlierefore other sources of financial g have to be forged 
in  order to  finance th e ir  o i l  b i l l  for the interim  period* The next 
sec tio n  deals w ith part o f th is  problem*
SECTION I I I  -  ÏÎ-TE FINANCmO CHANNELS
In th is  sectio n  we s h a ll  content ourselves with presenting  
on3,y the channels through which o i l  importing countries are like3.y to 
finance th e ir  o i l  b i l l*  The rea l financing process w i l l  be presented 
in  d e ta il  in  Chapters IH  and IT* However, before th at v:o sh a ll  
consider the financing o f a B.O,P* d e f ic it  in  a broader framework, such 
as during a trade cycle  and p re c ise ly  during a slump,
SECTICN I I I  -  1 : FINANCING PROCESS DURING A TRADE CIGLE ; CASE OF SLUMP
F ir s t  of a l l  one has to mention that our case occurs in  a 
recession . Recession in  the O.E.C,D, and L.D.C, countries a t the same 
moment and given the economic strength of the OPEC countries th e ir  boom 
becomes more or le s s  na,rginal at World le v e l ,  e sp e c ia lly  during the  
f i r s t  year o f the c r i s i s .  The slump has been transm itted from abroad 
(O.E.C,D, + OPEC) to L.D.Cs, vhereas in  the case o f  th e  0,E,C,D* pa.rt 
of the recession  orig inated  from abroad (OPEC ) and part i s  due to  
domestic p o licy , 3rs other words, the economic p o lic y  pursued by 
0,E,C.D. countries tended to  magnify the slump orig in atin g  from OPEC’s 
d ec is io n .
ôo.
Sec end, the flnsaictog process has to  b e seen as the l a s t  card 
used by o i l  im porting countid.es to  cope w ith  the new s itu a tio n *  I t  
cormpleraents th e adjustm ent p r o c ess . Therefore i t  i s  on ly  a m atter of 
time fo r  th e d e f i c i t  co u n tr ie s  to  have recourse to  th e finanoD.ng process  
Which i s  a "solution" on ly  fo r  the in ter im  period* In the long term 
one can tah c about a second sta g e  o f  the adjustment p rocess vjheri 
u3.tim ately goods fo llo w  money.
Third, i f  we had on ly  two ccu n tr ies/grou p s o f  countid.es,
(A-OPEO aïid B - o i l  im porting c o u n tr ie s )  th e  fin an cin g  problem would be 
much simpler* The surplus o f  A ’iv i l l  be in v ested  -  or v^uld save to  buy 
goods -  in  B, and we w i l l  aid up w ith  an autom atic financing o f  both 
d e se q u ilib r ia . However, in  our ea se  we are in  presence o f three  
d is t in c t  groups -  OPEC, 0*E,C*D, and L*D,Cc co u n tries  -  and even d is t in c t  
co u n tr ies  w ith in  each group*
In our op in ion , given th e present in te r n a tio n a l s e t t in g ,  OPEC 
fin an cia l, surplus -  and t o  be p r e c ise  Arab countries* fin an cia l, sure lu s  
because most o f  non-Arab Ol^C members were in  d e f i c i t  by mid 1977 w i l l  
be au tom atica lly  tra n sferred  to  o i l  im porting co u n tr ies  as a group 
(O.E.CoD* -  LJloCvS*), We agree to c a l l  t h i s  f i r s t  s te p  the r ec y c lin g  
process* The second step  i s  the r e d is tr ib u tio n  o f  the A’s surplus  
between o i l  im porting cou n tries*  We s h a l l  c a l l  th is  s ta g e  the 
r e sh u ff lin g  p ro cess .
I t  w i l l  be very  u n lik e ly  th a t the r e sh u fflin g  process w i l l  
s a t i s f y  every member o f B*s f in a n c ia l  needs. The reason being th a t  
fa c to r s  such as premium .r isk s, in d u s tr ia l endowments, p o l i t i c a l  
a c t iv a t io n s  and the in ter n a tio n a l f in a n c ia l  system  w i l l  be a t  work, 
conseq uently  some co u n tr ie s  might be handicapped by such elem ents.
Then, what i s  th e so lu tio n ?  As a matter o f  fa c t  in  the case  o f  an 
economic r ec e ss io n  some su g g estio n s had a lready been made to  so lv e  the  
problem of bo Hi groups of c o u n tr ie s  (A and B )* For in sta n ce , a f t e r  
recogn izin g  th a t in  s im ila r  circum stances the d e fla t io n a r y  n o lic y  
suggested  by the o ld -fa sh io n ed  th eory  i s  in  c o n f l i c t  w ith  f u l l  
employment, an im perative o f  our p resen t day, R.C.O, Fhttheivs th inks  
th a t:
"the -government o f any country experiencin g a co n tra ctio n  iji  
demand should make a v a ila b le  to  other co u n tr ie s  an amount o f
Ôl,
i t s  currencies equivalent to  the f a l l  in  the val-ue o f  i t s
imports compared with a "normal" ^^ear, receiv in g  in  return
a corresponding amount o f  the currencies o f other co u n tr ies.
In th is  way the supply o f  in tern a tio n a l currency reserves
(1 )wou).d in  e f fe c t  be increased whenever the need arose."
R.C.Oo lyhtthew’s aim i s  to  maintain world trade le v e l  by avoiding t i e
transm ission o f any country’s contraction to  the re s t  o f the World by
means o f r e s tr ic t iv e  measures. Such a suggestion  contains some l im it s ,
l im its  recognised by î^ t thews h im self. Tiw main one being the
agreement of the governments concerned, the determination o f the cause
o f the f a l l  in  imports and thus the exact amount o f currency to  be
transferred . In our case , other d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  due to the nature o f
the countid-es involved, a r ise . R.C.O. î%,tthewa doe-s not d if fe r e n t ia te
between the nature of the currencies involved and t^us he im p lic it ly
assumes that any country’s currency i s  acceptable to other cou n tries.
I t  seems obvious to us that in  h is  mind both ^ and B countries are
developed economies.' I t  goes witliout saying th a t the ex isten ce  of
developed arid L.D.C. countries and the ex isten ce  of con vertib le  and
non»convertible currencies change the whole p ictu re . Such a suggestion
cannot apply to  our ca se , How e^vor, the author’s second suggestion  i s
more r e a l i s t i c  s in ce , according to him;
"a siü d lar e f fe c t  would be produe ed i f  the government of
country A in  those circumstances were to rne,ke loans to
foreign  countries or were to buy foreign  goods on i t s  ovmi 
(2  )account."
In t h is  case A represents OTEC countries that do not experience any
contraction in  th e ir  demand. In our opinion loan granting could be
adequate as a so lu tion  although t ie  ex isten ce  o f the three groups makes 
i t  more complex. Such a suggestion  has also  been ra ised  as a p ossib le  
so lu tio n  to the o i l  c r i s i s .  For in stan ce, Paui. S treeten , to  the 
ex is t in g  developed and developing countries d iv is io n  suggests a new 
tr iangu lar world system in  Winichs
(1) -  R.C.O. Fhtthews, "The Trade Cycle," A study in  the Theory of
Econom3.c F luctuations, Cambridge Economic Handbooks, Cambridge 
U niversity  Press, Cambridge, Reprint 1970, p .269.
(2) -  R.C.O, Matthews, op. c i t .  p .269.
"the oil-producing countries would lend and in v e st  ps,rt o f  
th e ir  surplus earnings in  the Third World, The Third World 
would thai use th is  money to  buy equipment a ni m aterials 
from th e in d u str ia l countries o f  Western Europe from America 
and Japan, And th ese  countries would use the rec e ip ts  from
ti ( \  )
th eir  sa le s  to pay for th e ir  o i l  imports. ^
In th is  tra n sla tera i scenario , P* Streeten  suggests even the s e tt in g  up
o f an aid fund by Arab cou n tr ies.
I f  such a so lu tio n  were to  be put in to  p ra ctice , OPEC countries
may fe e l they are bearing the burden.
Professor D, Seers i s  another economist who suggested a?
"big aid programme (for- the Third World ) which d ife r s i f y  the
a sse ts  of petroleum exporting cou n tries, in crease th e ir
p o l i t ic a l  power and reduce in tern ation a l c r it ic ism  of high
o i l  p r ic e s . I t  would be a mighty boost to  the Third World
Development even i f  10^ of the proceeds of o i l  exports were
(2 )used in  th is  way,'W “ '
I t  fo llow s that Professor D, S eers’ idea gees beyond curbing the o i l
c r i s i s  impact on N.0 ,0 ,0 , ,  i t  could be a so lu tion  to  the foreign
exchange shortage vJl-vlch has characterised  the w e ll before 1973,
Furthermore, i t  i s  worthwhile mentioning that both P,
S tree ten ’s and Professor D. S eers’ suggestions do not f a l l  w ith in  R.C.O,
A tth ew ’s “ the O.E.C.D, group i s  not taken dr,to consideration , Oi'i
the other hand, by suggesting;
"broadening and a more concentrated aid pîograïïtfns d ir e c t ly
(3)related  to  the cou n tries in  c lea r  and desperate needs,"
Professor H, Singer brings back the O.E.C.D. group to the p ictu re ,
Tliis i s  an im p lic it  suggestion  o f a flow of aid and loan from OPEC plus 
O.E.C.D, countries to  N.O,D,C,
(1) -  Paul S treeten; "Aid and the O il C risis" , op. c i t .  p.lO S. The saire
idea was expressed by the same author in  a second a r t ic le ;  "Oil
and DevelopmentÎ a Steady Tidpod", in  conjunction with Mrs, F. 
Stewart, Report o f  Select- Committee on Overseas Development 
ppi 103-105.
(2) “ D, Seers, "The R ise in  th e  Price o f O il. Terrible D isaster or
Great Opportunity", c f .  Report from the S e le c t  Committee on
Overseas Development, op, c i t .  p .55.
(3) « Professor H. S inger, op. c i t ,  p .55.
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In our opinion, the Third World market i s  important to  O.E.C.D, 
co u n tr ies’ export sec to r  and consequently a shortage o f foreign  exchange 
or other means and ways o f buying in  the former w i l l  lead to  an economic 
contraction o f the la t t e r .  This contraction , in  turn, w i l l  reach OISC 
cou n tries. Thus the N.O.D.C. are necessary i f  the m e^V'ine i s  to  be
kept going. Cm top o f th a t, OPSC and especiîa lly  Arab countries have
sp e c ia l reasons to  take N.O.D.C. in to  consideration; these reasons w i l l  
be outlined in Chapter IV.
Fima 11 .y, one has to  s tr e s s  that such a;
"proposal does not call, for  any great altruism  on the part of"
OTEC and O.E.C.D, cou n tr ies,
"though i t  may appear to , since;"  
they:
(1 )"w ill b en efit  by the maintenance o f  foreign  demnd" 
for th e ir  resp ective  products.
Hov;ever  ^ in  order to be carried  out, such a proposal requires
in s t itu t io n a l suppoi't or, in  other words, fin a n c ia l channels which
might not e x is t  y e t . Several d iffer en t ways and means can be thought 
o f and used but a3JL o f them can be grouped under the heading o f  
resh u fflin g  process.
SECTION I I I  -  2 Î THE RESHDFFI.INCt PROCESS
The resh u fflin g  process w i l l  occur through e ith e r  ante- or 
post o i l  Oïd-sis channels or, in other words, through channels ex istin g  
w e ll before the c r i s i s  and channels deriving from t-,o c r is is  i t e e l f .
Both types w i l l  be revievjcd. However, fo r  the time being we s h a ll  
only mention th e ir  ex is ten c e  and the d irec tio n  tx^wards iMiich they w i l l  
work. The fin a n c ia l r e su lt  o f  th e ir  workb'jg, or, in  other words, the 
rea l financing process w i l l  be presented in  Chapters I I I  and 17 for 
O.E.C.D^ and N.O.D.C. countries resp ec tiv e ly ,
A. -  E xisting Financing Channels
These channels regroup in tern a tio n a l f in a n c ia l in s t itu t io n s  
and World banking cen tres.
(1) -  R.C.O. Fbtthews, op, c i t .  p .269.
Ô4.
« International F inancial In s titu tio n s
This heading excludes p rivate in s t itu t io n s  and by i t  we 
understand in s t itu t io n s  such as the World Bank and i t s  a f f i l i a t e s  and 
the I.M .P. Given our scope the la t t e r  i s  more important because i t  
has been more a c t iv e . Thus we s t a l l  focus on i t s  a c t iv ity  but in  
Chapter lY,
-  World Banking Centres
P-bst western in d u str ia lized  cou n tries' banking in s t itu t io n s  -  
Sw itzerland'.5', West Germany’s and France’s -  played a more or le s s  
a c tiv e  ro le  during the o i l  c r i s i s ,  but i t  remsiins that New York and 
London were, and s t i l l  are, the prominent centres and consequently we 
s h a ll  l im it  ourselves to  both o f them.
Concerning London’s l ik e ly  ro le in  resh u fflin g  f in a n c ia l o i l  
su ip lu s between o i l  importing cou n tries, H.M. Treasury considers that 
given the purely short «term nature of the:
"new d ep osits  placed in  s t e r l in g . . .  and the facu th a t they f a l l  
short o f  t ’r.e prospective external financing needs of the United 
Kingdom, make i t  inappropriate to  consider any j^ e eye lin g  of
( l  )funds placed in s ter lin g  in  London in present circumstances,"
Such a statem ent, beyond confirming the old saying that "charity s ta r ts  
a t hoirie", excludes any p o s s ib i l i t y  o f resbuflG.ing o i l  revenues to other 
O.E.C.D* countries and, of course, to  N.O.D.C. London i s  a lso  an 
inrportant pole in  the Eurocurrency markets that w i l l  be presented in  
Chapter I II ,
There i s  no reason to  expect a d ifferen t and more a l t r u is t ic  
behaviour from the New York based fin a n c ia l cen tre. Cur opinion i s  
confirmed by the fear expressed by son^ O.E.C.D, countries th at New 
York might prove an endless ca p ita l sink* The?/ expressed th is  fear  
because they were rely in g  on i t  to  accomplish th e ir  financing process.
From anothei' point of view, the o i l  c r i s i s  has a novel 
featu re, namely th at o i l  b i l l s  are paid in  U.S. d o lla rs  and Pounds 
S ter lin g  and the revenues kept almost ex c lu siv e ly  in  those currencies. 
Such a fa c t  d ir ec ts  the working of the in tern a tio n a l financing mai'kets 
in  a very sp e c if ic  d irec tio n - With regard t-o th is  p o in t, undertaking
(1) -"O il Revenues, International F inancial Fhikets and the Less 
Developed Countries," Memorandum submitted by H.M. Treasury, 
o f .  Rep. from S e le c t  Committee on Overseas Development 
op. c i t .  p .85.
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a study of in tern a tio n a l money H.G, Aubrey recognized;
"the ca p a b ility  o f  a reserve currency country to  secure 
a ltern a tiv e  "credit" in  the form of lio u id  l i a b i l i t i e s  th at  
are a counter part o f  i t s  B .O.P. d e f ic i t s ,
However, one can always re to r t th at such a statement has been made w e ll  
before the co lla p se  o f  the Bretton Woods System, but few would dispute  
the fa c t  th a t, in  s p ite  o f  th a t, the U .S .d o llar  does s t i l l  f u l f i l  the  
function of a reserve currency. This being s e t t le d , the second part 
o f H.G. Aubrey i s  more in te r e st in g  because,, according to  him;
"a reserve currency country has the a b i l i t y  to  l'un d e f ic it s  
for some time because the cr ed it  standing o f  a banking centre  
i s  such th at i t  can in  e f fe c t  borrow to meet i t s  needs in  
almost an im perceptible fashion vithout the n ec ess ity  of
(p )
arranging and n egotia tin g  loans as other borrowers must do."
Given these fa c ts  aM given the resp ectiv e  importance o f New York and 
London as World banking centres^ the working o f  in tern a tio n a l finance  
could finance prim arily  the U .S .A .’s B,0*P„ d e f ic i t s  resu ltin g  ih'oin 
the o i l  c r i s i s 0 The United Kingdom’s B.O.P, d e f ic i t  was only  
marginally financed as th is  country had to  n egotia te  government to  
government loans -  vjith Iran e sp e c ia lly  -  and to have recourse to other 
channels.
However, other O.E.C.D. cou n tries, in varying degrees, managed 
to  take advantage of the more or le s s  d is tr ib u tiv e  r o le  o f  New York 
and of th e ir  own fin a n c ia l network.
On the other hand. Professor M, Xipton doubts the adeouacy of 
World Banking Centres to  respond to  N.O.D.C’s needs because according 
to  him, "the major reason is  th at World Banking i s  not geared ix> f3.ow 
in  th is  d i r e c t i o n , T h i s  a p p lies  even to s o c ia l i s t  countries and 
can be explained by factors such as solvency and indebtedness,
(1) -  H.G. Aubrey, "Behind the V eil of International ^bney".
International Finance S ection , Department of Economics, Princeton  
U niversity , Princeton, New Jersey, No. 7# January 1969 p .p . 10-11,
(2} -  Robert V. Roosa in  Testimony before the Sub-Committee of
Xliternational Exchange Payments (Join t Economic Committee of 
Congress Hearings, Outlook fo r  The B .O .P., p .119 13 November 1972) 
quoted by H.G. Aubrey, op,c i t .  p ,13 .
(3) •“ Professor M, Lipton, "Im plications o f  O il Price Changes for
Less-Developed Countries", c f .  Report from the S e lec t Committee on 
Overseas Development, op, c i t ,  p .53*
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However, in  sp ite  of the fa c t  that such a source i s  denied to the  
m ajority o f the N.O.D.C. some of them managed to access to  i t .  To 
what exten t and # ia t  countries b en efited  from th is  type o f financing  
w i l l  be treated  in  Chapter I I I ,
Hov/ever, the combined working of both in tern ation a l f in a n c ia l  
in s t itu t io n s  and World Banking Centres could not f i l l  the f in a n c ia l  
gap every o i l  importing country, therefore th is  3.ed to the creation  
of new financing f a c i l i t i e s .
B Newly-crested Financing Channels
T'lere are severa l channels and we sh a ll d istin g u ish  between 
those created by O.E.C.D. and OPEC cou n tries.
As early  as 1974 most of the major O.E.C.D, countries came 
w ith new schemes aimed a t  financing th e ir  oi-m B.O.P, d e f ic i t ,  VJhether 
th ese  schemes were accepted and put in to  p ractice  and to  i\hat extent 
they contributed to  a l le v ia te  the financing d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  the 
countries concerned w i l l  be treated  in  the subseouent chapter, OPEC 
countries were not short o f id eas e ith e r . But we sh a ll concentrate  
only on channels w holly or p a rtly  Arab-owned and Arab-organized,
These charnels regroup severa l banks and whose purpose i s  to
provide B ,0 ,P , support arid a lso , sometimes, development aid to N.O.D.C.
At th is  stage one has to mention th a t some suggested the 
s e tt in g  up o f sp e c ia l p r ices  of o i l  to  the M.S.A. cou n tr ies. This 
scheme i s  not workable for severa l reasons. F ir s t ,  i t  would mean 
th at the same product has two market p r ic e s . Second, OIEC countries  
have maintained th at t h e ir  crude o i l  has been underpriced, 
consequently, they wnuld con trad ict themselves by  fix in g  a second se t  
of lower p r ic e s .
In our opinion, given present circum stances, i t  would be 
more sub tle  on the part o f OPEC to take from N.O.D.C, with one hand 
and to  g iv e  back to  them with the other. The r e su lt  v-ould be the 
same but i t  would have the advantage of avoiding O.E.C.D**s c r it ic ism  
and creatin g  more in ter-T hlrd  World l in k s .
F in a lly , there i s  another ob stacle , because, according to  
Fîrs, Edith Penrose;
"the o i l  companies are equally  opposed to sp e c ia l p r ices
8 7 .
for L.D.Cs, They consider i t  unworkable, but probably of 
equal importance i s  th e ir  ob jection  to  the ex isten ce  of 
government-to-government arrangements that would be 
involved and which are a threat to  th e ir  own p o sitio n  on 
the in tern a tio n a l o i l  trade and to  th e ir  view ho/ i t  shou3.d 
be c o n d u c t e d , ^
I t  is  for  th ese  reasons, coupled with the working of 
in tern ation a l p rivate banking in s t itu t io n s  H a t Arab countries were 
driven to  se t  up th e ir  own channels. The working of th ese  channels 
and whether ox' not they serve the in te r e s ts  o f both granting and 
receiv in g  countries w ill, be tackled in  Chapter 17,
CONCLUSION
According to  the standard theory a country faced w ith  a 
BcO.P. d e fic it^  such as the one re su lt in g  from the o i l  c r i s i s ,  has 
four options;
-  to  slov/ down i t s  economic a c t iv ity ,
™ to  cut dovM i t s  p rices and devalue i t s  currency in  order to  
record a trade surplus with the surplus country. Prices 
and exchange manipulations are complementary and s'ubsti tu ta b ie ,
« to impose trade r e s tr ic t io n s  under the form of Import quotas 
and higher t a r i f f s ,  
the other hand the siu p lu s country’s domestic economy w i l l  
autom atical]y adapt i t s e l f  to  the new s itu a tio n  through
-  higher prices
-  o f f i c ia l  or e f f e c t iv e  revaluation o f the lo c a l  currency,
« higher Imports from the surplus country because of the
d if f e r e n t ia l  prj.ces.
One has to  mention th a t in  both cases the measures are su b stitu ta b le  
and in te r -r e la te d . The lo g ic a l question i s  to ask i f  th is  theory  
applied to our cas e-stu d y . In trying to  answer th is  Question we sh a ll 
consider each measure in  the case o f each group of co u n tr ies ,
(1) Mrs, Edith Penrose, "The Pii.ce of Oil and Less-Developed Countries: 
A ssistance and Permanent Adjustment", o f . Report from the S e lec t  
Committee on Overseas Development: 1974 op. c i t .  p .126.
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F ir s t , the domestic a c t iv ity ,  as measured in  terms of 
in d u str ia l output and rate  o f unemployment, slowed dcfir/n in  both 
O.E.C.D, and N on-oil Developing Countries. On the other hand from 
1974 onwards the OPEC countries recorded a boom because they are 
adapting to  the new s itu a tio n  by increasing th e ir  spending.
Second, the l e v e l  of p rices and exchange rates* Domestic 
p rices increased in  the three groups. Kov/ever, given the nature o f  
the three groups one has to go further by making a d is t in c tio n  between 
domestic and export prices* This represents a novel fea tu re . In 
our opinion th is  d is t in c t io n  i s  ju s t if ie d  on severa l accounts. In 
our case domestic p r ices are ju st fca' domestic use whereas in  the  
standard theoipf case they are equal to export p r ices  when one does 
not take in to  account transport c o s t s .  In the case of Arab and 
OrSC cou n tries, domestic p r ices play a very small ro le  in  d ec is io n ­
making which are made mainly on the b a sis  of the U,S. d o lla r . A 
p a r a lle l can be drawn with the case o f United Kingdom and the U.S. 
because o f the r o le  played by th e ir  resp ective  currencies in  
in tern a tio n a l trade,
% at i s  why the exchange rates o f the domestic currencies  
of OPEC countries are not very important. These important 
d iffé re n c ié s  were not talc en in to  consideration  by trie standard theory  
because When the la t t e r  was elaborated we had a d iffé r e n t  in tern ation a l 
trade and monetary system . Therefore i t  has nothing to do with the 
a b i l i t y  of^ say. Professor B. Ohlin and J.M, Keynes, to  see the 
problem. I t  i s  th is  fa c t  Which led  us maintain a t the beginning of  
the chapter that the ex isten ce  of the three groups w i l l  com plicate 
the problem. We did not have in  mind thf’t  much the number o f groups 
but th e ir  le v e l  o f economic development and therefore the p lace th ey  
occupy in  the present World trade and monetary s e t t in g . I t  was a lso  
th is  reason th at led  us not to p resm t sep arately  the d iffe re n t  
elements of the standard theory and th e ir  working and a r ticu la tio n ;  
but rather present the case-study by referrin g  to  i t  when necessary  
and^tra^e p o sitio n  only a t  the end of the chapter.
However, even i f  one takes in to  account the in fla tio n a ry  
m ilieu one n o tice s  th at domestic p r ices  increased more in  OPEC than 
o i l  importing cou n tr ies. This goes in  l in e  with the standard theory  
but our own p o sitio n  i s  that the le v e l  of domestic p r ices in  OPEC
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and even N.O.D.C. has no in flu en ce  on the adjustment pix>cess, PVhat 
m atters most i s  th e  export and import p rices  o f the three groups. From 
th is  viewpoint one cannot refu te  or agree with the standard theory but
not© th a t in  the O.E.C.D. p rices were not cut and currencies were not
devalued*
Let us nov/ consider the f in a l  s e t  of measures namely the trade 
r e s tr ic t io n s .  They were p a r tly  and s e le c t iv e ly  applied by both O.E.C.D, 
and N.O.D.C. cou n tries; but given the magnitude of the o i l  induced.
B .O.P. d e f ic i t  one would expect more r e s tr io t iv e  trade measures i f  the  
standard theory approach to  a B .O.P. d e f ic i t  was to  be f u l ly  ap p lied ,-  
This did not occur for  two main r©a.sons* F ir s t , most .o f the in tern ation a l 
trade of in d iv id u al O.E.C.D. countries i s  done vaH:ijn the O.E.C.D, area. 
Therefore^, trade measures would, so lve  the B.O,P. problem of soub countr;les 
on].y and the bulk would be passed to  th.e next country more ab le  to bear 
i t*  The r e su lt  wouJd have been another depression. Secondly,
according to  the standard theory trade r e s tr ic t io n s  would aim a t cu ttin g
the import o f the product or products that caused the B.O.P. d e f i c i t ,
% is does not make sense in  our caso-study because i t  i s  an o il-induced
B.O.P. d e f ic i t  but the O.E.C.D. countri.es cannot expand th e ir  domestic 
production of o i l  because they do not produce it^ therefore there i s  no 
room for import su b stitu tio n ; a t l e a s t  in  the medium term.
In concluding th is  chapter we can maintain that even i f
O.E.C.D. countries cu t down th e ir  export pnVcos and devalued th e ir  
currencies they would not have f u l ly  adjusted to  the new si buation, 
because the volume of th e ir  exports are lim ited  not. because o f th e ir  
ex istin g  capacity  to produce i s  lim ited  but because o f the import 
cap acity  of OPEC countri.es .and s p e c if ic a l ly  those with fin a n cia l 
surpluses* This i s  explained by What i s  u su a lly  referred  to as a low  
absorptive c a p a c ity ,. I t .  fo llow s th a t oil-im porting countries were . 
bound to  finance part o f th e ir  B.O .P, d e f ic i t ,  . The l ik e ly  ways th is  
financing process w iH  occur have been d ea lt  with in  the l a s t  sec tio n  
and the process i t s e l f  w i l l  be presented in  the follow ing two chapters.
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C H A P T E R  I I I  
ARAB DOLLARS RESHUFFLING THROUGH NON-ARAB FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
INTRODUCTION
As shov/n in  the previous chapter, o i l  importing countries were 
not able to pay completely for tu e ir  increased o i l  b i l l  by a 
commensurate expansion of th e ir  exports to  OPEC countries* They also  
used th e ir  in tern ation a l reserves ( l , R , ), borrowed.from the I.M .F..and  
from one another, e*g* the West German's loan to  I ta ly , On the other  
hand they feared that the m ark et,-i*e, private fin a n c ia l in s t itu t io n s  -  
w il l  not be able to .arrange the needed financing of t h e ir .oil-induced  
B oO,P*..d©ficit, ..or to cope with the flow o f p é tro -d o lla rs . Some 
predicted that the market v d ll  collapse* Gonseouently they thought 
that new channels were necessary to resh u ffle  the petro dollars-betw een  
o i l  imporbing countries according to th e ir  financing reauirements.
This thinking appeared as early  as 1974 and i t s  prime im plication  was 
th at almost every major CuE.C.D, country cam© up w1.th i t s  own proposal 
to  achieve a harmonious "distribution" o f the o i l  revenue surpluses. 
These proposals vd-13. be presented as an introduction to  the 
present chapter* In the f i r s t  sec tio n  we s h a ll  consider the  
composition o f the f in a n c ia l surpluses of The Arab World* These
surpluses w i l l  be equated to  the in tern ation a l reserves. The second
sectio n  deals .with the resh u fflin g  process through in tern ation a l 
f in a n c ia l in stitu tio n s*  The Third .section  considers the problem of 
Arab d o llars resh u fflin g  through private and public f in a n c ia l 
in s t itu t io n s , i ,e *  Eurocurrency and Eurobond markets* In the f in a l  
sec tio n  we sh a ll present Arab d irec t investments because-these  
investm ents do represent an in flow  o f ca p ita l that w i l l  in d ir e c tly  help  
cushion the B.C.P, d e f ic i t  of the h o st country. F in a lly  we have to  
mention that each type of resh u fflin g  w i l l  be studied  from two points  
of view. The f i r s t  angle i s  the d irection  o f the resh u fflin g  
mechanism, or in  other words which countries or group of countries  
benefited  from i t .  The second angle concerns the advantages or 
disadvantages derived by the Arab World from each type o f resh u fflin g .
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As far  as the proposals made by the o i l  importing countries  
we s h a ll present the German, American and B ritish  proposals.
The West German Proposal : The Iriternatior^al Investment Bank,
West Germany proposed the creation  of an International
Investment Bank ( I . I .B , ) .  Her idea was made Icnown durirvg the 1974
I.M.Fo annual, meeting. Ttie International Investment Bank was to be
created by and to function  under the supervision  o f  the I.M .F., the
western in d u str ia lized  co u n tr ies, and . the o i l  pix)ducers. However,
on ly  the o i l  producers would contribute to  the International Investment
Bank’s c a p ita l .  The International Investment Ba.nic’s function  was to  
(I )resh u fflo  ' o i l  revenue from the o i l  producers to the western  
in d u str ia lized  cou n tries, such as the United Kingdom and. I ta ly , thus 
leav in g  in  the cold other developing cou n tr ies, Ihe only "nositive"  
sid e  to  th is  "negative proposal" was to  allow the o i l  producers to  
p a rtic ip a te  in  the supervision  o f the International hivestiTsnt Bank,
The proposals did not come in to  being and a f u l l  s e t  o f  
reasons could explain  such a fa te ;
F ir s t ly , i t  was fa r  too early  to bring together o i l  producers 
s,nd western o i l  consumers whose se lf-co n fessed  aim was to  break the  
"OPEC cartel" ; a s ta te  o f  confrontation predominated a t th at tim e. 
Secondly, some OHüG mentoers did not see any d ifferen ce  
between leading western countries and some in tern a tio n a l in s t itu t io n s  
such as the I.H .F ,
Thirdly, tiie West German proposal "ignored" the Developing 
countries xvhose support was v i t a l  to  OPEC’s success in  maintaining 
high o i l  p r ic e s .
The United S ta te s ’ Proposal ; The K issinger Bank.
. I t  was b e tte r  known as the "Kissinger H’oposal". His aim 
was to  es ta b lish  a 25bn, d o lla r  bank vhich would help  western d e f ic i t  
co u n tr ies. The proposal has two main c h a r a c te r is t ic s . F ir s t  in  
Dr, H, K issin ger’s idea "since OPEC’ s f in a n c ia l surpluses vjould, in  any 
event, have to  be in vested  abroad and, as a p r a c tica l matter, mainly 
in  the O.E.C.D, co u n tr ie s . There was no doubt about the a v a i la b i l ity
(1) -  As a matter o f fa c t  they used the term recy c lin g .
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of funds for  th e O.E.C.D* countries as a group* And the United S tates  
ev id en tly  wanted O.E.C.D. countries to  look "within the family" for  
f in a n c ia l help , even ‘though the c r e d it  r isk s would have to be borne by 
the O.E.C.D* governments, to s h if t  the cred it r isk s  to OPEC could have 
made the western O.E.C.D. nations beholden to OHiiC fin a n c ia l
n  )assistance"  .
Secondly, o i l  producers were to be excluded from managing
the bank.
The proposal did not g et o ff  the ground for sev era l reasons;
(P )Given the U .S. poaltion^- and her s e l f  confessed aim o f breaking the  
"OHSC ca rte l" , OPEC members wSre very suspicious of going .along with 
any 11.Sc proposals.
Tie proposal excluded o i l  producers from the management of the  
bank ; o i l  producers were to be in-vited When ca n ita l contribution  was 
to  be made but they were .to  be excluded when the council o f the bank was 
to  d iscuss ca p ita l comniitments.
The bank's function was to  resh u ffle  p etro-d o llars to  western 
o i l  consumers only, thus ignoring the case o f Non-oil Developing 
Countries (N.O.D.C*). However, the la s t  ouarter of 1974 was the period 
when the OPEC, under the pressure of A lgeria, was ti^dng to secure the 
■ihird World’s aupport by putting the " o il c r is is"  in to  a world wide 
stru ggle fo r  a New International Economic Order (N .I.E .O ,)*
The B r itish  Proposa l ; The I.M. Oil Fund
Through her Chancellor o f the Exchequer, Nk*. Denis Healey, 
Great B rita in  proposed an I.M .F, o i l  surplus fund Whose ca p ita l would be 
around 6bn, and 12bn. d o lla r s . This i s  p e r fe c tly  in  l in e  vdth the 
a ttitu d e  of Great B rita in  which wanted to so lve i t s  " o il d e fic it"  by 
borrowing eith er finm the market, from the o i l  producers d ir e c t ly , or 
from any. other in s t itu t io n . W illing to  win the o i l  producers’ 
agreement. Great B rita in  suggested an increase o f th e ir  I.M.F, ouotas. 
The re su lt  was that another version  of th e  B ritish  proposal was 
adopted: The I.M .F, O il F a c il i ty .
(1) -  G.A. Pollack, "Are the O il Payments D e f ic its  Tfenageable?" op. c i t .
P .7 .
(2) -  The International Energy Agency (I .E .A .) was. created by the U.S.A.
Which a lso  threatened to  inter^/ene m ilita r i ly  in  the Middle East 
and take over o i l  w e lls .
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I t  i s  worth noting th a t n eith er France nor Japan came up with
sim ilar  proposals. France was aga in st the creation  of any western o i l
consumers ’ fron t. She thought, q u ite  r ig h tly , th at such a. fron t would
lead  to a s ta te  of confrontation , or rather would worsen an already bad
situ ation *  This explains why she stayed out of the I.E .A , Nearly
a l l  Japan’s o i l  imports come from the Middle Eest and th erefore Japan
did her b est to avoid making any "faux pas".
However, what i s  more s tr ik in g  is  that no developing country
or Third World organisation  came up w ith  a concrete proposal. For
in stan ce, the se cr e ta r ia t  of the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.)
had no more than;
"taken a keen in te r e s t  in  various proposals made by-western
countries to  recycle  vast accumulated reserves of the Middle 
( ’ 1 )East producers *"
I t  was not enough.. However, th e .fa c t  is  that none .of these .proposals was 
adopted* Unexipectedly, the so lu tion  was fou.nd in  the a b i l i t y  of the 
maidcet and a reformed B r itish  proposal undertaken undsr the auspices o f  
the Id'LF. 'g?etro"-dollar surpluses were, and s t i l l  are, reshuffled  
through two main channels; in tern ation a l f in a n c ia l in s t itu t io n s  on the  
one hard, and in tern a tio n a l private f in a n c ia l in s t itu t io n s  on the other. 
However, before considering the resh u fflin g  in  i t s e l f ,  i t  could be 
in ter e st in g  to present the Arab World’s Internationa]. Reserves.
SECTION I -  COMPOSITION OF TfF) ARAB WORLD’S INTERNATIONAL RESERVES,
By in tern a tio n a l reserves we mean holdings o f gold, S.D.R, 
and foreign  exchange (F .E .) . Foreign exchange i s  defined according
(9 )
to  the I.M.F, ' ’ th a t i s  holdings by monetary a u th o r itie s  (cen tra l 
banks, central currency board.s, exchange s ta b il iz a t io n  funds and 
trea su ries  to  the extent to  \Hich they  perform sim ilar  fu n ction s) o f  
claims on foreigners on the forms of bank d ep o sits . Treasury B i l l s ,  
short and long-term  government s e c u r it ie s  and other claim s usable in  
the event of a B .O.P. d e f i c i t ,  including non-marketable claim s a r is in g  
from in ter-cen tra l, banks and inter-govem m ental arrangements, without 
regard to iVhether the claim  i s  denominated in  the currency of tVe debtor 
or the cred ito r .
(1) -  E.C. Chibwe, "Arab D ollars fo r  Africa", Groom Helm L td ., London,
1976, p .51.
(2) -  International Financ3.al S t a t i s t ic s  ( I .F .S .) ,  September 1976, p .4 .
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The Arab World’s International Resenms are compiled in  the  
subsequent ta b le .
TABLE 27 Î Arab C ountries’ International Reserves in  1970 and 1976^
(Units in  m î.llions
Items & 
Periods
Countries
A lgeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Mauritania
Mbrocco
Qatar^
Saudi Arabia
Somalia
Sudan
Syria^
Tunisia
Y ,A .R .^
Y.P.D*R.™c
Total A.C.
France 
W, Germany 
U.S.A.
Iran 
N igeria  
Venezuela
GOLD
1970
191
6 .3  
93
1 4 3 .5  
27.9  
66.2
267.5  
65 ■ 
n i l  
21
6 .5
119
n i l
n i l
26
4 .4  
n i l
0.6
1976
July
SDRS
1970
Foreign
Lbcchange Total I.R,
220 14
6 n i l  
97 n i l  
164.6 n i l  
32 2 .7
162.1 n i l  
376.9 n i l  
96 n i l  
n i l  1 .7
24 n i l  
7.6 n3.1 
124 n i l  
0 .1  0.6  
n i l  0 ,1  
35 n i l  
5.2 n i l  
n i l  2 ,6  
0 ,7  1 .7
1976
Jxily 1970
1976
July 1970
1976
July
49 101 1,314 339 1 ,620
n i l 62.6 366.7 71.1 405,9
9 74 226 167 334
32.1 263,7 2 ,6 6 9 .7 462.2 2, 697,7
6.5 226*9 449,2 255.6 496.3
n i l 63.4 600.6 203.3 1 ,6 3 1 .1
n i l 95,5 1,199 365.5 1 ,576 .5
n i] 1,499 2, 391 1,590 2,496
1 .7 ] .5 97.2 3.2 96.9
15 119 401 140 Ul'O
n i l
n i l
4*9
0 ,7
6
11 .4
2 ,5
4 .3
11.3
520
16.6
26,1
27
55.2
121.3
53,3
75.6  
21, 616 
75.5
25 .1  
1,160
320.6
595.4
50.2
17.6  96.6
662 24,567  
21.1  65.3
21.7  25.6
55 1,205
59.6 351
126,9 600.7
59.3 54,7
1 ,101 .9  1 , 372.2 23 .4  14711 3 ,356.3
3,532 4,056 171 220 1,252
3,960 4 ,721 256 1,673 6,455
11,070 11,030 650 2 ,320 630
131 150 1 70 76
20 23 17 70 174
384 U 6  46 lidf 472
34,059 4, 640.3 39,2(^.5
tjSOS k,96o 9 ,353 !
23,960 13 ,610 32,990  
860 14,690 17,780  
6,992 208 8,426
5,376 222 5,852
6,150 1,021 7,285
X -  Source compiled from I .F .S . September 1976. 
X -  Figures of f i r s t  quarter 1975.
XX -  Figures of 1973
XXX -  Figures of December 1975.
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By presenting such a tab le  we hope to achieve two o b jec tiv es .  
F ir s t  to  have an idea about the composition of the in tern ation a l rese iv es  
in  rea l terms of in d iv idu al Arab cou n tries, that i s  the r e la t iv e  weight 
of gold , S.D.Rs. and Foreign Exchange, For th is  purpose we sh a ll  
undertake an inter-Arab c o u n tr ie s ’ comparison on th e  one hand and on the  
other hand the Arab World as a vhole sh a ll  bs compared to  some OFEC ani
O.E.C.D, cou n tries. Second, to  have a p icture about the geographical 
"concentration" i f  there i s  any, o f the p etro-d o llars w ith in  the Arab 
World. This "concentration" might help explain current investment 
p o lic ie s  of the Arab World and could even help us shape our suggestions  
concerning future investment p o lic ie s ., This table deals with the
1970-76 période Although most people w riting on the subject take 1973 
as "floor year", we opted for 1970 because a t th a t time no Arab or OPEC 
country started  b en efitin g  from increased o i l  revenues. The f i r s t  
country to  do so was A lgeria Which n ationalized  French o i l  in te r e s t  in  
1971. F isc a l 1976 was chosen fo r  the sake of having up to  date data.
Let us then consider'the ta b le  by oompna'ing, f ir s t ,  Arab and non-Arab 
countries*
SECTION I -  1 : COfîPARISON OF ARAB AND NON-ARAB COUNTRlifS ’ INTERNATIONAL 
RESERVES
By non-Arab countries we mean two d iffe r e n t  groups of
cou n tries.
F ir s t ly , tîireo western in d u str ia lized  countries; the U .S ,A ,, 
West Germany and France, Our c r ite r io n  i s  that they are the three 
leading western cou n tr ies, Japan i s  obvioiis.ly not a western country 
and Great B rita in  and I ta ly  were excluded because they wei-e badly h i t  by 
the " o il c r is is " . The present " financia l health" of the la s t  two 
countries does not seem, in  our opinion, to be representative»
Secondly, three main o i l  producers; Iran, N igeria and 
Venezuela, The reason fo r  t h e ir  in clu sion  i s  ju st to  find out What 
our "Next-door neighbours" are doing.
For the three groups the same trend appears; the Arab World's 
t o ta l  in tern ation a l reserves jumped from ju st over 4.5bn, d o lla rs  to over 
39bn, d o lla rs  or more than e igh t times from 1970 to 1976. The 
in tern a tio n a l reserves o f our developed countries increased from 30bn, 
to^Cton, -  thqy doubled, Tliis upswing has surely  to  do w ith  the
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Martinique Summit Which led  to  O.E.C.D, countries evaluating th e ir  gold  
reserves a t market p rices ( c f .  Chapter H ). The combined in tern a tio n a l 
reserves o f the three other 0PM] members passed from le s s  than l,5 b n ,  
to  more than 21*5bn.
After comparing the in creases of the in ternation al reserves  
of the three groups one has to  consider the composition of those very  
in tern ation a l reserves» I t  appears that Foreign Exchange^oonstitute^  
the m ajority o f the in tern a tio n a l reserves for every group. In 1976 
Foreign Ex:chari;',oi represented 85^ of the International reserves in  the
n  )case o f the Arab World; 66^ in  the case o f th e developed countries^  
and 86% fo r  the th ird  group* Next to  Foreign F xchang^is Cold and 
S.D.Rs. come la s t  and th ir d .
From the p oin t o f vi.evj o f the in ternation al reserves' 
composition, the Arab World's behaviour i s  not d iffe r e n t  from th at of  
both leading in d u str ia lized  and other 0B5C cou n tr ies, Uovfever, in  so 
fa r  as our subject i s  concerned, an in tra  Arab World comparison has to  
be undertaken.
SECTION I  -  2 ; INTER-ARAB CDJNiRIBS' COMPARISON
The Arab World, taken as a Wliole, w itnessed an in crease in  
i t s  in tern a tio n a l reserves; ho/vever, taken in d iv id u a lly , the Arab 
countries did rot r e g is te r  the same rate of increase in  th e ir  
in tern ation a l reserves. Most o f t ie  increase was due to o i l  producing 
in ternation a l reserves? A lgeria , Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Xibya, Saudi 
Arabia and even the U.A.E, although they are not included in  Table 27. 
Lebanon and SyitLa took advantage o f  the o i l  exports to o . T-breover, 
increases d i f f e r  even fix>m one o i l  producer to  another. For instance, 
Qatar's in tern a tio n a l reserves Increased from 17.8m, d o lla rs  in  1970 
to  98ffu in  1976: more than 50C^, Percentagewise, that increase i s
important; however i t  i s  s t i l l  very in s ig n if ic a n t  compared w ith the 
"financia l giant" o f  the Arab World : Saudi Arabia whose in tern ation a l
reserves jumped from 662m. d o lla r s  in  1970 to^PA,587m, in  1976. That
(1) -  The figure concerns only France and West Germany, This i s  so  
because of the actu a l c h a ra c ter is tic s  o f the I.M.S, The U.S.A. 
i s  a sp e c ia l s itu a t io n  sin ce  she has to keep most of her 
in tern a tio n a l reserves in  gold (62%).
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i s  more than th ir ty -sev en  times the le v e l  of 1970, Whereas the average
increase for the Arab World was ju st  e ig h t tim es.
As fa r  as in tern ation a l reserves are concerned the importance
o f Saudi Arabia i s  outstanding. In July 1976 i t s  in tern a tio n a l
reserves account fo r  ai'ound 64% o f  the to ta l Arab WorXjd ' s in tern ation a l
reserves. The in to m a tio n a l reserves of the main f iv e  Arab o i l  
(1}producers ~ Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Libya and Algeria, ~ were 
33$431.8m* d o lla rs  or more than 85% o f the to ta l  Arab World' s 
in tern ation a l reserves, Arab countries keep most o f  th e ir  in tern a tio n a l 
reserves in  foreign exchange^ . the causes and im plications o f  such 
behaviour w i l l  bs assessed  la te r  on. However, one has s t i l l  to  
consider the impoii-ance of Gold and S,D,Rs,
A •“ Arab Countries' Gold fo ld in g
A couple of reasons m ilita te  fo r  the Arab countries increasing  
th e ir  holdings In gold*
Firstly.^ most o f them are s t i l l ,  f in a n c ia lly  speaking, 
conservative, in  the sense that they are characterized by a great 
aversion to r isk , and fo r  th is  type o f investor gold has always apoeared 
to  be a r isk le s s  "investment".
Secondly, gold has always played an important part in  the day- 
to-day l i f e  o f  the Arab so c ie ty  as a whole,
Thircil,v$ Arab countries have been shaken by the su ccessive  
devaluations of the U.S. d o lla r  and the Pound S ter lin g  during the la t e  
1960s ,  to  early  1970s,
However, one should be aware of the meaning end im plications  
o f an increased gold holding on the part of the Arab World in  general 
and Arab o i l  countries in  p a rticu la r . In other words, i t  means that  
part of the petro-dol3.ars i s  invested  in  gold . % at would be the 
im plications i f  Arab o i l  countries invested  the bulk of th e ir  petro­
d o lla rs  in  gold . I t  would mean link ing th e ir  wealth to  the price o f  
gold . In p ra c tica l terms i t  a lso  in p lie s  "pegging the price o f  o i l  to
(1 ) Those are the countries we defined as the rich ones on the "have" 
in  Chapter I , S ection  I I ,
(2 ) In the follow ing part we are indebted to  Jan Tumlir "Oil Payments 
and O il Debt and the Problem of Adjustment, in  "The Economics o f the  
O il C risis" , ed ited  by T.M, Rybczynski, published by Pacldllan for 
The Trade Policy Research Centre, Jx>ndon, 1976.
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the p r ice  o f gold . In such a s itu a tio n  ard under a Gold Exchange 
Standard, the o i l  importing countries cou].d not escape through 
in f la t io n  the rea l payment o b lig a tio n s . However, the Gold E>cchange 
Standard i s  over, but in  sp ite  of that l e t  us suppose that i t  i s  s t i l l  
"en viLgueur Tliis presupposes a fixed  and s ta b le  p rice o f gold on
the one hand * On the other hand the demand for o i l  being characterized  
by a low p r ic e - e la s t ic i ty  and a high income e la s t ic i t y ,  the cen tra l bank 
of the o i l  inqiorting countries would be soon emptied o f  th e ir  gold 
sto ck s. Consequently th e ir  demand fo r  gold w i l l  in crease . But the 
gold trd.ning industry being characterized by high itdning costs  the 'World 
p rice o f gold -  and th at of o i l  » would u ltim ate ly  soar. This means 
the end o f our gold based monetary system.
Let us even suppose th a t our gold based monetary system could 
s t i l l  work. At th is  sta g e  one has to  aslc wheid'er gold holdings 
c o n stitu te s  the u ltim ate '/-esult o f a rea l or a fin a n cia l tra n sfer .
I t  i s  commonly considered as f in a n c ia l transfer; ccnsenuently Arab o i l  
countries w i l l  become a new type o f "conouistadors" who iidjxed up 
acquiring and t'n es au r is in g  gold and national w ealth . Gold i s  
thesaurised  because Arab o i l  cou n tries are characterized  by a low 
absorptive capacity* Ttqe problem of absoz'ptive capacity  w i l l  be treated  
in  the fourth chapter. F in a lly  s in ce  gold i s  ju st  a f in a n c ia l tran sfer  
one ought to consider how the flow  o f rea l tra n sfer  i s  going to occur.
In the f i r s t  stage we should w itness a tra n sfer  o f  gold from o i l  
•Jjnporting to o i l  exporting co u n tr ies . However, although for the 0,'E.G.D 
countries which enjoy high gold reserves, they would not account for  
more than a marginal share of the o i l  b i l l .  This is  very much in  l in e  
with what we v/rote when the use o f in tern ation a l r*eserves was considered  
in  Chapter I I .  However, i f  OPEC countries keep on asking for gold and 
s in ce  the o i l  payments are bound to la s t  many years; o i l  importing 
countries w i l l  have to  earn new q u a n titie s  of gold through export surplus 
v is - a - v is  the gold producing co u n tr ies, UItiD>at3ly we sh a ll have the  
folloiving scenario Where A represents Arab Oil Countries and th erefore  
the Arab World, Y Japan, E European Countries mainly France, West 
Germany, United Kingdom and Ibal;>'‘, N Non-oil Developing Countries and 
G the Gold producing and ex^iorting cou n tries.
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According to  the tab le  a l l  do^mwaris flows are rea l tran sfer  
because they represent Arab cou n tries' o i l  export, to  Y, E, Ü and N and 
th a t la t t e r  export of goods and serv ices  to  G in  tVie purpose of earning 
gold from it*  One can go one step  further and maintain that T, E, D 
and N's s tra teg y  would be to achieve a trade surplus w ith G th at would 
help restore th e ir  B.C.P. equilibrium  vdth A, Oi the other hand, the 
upwards flows are f in a n c ia l tran sfer  and u ltim ate ly  end up with A*
loo.
I f  Y, E, D and N manage to  achieve a trade su ip lu s vdth G 
equal to  th e ir  trade d e f ic i t  witSn A, no resh u fflin g  process i s  needed 
because the o i l  importing countries have e f f ic ie n t ly  comoleted th e ir  
adjustment process. Hovjever, such a sa t is fa c to r y  s itu a tio n  i s  a 
functioi'i o f the absorptive cap acity  o f G that i s  mainly the U .S.S.R , 
and South Africa on th e one hand and on the other hand a function of  
the physical capacity  of Y, E, D and N to  s a t is  157- Q uantitatively  and 
q u a lita t iv e ly  the- very needs o f  G, FXirthermore th e ir  export proceeds 
so earned must equal th e ir  re sp ectiv e  o i l  induced B.O.P* d e f ic i t .
Given the actors concerned, particularly?- N, nt i s  very u n lik ely  that 
such an id ea l s itu a tio n  woul-d ever occur. Cons ear e n tly  a resh u fflin g
mechanism must be worked out. Here one i s  l e f t  with two ways. I f  
Gold i s  kept w ith in  A the la t t e r  open up cred it to those countries  
unable to  achieve a B.O.P. surplus wi.th G^^'. On the other hand, i f  
gold i s  rechannelled from A to  Y, E, D and H, or even an outside  
in s t i tu t io n /s  the resh u fflin g  process m i l  involve only -those countries  
and ’the outside in s t i tu t io n /s  i f  there i s  any.
We sh a ll go no further before considering v^ h^other^  the b asic  
assumption, that i s  Arab O il Coujrtries in vestin g  th e ir  surpluses in  gold^ 
m ateria lised . As a matter of fa c t  i t  seems th a t in sp ite  of the above 
mentioned reasons o f f i c i a l  gold holdings o f  the Arab World v^ere not 
commensurate idth  the in crease  o f th e ir  in tern ation a l reserves.
From 1970 to  1976 the Arab Wbrld's gold holding increased by 
no more than ZOfo r is in g  from 1,101.9m* d o lla rs  to  1 ,^ 7 2 .2m. However, 
th ese figu res take in to  consideration  only o f f i c i a l  holdings and i f  we 
were to  add p rivate  holding to  i t  the conclusions might be d iffe r e n t .
In 1970 four Arab cou n tries, I^ uritan ia , Somalia, Sudan and 
Y.A.R., did not hold go ld . Ihe s itu a tio n  seemed sim ilar  in  1976 vdth 
the exception o f  Som li.a holding a n e g lig ib le  amount o f 0,1m, d o lla r s .
In so  fa r  as the Arab o i l  producing countries are concerned, the 
in crease of th e ir  gold holding was le s s  than proportional to  the t o t a l  
increase in  th e ir  in tern a tio n a l reserv es. Their combined gold holding  
passed from 633m, d o lla rs  to 79W . during the period ccncem ed, that i s  
an increase o f no niore than 21%.
(1 ) « This i s  R.C.O, # ,tth ew s' suggestion , o f .  Chapter I I ,
loi.
According to some oral reports, Arab o i l  producing countries  
■were considering whether to  in v est some of th e ir  newly acouired "wealth 
in  gold . According to  one o m l report the move was to  be carried out 
through Swiss banks. Tlneir abstention could have an impact on go ld 's  
future ro le  in  any new International Ibnetary S^^ Btem, As fa r  as the 
la t t e r  i s  concerned a c lea rer  p ictu re sh a ll appear Ween the Arab World's 
S.'R.D. holdings are considered,
B -  Arab Countries' S.D.R. Holdings
In 1970 only seven Arab countries (A lgeria, Jordan, hnuri-tania, 
Somalia, Sudan, Y.A.R. and Y.P.D.R.) held S.D.Rs, The to ta l amount 
was 23. /un. d o lla rs , with Algeria holding the bulk of i t ;  1/^ m. d o llars  
or around 6C% of the t o t a l  holding. I t  i s  worth noting that o f th ese  
seven countries A lgeria i s  the only o i l  producer.
In 1976 only six. Arab countries did not hold S.D.Rs. ;
Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Qatar and Saudi Arebia^ A ll of them, 
except Lebanon, are o i l  producers. In that year the to ta l  holding was 
S.D.R. 147. Im., that i s  more than seven tim es more.
However, the to ta l combined S.D.R. holding o f the three  
in d u str ia lized  countries passed from S.D.R. 3.,2?9m. to  S.D.R. 4 , A13m. in  
19760 In other woi'de they m ultip lied  th e ir  holding by 3, 5. In 1976 
the Arab World holding was ju st th ir ty  times le s s  than the combined 
holding of the thi^ae in d u str ia lised  countries and ju st le s s  than 50% of 
the combined holding of the three other OPIilî mcsnbers. The la t t e r  
increased th e ir  holding from S.D.R. 66m, in  1970 to S.D.R, 2B4m. in  
1976. This means an increase of 430%,
I t  appears th at compared to both groups the Arab World's S.D .R , 
holding i s  lagging far  behind. I t  would be in terestin g  to  find out 
the im plications of such a s itu a tio n  as far as future developments of  
the I.I''L,S. are concerned. For instance, Libya, Kuvjait and Saui.i 
Arabia did not have any S.D .R. a t a l l .  The le a s t  one can say i s  that 
such beha-viour i s  not strengthening the role of S.D.R, w ith in  the I .Y .S ,  
From th is  broad p icture o f the Arab World's in ternation a l 
reserves i t  appears that most of the combined holdings are kept in  
Foreign Exchange. The percentage was as high as 80% in  1976, However 
the term Foreign Excharge covers a vdde range o f item s. I t  includes  
d ifferen t currencies and severa l types o f claims denominated in
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d iffe r e n t  currencies. In our present circumstances the mair-i currencies  
lU cely  to  be held by Arab o i l  countries are the U.S. D ollar, the  
Deutschmark, the Japanese Yen, the Pound S ter lin g , the I ta lia n  Lira and 
f in a l ly  the Swiss and French Francs, These are the so -ca lled  hard
cu rrencies. I t  v d ll  be in te r e stin g  to consider the structure o f the
forei*gn exchange reserves of the Arab o i l  cou n tries.
SECTION I -  3 : STRUCTURE OF THE ARAB OIL COUNTRIES' FOREIGN MCHANGE
RESERVES
The structure o f the foreign  excWan^o reserves i s  inroortant 
because in p r a c tica l terms i t  i s  the very beginning of the resh u fflin g  
process. I t  a lso  shows the d irectio n  of th is  very process. As shoim 
e a r lie r , the bulk o f the o i l  revenues not spent on imports i s  held in  
f in a n c ia l a s s e t s .  I t  fo llow s th a t the o i l  producing countries have a 
choice between several currencies th at w i l l  be used either to  denominate 
th e ir  claims or to  hold th e ir  liq u id  a s s e t s .  Let us 
prsvlsus Table 2^ (]%ge%0^) and assume that A has no preference  
whatsoever between the various foreign currencies and decides to  hold 
a l l  i t s  e32port suiq^lus with the U.S.A. in  the U,3, DolJ.ar, with Japan 
in  Yen and so fo rth . I t  fo llow s that there i s  no need to d ev ise  any 
resh u fflin g  scheme for the countries whose currencies a.re held  by Arab 
o i l  cou n tries. Those countries hapiDen to  be the major O.E.C.D. 
members. In p ra c tica l terms: i t  means that Arab o i l  countries opened 
up unlim ited cr ed it  to  the la t t e r  cou n tries, Tnis cred it i s  
commensurate only with th e ir  o il-induced  B.O.P,., d e f ic i t .
Now what about the countries vhose cui’rencies are not accepted  
and he^d by Arab o i l  cou n tries, that i s  the N.O.D.C. In th is  case Arab 
o i l  count l i e s  can lend to  them e ith e r  d ire c tly  or through a th ird  party.
However, the previous assumption i s  not vAiolly true because 
Arab o i l  countries do have preferences even between the hard currencies. 
As a matter o f fa c t  they p refer the U,S. Dollar p r in c ip a lly  and un t i l l  
r e c m tly  the pound s te r lin g  m arginally, but for the sake of c la r if ic a t io n  
l e t  us suppose that they  have an exclu sive  preference for the former 
By talcjjng the same c 
the d iffe i'en t flow s.
o u n t r i e s w e  end up with the follow ing tab le shoving
(1) -  Gold producing and exporting countries are excluded from the 
senario .
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TABLE 29 : O il Revenues Held in  U,S,  D ollars and In tern a tio n a l T ran sfers.
»r! •O CC
GO
Goods & Services pds & Services”
I f  E, Y and N were certa in  that A would in d e fin ite ly  hold i t s  
extra proceeds in  liq u id  resei^veg and s p e c if ic a l ly  in  the U.S. D ollar  
they would, with the help o f D, keep on borrowing from D with the la t t e r  
printing paper iTioney, This would put in  D's hand a strong means o f ■ 
pressure on Y, E and N because lending has always been a d iscretion ary  
operation^except th is  fa c t  nothing would happen j D, E and Y and H's 
other b i l l  would become a m tte r  o f money printing ard book-keeping 
e x e rc ise s . However such a s itu a tio n  i s  u n lik ely  to  happen because E,
Y and N cannot be expected to  accumulate in d e f in ite ly  foreign  debts. 
Therefore they must earn D^s currency by experiencing a p o s it iv e  trade 
balance with D, As shown by our previous tab le  our World trade would 
in p ly  a flow o f fin a n c ia l tran sfer  from E -  Y, D and N to  A but 
u ltim a te ly  a steady flow o f coimnodities to  D from E, Y, E and a lso  A,
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As a m tte r  of fa c t  in  a second sta g e  the f in a n c ia l trsm sfer, equivalent 
to  the extra proceeds, ^oes from A to  D, Such a scenario i s  fe a s ib le
only i f  D records an economic boom and does not d e f la te  or take
r e s tr ic t iv e  trade measures against E, Y and N.
hhat i s  the d irec tio n  o f  the petrodollars resh u fflin g  process
under these circumstances?
F ir s t , D*3 o i l  induced B.O.P, d e f ic i t  i s  autom atically  
financed. This already has been shown in  Chapter, H  Section  I I I ,
Secondly, D, receives the whole increased c o s t  of E, Y and 
N*s o i l  imports in  the form of goods and ser\dce as shown in the pr,:vious 
ta b le . Consequently only E, Y and N reouire the setting-.up o f a 
resh u fflin g  process. We s h a ll  not go further because A (Arab oil. 
exporting countries) in  in vestin g  th e ir  extra proceeds used a l l  the 
options open to them. In the next Section we sh a ll consider the extent  
and d irec tio n  o f the p etrod o llars resh u fflin g  through o f f i c ia l  
in tern ation a l fin an cia l in s t i tu t io n s ,
SECTION II  ~ ARAB DOLLARS RESHUFFLIIIl TRR0ÎX1H INTERNATIONAL FINANOBI.
INSTITUTIONS
By in tern a tio n a l fin a n c ia l in s t itu t io n s  WTe mean mainly th e  
I.M.F* and the World Bank*, However only the case o f the former sh a ll  
be presented, because th at in s t itu t io n  reshuffled  a b igger s l i c e  of the 
Arab d o llars than the In tern ation al Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (I ,B .R ,D .), This deal a lso  attracted  more a tten tio n  of  
the World opinion. This could be explained by the stature o f the
I.M.F, i t s e l f .
The deal was known as th e.I .M .F , Oil F a c ility  (0 ,F . ). F ir s t  
we s h a ll  present the scheme, then consider the Arab World coniu'ibution 
to  i t  and f in a l ly  tack le  the problem o f  i t s  Im plications, e sp ec ia lly  
with regard to  Arab and N,O.D,C, cou n tries,
SECTION II  -  1 ; CHAJtAGTERISTICS OF THE I.M .F, OIL FACILITY SCHEME
■From the beginning i t  was c lea r  that the operation would have 
a short l i f e ,  only for  1974 end 1975. The 0,F , can be considered from 
three an g les î
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F ir s t ly , the fom u la  ca lcu la tin g  the access o f c a p ita l-  
needy cou n tries.
Secondly, under What conditions a country i s  e n t it le d  to 
acceed to the O.F,
Thirdly, the rates o f  in te r e s t  charged.
The I.M .F. operated tv^ schemes: our approach w ill  be to present both
by comparing one with the other.
Access to  the O.F.
For the 1975 O.F. the I.M .F. came un with two d ifferen t ways
of ca lcu la tin g  two maximu *. e ith er 1?5^ o f the mei.ber ouota in  the Fund
or o f the ad d ition al o i l  b i l l  for that year. The o i l  b i l l  was
ca lcu lated  as foü.ows: e ith er  the o i l  imoort fo r  1972 or 1973 whichever
was tVe higher m ultip lied  by 7 .5  d o lla rs  per b a n -e l,
"Ttiis new formula g ives greater weight to  a trember’c ouota in
ca lcu la tin g  to ta l access and de-emphasiaes o i l  import, as
compared with the formula for the O.F, for 1974, which
included 100^ o f the ca lcu lated  r is e  o f i t s  o i l  import co st
(1 )and only 75% o f the member’s ouota".
The 1975 O.F, d if fe r s  in  two resp ects from the previous one:
F ir s t ly , a country’s in ternation al reserves wore not taken into  
consideration , whereas in  1974 up to 1Q;1 o f the in ternationpl reserves  
were deducted from the m^xiimm a ccess .
Secondly, the I.M.F, introduced a low er-floor below which a 
country’s mximum could not drop. This lower l im it  was e ith e r  one 
th ird  of the ad d ition a l o i l  b i l l  or the lïfôxiimm access as defined by 
the 1974 O.F.
C onditionality  o f the O.F.
A tougher p o licy  was introduced in  1975:
"under the O.F, for 1975 . . .  a men.iber country w i l l  not only 
have to describe to  the Fund, i t s  p o lic ie s  to achi.eve medium- 
term so lu tio n s  to i t s  B.O.P, problems, but the Fund w i l l  a lso  
have to  a ssess  th ese p o lic ie s  and find them adeouate before
(9 }
the msmber country" can make drav/ings under the O.F." ‘ '
(1) -  I.M.F. Survey, 11 August 1975, p. 107.
(2) -  I.M.F. Survey Ib id .
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Furthermore, two other cond itions were s e t ,  but were not sub ject to  
any assessment by the Fund,
F ir s t ly ,  any p o licy  aiming at conserving o i l  and developing  
a lte rn a tiv e  energy resources was to  be described.
Secondly, any member country w illin g  to take advantage o f  the 
O.F. had to  avoid introducing or in ten sify in g  import r e s tr ic t io n s .
This point has been stressed  in  Chapter H ,
In terest ra tes charged.
A compi r isen  o f  both schemes i s  compiled in  the follcpfdng
tab les
TABLE Î O.F. In terest Rates Charged for 1974 and 1975
0-3 years 3-4 years 4-'7 years Average year Charge
1974 6 ^  1% l\%  , 1%
1975 7-^ 7 ^
Sources Compiled from I .F .S , op, c i t .
In terest ra tes  were higher in  1975 that in  1974, However, the  
1975 O.F, l e f t  a margin of 0,5^ fo r  the Fund enabling i t  to cover i t s  
O.F. expenses.
These ,^u*e the terms under Whizh the O.F. schemes operated. 
However, given our top ic we have to find  out the amount of p etrod ollars  
resh u ffled  through th is  channel. We sh a ll  do so by considering the 
Arab World’s and OPEC’s f in a n c ia l contributions to both schemes,
SECTION I I  -  2 Î THE ARAB WORLD’S CONTRIBUTION TO 1974 AND 1975 O.F,
' I t  is  true th a t only some Arab o i l  producers contributed to  
O.F, but we s h a ll  consider such a contribution under the t i t l e  of the 
Arab World’s con tribu tion . This contribution  i s  contained in  th e
(1) -  Compiled from I.M .F. Survey Ib id .
la ? .
subsequent table(_^. ) .
The Arab co u n tr ie s’ p artic ip a tion  in  both O.F, i s  very 
importante I t  amounted to  50^ o f the to ta l  contribution  to the 1974 
O.F, and l e s s  than 40^ o f the 1975 O.F. However, i f  one subtracts the 
S.D .R . 461m. remaining from the 1974 O.F., the Arab World’s contribution  
to the 1975 O.F. would reach 45.2^. The OPEC’s contribution  was 
obviously bigger; in  1974 and 6l^ in  1975*
One could always find  ways and means to  show the Arab World’s 
and OPEC’s contribution  to  O.F, For instance, re la tin g  the len d er ’s 
contribution to  i t s  quota with th e  Fund or i t s  in tern ation a l reserves  
would d e f in i t e ly  show a bigger contribution o f the OPEC menbers than 
the developed cou n tries.
Furth©more, three major indust i ia l ia e d  cou n tries, namely 
U .S.A ., Japan and France, did not p a rtic ip a te  in  e ith er  o f the O.F. 
schemes.
The OPEC contribution , and th erefore the Arab World’s car. be 
explained by a kind of moral and p o l i t ic a l  ob ligation  hanging upon 
them. But there was no le g a l  ob lig a tio n . However, the fa c t  i s  th at  
the Arab World did contribute to the o i l  f a c i l i t y  schemes and wo have 
to a ssess  the return o f  such a con tribu tion ,
SECTION II  -  3 Î ARAB WORLD’S RETURNS DERIVED FROM THEIR CONTRIBUTION 
TO THE OH,-FACILrfY SCHEMES.
By returns we mean the economic and p o l i t ic a l  aims achieved. 
This can be assessed  by considering What countries and to  wHit extent  
took advantage of the O.F, A country by country breakdown access to  
the O.F, can be found at the end o f th is  chapter (Appendix IIT -1 ) and 
our conclusions are drawn from i t .
N icholas Fallon^^^ d iv id es  the borrowers in to  four ca tegories:  
Developed Areas, Latin America, Asia and fina].ly  A frica , Such a 
d iv is io n  i s  not acceptable because N, Fallon moves from an economic- 
p o l i t ic a l  c r ite r io n  -  development -  to  a geographical concept 
(co n tin en ts). In our approach we opt for the f i r s t  c r iter io n  and
( l )  -  N icholas Fallon, "Fo.ddle East O il Money & I t s  Future Expenditure" 
Graham & Trotnan Ltd. in  Great B ritain; Russak & Company Inc, 
in  the U.S.A, and Canada, 1975, Table 93 p .189*
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TABLE 31 î Borrowing Agreements under the 05J. F a c il ity  for 1974 
and for 1975 (Lending Countries )
Unit Î M illion of 8.D ,Rs,
Lender Countries /  Group o f  Countries O.F, 1974 O.F, 1975
Abu Dhabi ICO n i l
Central Bank o f ,Kuwait 400 285
Central Bank of Oman 20 0.5
Saudi Arabia Mbnebary Agency (S.A.M.A. / 1 ,000 1 ,250
Total Arab Countries 1 ,590 1^535.5 !
Central Bank o f Iran 530 410
Nigeria 100 200
Central Bank o f Trinidad & Tobago n i l 10 I
Central Bank o f Venezuela 450 200 1
Total OPEC countries 2,650 2 ,355 .5
Austrian National Bank n i l IDO
National Bank o f Be].gium n i l 200
Canada 246.9 ni].
Deutsche Bundesbank n i l 600
Netherlands 150 200
Bank of Norway n i l 100
Sverigea Riesbank n i l 50 1
Switzerland n i l 150
Swiss National Bank n i l 100
Total Developed Countries 396.9 1,500
Grand Total 3 ,046 .9 3,855.5^’- ’
Source: I.M .F. Survey, April 5, 1976, p .102 (The d isp o sitio n s of the
ta b le  has been rearranged),
(1) -  Purchases equivalent to  S.D.R. 460.977 m illion  under the 1975 O.F. 
were financed from borrowing agreements for  1974.
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therefore d iv id e the borrowing countries between developed countries
and n on -o il developing cou n tries. However, in  so far as our subject
i s  concerned, we s h a ll  a t a la t e r  stage devote special, a tten tio n  to
Arab countries amongst N.O.’D.C.
In 1974 the developed countries borrowed S.D .Rs, 1,469.6m.
or 57^ of the t o ta l  a v a ila b le . During the follow ing year th e ir  share
increased to  S.D.R» 2,894.01m . or 67% o f the funds a v a ila b le  for  the
(1 )year. In other words ten developed countries took most of the sum
a v a ila b le , whereas forty-seven  N.O.D.C. shared the r e s t .
In 1974 only two Arab c o u n tr ie s  acceded t o  the O.F. by
borrowing S.D.R, 40.5m. (Sudan borrowed S.D.R, 28 ,710m ./and  Yemen P.D.R,
S.D.R. ItJoSm. ), The combined borrowing for both countries i s
n e g lig ib le :  le s s  than 2% of the to ta l a v a ila b le .
( 2  1In 1975 f iv e  /u'ab c o u n tr ie s  borrowed S.D.R.  85,32m. or 
ju s t  over 2J? o f  the t o t a l  1975 O.F,
Seen from another point of view, for both years only, out o f
a to ta l  o f S.D.R. 3,055,5m. le n t  by Arab countries, only S.D.R. 1 2 5 .82m,
went to needy other Arab countries through the O.F.
From wl' i^t can be said  one can sa fe ly  maintain that although
the bulk of O.F. was financed by OHiîC members, only a tin y  part o f i t
( q  }
was resh u ffled  to  other developing cou n tries,
(1) -  c f .  App en dix I I I - l .
(2) « The Borrowing occurred as follow s: Egypt S.D .R. 3 1 ,680m.,
Fhuritania S.D.R, 5.320m., Morocco S.'s^ '.R, 18m,, Sudan S.D .R.
18.3m., U.P.D.R. S.D.R. 1 2 .0 2 m -
(3) -  In re la tio n  to  t h is  poin t one has to  mention the sp e c ia l account
8,A . or "Subsidy Account" se t  up by t ,e  Fund. Contributions were 
to  be made by o i l  exporters, developed countries and others able  
to do so . The aim o f the S.A. was: "To reduce the burden of 
in te r e s t  payments on O.F, drawing for the ’most ser io u sly  a ffected  
co u n tr ie s’ ," by 5% p o in ts . Therefore the goal of the S.A , was 
not to  in je c t  more ca p ita l in to  the needy countries but only to  
reduce the in te r e s t  r a tio  from say 7% to  2^, This lacuna was to  
be corrected by OPEC members when they s e t  up th eii’ 800m, d o lla r  
Aid Fund,
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Another disadvantage i s  that those Arab loans to  the I.M.F, 
are not in fla tio n -p r o o f, and therefore th is  means lo s s .  The problem 
of in f la t io n  w i l l  be presented in  Section  III-2  (numerical example) 
when Arab d o lla r  investments in  the Eurocurrency markets w i l l  be d ea lt  
w ith.
Another disadvantage can be la b e lled  "n%noue a gagner". 
Everyone i s  conscious about the in flu en ce and advantages given by 
capital-money and i t s  management. One can even go further and s ta te  
th a t, given the present in tern ation a l s e tt in g , managing cau ita l could  
be more important than owning i t .  The S.D.R. 3bn. odds contri.buted 
by Arab countries were managed by the I.M.F. and therefore those Arab 
lenders lo s t  the in flu en ce and advantage th at would have been derived  
from tV(edu management., uowe ver, in  sp ite  of a l l  th at, contributions  
to  O.F, d’j d not bring only disadvantages to Arab and OPEC len d ers.
In our opinion OPEC members were under heavy pressure from 
western in d u str ia lized  cou n tr ies. I f  these a kind o f "Inter­
national sociology or socio logy  of s t a t e s ’ behaviour" they would 
d e f in ite ly  have to recognize the in fluence of these pressures on OPEC 
cou n tr ies.
On the other hard, those OPEC countries did not want to  
a lien a te  to themselves the backing o f N.O.O.C, By contributing to 
O.F, Arab and OPEC countries hoped to  prove two things;
F ir s t ly , that they we;re res’^ onsible members of the 
International Community; and secondly that th ey  werp determined to  
help the developing cou n tries, themselves being in  such a s ta te .
Did they succeed in  so doing? Not com pletely in  our 
opinion. For given the disbursements o f the O.F. most of i t  went to 
in d u str ia lized  cou n tr ies, and Arab countries fourvd themselves in  a 
kind of "vicious c irc le" : the more in d u str ia lized  countries took
from the o i l  revenue the more L.D.Cs, wanted too .
In  concluding th is  se c tio n  about O.F. we sh a ll take up the 
argument w idely used in Arab and Third World c ir c le s  th a t  t h is  scheme 
was ju s t  part o f  a b igger scheme loiown as "recycling" whose aim was 
to  deprive o i l  producers of th e ir  revenues. Only such an argument 
could explain the absence o f  two Arab countries with surpluses:
Iraq, whose o i l  reserves are sa id  to be able to  ou tstr ip  Saudi reserves, 
and Lybia the only Arab country ab le  to challenge, i f  w illin g  to  do so , 
Saudi Arabia f in a n c ia lly  speaking.
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Some argued that th is  c a itr ib u t!on helped the Arab countries  
to  increase th e ir  Fund's quotas, Unis i s  not time because according 
to  the rbnd’s sta tu s  members quotas have to  be p e r io d ica lly  viewed 
and according to the Fund's agenda i t  had to be done in  1974-75.
From another point of view one has to mention that the I.M.F. 
reshuffled  only a t in y  part o f the OFSC and Arab d o lla rs  sui-pluses; 
j^7bn, or abcut 5?o o f the la t t e r .  Consequently th is  was only o f  
marginal help as far a s the o i l  induced d e f ic i t  i s  concerned.
The O.'K.C.D, countries financed only 3.745? o f their B.O.P, d e f ic i t  
through l . î f .F ,  schemes iVlicreas the financing amounted around 12 ,38%  
in  the ease o f  M.OpD.G, This i s  for the o i l  b i l l  of 1974 and 1975.
Conoeouently since none of the proposals put forward by 
ind iv idual countries were adopted and since the in tern ation a l fin a n c ia l  
in s t itu t io n s ' contivbutiom  to the resh u fflin g  pi-ncess were n eg lig ib le  
i t  means that other channels took the l io n 's  share of the p etrodollars  
surpluses,' Some of those channels could be the pi'lvate f ju sn c ia l  
in s t itu t io n s . In the subsequent sec tio n  we s h a ll  ccnsider the ro le  
of those in s t itu t io n s  which are not p a rtly  or wholly Arab-owned.
SECTION I I I  Î ARAB DOLLARS RESPUFFLIIG THROUGH PRIVATE INTEmATKmi 
FINANCIAL INSTIfUTIŒS.
In th is  s e c tio n  we s h a ll  be concerned witJi the ro le  p layid  
by the Euro-currency and Eurobond markets in  resh u fflin g  the 
p etrod ollars surpluses. However such a role i s  a function o f  the 
share of surpluses placed in  in d iv id u a l marlcets. Consequently one 
has to  present an estim ation  o f the deployment of the o i l  producers' 
surpluses,
SECTION I I I - l  DEPLOYMENT OF THE PSTROBOI.LARS SURPLUSES
Table 32 g ives an idea about the placement o f  OPEC's 
surpluses in  the United Kingdom, the U .S.A ., in tern ation a l organisations  
and other cou n tries. This tab le  contains the follow ing weaknesses. 
F ir s t  we Icnow that the term "other countries" means Japan and the West 
European countries but i t  would have been b etter  to  have the p recise  
figu res fo r  each country. Second i t  considers the OPEC as a Whole 
whereas we are mainly concerned with Arab co u n tr ies. Consequently
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i t  w i l l  not be p ossib le  to  determine with exact p recis ion  the p3.acement 
of ind iv idual Arab countries of t^ e ir  surpluses in  the various 
channels opened to them. However concerning the precise case o f the 
Eurocurrency market Table 33 wlH. shed more l ig h t .
N onetheless, d esp ite  these weaknesses, some conclusions can 
be drawn; and in  doing so we sh a ll not go in  deep d e ta ils .  I t  seems 
that during the 1974- 3rd quarter of 197? OI^ C countries recorded a 
surplus o f |jl5 6 ,7  b i l l i o n s . This sum was deployed as f  oZLlows;
'H'34e5bn, or 22.05?. in  the United Kingdom, |42*4bn. or 27.055? in  U .S .A ., 
^70bn. or 44,67^ in  other countries and f in a l ly  |9 .8 b n . or ju st  
6,255? was deposited with in tern a tio n a l organ isations. However even 
those figu res do not t e l l  the fa c ts  because developed countries other 
than United Kingdom and U.S.A. as w e ll as NoO.D.C. are included under 
the heading "other countries" . As we luiow a s ize a b le  share o f  the 
fin a n c ia l surpluses were in vested  in  U.S. d o lla rs  outside the U.S.A.
The resh u fflin g  ro le  of such an investment has already been outlined  
in  Chapter II  and e a r lie r  in  th is  chapter. This leaves us with the 
conclusion that the share o f OPEC surpluses d ir e c t ly  or in d ir e c t ly  
invested  in  the U.S.A. i s  predominant. However, as we have said  
e a r lie r , the choioo of the currencies in  which the surpluses are held  
or c l  si. ms dsnonij.nated c o n stitu te s  the f i r s t  step  o f the resh u fflin g  
process. The previous ta b le  g ives the opportunity to consider the 
extent of such resh u fflin g  in  the cases of tM  United Kingdom and tho  
U.S.A. During the 1974-3rd quarter of 1977 period part of the o i l  
revenues was invested  in  B r itish  Government Stocks, Treasury B i l l s  
and deposited in  pound s te r l in g . There was a net in flow  o f |5 .3 b n , 
in  1974 and oijtflow o f  |2 ,4 b n . in  1976, At the end o f the period 
United Kingdom recorded an in flow  of |2 ,9 b n . that helped cushion the 
o i l  induced B.O.P, d e f ic i t .  I f  one adds the |0 ,2 b n , received by the 
B ritish  government through foreign  currency bonds the figure goes up 
to  |3 .1 b n .
The U.S.A. seem to  have done b etter  because i f  one considers  
the treasury bonds, notes and b i l l s  one fin d s out that |l4 .5 b n . were 
resh u ffled  to the U .S.A , On the other hand ^21.6bn. were invested  in  
the U.S.-under the form of holding o f  e q u itie s , properties e tc , . I t  
appears th at vdthout considering bajiks d ep osits  the U.S.A, managed to  
a ttr a c t  |3 6 ,lb n . or 23.03^ o f the t o ta l  OPEC surpluses, Cn the other 
hand in  Chapter II  (Table 12, Page 35) we showed that the American
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TABLE 32 î Estimated Deployment o f OPEC's Surpluses ; 
1974 -  3rd Quarter 1977
Period
Items 1974 1975 1976 1 s t  Otr 2nd Otr 3rd Otr^ Total
United Kingdom
B ritish  GVT Stocks 0 .9 0 .4 0.2 » 0 .1 -  0 .1 0 ,1 1 .4
Treasury B i l ls 2 .7 -0 .9 -1 ,2 — ~ 0.1 0,2 0 ,7
S ter lin g  Deposits 1 .7 0 ,2 —1 « 4' 0.2 0 .3 -  0 .2 0 ,6
Other s te r lin g  
Investments (a ) 0.7 0 .3 0.5 0.1 0 .1 0 .1 1 .8
B ritish  GVT Foreign 
currency bonds - — - . » . 0.2 — 0.2
Foreign currency 
D eposits(1) 13 .8 4 .1 5.6 2 ,0 1.4' 0 ,5 27.4
Other Foreign 
Currency Borrowing 1 .2 0 ,2 0 .8 — — 2,2
TOTAL United Kingdom 21 ,0 4 .3 4 .5 2 .2 1 .8 0 .7 34.5
United S tates
Treasury Bonds 
and Notes 0 .2 2 .0 4o2 1 .0 1 .0 0 .7 9 .1
Treasury B il ls 5 .3 0 .4 - 1 .0 1 .5 -  1 ,0 0 .2 5 .4
Bank Deposits 4 .0 0.6 1.6 0.2 -  0 ,2 0 .1 6 .3
Others (a) 2 ,1 6.5 7 .2 1 ,2 2 ,7 1 .9 21,6
TOTAL U.S.A. 11 .6 9.5 1 2 .0 3.9 2 ,5 2 ,9 42,4
Other Countries
Bank Deposits 9 .0 5 .0 7 .0 1 .5 2 .5 2 .0 27 ,0
S p ecia l B ila te r a l  
f a c i l i t i e s  and 
other investm ents 
( (a ) and (b ) )
11.9 12 .4 10,3 3.3 2 .8 2 .3 4 3 .0
TOTAL Other 
Countries 20,9 17 .4 17 .3 4.8 5 .3 4 .3 70 .0
International
Organisations 3.5 4 .0 2 .0 0 ,1 0 .1 0 .1 9 .8
GRAND TOTAL 57.0 35.2 35.8 11.0 9 .7 8 .0 156.7
(a) Includes holdings of e o u it ie s  and property, e tc ,
(b) Includes loans to L.D.Cs.
(c ) P rovision al, I t  i s  estim ated to  have been even lower tv-an in  the 
second quarter.
Source: (1974) The Banlcer, I'ferch 1977, p .91.
-  1975 onwards: Bank of England Quarterly B u lle tin
Volume 17, No, 4, December 1977, p,442,
(1) Foreign currency d ep osits  in  London represent an important part of the 
Eurocurrency market, Conseouently double counting could e x is t  
between Tables 6 anH 7 (
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increased co sts  o f  o i l  imports amounted to  i}62, 2bn, for 1974-77 period.
(1 )A fter comparing both Tables we can conclude th at around 58.03% of  
the U.S. oiH b i l l  was financed through the resh u fflin g  p rocess. I f  
one suppose that the 0H3C surpluses déposited with the U.S. banks in  
the U.S.A.; |6 .3b n ; were a lso  used to cushion the B.O.P, d e f ic i t  the  
figu re goes up to 68,16% of the o i l  b i l l s .  Only under such 
circumstances we can understand Wiy the U.S. owned in tern ation a l 
reserves did not d eclin e  during the 1974-77 period ( c f .  Table 15,
Page 41) and why the Aci^rican government did not f e e l  the need to draw 
money from the I.M .F. or even to talce advantage o f the O.F. schemes. 
Tliese de\relopraents are w e ll w ith in  the scenario vAd_ch has been, 
presented in  Table 29 (Page 103), This i s  a lso  very much in  l in e  
vdth H.G. Aubrey s in ce  he maintained th at a resei've-currency country 
can borrow in  an "im perceptible fashion" and does not need the 
n e c ess ity  to arrange loans in  a case o f B.O.P. d e f ic i t .  I f  one takes 
in to  account the export îocord of the U.S.A. to  OH*îC and Are.b countries  
one finds out that the U.S.A. have su ccess fu lly  coped w ith the new 
s itu a tio n ,
V\hat about other O.E.C.D. countries and W.O.U.C. countries?
Table 32 does not g ive us the extent and directj on o f the r-oshuffling
process in  the caise of each country. The p icture i s  obscure.
However we loiow that OPFC countries deposited part o f  th e ir  surpluses
a lso  in  west European co u n tr ies. To i^lLustrate the extent of th is
geographical deployment we s h a ll  take ttie case o f Kuwait which
developed severa l to o ls  to achieve i t s  "world-wide" investment p o licy .
We opt for Kuwait because i t  was th e  f i r s t  Arab and OPEC country to
record f in a n c ia l surplus, and started  foreign investment as early  as
1964* Therefore one expects th is  country tc> have the b est experience
and the most sop h istica ted  to o ls  to  implement i t s  p o l ic ie s .
Our opinion i s  confirmed by the "Financial Times" when
w ritin g  that the s ta te  o f Kuwait' s reserve:
"at the beginning of 1975 was rather more complex and more
( 9  1d iverse  than other F iddle East co u n tr ie s’ re serv es ." ''
(1) In th is  ca lcu la tio n  we did not d e lib e ra te ly  take in to  account the 
fa c t  th at Table 32 goes only to the th ird  quarter o f 1977 whereas 
Table 12 (Page 35) considers the whole 1974-1977 period .
(2) F inancial Times Survey- "Fiddle East Banking & Finance", c f .  
A rtic le  ""Where the S ta tes  Lodge Their Money", F.T, Fhrch 24, 1975.
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Kuwait used the follow ing fin a n c ia l in s t itu t io n s :
-Kuwait Investment O ffice which i s  the M inistry of Finance's 
representative in  London. According to some reports Kuwait's o i l  
revenues cjo f i r s t  to  th is  in s t itu t io n  before a part of them i s  
channelled to  the M inistry o f Finance.
-F ir s t  National City Bank and chose Manhattan Bank in  New York,
,% e  Svd,ss Bank Corporation and Union Bank o f Switzerland.
These in s t itu t io n s  have been used in  acquiring stocks from most West 
European countries,
“Credit Lyormais -Jn France.
-The Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Banlc and the Coinmers Bank in  W e s u  
Germany.
"A further block of the reserve (about 15% of the t o ta l )  was in  bond 
mostly issued by the Governnent and government agencies, Arab
p a rtic ip a tio n  in  Eurobonds wiDJ. be .considered In paragraph 3 of th is  
sec tio n .
— The remainder was in  three blocks of property: Two were managed
on the Ministi"^' of Finance's beha‘Ji' by the Manhattan Bank and Bank of
America, and id n a lly  the th ird  was managed by the Ministry of Finance.
However, What i s  the main conclusion to  be dram from, the
Kuwaiti case? I t  appears that investments were spread a l l  over
western European cou n tries, including Japan. In other words, thei'e i s
an almost p erfect in tern ation a l d iv e r s if ic a t io n  obviously aimed a t  an
optiDium investment or a minimum r isk . For F .F . Rassi^^^, "the
consequence o f the d iv e r s if ic a t io n  of a p o r tfo lio  i s  to  ensure such a
s itu a tio n  that the p rices due to  factors sp e c if ic  to en terp rises and
in d u str ies  compensate or n eu tra lise  them selves," However, th is  does
not mean that t'neso investm ents are r isk le s s  s in ce , according to  the
same author: " .. .P r ic e  varia tion s induced by the m rket a f fe c t  a l l  the
(  P  )shares and can not be elim inated by the d iversifica tion ," ^ "  '
Stronger c r it ic ism  w i l l  be made a t a la te r  s ta g e , 'however, 
our immedia-te in te r e s t  i s  to  consider the œctent and d irection  o f  the 
ro le  played by those banks in  the resh u fflin g  process. I t  i s  not
(1) and (2) F .F . R assi, "The Theory of International D iv e r s if ic a tio n  
and Cptimum Use o f  Petrodollar Surpluses", (Translated from 
French), Revue d'Economie P o lit io u e , January/February 1976,
Number 1, p .112.
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p o ssib le  to ta ck le  those banks in d iv id u a lly . Therefore we s h a l l  
consider them under the heading of Eurocurrency market. In our 
opinion such an approach i s  ju s t if ie d  by the fa c t  th at the above- 
mentioned in s t itu t io n  c o n stitu te s  the most a c tiv e  elements of the 
banks composing that very market.
SECTION I I I  -  2 : ROLE OF THE EUROClTRREhCY MARK'EIS IN Î^ TRO^ OLLÂRS
R FSTEJm ™
A -  Arab countries holdings vitJi the Eurocurrency market
This ro le  can be assessed , f i r s t ,  by considering the amount 
of OPEC surplus placed in  i t .  In doing so we s h e l l  consider the 
external p osition  o f the banks of the Grain of Ten and Switzerland  
vi-s-a-»\)is the Arab World, o f .  Table 33 (117)* In t h is  tab le a f u l l  
countigy breakdown i s  not a v a ila b le  for l i a b i l i t i e s  and a sse ts  o f banks 
in  Canada, Japan, Switzorland and U.S.A. P osition s of banks in  these  
countries have been a lloca ted  in  the tab le by the follow ing:
Hr Switzerland, C -  Canada, J.-Japan, U.«U.S.A. The l i a b i l i t i e s  in  
the U.S.A. exclude U.S. Treasury b i l l s  and c e r t i f ic a te s  in  custody by 
the banks on behalf of n on -resid en ts, Hov:ever in  the case o f  the 
U.S.A. these treasury b d lls  and c e r t i f ic a te s  have already been 
presented in Table 32 (Page 1^3) and d ea lt w ith. Furthermore,
Table 33 contains one l im it .  I t  considers Iran that i s  not an Arab 
country. However, f in a n c ia lly  speaking, i f  one takes the Arab World 
as a whole Iran 's r o le  could be n e g lig ib le , H i s  holds true  
e sp e c ia lly  from 1976 onwards when Iran started  borrowing from the 
Eurocurrency markets.
Before drawing conclusions from th is  ta b le , two anomalies 
have to be c la r i f ie d ,  namely the cases of Egypt and Lebanon,
Lgyp't i s  not an o i l  exporter on tV.e one hsnd and on the other 
hand her external debt i s  between £10 and £l?bn.^^^ and by the same 
token i t  contributed more than 600m, d o lla rs  to  the euromarket. The 
fa c t  i s  that Egypt i s  the developing country Which took most advantage 
of the new o i l  p rices: for one reason or another almost every Arab
(1) -  F inancial Times, January 20, 1977, front page a r t ic le  "Sadat - 
Bows to Dennnds o f R ioters" ,
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TABLE 33 î External P osition  o f the Banks o f the Group o f Ten 
Countries and Swi^taerland v is -a -v is  the Arab World in  1975
L ia b ilit ie s /A s se ts  v is -a -v is
Low Absorbers
KWAÏT
QATAR
SAUDI ARABIA 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
L ia b il i t ie s
24,570
A ssets
M illions
1,163
b -  High Absorbers J"
BAHRAIN
IRAN
IRAQ
LIBIA
OMAN
ALGERIA J
0 -  Obher Arab Countries
EGYPT JÜ
JCHDAN
LF.BANŒ
MAURITANIA
MOROCCO U
SOMLIA
SUDAN
SYRIA
TUNISIA
YEIdSN A.R,
YEMEN P.D.R.
RESIDUAL^  HCJU
8,6o6
1,285
1,521 
U 4  
2,515 
56 
537 
74 
141 
775 
286 
235
84
6,523
3,176
1,383
914
56
390
6
74.
7
254
35
25
5
1,294
Total Arab World 47,622 8,782
2 -  Include p osition s o f  Japanese Banks v is -a -v is  Kuwait, Saudi Arabia 
U.A.E,, Iran, Iraq and Lybia only  
Source: Compiled from the Bank of Internaticxial Settlem ents, F orty-six th  
Annual Report, (1 st  April 1975 -  31st Mkrch 1976 ), Basle, 
Switzerland, June 14, 1976, p .87,
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o i l  exporter gave grants or easy loans to Egypt. In our opinion, Egypt 
was ju st keeping th at money w3.th in tern ation a l banlcs before spending i t .  
Another figure corroborates our view. According to Table 27 (Page 94) 
Sgii'pt's in ternation al reserves were no more than 334m, d o lla rs  in  July 
1976.
The second caso i s  Lebanon which contributed more than 2bn. 
d o lla rs  to  the eur'ccurrsjicy tm rkets. This i s  due to the role played 
by .Beirut in  the realm of Arab in ternation a l finance. Beirut has 
always been the p lace vhere /irab in d iv id u a ls , jratoly from Kuwait and 
U.A.E, kept th e ir  p rivate fortunes, ■ Pow.'evor, those fortunes were 
channelled towards the eurocurrency markets and, accord ins: to the 
"Lebanon's ro le  i.-as mainly that of a channel for funds from Fiddle 
Eastern o i l  producer countries to the banks of the Group of Ten."^^^
In our opinion had i t  not been for the Lebanese oi'd.l war the amount 
would have been much la rg er . Without encroaching on the next chapter 
one can say that B eiru t's  function i s  sim ilar to  Fa.nama's ro le  
(Bahrain ).
Furthermore, the fa c t that every Arab couritiy, including the 
poorest ones, i s  connected In one way or another to in ternation a l ca p ita l  
markets, i s  not a surprise, because even the so -ca lled  Eastern Block 
maintains re la tio n s  with the in tern a tio n a l ca p ita l market.
The main conclusion to be drawn from Table?3 i s  that the Arab 
World’s cont-ribution to  th e E.C.F. (Eurocurrency Market) was around 
39bn. d o llars for 1975. However, considering the Afab World as a whole 
could be m isleading. A country by country approach i s  necessary.
Such an approach rev ea ls  that th is  contribution comes mainly from the 
o i l  producers excluding A lgeria, Hiey are l i s t e d  under items (a) and 
(b ) of Table 33. I f  one accepts the assumption that Lebanon's 
contribution o f f s e t s  Iran 's , the Arab o i l  excorting countries'
(d iffer e n t from OAPSC) contribution  to the market was 38,8bn, d o llars  
( l i a b i l i t i e s  minus a s s e t s ) .
The next lo g ic a l  question i s  to  find  out how th ese  ^39bn. 
d o lla rs  were reshuffled  between o i l  imnorting cou n tries.
(IJ B .I .S , F orty-six th  Annual Report, op, c i t ,  p .89.
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B -  The R eshuffling of Arab Countries' Holdings vd.th the Eurocurrency 
Mhrket
Tliis resh u fflin g  shall, he assessed by considering what 
countries or group o f countries recorded such borrowing from the 
Eurocurrency Mhrket, Such In forimtion i s  contained in  the next tab le  
that considers the sources and uses of Eurocurrency funds a t th e  end 
o f 1975,
Without going in to  great d e ta ils  i t  appears th at, a t  tbe end 
o f  1975, the net borrower groups are;
« The Reporting European Area with l6 ,5b n . d o lla r s ,
-  Other Group of Ten Countries (0 ,10) with 13bn d o lla r s ,
-  And f in s l l y  Eastern Europe w ith 10,5bn. d o lla r s .
Those fig u res  were obtained by subtracting "sourocs" from 
"uses". I t  is  worth nobing that the combined net borrowing of the 
three above mentioned groups equals lObn, d o lla rs , or, in  other words, 
the v e iy  amount contributed by t i e  Arab World and Iran, I t  has been 
argued that the Eurocurrency Market reshuffled  Arab d o lla rs  to needy 
Arab co u n tr ies . I t  cannot be so fo r  two main reasons.
F ir s t ly ,  according to  Table 33 i t  is  q u ite  c lea r  th a t the 
Arab cou n tries, and therefore the Arab World as a whole, have not 
borrowed from the Eurocurrency Mhiiset.
Secondly, according to Table 34 the developing countries 
group to  which a l l  the b.D.C. n o n -o il producing countries belong, 
borrowed no more than 3c3bn, d o lla rs  u n til  December 1975; l6 ,2b n .
orig inated  from them and thqg used 19.5bn, d o lla r s . Therefore i t  i s  
c le a r  that the Eurocurrency Market i s  financing th e  developed countries  
or, in  other words, taking coa l to  Newcastle, At th is  stage we s h a l l  
not consider the lo g ic  behind th is  behavi.our, however one has to  
recognize that from 1974 onwards the Eurocurrency I'b.rket's function has 
been to finance B.O.P. d e f ic i t s  and i t  happens th at the in d u str ia lized  
countries enjoy a high rate o f  solvency. On the other hand our purpose 
w i l l  be to c la r i fy  the fo llow ing question; VAnat advantages does the  
Arab World as a whole derive from such a situ a tion ?
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TABLE 34 î Estimated Sources and Uses of Euro-currency Funds 
(B ill io n s  of U .S. D ollars)
End of m o n th
Rope
Europe
To ta l '
rling 
an  a rea
o f
which
N on­
bank*
O th e r
GMO
c o u n ­
tries
O the r
devel­
ope d
c o u n ­
t r ies
Easte rn
Euiope
Off-
s iiorc
banking
centres*
OÎI-
exuorl-
Ino
c o u n ­
t i e s '
Devel-
o p inp
c o u n ­
tries
U p -
a l loc ­
a ted
Total
■
U s e s
1 9 7 3  D ec .  , 4 3 . 0 2 9 . 5 2 6 . 2 14.7 7 .4 10.7 1 4 .3 1.7 1 3 2 . 0
1 9 7 4  D e c . f  . 6 1 . 9 4 1 . 0 3 6 . 4 2 0 . 2 9 .8 2 6 . 7 3 .5 15 .7 2 . 8 1 7 7 .0
D e c . l t 6 1 . 5 4 1 . 3 3 6 . 4 2 0 . 4 9 .8 2 6 .7 3 .5 15 .7 3 . 0 1 7 7 .0
1 9 7 5  M arch C 4 . 3 4 4 . 3 3 5 . 5 2 1 .7 1 1.9 2 9 . 4 3 .8 15 8 3 .6 1 0 6 .0
d u n e  , 6 3 . 6 4 6 . 0 3 6 . 3 2 4 . 3 12 .6 3 0 . 5 4 .3 16 ,8 3 . 6 1 9 2 .0
S e p t .  . 62 .1 4 3 , 2 3 7 . 9 2 3 . 9 13 .5 3 3 . 0 4 . 8 1 7 .5 3 . 3 1 9 6 .0
D e c .  . 6 3 . 0 4 3 . 6 3 6 . 7 2 5 . 0 16 .6 3.5.6 5 ,3 19 .5 3 .5 2 0 5 . 0
S o u r c e s
1 9 7 3  D e c .  . 5 0 . Q 2 7 . 5 1 9 .3 1 7 .7 3 .7 12 .5 2 4 . 6 3 . 4 1 3 2 .0
1 9 7 4  D o c , I . 6 8 . 5 3 6 . 9 2 0 . 5 1 8 .4 5 .1 17.8 29 .1 15,5 2.1 1 7 7 .0
D ec.f i 6 7 . 0 3 6 .2 2 0 . 6 1 8 .5 5 .0 17 .8 29 .1 15 .5 2 .7 1 7 7 .0
1 9 7 5  M arch 7 3 . 0 3 7 . 8 2 1 . 3 17 .8 4 .5 18.2 3 1 . 8 16.1 3 . 3 1 8 6 .0
J u n e  . 7 5 . 7 3 6 . 5 2 1 . 4 18 .3 3 .7 2 1 . 3 3 2 . 5 16.1 3 .0 1 9 2 .0
S e p t .  . 7 7 . 3 3 8 . 0 2 3 . 2 19 .4 4 .5 2 0 ,5 3 2 . 3 15 .5 3 . 3 1 9 6 .0
D e c .  . 7 9 . 5 3 0 . 5 2 3 . 7 19 .9 5.1 2 1 . 8 34.G Î 6 . 2 4 . 2 2 0 5 . 0
'  I n c lu d e s ;  (n) u n d e r  " U s e s " ,  the  b a n k s '  c o n v e r s io n s  from foreign currency  into d o m e s t ic  cu rrency  a n d  foreion  
cu r ren cy  fu n d s  s u p p l ied  by Ihe reporl ino  banks  to the c om m erc ia l  banks  of the coun try  of i s s u e  of the  c u rrency  
in q u e s t io n  ( s u c h  a s  DM funds  de posH od  with G e rm a n  ban k s) ;  (b) u n d e r  " S o u r c e s " ,  d e p o s i t s  by official m one ta ry  
in s t i tu t ions  of tite re por t ing  a re a ,  the  t ranks ' c o n v e r s io n s  fsom oorrtcst ic  into foreicin c u rre ncy  an d  foreign 
cu r ren cy  funds  obln ined  by the  re po i t ina  banks  from the banks  in the  country  of i s su e  of the  c u rrenc y  in qtm stion 
(suc t i  a s  fu n d s  received  in D c u ts c n e  Mark from G erm an  b anks) .  = On the s o u rc e s  s ide  inciudirtrj f u s t e c  funds  
to  the  extent  that they a re  t ransm it ted  by the  S w is s  banks  to the o th e r  uanks  within the  reporl ino  a rea  a n d  io th.e 
ex ten t  (hat they arc  no! re po r te d  as  liabilities vis-à-vis  n o n -b a n k s  ou ts ide  the  reporting  a rea  Uy the S w is s  banks  
t h e m s e lv e s .  » B a h a m a s ,  B a r b a d o s ,  B erm uda ,  C aym an I s lands ,  Hong  Kong,  L ebanon ,  Liberia, N e the r lands  
A nti l les ,  New H ebr ides ,  P a n a m a ,  E in g ap e ro ,  'i/irgin I s lan d s ,  W e s t  Indies ,  A lneria ,  B ahrain ,  Brunei,  Ecuador,
G a b o n ,  In d o n e s ia ,  Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,  Libya, Nigeria, O m a n ,  Q atar ,  Saud i  Arabia ,  Tr in idad a n d  T o b a n o .  United 
A ra b  E m ira tes ,  V enezue la .
-
Source? B .I .S , op, c i t ,  p ,83 .
G -  Arab World's advantages and disadvantages f r om Eurocurrency 
Fàrket R eshuffling of P etro d o lla rs,
The problem o f advantages and disadvania.ges to  ojI  producers 
from th e ir  f in a n c ia l investment has been tackled by severa l people, 
such as Haim Lev^ r and M, Sarnat. Their paper analyses the behaviour 
of the Middle Eastern O il Producer countries?
"in terms of a , , .  two-period p o r tfo lio  model wV'ich hypothesises  
th at the countries in  Question seek the optimal so lu tio n  to  
the problem of d iv ersify in g  th e ir  a s se ts  between o i l  reserves
(1 )in  the ground and other non-petroleum investment a lte r n a tiv e s ," '
( l } -  Haim Levy and Marshall Sarnat, "The World O il C risis? A P o r tfo lio
Interpretation", Economic Enouiry Volume X l l l ,  September 1975^ ^ 3 4%, 
Most o f  th e ir  arguments w i l l  be taken up in  th is  part of Section  I I I ,
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From th is  point o f view Arab o i l  producers are faced with econoni.c 
"danger" end p o l i t i c a l  disadvantages,
-  Economilc Danger for Arab Oil Investments,
From an economic point of view, the common danger i s  in!D.ation, 
This danger can be found throughout a l l  ow  research and therefore we 
f e e l  the need to s tr e s s  i t .
Considering the case of in f la t io n , the authors concluded th a t  
i t  i s  b e tter  for t ’-e ojJ. producers to have o i l  in the ground than 
fin a n c ia l investm ent. The reason is  that:
"The rate of retumi on fin a n c ia l investment in  the developed 
countries i s  im p erfectly  correlated  with in f la t io n  and as 
a r e su lt , the upward adjustment of minimal in te r e s t  rates  
tends to  lag  behind the ri.se of p r ice s .
The magnitude o f the lo s s  can be i l lu s tr a te d  by the fo llow ing  
numerical exanple. Say an Arab o i l  producer earmarks 10 d o lla rs  for  
fin a n c ia l investment with a ra te  of in te m s t  (r) eouaJllng 7a per 
annum (e .g . O i l - f a c i / i t y ) a t the end of the yoar that country w i l l  
receive:
Y1 s  10 (1 -r) -  1 0 ( 1 - 0 . 0 7 )  « 10(1 .07) 10 .7  d o lla r s ,
Foweve?.', i f  that i'nvestment was to  have an in fla tio n -p ro o f investment
the rate  of in f la t io n  has to  be considered. Say the ra te  of
in fla t io n  ( g } i s  11% per annum at the end o f ttje 3^3ar tha.t country  
wou3.d receive:
Y2 c. 10 (1 -  r) (1 -  g)
« 10 (1 -  0.07) (1 -  0 .14)
« 10 (1 .07 ) (1 .14)
« 12.19Ô d o lla r s .
The lo s s  (L) i s  then
L « Y2 -  n
L ET 12,190 -  10 .7  d o lla rs  
L a; I . 49& ^  1 .5  d o lla rs  
I t  appears that although that country gained 7% o f  i t s  i n i t i a l  in v e s t­
ment, i t  lo s t  a c tu a lly  15% o f the purchasing power of i t s  p rin cip a l 
in  one year. I f  one goes further and supposes th at even in te r e s ts  
were to  be protected a g a in st in f la t io n  the actu al lo s s  would be higher 
than 15%. I f  the i n i t i a l  purchasing power was to  be maintained,
(1) -  H. Levy and M, Sam at, op. c i t ,  p .367.
122.
He Levy and M, Sam at suggest two methods?
"Since we have seen th a t p o r tfo lio  d ec ision s are influenced by 
the in troduction  o f purcM sing power r isk , one such p o licy  
would be to  reduce the r isk  attached to  fin s.n cia l investment 
by o ffer in g  to t i e  o i l  pmducing countries an in fla tio n -p ro o f  
investment o u t le t  whose p rin cip a l and in te r e s t  rates are 
linked to  a general index o f  the change in  world p rices,"
or,
" . . .  to  pay for tîie o i l  in  linked  currency, e ,g ,  in  d o llars
)
of constant purchasing power."'
These conclusions were reached under the assumption that 
future o i l  p rices are uncertain. However, i f  i t  i s  certa in  that o i l  
p rices w i l l ,  a t  b est for  some or a t worst for o th ers, maintain th eir  
current le v e l  and indeed i t  i s  so ( c f .  Chapter I ) ,  th e ir  conclusions  
w il l  acquire more w eight. Furthermore, there is  anotlier element TAiich 
strengthens th e ir  conclusion: in early  1974 ca p ita l exporting Arab
countries VJeîre "offered" negative In terest ra tes maird.y in  the Svd.ss 
markd*/, Tie truth i s  th a t n eith er  of the two a lte rn a tiv es  suggested 
by He, Levy and It Sarnat apply to  Arab ca p ita l exporters' current 
f in a n c ia l investment in  western in d u str ia lised  co u n tr ies.
To the dilemma between o i l  in  the g3X>und and p o r tfo lio  
investment and given the above described s itu a tio n , the two authors 
came up with the fo llow ing conclusion:
"The expected e f fe c t  o f  the type o f in f la t io n  \iiich  has
characterized the tvestem w/orld during the 19703 m y  w ell
have been to  reduce the developing cou n tries' in cen tives
to  ex tra ct o i l  reserves from the ground on p o r tfo lio
(2 )investment al.one,"
However, one cannot consider Arab fin a n cia l investments on 
p o r tfo lio  considerations alone. Before movi.ng to  p o l i t ic a l  
considerations v;e f e e l  the n e c e ss ity  to r e c a ll  an argument we used when 
considering o i l - f a c i l i t y .
For instance, the Arab World exported more than 39bn. d o lla rs  
in  1975 to  the Eurocurrency F&rket. This does mean that they are not 
contributing to the management o f th e ir  new/ fund; no fin a n c ia l
(1) -  H, Levy and M. Sam at, op, c i t ,  p .367.
(2) -  Ib id .
1P3
exp ertise  i s  gained from those b i l l io n s ,
“ P o l i t ic a l  Pis ad van tap, eg to  Arab Financial Investnrient s
Fere again another argument has to  be rep eated :- sin ce they 
are not managing th e ir  own funds Arab c a p ita l exporting countries are 
bound to lose  p o l i t ic a l  gains or in flu en ces which are derived from 
fund managing.
Some Arab p o lit ic ia n s  voiced the fear th a t, although they are  
deposited with private banks, th ese funds could be frozen in  case of  
p o l i t ic  e l  confrontation . The point i s  th at i t  i s  need less to  try- 
proving the normal c lo se  re la tio n sh ip  between western in d u str ia lized  
countries and major in tern a tio n a l banks. Such a fear  could be 
ju s t if ie d , but with regard to i t  one has to r e c a ll two h is to r ic a l  
cases ; India/Egypt and /ilg er ia .
The Case of India and Fgwb.
During the Secoml World War India and Fgjnt supplied B r itish  
so ld iers  with food and war m ateria ls. By the end of the war, B r ita in  
owed a co n sis ten t amount of money to both cou n tries, estimated, to  bo 
around £l,600m, for India, In 1940 the Bank o f England blocked the 
debt for both cou n tr ies. India and Egypt were allowed to withdraw, 
sin ce that debt became d ep osit, only a given part o f i t  . . .  to  buy 
B ritish  goods. Fartbermore. Great B rita in  was ju st  emerging from the 
war and she had "nothing to  s e l l" .  H istory could repea.t i t s e l f  a s  
far as Arab funds are concerned.
The Case o f  Algeria
During the Algeri.an War of Indépendance, the "Front da la  
lib era tio n  Nationale" or F.L.N. used to  d ep o sit i t s  funds i^dth a Swiss 
Bank, A.fter independence the Algerian government claimed the funds
back. In the early  1970s a Swiss tribunal rejected  the Algerian c^alm
on the grounds that only the person or moral per sen who made the  
d ep osits have the r igh t to withdraw them. In t h is  case i t  vias the 
Treasurer o f  the F.L.N, who i s  dead, What i s  the moral fo r  us?
As a matter o f fa c t  one does not know whether Arab d ep osits  
in  foreign  banlts are made in  the name o f fin a n c ia l in s t itu t io n s  or 
ru].ing fa m ilie s . In the la t t e r  case and in  the case of the  
disappearance o f the ruling fam ily -  i . e .  tlie current regime -  the  
people of th at very country might lo s e  a l o t .
124,
Such fe a rs  a re  n o t b a se le ss  fo r  as e a r ly  as 1973, " le  Mbnde" 
suggested th a t  Arab d e p o s its  could be " n a tio n a lise d " .
Furtherm ore, our v5.ew i s  co rroborated  by Mrs, Frances S tew art 
and Mr. Paul S tre e te n  who f e e l  t h a t  by in v e s tin g  th e  bu lk  of t h e i r  
su rp lu ses  in  developed c o u n tr ie s  th e  OHCC, and conseouen tly  th e  Arab 
c o u n tr ie s , face "the th r e a t  o f e x p ro p ria tio n  and th e  weakening o f î'haj.r
n  )subsequent economic and p o l i t i c a l  b arg a in in g  p o w er." ' I f  such a 
move does occur w estern  c o u n tr ie s  \ 'd .ll be ju s t  fo llow ing  th e  Arab o i l  
producing c o u n tr ie s ' example.
From an economic p o in t o f  view and i f  only  dom estic in t e r e s t s  
were to  be co n sid e red , Arab o i l  producing c o u n tr ie s  w ould.have stopned 
t h e i r  c a p i ta l  exports  y ea rs  ago. However, p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y  has i t s  
ro le  to  p la y  to o .
Another channel in  the Arab cou n tries' fore ign  investment i s  
the International Bond Market (l.B'.M ,) which has to be considered to o ,
SECTION I I I  3 Ï THE ROLF OF INTERNATIONAL BOND MARKETS (I .B .M J  Lm
ARAB DOLLARS RFS'JUFFLINO AND ITS IMPLICATIONS,
A. -  Role of the In te rn a t io n a l  Bond Market in  R esh u fflin g  Arab D o lla rs .
The ro le  o f th e  In te rn a t io n a l  Bond îfe rket in  absorbing  Arab
d o l la r s  has been in c re a s in g  from  1975 onwards. The s h i f t  occurred
fjp'F: p u re ly  d i f f e r e n t i a l  i n t e r e s t  r a te s  between th e  Eurocurrency
I'^i.rket and the I r i te m a tio n a l  Bond F a rk e t. The e v o lu tio n  of bo th
m arkets ' i n t e r e s t  r a te s  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  by the  follow/in g ta b le .
According to  t h i s  ta b le  the  E u ro -d o lla r  d ep o s it r a te s  were
h ig h er than the Euro-bond y ie ld s  only  from od.d 1973 to  th e  th i r d
quarter o f 1974 with an upsurge during February 1973.
The 1975 Bank fo r  In te rn a t io n a l  S e ttle m e n ts ' Annual Report
g iv es  two reasons fo r t h i s  " sp e c ta c u la r  come-back" o f  the Eurocurrency
Fhilcet in  1975, the  fir* s t one be ing , " . . . t h e  easing  of dom estic
( P  )monetary co n d itio n s  and the r e s to r a t io n  o f c o n f id e n c e .. ."  , and t're
(1) lyîrs, F, S tew art and F r, P. S tre e te n , "O il and Developments, a 
Steady T ripod", op, c i t ,  p .104.
(2) The Bank fo r  I n te rn a t io n a l  S e ttle m e n ts ' F o r ty -s ix th  Annual R eport 
op. c i t ,  P.Ô9.
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TABIE 35 î E u ro -d o lla r  D eposit R ates and Euro-bond Y ields
from 1972 to  1976
%
E u r o - d o l l a r  c lopos i l  r a l e s  a n d  E ur o- r l o l ln r  b o n d  y i e l d s .
EncI'Pl-rnoiith f ' î s  and wccv.iy n v e r a g o s .
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SourceÎ Bank fo r  In te rn a t io n a l  Settlem ents»  F o rtjr -s ix th  Annual R eport, 
op. c i t ,  p.&9.
second one i s  due: to  th e  re la x a tio n  o f United S ta te s  monetary
r e s t r a i n t , , , "  and to ,  " . , . , t h e  f a c t  t h a t  the ma.ik e t  r e a l is e d  th a t  th e  
recess io n  was deeper than a n t i c i p a t e d ^ ^  Both reasons being  out 
o f c o n tro l fo r  the Arab World.
'V.hen ta c k lin g  the r o le  of the In te rn a t io n a l  Bond Ifarket in  
r e s h u f f l in g  Arab d o l la r s  we need an approach d i f f e r e n t  from th e  one 
adopted f o r  the Eurocurrency k k rk e t, V/e cannot co n s id e r th e  Arab 
W orld’s c o n tr ib u tio n  to  th e  m arket from th e  "sources s id e"  s in ce  
buyers are  more o r  l e s s  anonymous.
(1) The Bank f o r  I n te rn a t io n a l  S ettlem ents»  F o r ty -s ix th  Annual Report 
op. c i t .  p . 69.
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For in s ta n c e , c o n s id e rin g  th e  d iv e rse  component of the  
Euro-bond I"krket the Banker w rote:
" th e re  i s  no m ystery about the borrow ers, about the cu rren c ie s  
used, about the  term s on vThich the  market d ea ls  or about 
th e  banks in  i t ,  a lthough  the earn ing  o f th e  in d iv id u a l banks 
from Euro-bond o p e ra tio n s  remains a s u b je c t  of sp e c u la tio n .
But no one knows fo r  c e r ta in  ju s t  who th e  in v e s to rs  a re .  ^
However, i t  i-3 c le a r  t h a t  th e  major in te rn a t io n a l  banks, 
those  banks w ith which Arab c o u n tr ie s  deposH  th e i r  funds, su b sc rib e  
to  th e  is s u e s .  Ih e re fo re , we thimk i t  i s  safe  to  say  th a t  th e re  i s  
an in d ij .e c t Arab p a r t ic ip a t io n  b u t, on th e  o th e r  h ard , i t  i s  Ward to  
reach an e s tim a te  fo r  the Arab World as a whole or fo r any in d iv id u a l 
Arab coun try .
However, according to  Table 32 (Page 113) th e  OPEC c o u n tr ie s , 
th e re fo re  Arab c o u n tr ie s , subscribed  to American, B r ir is h ,  European 
and even Japanese s e c u r i t i e s .  But th is  c o n tr ib u tio n  cannot be 
q u a n tif ie d . Then the  only  approach l e f t  to  us i s  to  ta c k le  the 
proV)lem from the  "uses s id e " . On the o th e r  hand th i s  approach has 
th e  advantage of g iving to  u s , a t  th e  same tim e, the d ire c tio n  of th e  
re sh u ff lin g  p ro ce ss . We- s h a l l  do so by co n s id e rin g  in te rn a t io n a l  
bond is s u e s .  The fo llow ing ta b le  g ives to  us bnose is s u e s  fo r the  
1972-76 p e rio d .
This ta b le  g ives us a b ioad  id ea  and we a re  n o t going to dig 
behind every f ig u re  and every  item . However, i t  i s  w orth n o ting , 
th a t  most of the is s u e s  were denominated in  U.S. d o l la r s .  As f a r  
as th e  paragraph i s  concerned, the  l a s t  item  " In te rn a tio n a l Bonds, 
t o t a l s  of Which issu e d  by" i s  im p o rtan t.
From t h i s  item  i t  appears th a t  7l„306bu, d o lla r s  worth of 
In te rn a t io n a l  Bonds were issu ed  by developed, developing c o u n tr ie s  
and o ther in te rn a t io n a l  o rg a n is a tio n s . They issu ed  53*277bn, d o l la r s  
4 ,l6 5 b n , and 13.926bn, d o l la r s  r e s p e c tiv e ly . Percentagew ise, the 
t o t a l  amount o f 71bn, odds was shared as fo llow s;
Developed C oun tries  -  74,65^
Developing C oun tries -  5.83%
In te rn a t io n a l  O rgan isa tions -  19,52%
( I j  •' The Banker, "Eurobond F krket" , The Banlter D iv ision  o f th e  
F in an c ia l Times, London, November 1976, p ,l? 4 9 .
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The share o f  the L.D.Cs, i s  obviously n e g lig ib le .
Furthermore, even i f  one considers th at a l l  the amount ra ised  by 
"International organisations" went to the L.D.C., th e ir  to ta l share 
would be I6 ,0$ lb n , d o lla rs  or ju st over a ouarter o f the to ta l  amount,
B, -  Returns Der5.ved from The In em ation al Bond m rk ets» Hole in  
Resh u fflin g  Arab D o lla rs .
Given the above described s itu a tio n , there i s  no room for  
arguing that the International Bond harlcet finances L.D.C. econond,c 
developiaent a n i th erefore that Arab funds were channelled ti-rough i t  
to N on-oil Developing Countries,
For a f u l l  s e t  o f reasons th is  maiket:
" is c le a r ly  no maidcet for developing cou n tries. Woo have 
accounted fcr only 5% of borromng :ln a l l  in tern a tio n a l 
f ix e d - in te l’e s t  markets th is  year (1976
A sort of discrepancy seems to  emerge fmm our statement 
and the much heralded 'Ihird World indebtedness. In cur opinion  
there i s  no discrepancy and the explanation being th s t  the L.D.Cs. 
are indebted nob to the Eurocurrency Market but to  in d iv i dual lendi.i'g 
cou n tries,
Hov.i0ver^ are tVio Ai'ab ca p ita l exnorting countries gettin g  
any b e n e fit  or advantages from the In tem atiob a l Bond Market’s role?
Let us consider the problem from an economic point of view. 
F ii's t, the Eurobond issu e s  are managed by the top 20/25 in tern ation a l 
banksJ most of whom are members of the so -ca lled  "golden c irc le"
(around 10 bs'ks ) which manages Saudi Arabia's surplus. Obviously 
th e in vestin g  countries are not gaining fmy f in a n c ia l exp ertise  from 
th is  type of investm ent.
Secondly, s in ce  no Arab country i s  p a rtic ip a tin g  in  the  
issu in g  Arab countries cannot even lay  claim  to  the b e n e fits  and 
advantages o f fees  and commissions whose annual amount was around 
300m, d o lla rs  in  1976,
Third and f in a l ly ,  even the nominal returns could d ec lin e .
Let us consider the problem from a p o l i t ic a l  point o f  view now. Given 
the structure of the market in  Question, in v esto rs , i . e .  Arab cou n tries,
( i j  T he B a n k e r ,  " E u ro b o n d  S u r v e y " ,  o p ,, c i t ,  p ,1 2 A 5 *
1 2 9 .
are anonymous. Therefore, from the lendinp; s id e funds become 
"impersonal” and, among other th in gs, th is  means that in vestors are 
not in  re la tio n  with borrowers and therefore they cannot ex erc ise  any 
in flu en ce or pressure on them. This is  argued bearing in  mind that 
from pressures or Influence in vestors could deri^ve in d irec t b e n e f it s .
I t  a ls o  means th a t Arab c o u n tr ie s  do not bear any r isk s  when i t  comes 
to  u lt im a te  in vestm en ts.
In concluding th is  sectio n  we s h a ll  draw the main conclusion  
namely that both the Eurocurrency and Eurobond Markets reshuffled  the  
p etrod ollars towards developed co u n tr ies. I t  seems th at around a 
th ird  of the extra proceeds was so resh u ffled . The ro le  of the 
Eurobond khdret has a lso  proved o f  growing importance for the O.E.C.'O, 
cou n tries. According to Table 36 (Page 127) th e ir  issu e s  tr ip led  
from |5 .0S5bn, in  197A to  ^15,213bn. in  1975. The share of the E .n .c , 
has always been n e g lig ib le  although th e ir  issu es  increased from 
IfO.ÔPTbn. in  1975 to  ^1.39^bn. in  1976. Tlie East European countries  
seem to  be absent from the Eurobond ]%rkets but th e ir  a ctiv e  presence 
i s  being more and irore f e l t  in  the Eurocurrency Market s in ce  they 
borroi'ved |lOo5bn. from December 1973 to December 1975. A ll in  a l l  
i t  i s  obvious that OcE.O.D, countries have ex ten siv e ly  used both 
markets to finance th e ir  B.O.P. d e f ic i t .  This trend has been 
strengthened by Arab d irec t investm ents because they happened -aajnly 
in  the p rin cip al O.E.C.D, co u n tr ies,
SECTION IV Î AhAB REAL ^VESTtEIfTS IN WESTERN INDUSTRIALIZED COiWRIES
i h i 8 type 01' Arab investment is  included in  th is  chapter 
because the Arab in vestors did not make i t  d ir e c t ly  and person ally . 
Both investox’s ,  p rivate  and o f f i c ia l ,  used the West European and 
North American banking system to  undertake th is  kind of investm ent. 
Second, the fn c t o f buying up companies in  the o i l  importing countries  
i s  a type of tran sfer  because i t  represents an Inflow o f  c a p ita l and 
therefore w il l  tend to  improve the B.O.P, s itu a tio n  of the d e f ic i t  
cou n tries. This type o f investment occurred almost ex c lu s iv e ly  in  
the O.E.C.D. area and th is  j u s t i f i e s  our heading. This problem sh a ll  
be tacl^d in  two phases. F ir s t ,  by presenting the d ir e c t  in  v est ms nt 
themselves and second theii? im p lica tion s. These im p lication s w i l l  be 
px’esented from the poin t of view o f  the Arab World in te r e s t .
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SECTION IV 1 î ARAB DIRECT INVEoTRENT IN WESTERN CCUNTRIRS
Arab in v e s to rs  were n o t in te re s te d  in  every  and any w estern  
co u n try . Investm ents occurred  only in  a han d fu l o f  c o u n tr ie s : U.S.A*,
West Germany, G reat B r i ta in  by the end o f 1975 and I t a ly  a t  the end 
o f 1976.
Our aim i s  n o t to  p re se n t a l i s t  o f  every Invesbïtent in  every 
w estern  country?-. Although such a descid .p tive iA;ork could be done i t  
would n o t lead  us to  d i f f e r e n t  co n c lu s io n s . S ince our Whole th e s is  
i s  based more or le s s  on a c r i t i c a l  approach to  the whole problem, as 
f a r  as  t h i s  p a r t  i s  concerned we s h a l l  focus our a t t e n t io n  on th e  
re a c tio n  of w estern  c o u n tr ie s  to  would-be Arab in v estm en ts . Such 
behaviour v â l l  d e f in i t e ly  shed some ],igh t on o th e r  ty p e s  of Arab 
in v estm en ts . I t  might a lso  b r to g  to l ig h t  the w estern  c o u n tr ie s ’ 
a t t i t u d e  v i s - à - v i s  the  Whole pxoblem.
Since w estern  r e a c t io n , r e f le c t in g  dom estic and in te rn a t io n a l  
s i tu a t io n s ,  d i f f e r s  from one country  to  an o th e r, we sh fill  p re se n t Arab 
investm en t country by co u n try ,
A, •» Arab D ire c t Investm ent In  the U nited S ta te s ,
Tlie U .S.A. has always pi-eachcd the f re e  movemenb of c a p i ta l  
throughout the h/orld, and she did app ly  i t ,  Conseouently U.S. 
investm en ts flooded Europe during  thw 1950s and 1960s, I t  occurred  
m ainly in  th e  c a r  and computing in d u s t r ie s ,  What was the U.S. 
r e a c t io n  to Arab investm en ts?
The f a c t  is  t h a t  the U.S. a d m in is tra tio n  took p recau tio n a ry
s te p s  to  avo id : " . . t h e  k ind  of b u s in e ss  taK e-overs p ra c tis e d  on a la rg e
sc a le  by Americans in  E u r o p e , T h i s  move was i l l u s t r a t e d  by two
Senate B i l l s ,  The f i r s t  B i l l :  " re q u ire s  d is c lo s u re  o f  a l l  fo re ig n
ho ld ing  in  the U nited  S ta te s  in  excess of 10,000 d o l la r s  w ith
(1}p e n a lt ie s  o f f in e s  and forced  d iv e s t i tu r e  a t ta c h e d ,"  The second
B i l l  empowered: "The P re s id e n t (o f the U.S.A. )  to  ban fo re ig n  
investm ent in  U.S. Companies on the  grounds o f  n a tio n a l i n t e r e s t , " ^
( 1 )  -  T he B a n k e r ,  M arch  1 9 7 5 ,  p . 2 2 $ ,
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Would-be foreign  in v esto rs  had to  go through lengthy adm inistrative  
processes before f in a lis in g  tb e ir  d ea l. For in stan ce, i f  the deal 
Involves more than 5% o f any U.S. compÆi.ny’s share, foreign in vestors  
had to g ive  a th to ty  day n o tic e  to  the S ecu r itie s  and Exchange 
Commission,
In our opinion such a le g is la t io n  was not ju s t if ia b le  on
economic grounds because twey were in  B.O,P, d e f ic i t  and therefore a
c a p ita l inflow  shciü.d be welcomed. Furthermore, by foreign
in vestors was r e a lly  meant Arab ones. With regard to th is  point
"The Banker" comments :
"A further dig a t the Arab s ta te s  i s  the reward for those
countries (Venezuela, Ecuador, N igeria, Indonesia and Iran)
of OPEC which did not take part in the Arab o i l  embargo of
1973. A B i l l  amendiiy; the U.S. Trade Reform Act to  make
these countries fo r  preferable trade terms has been
( \  1introduced to  the Senate,"^
As far  as bhe ü ,S ,A, i s  concerned, we did not vdtness any Arab 
investm ent on the sc a le  an tic ip ated  by everyone. I f ,  in the IJ.S.A,, 
the dig was obvious and d ir o o t, in  other western cou n tries, a 1thou.gh 
su b tle , i t  was not le s s  e f f i c i e n t .
B. -  Arab D irect Investment in Vbst Germany
Amongst the western European countries West Germny has the  
stron gest econo try. Therefore some Arab countries tr ied  to  in v e st  
in  some sectors such as s t e e l .  This was to be done through Swiss 
banks.
The only important Arab deal was th e Kuwaiti purchase of
shares in Daimler-Benz (car in d u stry). ihe deal co st D.M. Ibn.
The West German government d id  no t pass any p ro h ib it iv e  le g is la t io n s
although i t  was ready to do so in  case o f foreign  p a rtic ip a tion
involving 10^ or more o f the c a p ita l share, however, i t  i s  worth
noting that West Germa.ny has always been open to  foreign  can i t s  1 , ard
m ih ly  to U.S. investm ents. But Arab investm ents were prevented by
th e  e x is te n c e  of a;
"gentleman *s agreement amongst businessmen and bankers to  keep
the government informed o f  pronosed extensive foreign  
(? )
p a r t ic ip a t io n ,"
(1 ) and (2) -  The Banker, March 1975, p .22$,
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Furthermore, in  some ca se s , even the manageinant and shareholders were 
again st Arab p a r tic ip a tio n . For in stan ce, h'l the company Fannestmnn,
a g em ra l meeting of the shareholders r a t if ie d  a d ecision  made by the
Board of D irectors to prevent any p a rtic ip a tion  over 5  ^ of the to ta l  
voting r ig h t. However, here again i t  was Iran who succeeded to  the  
b est deal by purchasing 25^ o f  the Krupp s t e e l  subsid iary,
C, -  Arab D irect Investment in  Great B r ita in ,
Arab in v esto rs  did not tako ovei any big B r itish  industry,
but on the other hand, i t  was in  th is  country th a t most of Arab
investment in  rea l esta te  occurred. Kuivait excelled  in  thto f i e ld ,  
Kuwait even acquired a sp ec ia l to o l to  f u l f i l  i t s  nolxcy in  th is  
sector: S t, 1%rtiin ’s Property Cornorations .
Great B rita in  has an a ilin g  economy and was badly h i t  by
th e o il  c r i s i s  and therefore one would expect i t  to welcome foreign
c a p ita l, whatever i t s  origin* I t  was the other way round. One of 
the obvious barriers was the famous "Clause 10 of the new Industry 
B i l l . , , ”, empowering r
"The Secretary of State to issu e  a prohibiti.cn order again st
the tra n sfer  o f control o f a n y  manufacturing industry contrary
Cl )to  national in te r e s t .
Furthermore, the Secretary o fS tate had the le g a l power to  "save” any 
"threatened company" by allOA'ing the National Enterprise Foard to  
take i t  over.
Furthermore, the Banlc o f England, depository o f Arab funds, 
by sending a l e t t e r  to authorized d ep o sito r ie s , ensured th a t non­
resid en ts could not purchase or increase bheir previous p a rtic ip a tio n  
to  lOjC or more o f the t o ta l  ca p ita l without s p e c if ic  exchange con tro l.
D. -  Arab D irect Investment in France.
In so fa r  as foreign  investment i s  concerned, France’s 
p o sitio n  has always been d iffe r e n t  from that of other European countri.es. 
She has alvays been characterised by Fer reluctance towarts American 
d ire c t  investm ents. The country was ju r id ic a lly  armed to face any 
foreign  investment and therefore she did not take any le g a l s tep s , for:
(1) -  The Banker, Karoh 1975, p . 297.
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" th e re  a lre a d y  e x is ts  a law re q u ir in g  n o t i f i c a t io n  to  the 
M n is try  of F inance o f any fo re ign  purchase of sM re s
(1  )
amounting to  20^, o r  more of the ho ld ing  of any company."
I f  need a ro se  t h i s  law could be app lied  to  Arab in v estm en ts . 
N evertheless some Arab c o u n tr ie s  in v ested  in  r ^ a l  e s ta te ,  e .g , th e  
Tour Manhattan purchased by Kuwait,
A ll t h i s  cone em bed s e t  of ju d ic ia l  measures taken  by 
w estern  in d u s t r ia l iz e d  c o u n tr ie s  evented, ra+ker than d iscouraged , 
Arab d i r e c t  investm ent in  Europe anl North America u n t i l  tke  end. of 
1 9 7 6  when I ta ly  w itnessed  an im portan t d e a l .
E, «- Arab D ire c t Investm ent in  I t a lv .
Libya i s  a p p a re n tly  the  only Arab coun try  in v e s tin g  in  I ta ly  
and ap p aren tly  i t  i s  a lso  th e  only Libyan major investm ent, abroad.
For th ese  two reasons we s h a l l  la y  emphasis on th is  d e a l, A 9.6^^ 
ho ld ing  in  F ia t  c o s t  £250m, (around 1.1 dm, d o l la r s )  to  Libya, b u t twe 
A g n elli fam ily  s t i l l  r e ta in s  c o n tro l  of th e  v a s t empi.re o f the  
company. Compared to  o th e r  Arab investm ents th e  Libvan deal b rin g s  
two new elem ents: F ii’stl.y,, th e  approbation  of the  I t a l i a n  government,
and secondly  the  involvem ent of an Arab bank. This dea l ,  ju s t  l ik e  
any Arab investm ent in  in d u s t r ia l iz e d  c o u n tr ie s , has been w idely 
rep o rted  in  the B r i t i s h  P ress and according to  the  F in a n c ia l Times: 
"two Libyan re p re s e n ta tiv e s  w il l  s i t  on the 15-man F ia t  
Boato and one w i l l  jo in  th e  5-^ïbu execu tive committee
(p )
Which meets t^/d.ce y e a r ly ."   ^ '
However, i t  was n o t a cheap d e a l f o r  Libya, fo r  accord!rjg to  t?*e 
F in a n c ia l Times, Libya:
"w ill subscribe f i r s t  to a capita], increase o f n early  15hc.
( p  )
Lire and to  a convertib le bond issu e  o f s o i t ©  L,9'0bn,"
Libya’s subscrip tion  could be transformed in to  new shares and 
consequently th is  would g ive to  the investor:
"the option of ra is in g  i t s  share stake in  the company to
13%." (2 )
(1) Ib id .
(2) F inancia l Times, December 2, 1976 front page (only source o f  
inform ation, sin ce  the dea l i s  voiy new. )
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Furthermore, H bya would make a 10 year loan o f  around 100m. 
d o lla r s  a t a spread o f 0,2$^ above the LIBRA,
The Libyan d ea l comes w ith  sev e r a l o u estion  marks, Doss 
t h i s  d ea l emanate from new Arab philosophy in  in d u s tr ia liz e d  cou n tries?  
Is th e  European a t t itu d e  to  Arab investm ent changing favourably?  
E sp ec ia lly  When one r e c a l ls  th a t bhs d ea l happened in  a period When the 
F ia t company was "liquid"* And o f  co w  so , ju st l ik e  any oth er d ea l, 
one has to  a sse ss  i t s  im jolications fo r  the in v e s to r , bearing in  mind 
reg ion a l developments*
SECTION IV -  2 Î CAUSES OF AND RETlIhiiS DERIVE  ^ rpQM %N17ES'm?.N'"S IN 
WESTERN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES
F ir s t  of a l l  one has to  wonder about the .motives behind Arab 
investm ent in  those s p e c if ic  co u n tr ie s . These m otives vary from one 
country to  another, Arab investm ents in  the U .S.A . and West Germany 
are m otivated by the fa c t  th a t the American and West Deman economies 
enjoy the b e s t  productive c a p a c it ie s ,
Arab investm ent in  Great B rita in  proceeds from d if fe r e n t  
reason s. This country enjoys a long standing p o l i t i c a l  and c u ltu r a l  
r e la t io n sh ip  w ith  Arab c o u n tr ie s . This holds true esp a cj.a lly  in  the 
ca ses  o f Kuwait and Abu Dhabi, For inskariCCj, the n ^ jo r ity  o f  r id d le  
E astern o f f i c i a l s  stu d ied  in  the United Kingdom and most o f  them s t i l l  
spend their* h o lid ays th ere . Such a r e a l i t y  could ex p la in  wh3^  London 
was next on ly  to B eiru t in  a t tr a c t in g  Arab investiront in  r e a l © state.
In the course of t h i s  chapter wo have rep eated ly  put 
forward the idea th a t managing funds could be more im portent than 
owning them. From th is  p o in t o f  view, two r e a l i t i e s  appear,
Arab funds were d ir e c ted  to  the In tern a tio n a l Market, or 
World Fbrket, This World f in a n c ia l  market i s  no l e s s  then the major 
West European and North American banks. The case o f  Kuivait i s  very  
r e v e a lin g , H w ever, Kuwait i s  not th e  only countïy  in  th a t ca se .
The investm ent board which a d v ises  Abu Dhabi r e l i e s  on two 
main sources: B aling Bros, a merchant c i t y  bank, and an In tern a tio n a l
Banking concern from New York* Furthermore, in  the case o f Saudi 
Arabia :
"***some 40 banîcs which are knowi as the ’Golden C ir c le ’ and
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which include major B r it ish , U.S. ard continental groups,
play a central r o le  in  handling the flow  of petrodollars
(1 )case finto the world 's fin a n c ia l system,"^' which they 
constitu te*
As fa r  as in d u str ia l investments are concerned, one has to a ssess  them 
by considering the return th ey  are procuring for t lie ir  in vestors and 
the secu r ity  of the investm ents them selves.
Concerning the return one needs time to find out how
p ro fita b le  they are. However, the se n tr ie s  posted by Western Countri.es
in d ica te  th at i t  i^ very l ik e ly  that Arab investments occurred in
a ilin g  sectio n s or companies o f the concerned cou n try ,/.
Concerning th is  type of r isk , in  a speci.el survey of petro­
d o lla rs  "Heu'sweek" reports:
( 9  )
"Nearf.y everything Tamraz ' has proposed so fa r  seems to  
involve risk  for the Arabs, who, for the most part are 
a f in a n c ia lly  conservative l o t .  But he c entends Arabs 
must make such investm ents to show th at they are bent not 
merely on talcing over large , b lue-ch ip  U.S. companies
(p )
"It i s  the tax  you have to  pay, he s a id , , ."
In so far as the secu r ity  of Arab investm ents i s  concerned, the ouestion  
msrk remains, but in  case of n a tio n a liza tio n s in d u str ia l countries  
would ju st  be f o i l  w in  g the example se t  by the Arab countries  
themselves.
Again and aga/in, there i s  no tran sfer o f expertise: the
D.M.lbn, worth stake in  Daimler-Benz did not gi.ve to  Kuwait the right 
to  have one ms/n on the board. The only l ik e ly  advantage i s  to  
in te r e s t  those companies and therefore the western in d u str ia lized  
countries in the economic development o f the vaidous .Arab cou n tries.
(1) -  Financial Times Survey, "Fiddle East and Finance" o f . A rtic le
"Oil D ollars Flow to  London", F inancial Times 23-3-1975, pol6 ,
(2) -  R, Tamaraz has been involved in  some o f  the most w idely
publicized  in tern ation a l business transactions of recen^years, 
such as the Intra Bank, He worked with Kinder, and acted as a 
broker fo r  Arab in v esto rs . In 1974 he formed h is  oim B eiru t-  
based investment banking firm : F ir st  Arabian Corporation.
(3) -  Newsweek, op. c i t .  February 10, 1975, p .41 (c f .  A rtic le  "The
F irst Arab o f F ir s t  Arabian),
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In our opinion, i t  js  not enough to a ssess  Arab 3nvestments 
by considering only th e ir  fin a n c ia l returns, even though i t  i s  
in f la t io n  proof, and the secu rity  of the investments t ’-erreelves, One 
has to go further and consider the ultim ate purpose o f those  
in  v est (non t s .  For they are made by governments and countries which 
do have domestic and regional r e s p o n s ib il i t ie s ,  This point i s  of 
major importance to us and i t  w i l l  be considered la te r ,
CONCLUSION
In concluding th is  chapter we sn a ll consider the problem of 
Arab d o lla rs  resh u fflin g  by non-Arab in s t itu t io n s  from two angles.
F irst i t  was almost ex c lu s iv e ly  the p rivate market that 
channelled the p etrod ollars surpluses. Given the geographical location  
and past performance o f th is  market the resh u fflin g  process was 
completed fo r  the b e n e fit  o f the O.E.C.D, area orim arily and 
marginadly the S o c ia l is t  and M.O.D.C. Countries, For the O.F.C.D, 
countries the ex isten ce  o f the Eurocurrency/' jb.M<et and Eurobond Market 
proved to be t ’ie most important source o f  Financing, This type of 
financing was quick, e f f ic ie n t  and le ss  r isk y  as compared to  ca p ita l 
inflow  derived from o i l  exp orters'd irect investm ents. Only mador such 
circumstances one can understand why 0,E.C,D. countries could afford  
refusing d ir ec t  investm ents while recording b ig  B .0 ,1 .  d e f ic i t .
For a whole se t  o f  reasons N.O.D.C, were le s s  favoured by 
the resh u fflin g  process through the Eurocurrency Karlcet and Eurobond 
Market, Indeed they had the opportunity to improve th e ir  B.O.P, 
s itu a tio n  by borrovdng from in tern ation a l organisations which 
themselves borrov/ed d ir e c t ly  (I.M .F .) or in d ir e c tly  from Arab o i l  
cou n tries. The e f f e c t  o f such financing was welcomed but i t  w;as not 
s u f f ic ie n t ;  furthermore in  the case of N.O.D.C. one has to  go beyond 
the need o f B.O.P, d e f ic i t  financing requirements. The fin a n c ia l  
gap has always been a stru ctu ra l problem for them.
In the l ig h t  o f what has been said i t  seems th a t, by now;, 
the O.E.C.D . cou n tries have e f f ic ie n t ly  coped with the o i l  c r i s i s ,  at  
l e a s t  as far  as th e ir  B.O.P. d e f ic i t s  are concerned. I t  i s  not the 
case o f N.O.D.C,, th erefore other channels are needed to  refond to 
th e ir  needs.
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Let us, now consider the s itu a tio n  from the point o f  view of
the Arab countr5.es and indeed the Arab World as a Whole,
In our opi.nion i t  is  safe to  argue that there i s  a rea l
" ex tra -terr ito ra lity "  of o i l  because -  o i l  i s  consumed outside the 
Arab World ■» and o i l  revenues are kept outside the Arab World, mainly 
in  the United S ta tes , Great B rita in  and Western Europe,
One might be in c lin ed  to  explain such a r e a lity  by the 
lijïdted Arab o i l  exporting countries ’ absorptive capacity . This 
problem w il l  be presented in the follow ing chapter, ho'/zever, what 
about other Arab co u n tr ie s’ c a p ita l needs.
One can a lso  be in c lin ed  to  explain  the s itu a tio n  by aipning
that the Arab o i l  and ca p ita l exporting countries are in search of
security* However, what are the guarantees offered  to them to- 
in d u str ia lized  countries? D epreciation of the U ,8. d o lla r  and the 
B ritish  Pound, e sp e c ia lly  when one r e c a lls  th at the o i l  b i l l  i s  naid 
15% in  U.S, d o llars and 2$^ in the B r itish  currency, r isk s  of 
n ation a liza tion  or co n fisca tio n  or a t le a s t  Ara.b external holdings 
can be frozen in  case o f  c r i s i s .
In o\xr opinion, three factors could explain  th e ir  
behaviour;-
1. The a t t r a c t iv e  power of the in te rn a tio n a l  f in a n c ia l  t r u s t s  and 
th e  major American and West European Banks, coupled w5.th
2. The absence o f regional or even lo c a l v ia b le  f in a n cia l structures  
able to  channel Arab d o lla rs  w ith in  the domestic and regional 
areas,
3. F in a lly , as far as Arab o i l  d o lla rs  ai-^ e concerned, most o f  the Arab 
countries are taking the same stance as they did with o i l ;  u n til  
very recen tly  these countries thought th at any " rea listic"  o i l  
p o licy  passes by the co-operation with in tern ation a l o i l  companies. 
Nowadays 'they think th at any r e a l i s t ic  p o licy  in the fin a n cia l  
f ie ld  cannot be i»iplemented without the co-operation o f the I J I F .  
and the major in tern ation a l f in a n c ia l tr u s ts .
As lon,g as the Arab World i s  follow ing such a. path th e ir  
dépendance in the f in a n cia l f ie ld  w i l l  grow and, i f  one can say, the 
Arab World w i l l  be and remain " fin an cia lly  underdeveloped".
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The obvi.ous consequence of the 1973 o i l  c r i s i s  i s  an increased
U.S. predominance because the b ig g est f in a n c ia l tru sts  are Anglo-saxon
ju st as the b ig g est o i l  companies were, and s t i l l  are, American,
The r e a l i ty  being so , in f la t io n  and i t s  baneful e f fe c t s
appear to  be ju st a " la st rank" danger, a danger which could be removed
by se tt in g  up a New International Monetary System,
The rea l threat to  the Arab World's future i s  the co n fisca tio n
o f the " o il rent" by Western Countries, the ultim ate ro le  o f which iv i l l
be to  create new sources o f  energy to  challenge the predominance of
Arab o i l .  Another danger of the o i l  c r is is  i s  that i t  makes Arab o i l
exporting countries b e liev e  th at they are r e a lly  r ic h , -powever, I t
could be too ea r ly  to dravj a ju st and &nal conclusion  s in ce , according
to  Prince Fahd ton Abd-El-Aziz, a strong member o f the Saudi throne;
"our f i r s t  duty i s  to  the inhabitants of our kingdom. Then
we w i l l  take care of the Arab.and Muslim countries which are
our long»'St.anding neighbours and fr ien d s. Then we wiTL help
the developing countries with out d istin ctio n *  They deserve
(1 )our a id  more than the rich countri.es, " ^
'too main poin t i s  th at we are faced with twD problems. On 
the; one hand we have the L.D.Cs, and p a rtic u la r ly  N.O.D.C. th at could  
not cope with the oi] c r i s i s  e ith er  by adjustment or financing  
p rocesses. They recuire c a p ita l for B.O.P, and develooment purposes,
CM the other hand, we have the Arab o i l  countries with excess of 
c a p ita l but unhappy about the way i t  has been in vested , resh u ffled  
from others, up t i l l  now. Furthermore, as put by Pi'ince Fahd Ibn 
Abd-Bl-Aziz, Arab o i l  countries are committed to help N.O.D.C, 
Consequently one pmblem so lv es  the other provided there were Arab 
owned and organized channe3_s able to  d irec t Arab d o lla rs  surpluses 
to  N.O.D.C. and L.D.Cs, Those in s t itu t io n s , sin ce  they do e x is t ,  
w ill, be treated  in Chapter W,
( l )  -  Newsweek, op. c i t ,  p .41.
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C H A P T E R  I ?
ARAB DOLLARS RESHUFFLING THROUGH ARAB FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
As outlined  in the previous chapter, Arab D ollars reshuffled  
through in tern ation a l in s t itu t io n s  and world banking centres to N.O.D.C* 
f e l l  short o f the la t t e r  f in a n c ia l renuiremerts as derived from the o i l  
c r is is  discussod in Chapter I I .  Consequently Arab Countries s e t  up 
th e ir  owi channels to  respond to  those needs* The present chapter 
deals with these in s t itu t io n s . Furthermore, we sh a ll go beyond the 
o i l  c r is is  that required B.O.P. support, because we sh a ll a lso  consider  
Arab development aid to  thie L.D.Cs. in  general. This includes n on -o il 
Arab cou n tries.
This Chapter contains four sec tio n s . toe f i r s t  sectio n  deals
with the stractui-e of domestic banking systeios of Arab count id es
and the la t t e r  ro le  in  Arab d o lla rs  resh u fflin g . The second one deals  
with domestic placement o f the surpluses in  Arab o i l  countries  
s p e c if ic a l ly  in  agricu ltu re and industry. The problem of toe tran sfer  
of technology i s  d ea lt  with 5n general terms. The la s t  two section s  
consider the resh u fflin g  process through b ila te r a l  channels and tto  
m u ltila tera l in s t i tu t io n s .  These channels are- e ito cr  banks or funds,
SECTION I ; DOmSTIC BANKING SYSTEMS OF ARAB COUNTRIES AND THEIR ROLE 
IN' AR.1B DOI.LARS RESHUFFLING
In th is  sec tio n  and  ^ indeed, in  a l l  oiir research, Arab private  
comrrsrci.ai in s t itu t io n s  do net represent our concern. To name only  
some, these agencies are the type o f the Kuwait Investment Company 
(K .I .C .;, the Arab Petroleum Investment Company (A .P .I .C .) e t c , , .
Their aim i s  to  fin d  a ttr a c tiv e  o u tle ts  for private Arab c a o ita l.  They 
are in terested  in  return rather than in the contribution  to th e  
development. We have no objection  i f  they could seek hiah fin an cia l 
return outside the region but gi.vs more weight to sconomi.G development 
When in vestin g  in  the region.
This point being c la r if ie d ,  we f e e l  the need to  present a 
quick h is to r ic a l background of the development of banking a c t iv it ie s  in
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Arab countries in  general; th at i s  to  say not only Arab o i l  cou n tries,
Banlcing a c t iv it ie s  in  Arab countries appeared a t the beginning of th is
century, coinciding with foreign  occupation. During 'toe long perd.od
o f d irec t or in d irec t occupation the main banks, i f  not the only ones,
were foreign  In s t itu t io n s  * Their purpose was c lea r  s f a c i l i t a t in g
the sa le  of the co lon iz in g  power’s products and the exn lio ta tion  of the
colonized country’s natural resources,
Iraq has been the f i r s t  Arab country to se t  up i t s  owi') central
bank in  1947, ^Other Arab countries foD_owed s u it  during the f i f t i e s
and the s i x t i e s ^ , However, i t  i s  worth noting th at some Arab
countries do not yet have cen tra l banks. It is  the case-o f the Du i f
countries such as S-audi Arabia where only monetary agencies e x is t  and
%:)0rform the r o le  of central banks.
This having been sa id , we do not think that 51 i s  p o ssib le  to
present, w ithin the framework of our study, the banking system of every
Arab country. The main features of each one would seem to  be enough,
flur approach i s  to d istin g u ish  two types o f banking system, r e f le c t in g
the economic system of the Arab countri.es them selves. As a vrfâ.ttor of
fa c t , Arab countries could be di.\d.ded into two groups: countries with
"planned" or "soci.alist"  economies and countries adopting free  
( 2 )enterprise ,
SECTION I - l  : W E  BANKING SYSTEMS OF ARAB "SOCIALIST" ECONOMIES
Eight Arab countries fal3, withi.n th is group: Iraq, Syri.a,
Somalia, the People’s Republic of Yemen, Sudan, Libya, Egypt and A lgeria , 
For these countries banking a c t iv i t i e s  are but a part of the s t a t e ’s 
p rerogatives. This moans th at a f te r  acceding to  p o l i t ic a l  independence 
they n ation alised  foreign  banks and most of them even n ation a lised  
lo c a l in te r e s t s .
( l )  -  The creation  of Arab cen tra l banks occui-v'ed as fo llow s: Egypt in  
195].j Syria 1953® Libya 1956, Tunisia 1959, Sudan 1959, Algeria  
1963, Jordan 1964, Lebanon 1964, Kuwait 1969, Yemen Arab Republic 
1971, People’s Republic o f Yemen 1972.
(2 } -  To use the o f f i c ia l  terminology, sin ce  as fa r  as the Arab V-'orld 
i s  concerned such a c la s s if ic a t io n  i s  very a r t i f i c ia l  e sp e c ia lly  
with respect to  the s t a t e ’s ro le  in  the economg^ r. The so -ca lled  
s o c ia l i s t  countries are more often  no more than "state caoitalism ", 
and the ro le  o f the s ta te , mainly with the O.R. i s  ab so lu tely  
predominant in  the second group. Obviously there i s  no c lea r-cu t  
d is t in c tio n  between both s^/sterns.
l/a
Eg^ ’^ pt w?as the f i r s t  Arab country to  take such a step  in  I 96I ,  
follow ed by Syria in  the same year. Then came Iraq in  1964, Algeria  
in  1967, the People’s Republic o f Yemen in  I 969 and f in a l ly  Libya,
Sudan and Somalia in  1970.
These n a tio n a lisa tio n s  varied in  degree according to 
oountri.es. For in stan ce , in  Libya only foreign p artic ip a tion s were 
concerned by such a law.
N ation a lisa tion  meant reorganisation  of the banking systems 
to  s u it  lo c a l  cond itions and serve national purposes. This type of 
banking system i s  characterised  by two elements: namely cen tra lisa tio n
and sp e c ia lisa tio n .
"Banlcs were merged in to  few u n its  to f a c i l i t a t e  the control
and supervision o f the cen tra l bank, and be in  a b etter
p o sitio n  to extend cred it and d irec t i t  according to plan
and a v a ila b le  resources. Moreover, the merging operations
aimed a t  r e d u c i n g  adrm nistrative expenses",
However, sp e c ia lisa t io n  remains the main c h a r a c te r is t ic . This
sp e c ia lisa tio n  was a function of the d ifferen t sectors o f the economy
airi the development stra teg y , i f  any, of the country imrolved,
(2 )
In the case o f Egypt ' sp e c ia lisa tio n  i s  very pronounced: 
each nationalised  eominercial bank finances no more "toan one sec to r  of 
the economy. According to the Decisions o f July 1, 1972, the 
"Egyptian Real Estate Panic's" function  i s  to finance the housing sector  
the National Bank of Egypt finances foreign trade, the Ndsr Bank 
finances in tern a l trade vrith sp e c ia l emphasis on the m rketipg of 
a g r icu ltu ra l products, the Bank of Alexandria fo r  a g r icu ltu ra l, 
In d u str ia l and handicraft productions, and f in a l ly  the Bark o f C airo's  
ro le  was to finance the servi-ces sec to r . So, in  the casre o f Egypt, 
the economy i s  segmented and sp e c ia lised  banks are s e t  up to f i t  in  
and serve th is  stru ctu re . Another feature of t h is  type of banking 
system i s  i t s  "Branch Banking", In the early  stages o f  
n a tio n a lisa tio n  the branches were not geographically  spread to serve  
the country’s n ation al in te r e s t .  Such a c r it ic ism  i s  not v a lid  any 
more. I t  was not a d e lib era te  p o licy  of the cen tra l a u th o r it ie s ,
(1) -  The Arab Economist, B eiru t, Lebanon, August 1973, Number 55 p .19.
(2 ) -  The banking sj^tem of Egypt has undergone profound changes s in ce
1974/ 75, therefore some elements are outdated.
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but rather an in h erited  s itu a tio n  which goes back to  the pre­
n a tio n a lisa tio n  period. Nowadays, the s itu a tio n  hae d r a s t ic a lly  
changed; fo r  instance the N ational Bank o f Algeria o ffe r s  i t s  
serv ices through more than one hundred branches spread a l l  over the 
country, toe o f f i c ia l  p o lic y  of th is  in s t itu t io n  had always been to  
s e t  up branches with the aim of stim ulating economic a c t iv ity  and not 
to w ait u n t i l  there i s  such an a c t iv ity  to  create new branches.
However, fo r  Dr, H. A l-Bassat:
"It appears that the banking in s t itu t io n s  in  th ese countries  
have not yet been used rational].y  in the execution o f economic
development plans and as u n ified  centres to  e f f e c t  payments
)among productive u n its  and other public sector  bodi es" ,
Another c r it ic ism  of the "centralised" banking system i s  i t s  
lack  of e f f ic ie n c y . Such a s ta te  can be explained in  two ways : 
F ir s t ly , the absence of competition.amongst lo c a l  banks them selves, and 
secondly, the lack of experience, for  th is  banking s^^tem i s  recen t. 
However, i t s  "young age" cannot explain  everything. I t  i s  usually  too  
bureaucratic and too "obscure" for the general public to understand.
For in stan ce, in the People’s Republic of Yemen -  a " on e-n stion alised -  
bank-system" -  borrowers go to money lenders rather than to the bank 
which o ffe r s  lower in te r e s t  ra te s . The reason being that the la t t e r  
requires too many con d ition s,
SECTION I -  2 ; BANKING DYSTEM OF ARAB "FRRTF ECONOMIES"
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, T unisia, Morocco, Mauidtania and the 
Gulf countries could be c la s s i f ie d  in  th is  group. However, even in  
these countries not a l l  the bannies are p r iv a te ly  owned; but agajn the 
s itu a tio n  d if fe r s  from one country to another. The structure of those  
cou n tries' banking system i s  shown by the fo llovdng ta b le .
(1 ) -  The Arab Economist, op. c i t ,  p .19.
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TABLE 37 Î Number and N ation ality  o f Local Banks in  Arab 
"Free Econorrd.es" 1975-1976
Country N ational Banks Arab Banks Foreign
Bahrain 1 4 14
Jordan 6 1 2
Kuwait A ll banks are n ation a l, with the s ta te  having some shaï
The foreign  presence i s ir d ir e c t ly  imporbant.
Lebanon 34 4 39
Morocco 10^ 1 2
Oman 3 1 10
Qatar 3 2 9
Saudi Arabia 2 2 9
Tunisia 10 1 3
U.A.E. 9 2 2
Y.A.R. 1 4 16
Mauritania 2 1 1
a -  Only one or two banks are o i ly  lo c a l ly  wned, most of them be?ng 
mixed or a f f i l i a t e  o f foreign barffs,
Source; Compiled from "Fiddle East and North Africa" ani "Africa South 
o f  the Sahara", Europa P ublications, 1975-6, op, c i t .
These co u n tr ie s’ banking system i s  characterised by three  
elements: la^-k o f sp e c ia lisa t io n , presence of Arab banks and f in a l ly
predominance o f non-Arab banks,
-  As far  as economic development i s  concerned, the lack of 
sp e c ia lisa tio n  on the part o f lo c a l banks could be a serious handicap.
On the other hand, as outlined  e a r lie r , the ex isten ce of sp e c ia lisa tio n  
means le s s  com petition and therefore le s s  e f f ic ie n c y , A b e tte r  balance 
has to be found between both systems: a certa in  sp e c ia lisa tio n  combined
with q u a lified  s ta f f  could be the answer,
-  The existen ce o f banks from Arab countries i s  a promising s ig n . 
However, one has to  d iffe r e n t ia te  between Arab public and p rivate banks.
l U ,
The la t t e r  are very common in  the Eastern wing of the Arab World, 
Furthermore, apart from the ownership, one has to  wonder about the 
u ltim ate aim o f th ese in s t i tu t io n s .  Is th e ir  aim to  stim ulate economic 
development of the host country or merely gather and export funds?
This question s h a ll  be d ea lt  with when the banlting system 's ro le  in  
p etrod ollars resh u fflin g  w i l l  be presented*
“ The predominance of foreign  banlcs i s  an important factor  to o . In 
s ix  Arab countries foreign  banks outnumber the combined to ta l  of n ational 
and Arab banks. These countries are Bahra:m, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia and the U,A.E, However, one has to consider a l l  th is  
inform ation with caution , for , soiret^.inss the s itu a tio n  i s  very ambiguous. 
For instance in  Kuwait 8.11 banks are "national" but more often  net
Kuwaiti nation als serve as cover s in ce  the Kuwaiti Hanking Law reouires  
that the m jo r ity  share must belong to  lo c a l in te r e s ts  e ith e r  p rivate  
or p u b lic . In the former case Kuwaitis do not p a rtic ip a te  in  
management or in  p r o f it  sharing. In some cases a kisxl of "salary" or 
"commission" (e .g , fix ed  percentage of the ’oro fit ) i s  granted to  them.
These are both banking system s, However, with regard to 
our research one has to  wonder about the role played by both systems 
in  channeling o i l  revenues,
SECTION I -  3 s ARAB BANKING SYSTEFo AND ARAB DOLLARS liESîRTFFLING
The domestic banking system could e ith e r  "attract" the 
petrodollars and in v e st  them in  lo c a l /r e g ia ia l  economy or export them 
to foreign  co u n tr ies. I f  one has to  consider the banking a c t iv i t ie s  
as a separate and d is t in c t  sec to r  in  i t s e l f  th is  sector could be e ith er  
"inward" or "outward" look ing.
Although the or ig in  o f the funds i s  dom estic, the ro le  i s  
d iffe r e n t  when one considers e ith er  type o f bsnktog system. In our 
opinion the question of the a llo ca tio n  o f funds i s  important because 
in  almost every Arab country pro.vate d ep osits co n stitu te  a ^igh 
percentage of the bank's funds. This i s  true even in  " so c ia lis t  
countries" and therefore denotes the importance o f  the private sec to r . 
Such a statement could be e a s ily  checked by considering the balance 
sheet of commercial banks.
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In the case of "planned economies" the s itu a tio n  i s  obvious: 
there are no foreign  banks and the ex isten ce  o f tough control iDakes i t  
im possible for lo ca l banks to  "export" the funds c o lle c te d . Further­
more, the banks are ju st governmental too ls  and i t ^ u ld  be aga in st  
th e ir  nature to be "outward" look ing.
The s itu a tio n  i s  d iffe r e n t in  the case of "open" economics 
because of the existen ce o f the "foreign banks’ element" whose 
inportance has to be a ssessed ,
A -  Importance and Role o f  Foreign Banks in  the Banking System of 
Arab "Open" Economies
For two reasons we focus on the Lebanese case,
-  F ir s t ly  Lebanon, e sp e c ia lly  Beirut, i s  w ell known for i t s  "banking 
openness", and th is  Is  ill.u stra ted  by the number of foreign  banks -
39 ~ out o f a to ta l  of 77 banks,
-  Secondly, as far as the banking a c t iv it ie s  are concerned, other  
Arab countries such as Bahrain and Kuwait are considering the problem 
in  terms of "catching up" or challenging the Lebanese fin an cia l 
predominance. Furthermore, i t  i s  tru e that the " c iv il  war" did a f fe c t
the banking secto r  in  the sense th at most of the foreign  banks l e f t
the country to  se t  up th e ir  "Fiddle Fast Head O ffices" in  Cyprus,
Bahrain and evevi Athens and London, However, the Lebanese gowei-nn^ent 
i s  doing i t s  b est to  regain and maintain i t s  f in a n c ia l predominance. 
Furthermore, s in e g a "booming" banking system is  cu ite  a recent 
phenomenon in  other Tdi.ddle Fast countries, the Lebanese case co n stitu te s  
a kind o f " h isto r ica l case" or a "precedent" and th is  s itu a tio n  w i l l  
allow us, in a vray, to  gen era lise  our conclusions.
I t  appears th a t foreign  banks "monopolised" the banking sector  
during the period of co lo n isa tio n . Their predominance being based on 
money, experience and p o l i t i c a l  power and they:
(v)
"got more powerful v/hen the "Banoue de Syrie e t du Liban"
• •• got the right to  issu e  bank notes and to act as the
fin a n c ia l adviser o f the government in aH  cred it operations
( ? )
and money tran sfers b esid es a l l  the banking a c t iv it ie s ,"
(1 ) -  The "Banque de Syrie e t du Liban" i s  a Frefnch Limited Company 
and mostly foreign  owned,
(2) -  c f .  A rticle  "Lebanon: Growing Assets and U nrestricted Expansion", 
The Arab Economist, op, c i t ,  p ,40 .
1 4 6 ,
However, with respect to our study, by 'importance o f foreign  
banks’ we mean the magnitude of the funds they manage to  gather. toe  
fo llow ing tab le  g ives us an idea of the s itiB tio n *
TABLE 39 Î Source of Funds o f Commercial Banks in  Lebanon : 1920-1972
31 .19 .70  31. 12.71 21.12.7?
Savings Accounts 2,699 3,454 4,268
Checking .Accounts 515 6 3 7 7 5 0
Current Accounts 6 1 6 719 2 1 0
Notice and Time .Deposits 1 6 1 191 1 7 6
Other Credit Accounts 364 5 1 5 694
Total Deposits 4,355 5,515 6,698
Banlcs and Correnrondents 9 1 6 1,054 1,531
Equity ca p ita l U 7 439
Other 4 0 2 418
Total 5,271 7,398 9,076
Source: The Arab Economist, Number 55, August 1973, p .2.
The f i r s t  conclusion i s  that in  1972 d ep osits  con stitu ted  lk.% 
o f the commercial banks’ funds* Furthermore;
"the structure of the d ep osits  shows th at sa\d.ng d ep osits  are 
by far the most important and represent 64 / o f  the to ta l  in  
1972, compared with 6 2 .6 / in  1971.
On the other hand the banlcs’ own funds were no more than 1 6 / of th e ir  
to ta l  holding..
hhat i s  the importance of foreign banks as far as d ep osits  
are concerned? From ava ila b le  data i t  seems th at they were 
preponderant
« more than h a lf of the d ep osits  went to foreign  banks,
ThèfT role can be di-scemed throu^  the ap p lica tion  o f the funds 
c o lle c te d ,
(1) -  Ibid , p .52.
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The most recent data i s  for  1972. Such a tim e-lag has two 
explanations:
-  F ir s t ly , f in a n c ia l s t a t i s t i c s  take time to be published, mainly in  
the Third World.
-  Secondly, the " c iv i l  war" has an impact in  th is  f ie ld  too.
Therefore we can draw our conclusions only from the follow ing
table*
TABLE 39 s Principal A pplications of Funds of Lebanese Commercial Banks
1971-1972 (in  L.L. M illion)
T m m 31,12.71 31.12.?;
Credit extended as loans 5,113 6,183
B i l l s  p o r tfo lio 41 51
Foreign Holdings (net) 1,549 2,077
Buildings 127 133
Liquid ity 537 568
Total 7,367 9jCE'.£
SourceÎ Tie Arab Economist, op* c i t ,  p*53
The study of the structure o f the main ap p lication s of the 
funds shows the magnitude o f  the net foreign  holdings. They co n stitu te  
around 23 / of the to ta l  funds. This means that the amount o f funds 
transferred abroad by the commercial banks was LL 1,549 million^and 
LL 2,077 m illion  in  1971 and 1972 r esp ec tiv e ly . The Arab Economist 
magazine draws the conclusions o f th is  s ta te  of fa c ts  by affirm ing thai:  
"the structure of the u t i l i s a t io n  r e f le c ts  c le a r ly  the ro le  of the 
commercial banks in  Lebanon. Although these are mostly foreign  
banks or under foreign  con tro l, they p a rtic ip a te  on a small 
sc a le  in  financing economic a c t iv ity .  Their main concern is  to 
get the la r g e s t  amount o f  funds and in v est them abroad a t th e ir  
head o f f ic e s ,  
opportunity to  do so.'
The economic l ib e r ty  they enjoy g ives them the
„ ( i)
(1) -  Ib id . p .53.
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The fa c t  th at th is  statement was made in  1973 does not 
a f fe c t  i t s  v a lid ity  today. For toe  foreign orien ta tion  of the 
Lebanese banking system is  s t i l l  a fa c t .  At th is  point i t  i s  worth 
pointing out that the same general trend can be detected when one 
analyses the structure of the insurance companies operating w ith in  the 
Arab World, Therefore i t  i s  sa fe  to  gen era lise  our previous 
conclusions and mainly the outward looking or foreign  orien tation  
sta tu s 0
Ihjrtherrnore i t  appears th at during the Lebanese c i v i l  war
Manama (Bahrain) took over from Beirut and f u lf i l l e d  the same r o le ,
Another point to  mention i s  that fin a n c ia l expertise  i s  in
short supnly in  the Arab World and, accordingly, some suggested the
introduction of foreign  banks -  i . e ,  non-Arab concerns which, always
according to them, wou]d e f f i c ie n t ly  f i l l  the gap. I t  has been said.
that these foreign  banking in te r e s ts  enjoy a "comparative advantage"
derived from th e ir  high le v e l  o f exp ertise  and long standing experience
in the f ie ld .  This i s  undeniable. But i t  remains to be proved whether
such a "difference" in  ex^oertise would lead to  a competition b e n e fic ia l
to  lo c a l banks. The le a s t  one can say i s  that foreign banks are those
which in it ia te d  geographical mal.d istr ib u tio n  of branch that v:e
mentioned earLler, Mb re fundamentally one has to ask whether f o r e i g n
banks, when se ttin g  up th e ir  branches or even gaining access to  Arab 
( l  )countries are in terested  in  the economic development o f the host
cou n tries. In other words, what are th e ir  ob jectives?  Considering
th is  very point and taking the case of Saudi Arabia, Professor John
Bridge w rites that foreign  banks enter the tna.rket " . . .  almost
c er ta in ly  not to provide small sca le  loans to  merchants and craftsmen
in  Turaif, A1 Jauf and Jaizan but rather to  capture deposits at
source for reinvestment in  Europe and America, Thus the foreign  bank
element can c o -e x is t  with the lo c a l bank element and y e t  not a s s is t
( 2. )in  i t s  in tern a l development."^ One cannot be more e x p l ic i t .
(1) This can be extended even to non-Arab Developing Countries,
(2) Professor J , Bridge, "Absorptive Caoacity and Investment P o lic ie s  in  
the Arab ’torld", c f .  Chapter \n; in  Ra.gaei El-l-'allakh and Carld McGuire 
"Energy and Development", the International Research Centre for 
Energy and Economic Development, U niversity  o f  Colorado, U.S.A.
1974, p .76.
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Under such a s itu a t io n  one can r i.gh tly  wonder about r o le  
or p o te n tia l  ro le  played by Arab banking system  in  c^annelinm Arab 
d o lla rs*  However, t h i s  has been done bearing in  mind th a t o i l  revenues 
are s t a t e  property and th e ir  use f a l l s  d ir e c t ly  w ith in  the s t a t e ’s 
prerogatives*  Or i t  happens th a t th ese  s t a t e s ,  as has been ou tlin ed  
in  th e previous chapter, keep th e ir  o i l  revenues o u tsid e  th e  reg ion .
The fa c t  i s  th a t Arab banking system s rece ived  only crumbs o f the o i l  
revenues as a r e s u lt  o f  tr a n sfe r  payments and so on. Furthermore, 
even th ese  ortimbs have been exported ou tsid e  the loca l/A rab  reg ion  by 
the fo re ig n  banks im planted w ith in  theArab World,
N on eth eless, Arab oimed barks plagred a r o le  in  channeling  
Arab d o lla r s , a r o le  sumuod up by the Banker magazine as fo llo w s :
"Nearly three years a f t e r  the o i l  p r ic e  ex o lo sio n , the Arab 
o i l  s ta te s  remain th e  s in g le  most Important su p p liers  of 
funds to th e  In tern a tio n a l c r e d it  markets, but Arab owned 
and operated banks s t i l l  p lay  an in s ig n if ic a n t  ro le  in world 
le n d in g , , , 0 (th ey) are too small and ill-e q u ip p e d  to  p lay  
more than a symbolic part in  recyc lin g  the Arab su rp lu s, " (D  
Such a statem ent r e in fo r ce s  the views th a t w© have taken in  the 
previous chapter. I t  fo llo w s  th a t the le a s t  we can say i s  th a t Arab 
banlcs are, s t i l l :
" losing  income in  commissions and fees  to  fo re ig n  banks,
However, here again  Arab in t e r e s t s ,  e ith e r  o '/ivate  or p u b lic , seem to  
have chosen another path; namely jo in t-v en tu res  banking schem es,
B -  J o in t-v en tu re  Banking Schemes.
J o in t-v en tu res  in v o lv in g  on ly  Arab in t e r e s t s  are scarce  
indeed, and i t  i s  more d i f f i c u l t  to  fin d  them when on ly  s ta te -fu n d s  are 
in v o lv ed . An example i s  the Libyan-Algerian Bank, The fa c t  i s  th a t  
most o f th ese  ventures a s so c ia te  non-Arab in t e r e s t s ,  A comprehensive
l i s t  o f the jo in t-v e n tu r es  i s  g iven  in  Appendix.17-1 , From th a t l i s t
i t  appears th a t the id e a ,o f  crea tin g  jo in t-v en tu res  in  the banking 
s e c to r  was put in  p r a c t ic e  w e ll  before  the 1 9 7 3 -o il p r ice  ex p lo s io n , 
mainly w ith  th e  s e t t in g  up o f the "Union des Banques Arabes e t  
Françaises" or Ü.B.A.F,  This bank has g r e a t ly  expanded w ith o f f ic e s
( l )  -  The Banker, c f .  A r tic le  "Arab Banks and In tern a tio n a l lending  
Markets", op, c i t .  Volume 126?, July-Uecember 1976, p . 957.
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in  most western in d u str ia lized  cou n tries,
Vvhat are the advantages, from the Arab point of vd.ew, of 
jo in t  ventures?
Some put forward the argument t^at such undertakings '-'ill 
transfer a f in a n c ia l ex p ertise  to  Arab cou n tries. The same type of 
argument i s  adv-mced concerning the mushrooming of foreign  banks in  
Arab countries them selves, For t^em the reason i s  that foreign  
in te r e s ts  enjoy a "coiiroarative advantage" derived from t t e i r  high 
le v e l  of exp ertise  and long-standing experience in  the fie ld *  This 
i s  undeniable but i t  remains to be seen vA- e^ther such d ifferen ces  in  
le v e l  j f  exp ertise  would stim ulate Arab banks. These jo in t  ventures 
are recent and therefore we cannot r e ly  on th e ir  "behavi.our" or 
operations to draw d e f in ite  con clu sion s. however, we can alw^ a^ JS draw 
a p a r a lle l to.th th e ir  ro le  in  Arab cou n tr ies. fhe truth is  th at  
d esp ite  th e ir  long-standing presence in  the Middle East we did not 
w itness any b e n e f ic ia l  impact on lo c a l  fin a n cia l in s t itu t io n s . Had 
i t  been otherwise Arab banking systems would not bo so 3_nefficient,
Cn the contrary, one can always argue that th e ir  pi-esenco 'in Arab 
countries could have "atrophied" lo c a l  in s t itu t io n s  end hindered the 
apï>earance of lo c a l s k il l . .
As for  t ’ne jo in t  venture banks other elements m ilita te  in  
favour o f our p o s it io n ,
-  F ir s t ly , they are p h y sica lly  implanted outside the Arab World 
sin ce th e ir  head o f f ic e s  arc s itu a ted  in  Paris and sc on. This 
p h ysica l e x tr a te r r ito n a lity  does l im it  the impact on Arab in s t itu t io n s  
and could e a s ily  lead to  e x tr a te r r ito r ia l operations,
-  Secondly, most o f the s k il le d  s t a f f  i s  non-Arab, and i f  they are 
not very fam iliar  with Arab economies i t  would be very d i f f i c u l t  to  
grasp and so lv e  the problems of the la t t e r ,
-  to ir d ly , the presence of non-Arab private c a p ita l g ives more 
weight to purely f in a n c ia l fa cto rs when i t  cones to lending.
However, i t  has been repeatedly ma in ta in  ed that economic 
development, nowadays, i s  a p o l i t i c a l  act and therefore based on p ol­
i t i c a l  w illin gn ess*  At le a s t  th is  i s  the Algerian v i e w , ^
( l )  -  This p o sit io n  has been expressed in "La charte d ’Alger" and the 
Introduction o f the F ir s t  Four-year Plan.
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Another argument commonly put forward is  th a t jo in t  venture 
banlcs enable Arab in te r e s t  to  penetrate the in tern a tio n a l narkets.
In the l ig h t  of our reading and to.th respect to  what has been sa id  in  
the previous chapter, our opinion is  that the contrary i s  happening. 
These schemes are enabling in tern a tio n a l banks to  penetrate more 
profoundly and o f f i c i a l l y  the Arab markets * Hov/ever, suppose Arab 
in te r e s ts  are indeed penetrating other markets one has 8l.wa;.rs to  
wonder about the u ltim ate r e s u lt  o f such a s itu a t io n . The r e su lt  
w dll be no more than fin a n c ia l earnings. I t  i s  not wortHtoile sin ce  
some o f our sample countries are suffering from excess o f  funds and 
economic underdevelopment. N either problem i s  solved in  th is  way.
One has the cer titu d e  that Arab countries are ju st using western  
f in a n c ia l exp ertise , l ik e  foreign u nsk illed  labour, in  th e ir  own 
cou n tries, to acquire more f in a n c ia l return. Or, in  other irotos, to  
increase th e ir  ren t.
I t  appeai-NS th at n eith er  Arab nor foreign banks are r e a lly  
channeling Arab d o lla rs  for domestic or regional purposes. Given the 
p reva ilin g  s itu a tio n  such a in le  f a l l s  w ith in  the s t a t e ’s prerogative. 
I ts  assessm ent c o n stitu te s  the substance of the next se c tio n .
SECTION I I  Î DOMESTIC ALLOCATION OF ARAB OIL RETENUES
With respect to  domestic a ffec ta tio n  of o i l  revenues Arab 
governments are under some forms of pressure,
SECTION I I -  1 Î PRESSURES ARAB OH. COTJNTKroS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
A, -  Pressures on Arab Oil C ountries’ Governments.
These pressures are the r e su lt  of in tern a l end external
fo rces.
External Pressures
The main, and perhaps most important pressure, comes from 
other Arab cou n tr ies. In periods o f n o l i t ic a l  unrest, Arab 
governments, in  general, come under strong attacks aimed a t increasing  
the w ellbeing of the population o f the o o m tn i concerned,
' Howjever, Arab governments p ressu rise  Arab o i l  countries to  
give or increase economic aid or transfer payment to  other fe llo w  Arab
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countries fo r  various reasons th at w i l l  be presented in  the next 
sec tio n .
Furthermore, the present régional context is  a pressure in  
i t s e l f ,  Mov-'ovor in  sp ite  o f a l l  th is  in tern a l pressures are stronger* 
However these pressures are le s s  d e c is iv e  than in tern a l ones.
Internal Pressu r e s .
Given the nature of the governments in  power pressures do 
e x is t  from w ith in  them selves. These pressures lead to tran sfer  
payments, expenditure on consumption aimed a t  gaining or maintaining 
p o l i t ic a l  lo y a lty  of some quarters o f the population. The la t t e r  
exerts i t s  in flu en ce too . The people of these countries b e lie v e  th?t 
o i l  i s  a national wealth and therefore the whole community must 
b en e fit  from it*
Such a concept o f sharing springs from tr a d itio n , nomadic 
s o c ie t ie s ,  and Islam ic teachings; e sp e c ia lly  vhen one r e c a lls  that the 
Prophet Mohammsd him self said  that water, f ir e  and pastures must be 
shared. At th at time these were the only n ation al and natural 
resources.
These in tern a l pressures can be f e l t  a t  three le v e ls  and with
respect to  th is  point A ll Khalifa Al-Kuwari w rites that:
"Internal sectors have g rea tly  a ffec ted  a l l  the chsnnels
throïj.gh which o i l  revenue i s  a llo ca te d . These pressures
come from d iffe r e n t  sectors of so c ie ty  and are exerted in
q u ite  d iffer e n t d ir e c t io n s . Members o f the ru ling fa m ilies
are pressing to  keep, or even Increase th e ir  a llo ca tio n s
and p r iv ile g e s , the landlords to increase the a llo ca tio n  to
the land purchase schemes, and the general public for easy
w ell-pa id  governmental jobs, cheap public goods and serv ices
(] )
end increasing s o c ia l  tra n sfer  payments,"
With resp ect to  the f i r s t  point one has to  add that 
p r iv ile g e s  are not confined to senior members only but to every member 
of the ruling fa m ilie s . Such p r iv ile g e s  include even bodyguards and 
medical care abroad paid fo r  by the M inistry o f Health, The land 
purchase scheim led  to  the appearance o f an inportant "sub-sector",
( l  ) -  A li î l ia l i fa  Al-Kuwari, "Oil Revenues in  the Arabian Gulf 
Emirates: Patterns o f A llocations and Impact on Economic
Development", unpublished Ph.D. th e s is ,  U n iversity  o f Durham 
July 1974, p* 226.
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30 rew arding f in a n c ia l ly  spealcing th a t  some l e f t  governm ental o f f ic e s  
to  devote them selves to  th e  buying and s e l l in g  of la n d . I t  goes 
w ithout sajring th a t  from a p u re ly  economical p o in t of view such 
a c t i v i t i e s  a re  non-productive*
And f in a l l y  th e  g en e ra l p u b l ic ’s aim i s  to  secure f r e e  s o c ia l  
am en itie s , no ta x e s , and as  much t r a n s f e r  payment as p o s s ib le .  In  
B ahrain , fo r  in s ta n c e , th e  p o p u la tio n  re fu sed  to  pay fo r w ate r and 
e l e c t r i c i t y . T h e  r e s u l t  i s  an  unfortuna!'e  s i tu a t io n  v/here the 
governments are  w ill in g  to  buy p o l i t i c a l  lo v s l ty  a t  any p r ic e  and 
where th i s  very p o l i t i c a l  lo y a l ty  i s  fo r sale* B esides th e  
im p lic a tio n s  of such p re ssu re s  a re  d e a l t  w ith  in  the  follow ing s e c tio n ,
B, -  Conseouences of the  P ressu res  on Arab 03.1 C o u n tr ie s ’ Governments.
Those p re ssu re s  le a d  to  th ree  main ban efu l conseouences: 
the lack  o f adequate f in a n c ia l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  the appearance of "bad 
h a b its "  and the in c re a se  of m il i ta ry  and im port expen '- 'itu res .
Lack of Adequate F in a n c ia l I n s t i tu t io n s
In every  modern s o c ie ty  th e  c o l le c t io n  o f revenue i s  an 
im portan t fe a tu re  of any s t a t e ’s a c t i v i t i e s ,  bu t in  some Arab c o u n tr ie s  
the  o i l  r e n t  removes i.t by making the  magnitude of the t/rre s  c o lle c te d  
n e g l ig ib le .  This le a d s  to  an "u n n a tu ra l"  s i tu a t io n  where th e  f i s c a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s ’ ro le  i s  to  d i s t r ib u te  r a th e r  than to g a th e r  funds. The 
popu la tion  i s  not even asked to  pay fo r the c o s t  o f the  s o c ia l  
am en ities i t  en joys. In  the fu tu re  such behaviour by th e  s ta t e  w i l l  
d e f in i t e ly  have grave im p lic a tio n s . For, when th.e o i l  r e n t  decreases  
o r d isap p ears  in  some c a se s , th e re  w i l l  n o t be sny adequate and w e ll-  
e s ta b lis h e d  f in a n c ia l  in stru m en ts  to  enable those c o u n tr ie s  to  lead  a 
m ore'horm al l i f e " .  Furtherm ore, th e se  f i s c a l  to o ls  mi?.ht be c re a te d , 
w ith tim e, b u t a, jx ss itiv e  response from th e  general p u b lic  i s  d o u b tfu l. 
Bad h a b its  e a s i ly  becone n a tu r a l  ones.
Appearance o f  "Bad H abits"
The r e l a t io n  between e f f o r t  and reward c o n s t i tu te s  th e  
essence o f  every  working and p ro d u c tiv e  s o c ie ty . I t  i s  in te r e s t in g  
to  co n s id e r th e  im pact o f  the o i l  r e n t  on s u c h  a r e l a t io n ,
(1) According to  one o ra l  r e p o r t  th e  s t r ik e  was p o l i t i c a l l y  m otivated .
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0x1 p ro d u c tio n , and. th e re fo re  oi.1 revenues, did n o t
n e c e s s i ta te  any e f f o r t  on the p a r t  o f  the  p o p u la tio n , e s p e c ia l ly  a t
the e a r ly  s tag es  o f the o i l  in d u s try . Furtherm ore o i l  reso u rces  a re
(  1 )seen as a g i f t  and as  p roo f, in  October 1972, Shaikh Jab er Al-Av>med 
sa id  th a t ;
( ?}" , • ,God has g ran ted  us we a l t h . "
A g i f t  does no t re o u ire  an y pa f  f o r t ,  Cn th e  o t^ e r s id e ,  p r iv ile g e s  a re  
g ran ted  to  every  s e c to r  of^ , s o c ie ty . This means id^at rewards are 
g ran ted  to  evc;ryone w ithout asking fo r  any e f f o r t  in  countei-part. I t
appears c le a r ly  th a t the r e la t io n  betVv'een e f f o r t  and revjaid is
broken. I t  fo llow s th a t  by d isco n n ec tin g  e f f o r t  and reWAyd the o i l
r e n t  i s  destroyi.nv th e  b a s is  of those  s o c ie t ie s .
One has th e  co n v ic tio n  th a t  t to s o  s ta t e - r e n t i e r s  a re  on the
ft t r a n s f t h o i i '  p o p u la tio n  in to  "so c ie ty  r e n t i e r " , I t  i s  
hard  ' . fo rsee  th e  f u l l  im p lic a tio n s  of such a tren d ; nonetheless 
one i s  sure th a t  th e y  could be c a ta s tro p h ic  fo r the .future g e n e ra tio n s . 
For the o i l  r e n t  would have led  to  a s ta le  o f  drow siness in  th ese  
c o u n tr ie s  a t  bo th  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  and human le v e ls ,
(o \
K il i ta r y  and Import ivnend itn .res
M li t a r y  ex p en d itu res  do no t appear on the p u rc h a se r ' s annual 
budget and fo r  obvious reasons a re  no t published by th e  s e l l e r  coun try  
e i th e r ,  Powever, th e  fo llow ing  ta b le  provides us w ith  the Arab 
c o u n tr ie s -  arm purchase fo r  1974.
Mlitar^^r ex p en d itu re  has alvjays c o n s titu te d  a fa v o u rite  
su b je c t fo r co n tro v ersy , and we a re  n o t going to c o n tr ib u te  to  i t ,  
N onetheless, some rem arks seem n ecessa ry , a lth m g h  they  could bo 
in te rp re te d  ou t of c o n te x t.
(1) -  Quoted by i i l i  K h alifa  Jil-Kuwari, op. c i t ,  p ,?34 .
(2) -  Shaikh Jab e r Al-Ahmed was the K w a it h e ir  Apparent and Prime
M in is te r, Ncrw he i s  the  le a d e r  of Kuvfait,
(3) “ Arab and OPEC c o u n tr ie s ' irrpo rts  have a lread y  been d e a l t  w ith
in  C hapter I I I ,  th e re fo re  the p re se n t p a r t  has to  be seen as 
c omplementary.
TABTJ3 40 s Arab C oun trie s ’ Def  enc e Expend i t  ure Ps tim at es (19% )
-—— — — ----—
Defence
— —
Country Expenditure ^ of CrNP
b i l l io n )
:^nm*mK»wu*]taranM-r
A lgeria 0,404 25 3.3
Bahrain 0.00Ü 35 2 .2
bgypt 3.117 85 35,8  .
Iraq 0.Ô03 76 7 .0
Joïdan 0,142 54 10.9
Kuwait 0.162 154 1 ,5
lebanon 0.133 li?. 4c 3
Libya 0.402 178 3.5
Morocco 0.190 11 3.0
Quan 0.169 228 15 c 4
Q atar 0.023 130 1 ,1
Saudi Arabia l . M 228 5.7
Sudan 0.118 7 5,9
S y ria 0.460 65 16.&
T unisia 0.043 8 1 .5
U.A.E, 0.140 821 2 ,8
North Yemen 0.058 9 3,6
South Yemen 0.029 18 4 ,8
T o ta l IS Arab 
S ta te s  i 8.209 6 0 7.1
I s r a e l 3.688 1,131 42.4.
I ra n 5.328 165 13.3
Source; Dr. Yusuf J , Ahmed, "A bsorptive cap ac ity  of the Egyptian
îüconomy; An Exiatiination o f Problems and P rospects",
1
Development Centre o f  the O.E.C.D,, P a r is ,  1976,
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Although by World o r even re g io n a l s tan d ard s  the  Arab 
c o u n tr ie s , taken ind iv id u aL ly  o r c o l le c t iv e ly ,  a r e . spending sm alle r 
percen tages of t h e i r  G .N.P, -  7 .1^  o r G.N.P. p e r c a p ita  60 d o l la r s  ~ 
than , say , Iran  which i s  spending 13,3f' and I 6 5  d o l la r s  re sp e c tiv e ly , 
such expend itu re  ren%ins a burden.
M ilita ry  expend itu re  in tro d u ces  se v e ra l d is to r t io n s ;
-  f i r s t l y ,  armed fo rc e s  have "siphoned o ff"  s k i l le d  w orkers, and even 
te c h n ic ia n s  from o th e r  s e c to rs  of th e  economy,
-  secondly, t i e  tra.ns.port network has been m a te r ia l ly  a f fe c te d  because ■ 
g re a te r  response i s  req u ired  fo r  s t r a te g ic  needs and le s s  fo r c iv i l i a n  
ones.
Such e f f e c t s  have to  be assessed  b earing  in  mind a s i tu a t io n
o f lack  of skil3.ed la b o u r and inadequate  tra n sp o r t and comimmioati on
system . F u rth e r mors, .such a burden might d is ru p t  th e  economy by
d is tu rb in g  th e  i n t e r s e c t o r i a l  b a lan ce  of resou rces and th e re fo re  s e t  a
new p a tte rn  o f.dom estic  and re g io n a l developiïxnt. The above mentioned 
p re ssu re s  a f f e c t  a lso  im port ex p en d itu re s . For the tim e being  we s h a l l  
co n s id e r only  im port f o r  consumption, such as foods and c a p ita l goods.
Since 1973 t h e i r  Im p o rt has g re a t ly  expanded, ■ This f a c t
)
u n d erlin e s  th re e  elem ents; popu la tion  growth; '■' r u r a l  depopu la tion  
■Which denotes the  inadequacy of r u r a l  p o l ic ie s ,  i f  any, and f in a l l y  and 
forem ost the  weakness o f the a g r ic u l tu r a l  s e c to r  to  s a t i s f y  domestic 
needs.
As fo r c a p i ta l  goods, thejr a re  not produced by Arab c o u n tr ie s . 
However, th e  in c re a s in g  im ports a re  a d i r e c t  conseouence of the o i l  
revenues in c re a se s . I t  i s  t ru e  th a t  such consumption i s  d e l ib e r a te ly
encouraged by the C en tra l A u th o ritie s  and, thus, th e re  a re  no
r e s t r i c t io n s .  However, i f  r e s t r i c t io n s  such as tax  o r  cuo tas im ports 
a re  ev en tu a lly  needed, i t  w i l l  be too d i f f i c u l t  and too unpopular fo r  
any government to  iniplement them.
As f a r  as  consumption i s  concerned, and ta^d.pg th e  case of 
th e  U .A .E,, A ll K halifa  Al Kuwari draws a p a r a l l e l  between in d iv id u a l 
and s ta t e  behaviours when he w r i te s ;
"One might expect t h a t  a s o c ia l ly  backward, uneducated and 
inexperienced  perscn who in h e r i te d  w ealth  would souander
( i j  c f .  C h a p t e r  I ,
1 5 7 .
a co n sid e rab le  p a r t  of i t  on Is.vish consumption and luxury  
w ith l i t t l e  re sp e c t fo r  th e  e f f o r t  needed to  accumulate i t .
In s im ila r  c ircum stances a s ta t e  may be expected to  behave 
s i mi l a r l y , ” ^
Purtoerm ore, in  the  case of a. s ta t e ,  a more permanent body
than a person , the s i tu a t io n  i s  worse in  the sense th a t  such behaviour
w i l l  p lace an o b s tac le  to  fu tu re  p rog ress  end development. With
re sp e c t to  th is  p o in t V ivian Le\*ds w rite s ;
"Above and over th ese  w as te fu l expend itu res, th e re  i s
developing a lso  -  and perhaps more dangerously  ~ wi^at
Ragaei E l-M alla leh  in  Dis s tu d y  o f Kuwait has c a lle d
'th e  w as te fu l a t t i t u d e  in  human endeavour* and p r o d u c t iv i ty '.
C ap ita l form ation  in  OISC c o u n tr ie s  i s  o f te n  le s s  we 3.1-
reward ed than b u re a u c ra tic  s k i l l s  or tra d itio n a l. Levantine
(2 1m ercan tile  a b i l i t i e s . "
However^ Arab o i l  c o u n tr ie s  a re  no t spending t h e i r  o i l  revenu,es on 
consumption on ly . Our ta sk  would be u n fu lf i l le d  i f  we did no t 
co n sid e r o th e r types of lo c a l  o ff  c o ta tio n . But b efo re  th a t  we have 
to  co n sid e r what amount of c a p i t a l  t h e i r  domestic economies a re  ready 
to  absorb.
SECTION I I  -  2 ; ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY CR SPENDING CAPACITY IN ARAB 
OIL COUNTRIES
F i r s t  of a l l  the  ex is ten c e  o f funds su rp lus u n d erlin e s  the 
sm allness of th e  a b so rp tiv e  ca p a c ity  of the Arab o i l  c o u n tr ie s .  This
(c )i s  due to  s e v e ra l  b u i l t - i n  c o n s tr a in ts ,  '
-  weakness and n o n -o rg an isa tio n  of the lo c a l  market,
-  sho rtage  of s ta b le  and w e l l-o u a lif ie d  work fo rce  and m anagerial 
and te c h n ic a l e x p e r tis e ,
-  q u as i absence of s o c ia l  and economic in f r a s t ru c tu r e ,
-  in s u f f ic ie n t  means o f  communication and t ra n s p o r ta t io n  -  e i th e r  by 
road o r r a i l ,
(1) -  A ll K halifa  Al»Kuwari, op, c i t ,  pp. 228-9*
(2) -  V. Lewis, " Is  O il Money Spurring Real Development?" in  th e
Banker, op. c i t .  p . 886,
(3) -  Samir Nour, "Th.e C onditions of Economic Development o f Arab O il
C ountries" (F rench), in  Revue d 'Economie P o li t io u e , ed , S irey ,
Number 4, Septeirber-C ctdber 1974, p .633*
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However, f o r  o th e rs  the c o n s tra in ts  a re  not only p h y s ic a l. For 
in s ta n c e , A li K halifa  Al-Kuwari s ta te s  th a t ;
" the  lo c a l  economies were n o t ab le  o r ready s o c ia l ly ,  
p o l i t i c a l l y ,  o r econom ically  to  absorb the revenue obtained 
from e x p lo itin g  o i l  re so u rc e s , in  a more p ro d u ctiv e  and
f l )economic way than  they  have done,"
Both au tho rs  see th e  probleiiB in  terms o f ab so rp tiv e  cap ac ity ,
Such a vi.eif has been very cotiinon from 1973 onwards. However, Mr,
Michel C hatelus tak es  a d i f f e r e n t  p o s it io n , Ue s ta te s  th a t  the
concept of a b so rp tiv e  c a p a c ity  i s  u s e le s s . He m aintains th a t  i t  i s
n o t v a lid  fo r  a l l  th e  Obird World c o u n tr ie s . As fo r  the Arab o i l
c o u n tr ie s  ho w rite s  th a t ;
" in  the  case o f a mining r e n t ,  such as the o i l  r e n t ,  the very
cond itions of appearance and a l lo c a t io n  o f  the re n t leav e
u se le ss  th e  re fe ren ces  u s u a lly  adopted to  detenrd.ne the
O p  )
a b so rp tiv e  c a p a c ity , " "
The u su a l re fe re n c e s  being  the a b i l i t y  to  pay the e x te rn a l 
debt through revenues earned from nevj investm ent, the s tim u la tio n  of 
domestic savings and th e  m ain tain ing  o f some e o u i l ib r ia .  These 
to o ls  a re  irre lev an '^  In  our case , fo r  th e  s i tu a t io n  i s  com pletely 
d i f f e r e n t ;  excess of funds. At t h i s  s ta g e  i t  i s  w orthw hile n o in tin g  
out th a t  the concept of a b so rp tiv e  c a p a c ity  has always been approached 
in  the  co n tex t o f  c a p i t a l  a id ,  o r , in  o th e r  words, a s i tu a t io n  o f 
sho rtage of c a n iW ..
Tlio same auchor m ain tains th a t  i t  i s  n o t p o ssib le  to  take 
in to  c o n s id e ra tio n  a ll. th e  d iv e rse  co s ts  involved ( e .g .  p o ll.u tio n ) .
I t  fo llow s th a t  f in a l  cho ices a re  ju s t  a r b i t r a r y  ones.
Furtherm ore, the s e le c t io n  of p ro je c ts  i s  a fu n c tio n  of the 
volume of c a p i ta l  a v a i la b le ,  and th e re fo re  the Arab o i l  co u n trie s  
in tro d u ce  a new elem ent in  the  h a b itu a l  handling of the problem.
Mr. G hatolus r e j e c t s  the ab so rp tiv e  c a p ac ity  approach fo r  
two main reaso n s. F i r s t l y  " th e  in tro d u c tio n  of vague c r i t e r i a  to  
a p p re c ia te  the d i f f e r e n t i a l  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  (such a s  the c o e f f ic ie n ts  of 
d i f f e r e n t  c o s ts ) ,  and the  p e rs is te n c e  of a very  d i f f e r e n t  r a te  of
d isco u n t, even in  the in d u s t r ia l i s e d  c o u n tr ie s , s u f f ic e  to  sho/i f^e
(1) “ A ll K h laifa  Al-Kuwari, op. c i t .  p .228.
(2) -  c f .  P.lS-3"
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( i  )
n o n -o p era tio n a l c h a ra c te r  o f the th e o r e t ic a l  approach,"
-  The second reason i s  th a t  th e  ab so rp tiv e  ca p a c ity  approach assumes
th e  ex isten ce  o f a World optimum. Wit^ re sp ec t th is  p o in t th e
same au th o r w r ite s  th a t ;  " , , ,  in  the re a li .ty  o f the  " b rld  economic
system  and uneoual r e la t io n s ,  th e re  i s  no room fo r  an "optimum" w h ic h
would not be the norm of the  most pow erfu l. 6 0  we csn admit th a t ,
c\
f o r  th e  c o u n tr ie s  concerned, s in ce  they  are recognised  a s ^ p o l i t ic a l
e n t i ty ,  th e re  i s  indeed a zero  o p p o rtu n ity  co s t fo r  a c ê r ta in  type
of cap ita], fonnation  a t  l e a s t ,  even i f  i t  i s  ev id en t th a t  fo r  th e
(2 }\A)hole world th is  n o tio n  cannot be accep ted ,"
For th o se  reasons C hatelus s ta te s  t h a t  i t  i s  more r e a l i s t i c  
to  co n sid e r the problem in  term s of spending 'capacity . The
im p lic a tio n s  of th i s  s i tu a t io n  a re  assessed  in  he-’-nB of r i s k s ,  tow ever, 
wlnat a re  the  fe a tu re s  of t h i s  spending cap ac ity  which is  bound to  be 
h ig h e r than the ab so rp tiv e  capacity?
The main f a c to rs  which c h a ra c te r is e  Arab o i l  c o u n tr ie s ’ 
spending c a p a c ity  a're the p re ssu re s  t t o t  we mentioned e a r l i e r  and time 
c o n s tra in ts  t h a t  we p re se n t beloi^;,
X -  Time C o n s tra in ts  on Arab 013. Coun t r i e s
The Arab o i l  co u n tr ie s  want to  do every th ing  iu  the s’^ o r te s t  
tim e p o s s ib le , Such ■’ behaviour can be exp la ined , b u t no t j u s t i f i e d ,  
by fou r elem ents;
-  The f i r s t  tim e c o n s tr a in t  i s  derived  from the very  m tu re  of the oi3. 
r e n t  i t s e l f ;  o i l  re se rv es  a re  lim ite d  and th e re fo re  the  o i l  re n t to o -  
From t h i s  r e a l i t y  a r i s e s  the urge to  use the  o i l  r e n t  to  c re a te  "a 
n o n -o il based economy in  a given p e r io d . This le d  to  the appearance 
of "Econoiïd.c h o rizo n s" , I 9 8 O f o r  A lg eria , 19Ô5 fo r  Trac, Some even 
t a lk  in  term s o f  economic " ta k e -o ff"  by tV.at tim e.
-  The second time p re ssu re  comes from the  g a llop ing  p o p u la tio n  grov^fth 
r a te .  This p o in t has been t re a te d  in  the  f i r s t  ch ap te r.
« The th ird  element i s  a p o l i t i c a l  one. By speeding up th e  economic 
growth, which in  our case  means g re a te r  m a te ria l w e lfa re , every  Arab
(1) -  FfLchel C h a te lu s , "From the o i l  ren t to  Economic Development:
Hold-up o f the cen tu ry  o r Hew Hopen fo r  th e  Third World" (in  
F rench), in  Revue d ’Economie P o litio u e , E d itio n  S irey ,
Humber 1 , January /F ebruaiy  1976, p . 33.
( 2 )  -  I b i d .
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government i s  hoping to  n e u tr a l is e  e x is tin g  or v^u ld -be  p o l i t i c a l  
o p p o s itio n s . By hoping to  do so Arab regimes want to  show to  the 
people th a t  they  a re  conscious o f the problems of th e  populati.on and 
th a t  th e i r  p o lic ie s  vmrk. I t  fo llow s th a t  they  have to  remain in  
power.
-  Hie fo u rth  element sp rin g s  from a kind of com petition  amongst Arab
o i l  c o u n tr ie s . This can be r ig h t ly  extended to  a l l  OPEC c o u n tr ie s .
Every co u n try ^  wants to e s ta b lis h  i t s e l f  in  the world market fo r  a
given p roduct/p roduo ts  such as  th e  petrochem ical ones. These tim e
r e s t r a in t s  a re  determ in ing  f a c to rs  in Arab economic p o lic y , fo r  they
exp la in  most of i t .
On the o ther hand they tran sp o se  the  problem from an
ab so rp tiv e  to  a spending ca p a c ity  p o in t of view, the l a t t e r  being
g re a te r  fo r  in  a s i tu a t io '\  o f un lim ited  supply  c a p i ta l ;
" I t  is  p o ss ib le  to  envisage a ra p id  accatim lati on of im teri.a l
c a p i ta l ,  due to  a massive recou rse  to technology, o rg a n isa tio n ,
( ' ] )and fo re ig n  te c h n ic ia n s  and manpower
I t  i s  the  exact p ic tu re  o f th e  Arab o i l  c o u n tr ie s .
Furtherm ore t h i s  spending ca p a c ity  is  d e f in i te ly  more im nortan t when
th ese  c o u n tr ie s  a re  ready to  a c c e p t, or r a th e r  a f fo rd , some r i s k s .
These r is k s  being;
" . . hi gher  c o s ts ,  s h o r te r  d u ra b i l i ty  of th e  a s s e ts  bought,
an ex cessiv e  caps,city of p roduction , and fren u en t stoppage 
( )o f fu n c tio n in g , " ^
Every s id e  o f th is  o u o ta tio n  can be checked, Higher c o s ts
(d )a re  obvious w ith  g a llo p in g  in f l a t i o n .  Furtherm ore, Arab 'o i l
co u n tr ie s  s u f fe r  from d i f f e r e n t i a l  r a te s  o t in f l a t io n  which they  have 
learned  to  l iv e  w ith . S h o rte r  d u ra b il i ty  of c a o i ta l  i s  a f a c t  w ith 
re sp e c t to  defence ex p en d itu re . I t  i s  common th a t  the f i r s t  d e liv e ry  
b r in g s  o b so le te  weapons, E xcessive c a p a c ity  i s  the problem  they have 
to  face  tomorrow. An example i s  the mushrooming of r e f in e r ie s  and 
f e r t i l i z e r  p la n ts ,
(1) » M, C hatelus, op, c i t .  p .28,
(2) -  H, .C hate lus, op, c i t ,  p . 34.
(3) -  The problem o f i n f l a t io n  has a lread y  been d e a l t  w ith  i n
Chapter I I I .
.LM,
Stoppages are very "frequent" in  some co u n tr ie s  such as 
A lg er ia . 3h some oases in d u s tr ia l p la n ts  did not even s t a r t  
fu n ctio n in g  and they were faced w ith te c h n ic a l problems which led  to  
lon g  dela.-;;B,
The to t a l  expenditure of seven Arab co u n tries  -  A lgeria , 
Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and u.A -  i s  gj.ven by the  
fo llo w in g  ta b le . The most important item  o f Arab o i l  c o u n tr ie s '  
spending i s  "merchandise im ports". A ll in  a l l  th e ir  combined im norts 
in creased  frcru j.6,2bn, d o lla r s  in  1974 to  33* 5bn  ^ d o lla r s , th a t i s  
more than doubled.
However, although in s tr u c t iv e  th is  item  does n ot g iv e  u s, 
fo r  in sta n ce , the- magnitude o f  food b iJ l s ,  d w ab le  goods fo r  
consumption, and eouipment im ports; th e l o s t  being very  iirportant.
On th e other hand, i t  i s  in te r e s t in g  to wonder aU'ut th-. Arab o i l  
c o u n tr ie s ’ economic p o lic i.e s  beaïdng in  mind such an imnort b i l l  and 
the p rev io u sly  mentioned p ressures and consfj-a in to , i>ese p o l ic ie s  
form the substance o f  the fo llow in g  p art,
SECTION II  -  3 t ARAB O I L  COHNTRIES ' INDUSTRIAL ANh iORICULTURAL
POLICIES ANC TDHIR AFIROAC’-^ TO HD' ''PANSvgp qv 
TECmCLCGY 'ROBLEI ,^
Arab o i l  c o u n tr ie s ' s t r a te g ie s  of development could be 
d etec ted  through th e ir  economic p la n s, uowever, fd ven the number of 
co u n tr ie s  considered  i t  i s  n o t p 'ossib le  to  present a thorough study  
o f each p lan , Hie re fore  our approach w ill, be to  concentrate on 
agricu3_tural and in d u s tr ia l  s e c to r s  w ith a fir .a l b ir d ’ s eye idoiv of 
th e  way they are ta ck lin g  the problem o f  tr a n sfe r  o f  technology/.
A -  A gricu ltu ra l Hector
Arab co u n tr ies  could be d iv id ed  between co u n tr ies  vdth  
n e g lig ib le  or la rg e  a g r ic u ltu r a l p o te n t ia l .
1 , -  Arab Oil C ountries with N e g lig ib le  A g r icu ltu ra l P o ten tia l  
This group con ta in s a l l  the Arab o i l  co u n tries  except 
Aj.geria am  Iraq. These co u n tr ie s  are quasi d e ser t with l i t t l e  or 
no a g r ic u ltu r a l su rp lu s. They can, for the tim e b e in g , a fford  an 
in crea sin g  food import b i l l .  The presence o f  a huge o i l  ren t tnakes 
any a g r ic u ltu r a l production  "quasi n i l" .
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The prospects for  the agiR cultural secto r , connected mostly 
with ir r ig a t io n , tend to  s e t t le  nomads here and bedouins there. 
Furthermore 3 there i s  no a rticu la ted  plan to in tegrate  agricu lture to  
the whole domestic economy. From t h is  pojjct of view the future is  
not bright; as îa r  a s  food imports are concerned, we fo rsee  an 
increasing dependence, A regional so lu tio n  could be the "way out" ■ 
fo r  them,
2, -  The Case of A lgeria and Irao,
Both countries have undertaken o fta c tiv e  and serious land 
reforms. For them avricu ltu re should be the productive sector w/hich 
w il l  provide the reauired surplus wh Ich the vA'^ ole econoiiyr has to  be 
based on. Furthermore, the land reforms were designed to a sso c ia te  
p o l i t ic a l ly  and econom icalty the rural popul.ation. From th is  point 
of vi.ew even Libya could be r ig h tly  added to  both cou n tries. They 
a lso  aim a t  creating in te r -se c to r  exchanges between agricu lture and 
industry as w i l l  be seen :m the follow ing pa.rt,
B "• Industrial Sector
With respect to  the industr i.a l sector, the c r ite r io n  for  
distin gu ish in g  between the various Arab o i l  countries is  the s iz e  of 
th e ir  population,
1 , Arab Oil Countries with small Pooulations,
Only Iraq and A lgeria with v iab le  populations wd11 be 
excluded from th is  group. D espite a l l  the p u b lic ity  imde about th e ir  
development plan i t  seems th at those countries do not have any long 
term stra tegy  o f development. They onl.y have projects which w i l l  in  
no wqy lead to a se lf -su s ta in e d  and se lf-cen tred  economy. For, these 
p rojects , although p h y sica lly  implanted vdthin the country/region are 
e x tr a te r r ito r ia l;  hbst of th e ir  inputs, from raw/ materi.al to mnpower 
and techn icians are imported, and the outputs are intended to  be 
exported,
One has the fe e lin g  that those countries see the problems 
s t i J l  in  terms of gro /^Jth rather than development. Several cr it ic ism s  
are to  be d irected  to th e ir  approach;
-  From a tech n ica l point o f view these pr-ojects can have pi-oblerns a t  
both ends: supply and markets.
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“ The "Industrial sector" of these economies i s  becondng more and more 
an enclave or "foreign sector" Vvithin the domestic econoim?-, ju st l ik e  
the o i l  sector has always been.
“ Tliey do not in crease in ter -reg io n a l or inter-Arab trade since these  
countries have no comparative advantage at sub-regional le v e l:  that i s
the Arabic peninsula. These economies are characterised by excess of
o i l  and natural gas, availabiDdty i f  not excess of funds and lack of 
know-how' combined with small popula.tions. On the other hand th e ir  
p rojects rnigTrt crea te  conpebition which can be ruinous for a l l ,  sin ce  
the success of any one country i s  subordinated to the fa ilu r e  of o th ers. 
Fortunately so ire of them were aware of the oroblem and did not go ahead 
with every planned p ro jec t. I t  is  not enough.
“ Their e x tr a te r r ito r ia l ity  increases the dependence of those couni.ries 
on western in d u stria lised , countries vd.th.out promoting long-term  
ec onemic d evel oprnen t ,
-  P'in a l ly ,  and foremost, one has to judge those p rojects with regard to  
their' u lt in a te  aim. In our opini.on, apart from in f la t in g  th e ir  GKP, ■ 
these p rojects w d ll be ju st adding fin a n cia l earnings to countries  
which are ai.ready w itnessing fin a n c ia l surplus. In other words these  
countries are ju st  consolidating  th eir  s t a t u s  o f  "state ren tier" , and 
therefore making th e ir  future even more fr a g i le ,
2 , -  The Case o f A lgeria and Irao.
These countries seem to  be tacki.ing th e ir  under-devei.onment 
more seriou sly ; however i t  is  too early  to draw final, conclusions 
about what has become to be known as the "Iraol way" or the "Algerian 
model". Nonetheless th e ir  main features seem to be more or le s s  the 
-following ones,
-  The in d u str ia l se c to r  i s  to be c lo se ly  linked with agricu ltu re . 
Furthermore, i t  i s  designed to  serve and back agriculture wdlh 
f e r t i l i s e r s ,  tractors and so on,
-  Domestic ravj m aterials are used, iron ore and phosphates for  
Algeria and Iraq re sp e c tiv e ly ,
-  Production or output i s  to  be dom estically  consumed. This i s
p ossib le  because o f  the s iz e  o f  the home maiket.
There i s  no e x tr a te r r ito r ia l ity  with, the concept of "Industries 
// ]
Industria lisantes^  ' put in to  p ractice by A lgeria. I t  appears that
(1) -  I t  i s  the concept of Mr, G, De B em is who has been one o f  the 
a rch itec ts  of the f iT s t  Algerian "Qu.adriennial Plan",
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both countries have decided to create a se lf-su s ta in e d  and s e l f -  
centred economy based on domestic considerations and conditions alone. 
However two main c r it ic ism s  could be s a fe ly  made of them,
-  F ir s t ly , they do not escape the time pressures whose conseouences 
have already been analysed,
-  Secondly, given the in tern ation a l se ttin g  sooner or la te r  they w i l l  
be faced with market problems. I t  fo llow s that a regj.onal approach, 
including n o n -o il producing Arab cou n tries, i s  a n e c e ss ity  even for 
these cou n tries.
This i s  the actu a l approach o f the Arab o i l  cou n tries to 
development; however the p icture would not be complete without 
considering the tran sfer  of technology problem.
C Approaches to  the Problem of Transfer of Technolofp^.
(1 ’According to M, Chatelus when one considers the problem 
o f  tran sfer  of technology one i s  faced with the subseauent ou eat ions;
-  f i r s t ly ,  how to consider the problem,
-  secondly, how to  tran sfer  a u se fu l technology,
-  and th ird ly , howr to master and ^progressively produce the righ t  
technology.
Here again each group of countries follow s a sp e c if ic  p lan ,
1. -  Countries with Small Populations and ’Aige Fmids ,
As has been stated  these ccuntoies see th e ir  problems in
terms of growth and th e ir  tech n o lo g ica l choices derive from such a
stance. Their aims are in fla te d  Ct,N.P. end high growth ra te s . This
requires the most modem eouipment. They see the problem of the
tran sfer  o f technology in  terms of "catching up" with western
in d u str ia lise d  co u n tr ies. They catch up b"^  accuiring consi.derable
"stock" o f eouipment without taking in to  consideration th e ir  domestic
socio-economi.cal con d ition s, M, Cha.te3.us maintains that those
c o u n tr ie s  and m ainly;
" , , , the  Saudi and Kuwati mode].s o f growth co n s id e r the t r a n s f e r
o f technology on ly  under i t s  very lim ite d  a sp ec t: the
(Z  )progressive formation o f  lo c a l  techn icians,"
(1) -  M, Chatelus, op, c i t ,
(2 ) -  M, Chatelus, op, c i t ,  p ,4 2 .
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This means that they are try ing  to adapt th e ir  sp e c if ic  human co to itio n s  
to foreign  technology. I f  they persevere in  such a p o licy  the 
r e su lt  would be a complete and permanent tech n olog ica l dependence on 
western in d u str ia lised  ccountries. Technological dependence i s  a kind
of "snowball",
2 . " The Case of A lgeria and Irao *
Both countries are tryipg to  adapt foreign technology to  
lo ca l con d ition s, Uowever, from the aim to  success there i s  a long 
way to go; but as some say a problem r ig h tly  seen i s  ad.ready "half 
solved".
For the time being i t  appears that the "technologist"
tendency i s  not absent; e sp e c ia lly  when one nefers to some p rojects
contracted on a "turnkey" b a s is .  The f i r s t  Algerian contract on
th is  basis  has been applauded by the press and branded as "the way to
beat time". The tran sfer  o f technology i s  a very important one,
e sp e c ia lly  with regard to other l.D .G s, I f  the Arab countries manage
to so lve  th e ir  tech n o log ica l dead-end they wonId so lve  the problem o f
other LoD.Cs, For, the s o c ia l  and physical conditions a.re more or
le s s  sim ilar: i . l l i t e r a t e  population, vast d esert land, presence of
underground wateig p o llu tio n  in  arid zones e tc . I f  ihe Arab o i l
countries manage nothing but a ttr a c t  heavy in d u str ies  with th e ir
p o llu tio n , in  our opinion the Arab o i l  countriep have fa ile d . For
op
th is  i s  part o f the new in tern a tio n a l divi.sion^^^^bour, the western 
in d u str ia lised  countries are trying to  s e t  up.
In other words, i f  they f a i l  to  ob lige  the îd i lt inational
CoiTpanies to  red irec t th e ir  research and produce a new technology  
su ita b le  to the Third World's con d ition s, the consecuences w i l l  be
d is  turning for everyone. In our opinion th is  i s  the mai n
r e sp o n s ib ility  o f Arab o i l  countries towards ether L.D.Cs, and not 
ju s t  givi.ng tra n sfer  payments fo r  them. Furthermore, the Arab aid  
programme is  assessed  In the follow ing two se c tio n s ,
SECTION I I I  -  F-~:TR0D0IJ-.ARS HFS’’UFFLIN1 TNROPin ARAB BILATEFIL AG’^ 'NCr'S
' Four Arab b ila te r a l  agencies provide fin a n c ia l aid to  other  
Arab and non-Arab co u n tr ies . They are the Kuwait Fund fo r  Arab 
Economic Development or KFA3D, The Iraqi Fund o f  External Aid or IFEA, 
and f in a l ly  the Saudi Development Fund or SDF, The KFAED was the
f i r s t  to be s e t  up and enjoys the h igh est exp ertise  and the g rea test
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performance as w1.ll be seen la te r .  Furthermore i t  was th is  which 
in sp ired  other funds Which have been estab lish ed  in  l in e  with i t .
A reasonable approach vjould seem to us to focus our study on thé 
Kuwait Fund for Arab Eoonom1.c Development and to  g en era lise  ca u tio u sly  
our conclusions. However, a presentation  o f  other funds, although 
rapid, seems necessary to  us. I t  w i l l  be done beforehand.
SECTION I I I  « 1 : BILATERAL AID AGENCIES T^ AN T"E KIRAAIT FlN^ rn
FOR ARAB ECCNOFIC D E m O P iE N T
A -  The Abu Dhabi  Fund for Ara.b Econoînic Develonment
This fund i s  based in  Abu Dhabi and w/as estab lish ed  in  1971 
w ith authorised c a p ita l o f 500m. d o lla r s .
The Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development finances  
three types of operations: p ro ject loan s, eou ity  ho'ldings ani other
forms o f a id .
Ibe terras o f loans are veiry advantageous to the rec ip ien t  
countries; In te re st  rates are lower than those offered  by c a p ita l  
markets and even the World Bank, They vary from 2-31 per annum, 
w ith grace period of 2 -4  years and repayiTient period o f 11-12 years.
The Grant Element^^^ v a r ies  from 29 to i S i  of t ’^  e loan . The Fund 
grants loans for the subsequent secto rs: industry, agricu ltu re ,
in frastru ctu re and even tourism . This agency imposes three lim its  
on financing any one p ro jec t. F ir s t ly , loans must not exceed 50% o f  
the p roject c o s t , secondly, or 10$ o f  the funds c a p ita l, that i s  50m. 
U.S. d o lla r s , and th ird ly , only foreign  exchange requirements of  
p rojects are met,
( IJ  -  In  ca lcu la tin g  the Grant Element Arab aid  in s t itu t io n s  use the  
D.A.C's formulae, th a t i s :
( ,  D C  ■ e - 9 G _  e - q T  )s ss ^1 — " j  ^1 — — ——— j where
s « G rant Element as share  of face  value 
i  c  Rate of I n te r e s t  
q -  Rate o f  D iscount 
G = Grace Period  
T s  T& turity
Source; Goran Ohlin, "F oreign  Aid P o lic ie s  R econsidered", Development 
C entre , G.E.C.D,, P a r is ,  1966, p,102 and p ,103.
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These conditions are very 8imi.lar to s e t  by other
Arab agencies, and therefore they w i l l  bo assessed a t  the end. of th is  
sec tio n . I t  i s  too early  to draw d e f in ite  conclusions concerning the 
Fund’s operations, for  In i t s  f iv e  year existen ce i t  has financed 
only twenty-seven p rajects to ta llin g  279m, d o lla r s . A ll but 10i>u of 
th is  amount went to Arab cou n tries. However, according to K. Fallen; 
"lending p o licy  appears to be a matter of impulse rather than o f  
planning, but i f  there is  to be a greater co-operation between the 
Fund’s granting a id , as some hope, Abu Dhabi i s  l ik e ly  to  contribute  
to take a fu ll  share,
B “• The. Sau^i nevelfipment Fund
Based in  Jiddah with a ca p ita l of dol3„ars the Saudi
Development Fund i s  the most recent a id -g iv in g  Arab agency; estab lish ed  
in  1974 0 T'lis, a'rong other th in gs, means that data, such as the t e  mis 
of loans and grant element i s  not a v a ila b le . This s itu a tio n  imposes 
some r e s tr ic t io n s  on our work. The onl.y purpose o f the Saudi 
Development Fund is  to  provide project loans for in frastru ctu re, 
agricu3.ture and lid u str y . Three conditions characterise the Saudi 
Development Fund’s loan policy;
-  loans do not exceed 50% of th e  to ta l  co st of a s in g le  project,
-  or 5% o f the Rind’s ca p ita l, that i s  to  say 145m. d o lla rs,
-  and finalR y no country can b en e fit  more than o f the Fund’s 
tota.1 ca p ita l, i , e ,  290m. d o lla r s .
The Saudi Development Fund has a fourth ch a ra c ter istic  which 
d istin g u ish es i t  from other Arab funds, namely the Saudi R yial being 
the u n it o f account. From 1974 onwards the Saudi Development Fund 
granted loans totalling^330m .
G -  Irao Fun^ ’, fcpr '.bctern a l Development '
I t  i s  a lso  a very recent in s t itu t io n  estab lished  in  Juno 
1974; unfortunately information concerning the terms of loans, the 
conditions of the loans and i t s  s e c to r ia l emphasis are not a v a ila b le .
I t  i s  the le a s t  important of a l l  Arab aid agencies for i t s  
c a p ita l does not exceed I 60 mil31.on<dl oWn.rs.
For the time being i t  has financed onl r^ one p roject with 10m. 
d o lla r s , although i t  intends to undertake project and tech n ica l 
a ssista n ce  operations,
(1 ) -  K, F a l l o n ,  o p .  c i t ,  p , l 6 7 .
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Those a re  th e  main f e a tu re s  of the Abu Dhabi Fimd fo r  Arab 
Economic Development, th e  Saudi Development Fund and tto  Iran  Fund 
fo r  E x te rn a l Development which a re ,  more o r  l e s s ,  n e g lig ib le  
com paratively  to  the  Kuwait Fund fo r  Arab Sconopiic Development.
SECTION I I I  -  2 s TR? W A IT  FUND FOR ARAB ECONOMIC DEWbO’^ 'vliT
A -  Presentation of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Develonment
The Kuv/ait Fund for Arab Economic ^development, u su a lly
known as the Kuwait Fund, was the f i r s t  Arab agency o f  i t s  type;
furthermore i t  served as a model for o'fher funds and sometimes
contributed in  drawing th e ir  s t a t u t e s ‘ . I t  wes esta b lish ed  in
December I 96I  vblth a moderate c a p ita l of KP. FQOm, or 500m. do3„lars
equivalent, but fo llow in g  the o i l  pr1.ces upsurge i t  was extended and
enlarged in  July 1974. I t s  authorised capi.t.al reached '{p Ibn. or
3.iibn, d o lla rs  and i t s  serv ices  were extended to  non-Arab developing
cou n tr ies. However i t s  headcuarters are s t i l l  in  Kuv;ait-City and i t s
s ta f f  does not exceed 24/30 people.
The Kuwait Fund fo r  Arab Econome Devei.opm j^nt functions l ik e
the World Bank and. i t  has been sa id  that the structr’re o f the la t t e r
insp ired  i t s  a r c h ite c ts .
The Kuvrait Fund o ffe r s  only project lo^^ns, provision of
guarantees and techni.cal a ss is ta n c e . Given the le v e l  o f  the Kuwait
economy the Fund has lit t3 .e  tech n ic a l a ssista n ce  to o ffe r . On the
other hand, during i t s  decade or so of ex isten ce  the Fund’s p rincipal
a cti\d b y  has been to  provide p roject loans,
(%}The Fund charges 3 to  4 /  in te r e s t  rate per annum plus  
0 ,5 /  serv ice  charge, repayment and grace period are u su a lly  10-25 and 
4-5 years. I t  has been estim ated that the Grant El.ement v a r ies  from
29 to  48%. According to  i t s  s ta tu te s  the Fund is  to  g ive  prd.ority ^
to in frastru ctu re , a g r icu ltu re  and in d u str ia l sec tq rs .
However l ik e  any other Arab in s t itu t io n s  the Kuwal t  Fund 
imposes some conditions Which are;
-  Ttie Kuwaiti Dinar i s  the u n it of account,
(1) Drafted the s ta tu te s  o f  the Arab Fund for Economic and S ocia l 
DeveLopment.
(2) For further d e ta i ls  o f . ; A.Y. Al-Hamad^ "The Employment and Income 
D istrib u tion  ; O bjectives in  the Kuwait Fund Development Assistance"  
and Galal A, Amin'^'^'Project Appraisal end Income D istribution" , Wor3.d 
Development, Pergamon Press L td ., Oxford, Febiu.ary 1978,
* A.Y, Al-Hamad i s  the Chairman of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic 
DevaL op ment ( KFAED )
♦V Jfr n  A f. — » -- - '  * ■ ‘
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-  No s in g le  loan could exceed 50% of to ta l project,
-  or 101' of the Fund’s c a p ita l.
-  Fina^ncing i s  r e s tr ic te d  to foreign exchange renuirements only,
-  and f in a l ly  p io jec ts  imist not be in con fid et vdth Kuwaiti or Arab
economic in te r e s t s .
B -  Performance o f the Kuwait Fund
Table 42 g ives an idea o f the Fund’s record from 1962 to  
1976. What are the conclusions to be drawn1 Since i t s  creation to 
June 1976, the Kuwait Fund disbursed KD 320*36 trillion s or about
U.S. rOPpbn0 The Arab countries share was 76.5%  o f the to ta l
amount. TFiis i s  understandable because from 196^ to  1^75 the Fund 
operated ex c lu s iv e ly  fo r  the b en efit o f Arab cou n tries. I t  was only- 
a fte r  the o i l  c r is is  that i t  extended i t s  f a c i l i t i e s  to other L.D.Cs. 
However, as 'shown in  Table li2B, in  one year the Kuwo.it Fund granted 
T(D 75,05 m illion  or U.S. /255,17m , to  other cou n tries, that Is ju st  
under one f i f t h  o f  the to ta l amount granted in i t s  fourteen year 
ex isten ce .
Let us now consider the problem from a sectorisai, point of 
view. For the Arab countries 3 3 ,6 / o f the loans granted went to  
Transport, communications and storage. Then comes agricu ltu re with 
23/ÿ e le c t r ic i ty  has been treated on eoual footing wldb industry,
ju st above 21 / each. This sectorèsil d istr ib u tio n  wl'hh so marked an
emphasis on transport communications and storage w i l l  d e f in ite ly  expand 
the absorptive capacity o f in d iv idu al Arab countries by removing sotm 
bo'ttlenecks. Concerning nun-Arab cou n tries, i t  seeo‘3 that the l i o i 4 5 
share went to e le c t r ic i t y ,  5 3 ,9 / of the to ta l  .loans. Then comes 
agricu ltu re with 2 2 .2 /,  industry with 16,C / and f in a l ly  transport 
cominunications and storage vdth ju st  8 ,0 / ,
I f  one does not d istin gu ish  between Arab and non-Arab 
receiving countries the sec to ra l d istr ib u tio n  i s  as follow s:
A griculture 23 .17 /; Transport Comiriunications a.nd Storage 2d ,34/» 
E leotiu-city ?9*1G% and f in a l ly  Industry 20, 08/ ,  The main remark-is 
that the combined share of agricu ltu re , transport and e le c t r ic i ty  
amounted to ju st under 8C/, Those three secto rs do not produce any 
quick returns. This underlines the fa c t  that the Kuwait Fund for 
Arab Economic Development i s  ready to finance long-term  p rojects.
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TABLE 4 2  î Sectoral, and Geographical D is tr ib u tio n  
o f The L o a n s G r a n t e d  by - 
The Kuwait Fund fo r  Arab Economic Development 
(1 Januaiy  1962 -  30 June 1976)
A : Arab C ountries (M illion  10) )
Country Agri­c u ltu re
T ranspoï't 
Communi­
ca tio n s  
& S torage
E le c t r i c i ty Industry T o tal 2(1}
A lgeria lOj, 000  ^ 10,000 4.1
Bahrain . 5 0 0 7, 350 1 . 4 9 0 9.340 3.8
Lgypt 2 7 . 8 0 0 10.000 1 3 . ^ 0 0 51.500 21 .0
Iraq 2.620 3 . 7 6 0 6.380 2 . 6
Jordan 6 . 4 8 0 3 . 2 6 0 6.980 16.720 6 .8
Lebanon , 8 0 0 1 . 6 6 0 2 , 4 6 0 1 .0
M auritania 9 , 4 0 0 9.400 3.8
Morocc 0 1 0 , 0 5 0 3.500 9 . 2 5 0 2 2 . 8 0 0 9 .3
Somalia 6.000 6.200 19,?00 5.0
Sudan 2 0 , 3 1 0 7.000 7 . 6 7 0 3 4 . 9 8 0 14.3
S y ria 7.0C0 9,900 2.000 1 8 . 9 0 0 7.V
Tunisia 5.200 1 3 , 7 5 0 8.350 4. 500 3 1 , 8 0 0 1 3 . 0
North Yemen 5.020 1,780 3,000 9,800 4 .0
Sout>i Yemen 4. 5 3 0 4 , 5 0 0 9.030 3.7
TOTAL 57.590 8 2 . 5 3 0 5 2 , 8 4 0 5 2 . 3 5 0 245.310 100.0
23.5 33.6 21.5 21,3 100.0
B : Non-Arab C ountries (1 s t Apri.l 1975 -  30 June 1976)
ASIA
Bangladesh 2 . 3 0 0 6.400 8.700 11.6
In d ia 1 5 , 0 0 c. I 5 .OOO 20.0
m la y s ia 7 , 6 0 0 7 . 7 0 0 10.1
T&ldives 1 , 5 0 0 1 . 5 0 0 2 .0
Nepal 5,000 5,000 6 .7
P ak istan 1 3 . 0 0 0 13.000 17 .3
S r i  Lanka 7 . 5 0 0 7.500 10 .0
T hailand 1,000 1.000 1 .3
AFRICA
Commores 1 . 8 0 0 1.800 8.4
Guinea 2 . 7 0 0 2 . 7 0 0 ■ 3,6
Rwanda 1.000 1 :. 000 1 .3
Tanzania 4,500 4,500 6 .0
Uganda 5,750 5,750 7 .7
TOTAL 1 6 . 6 5 0 6.000 40,400 12,000 75.050 100,0
/ ( I ) 22,2 8 .0 53,9 16 .0 100.0
Source: Kuwait Fund fo r  Arab Economic Development "Annual Report" 
1975-1976. .
GW-KDl ' « LRS . /
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Another sa tis fa c to r y  feature i s  the place of agricu lture  
that took around 23/ o f  the to ta l loans granted. This d evel. op ment 
i s  l ik e ly  to resrond to L.D.C’s needs because th e ir  agricu ltu ra l 
population i s  very important. As far as Arab countries are concerned 
i t  has been outlined  in Chapter I . However th is  does not mean that 
the fouï- funds arc sa fe  of any c r it ic ism ,
SECTION I I I  ™ 3 Î AIT'S AND LIMITS OF THF BIlATERAX ARAB AID FHMS
A -  Ain^ s ojid Motives behind A.rab Aid,
Either for b ila te r a l  or m u ltila tera l funds the Arab countries  
havej, more or less^  the same aims and m otives. I t  follo^/'S th at some 
elements of th is  section, have to  be extended to  the next one„ R. SI-  
N a lla le^ ^ lists  three Ivy-pes of motives; they are p o litica l^  r e lig io u s ,  
eoonond.c a ni humanitarian m otives.
The P olitico«-oultu  r s l  Tbtdves
R. SL"î%U.aleh d istin g u ish es  between p o lio icQ l and cu ltu ra l 
m otives, however as far as aid to fellow  Arab countries i s  concerned, 
we do not. For i t  is  hard to  find a c lear  cut between cu ltu ra l, 
r e lig io u s , p o l i t ic a l  and h is to r ic a l  lin k s and i t  in harder to. deny 
th e ir  ex isten ce  and the Arab cou n tries' common drive towards un ity .
I t  i s  th is  common d estin y , e ith e r  pa.st, present or future which not 
only .'justifies the flow o f aid between Arab countries but puts i t  in  
terms o f  duty.
The Economic Motives
Every Arab government i s  conscious of the in terre la tio n  
between A.rab economies and the repercussions of any countgv's strength  
or weakness on the r e s t .  Such an argument i s  more v a lid  when th at  
very country occupies a very important place given the strategy  of the 
moment. Such a s itu a tio n  i s  very we].l exem plified by Ecurpt W^ich, for  
the moment, co n stitu te s  the sp in a l bone of the Arab World, Eo-ypt's 
current importance has been m aterialised  by m illion s of d o llars nourinv 
in to  i t .  Furthermore, a sp ec ia l fund has been s e t  up by Saudi .Arabia, 
Kuwait and the U.A.E. to resnond to Egypt' s sp e c if ic  economic needs. 
Tills scheme, known as the Gulf Fund, i s  to  provi.de Egypt with more than
173,
?bn, d o llars over the next f iv e  years. The la s t  r io ts  in  Cairo,
Which led  to more grants offered  h^r Arab countries to are very
te l l in g ,
F in e lly  the economic motive can b e tter  be explained bjr 
every Arab country’s open aim to  reach econoniic u n ity ,
Humanitar:an Motives
I f  some Arab countries such as Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Libya 
enjoy one of th^ h igh est G.N.P, per ca n ita  in  the World, other Arab 
countries such as Sudan and Somalia are c la s s if ie d  amongst the poorest 
countries by in tern ation a l organ isations. This means th at any 
national calaimlty, such as a flood or drought, would bring down the 
la t t e r  to starvation  l e v e l .  I t  follow s thatf
"PurjB-nitarian considerations r e f le c t  the normal p rin cip le  of 
r e la t iv e  ega litar ian isiii normally accented w ithin a s in g le  • 
country and community must be recognised as an imoortsnt 
fa cto r  in  Arab a id  g iv in g ,
This argument ap p lies to non-Arab Developing and e sp e c ia lly  Muslim 
co u n tr ies, Howftvor, as fa r  as we are concerned, we w i l l  add another 
motive which has not been l i s t e d  by R. E l-ï-a lla leh , namely the impact 
of o i l  p r ices on Developing Countri.es ’ eccî’jomies.
\2 )Oil Price Increases
I t  seems tha.t some support the view that 0Î1]C countries in
general underestimated the rimpact o f o i l  p r ice  increases on the
developing co u n tr ie s’ economies. For in sta n ce , in w 'ice J , W illiam
w rites: ",,,QidLG countries underestimated the i  moor tone e of o i l  bo t ’-'em
and tended to regard fo reca sts  of the dire e f fe c t  o f o i l  p r ice  increases
as part o f  the p u b lic ity  campaign by in d u str ia l consumers against higher
(3)p rices,"
This s itu a tio n  led  to a campaign o f propaganda between indus­
t r ia l  and OEG co u n tr ies. The former maintaining th a t o i l  p r ices have
(1) Ragaei E l-Ia lla le h  and IHhssen Kadaim, op. c i t .  p .479.
(2) The Oil C r is is ’ d ir e c t  and in d irec t impact on N.O.D.C, has already- 
been, treated, in  Chapter I I ,
(3) ib u rice J. W illiams, "The Aid Programs o f the OPEC Countries", 
Foreign A ffa irs , January 1976, p .311.
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"shattered" the L.D.Cs' economies and the la t t e r  responding thmt o i l  
prices contributed "only s lig h tly "  to an alread":  ^ n.n f la t  ion a 37/  s itu a tio n  
and th a t:
" o il p rice r ise s  should not be seen in iso la t io n , but in
conjunction with other fa c to rs  causing ad d ition al B .O.P.
burdens for developing countries including, in  p articu lar ,
price increases of manufactures, fool and f e r t i l i z e r s ^
This polem ical atmosphere did contribut.e to  pushing OR50
cou n tries, o f which Arab o i l  countries, to g ive aid to L.D.Cs, in  the
aim of maintaining an already w/on support. I t  goes wi thout saying
that ca p ita l aid was only one of the severa l means used b^ r the OFEC 
( ?  )
co u n tr ie s ,
Those are the aims and motives of Arab o i l  countries in  
giv ing aid; i t  i s  too early  to assess  the ao’'ielement o f such a p o licy , 
but re su lts  are function of the means used. In our ease these means 
are the in s t itu t io n s  being s e t  up by donor countries, and any b u i l t - in  
lim its  tright impede or diminish th eir  success.
B -  Some Limits to  the Arab B ila i.era l A id Fund s.
Some o f the follcfwing lim its  apply to  the Arab t b lt i la t e r a l  
Funds as w e ll,
-  The present paid-up ca p ita l of the above-mentioned four ’^ unds Is  
n e g lig ib le  comparatively to th e ir  authorised c a p ita l ,
-  The sum of pure grants in  the loan Is not very imnortant, on the 
other hand, one has to  recognise that the terms are more favourable 
than those offered  by in tern a tio n a l loading agencies and the D.A.C, 
members,
"Aid i s  provided on a project by project b a s i s , . ,  and th is  can
( 3 ibe harmful for a number of reasons,"
(1) -  Ibid, p .312.
(2) -  The OPSC s e t  up the "Special Fund Balance of Payments Support
Program" and the "Project Lending Program" c f .  Appendix IV-6  
and IV-7.
(3) -  R, B l-A nllaleh  and AT. Kh.adim, op, cit^  0 *481.
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F ir s t ly , the funds cannot bo a lloca ted  to other p ro jects ,
or part of them., even though the la t t e r  are being dela^/ed because of
a shortage of funds. T'lis i s ,  indeed, very harmful p articu la r ly  in
the case o f "planned" economies where a l l  projects are, more or le s s ,
in te r -re la te d  ard therefore any delay or slow/ness wdll d e f in ite ly  have
a chainy repercussion.
Secondly, wt.en there are several donors, i t  wri.ll be bard
fo r  the rec ip ien t country to s a t is fy  each one, for each one of them
w i l l  propose to  finance t'<o most creditworthy p ro ject.
The fa c t  of financing only the forei/p3 exchange reouirements
of the p rojects is  a problem too , Tne receiving country would be
tempted to: " , maximise the foreign exchange comnonent in  proposed
projects or n eg lect the development sec to rs , such as education and
f l  )tech n ica l tra in ing  in v.'hioh import costs  tend to be lo w ." The
consequence i s  increased dependence.
During i t s  decade or so o f eyistenctg the Kuwait Fund for
Arab F c mo mic Development concluded that one of fbe naln reasons of
the Fund's slowness i s ,  on the pfirt of tbe rec ip ien t country, the
shortage of ab le s ta f f  competent enough to formulate projects iworth
supporting. This i s  v e iy  important when one :recallo the Fund's
emphasis on crediiuworthiness and fea s ib ili .ty  me in].y^ One can alwa.ys
say t>at the Arab cou n tries cannot help such a s itu a tio n . On the
other hand, receiv ing countries noticed that th e ir  demands to through
lengthy adm inistrative procedures w ithin  the Kuv^ 'alt Find i t s e l f .
Concerning th is  point N, Fallon w/rites:
" if th is i s  the s itu a t io n  o f the Kuwait Fund foi Arab Economic
Development which we.s estab lish ed  in 1961, and has accumulated
both expo lie n e e  and competence i t  i s  certa in ly  not a ouestion
whether the other funds can operate e f fe c t iv e ly  u n til  .'several
(2 )years have passed."
Furthermore, i t  can be reasonably assumed that b ila te r a l  
funds are creating some kind of p o l i t ic a l  in fluence wd.thin the Arab 
World, This can be verjr harmful, i f  one considers the problem from 
the Arab unity  point o f  vi.ew. This behaviour could be seen as 
nothing but a narrow in d i\id u a lism  whose ultim ate r e su lt  is  nothing 
but r iv a lr ie s .
(1) -  Ib id , p .477.
(2) -  N. F a llo n , op. c i t .  p ,lf!7 .
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Furthemnore, up u n t i l  r ecen tly  there was no co-operation between 
the four funds. This i s  surprising s.t the time when in tern ation a l 
in s t itu t io n s  were aware o f the n e c e ss ity  for co-operation. For 
instance the United Nations through i t s  Economic Commission for West 
Asia (S ,C ,W ,A ,):" ,.held  a meeting with representatives o f the Kuwait 
Fund for Arab Economic Deve!Lopment and the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab 
Economic Development to  d iscu ss methods and rrooedures of in it ia t in g  
co-operation amongst them, " ^
T!nt-> three in s t itu t io n s  decided to  hold regular meetings 
Which were to  be enlargened to include the Iraq Fund for Economie 
Developihent and the Saudi Development Fund,
The non-existence of such a co-operation w i l l  be d ea lt with 
a t lengtFi at a la te r  s ta g e , however for the time oe:irg one can only  
b it t e r ly  deplore the fa c t th at s u c h  an in i t ia t iv e ,  althm yh b e n e f ic ia l ,  
had to cone from a non-Arab in s t itu t io n . I f  ouch a step  were taken 
by the League o f Arab s ta te s , i t  woudd have been, hi our opinion, a 
very positi.ve s ig n ,
Tliose a re  the  l im i t s .  However, i t  luould be u n fa ir  to  s ta t e  
th a t  Arab a id  co n ta in s  on ly  d isad v an tag es. For, d e sn ite  those l im its  
which g ive room fo r iinprovenient the ru a l.ity  of Arab a id  has to  be 
ap p rec ia ted  com pare.tively to a id  provided by o th e r co u n trie s  and 
i n s t i t i t i o n s .
~ The flow of Arab aid does, indeed, co n stitu te  another source of funds 
for L,D,Cs,
-  The vast lite r a tu r e  devoted to  western countries' aid accustomed us 
to  accept trie "quasi axiomatic" fa c t th at extern9j aid contains 
p o l i t ic a l  and econorrdc disadvantages, th a t about Arab aid then?
-  As outlined  e a r lie r  Arab aid  i s  granted on more favourable terms 
than "western aid" fo r  :instance, with more important grant elements 
Arab aid is  almost con stitu ted  of "clean loans", for Arab o i l  
countries have no imnufactured goods to export, therefore i t  cannot 
be t ie d .
For in stan ce, i t  follow’s that "credit export" i s  ruled out 
and with th e ir  "hard currency" loan the rece iv in g  country ca.n "shop 
around"• '
I t  appears that from an economic point of view the r u a lity  
of Arab aid i s  high,
(1 ) -  R , E l-M a i  l a  1  eh  an d  M h s s e n  K adhim , op* c i t ,  p . 4 8 ? ,
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The second p o in t i s  t h a t  although the D.A.C, co u n trie s  s e t
t h e i r  own a id  ta r g e t  o f 1 /  of th e i r  G.N.P. they never imnaged to
reach i t*  However, according  to an 0*>E*C.D, re n o rt nuoted by the  
f 1 )F in an c ia l Times , Kuwait, Q atar th e  U.A.E, end Saudi Arabia gave
2 .Ô /, 6 .7 / ,  4 .6 /  and 2 .6 /  of t h e i r  1975 G.K.P.
One has to  reco g n ise  th a t  concerning th e se  tii /^pes of flgui-as 
one i s  alwa;ys faced  w ith  c o n f l ic t in g  r e r o r t s .  For in s tan c e , according  
to  Kuwaiti d a ta  t h i s  country i s  g iv ing  around 8 /  o f i t s  G.N.P, aid 
F or M.J* W i l l i a m s t h e  D.A.C. gave 0,33 and 1 .8  and OPEC 0.78  and 
3.4./ o f th e i r  re sp e c tiv e  G.N.P. fo r 1974 and .1975 re sp ec tiv e ly ^ ^ ^ .
In view of th ese  figijires one can s a fe ly  advance th a t ,  although th.^re 
i s  room fo r  improvement, Arab c o u n tr ie s  are  doing q u ite  w e ll, however, 
b e fo re  condoming or p ra is in g  Arab a id  we have to  co n sid e r the o th e r  
channels used by Ai-ab c o u n tr ie s . These channels w i l l  be d e a l t  v i th  
in  th e  follow ing and fin a l, s e c tio n  of th is  ch ap te r.
SECTION J \r  ? ARAB AID T^ ’HOUGH ARAB miTII.ATERAI. AGENCIES
This se c tio n  w i l l  be d iv ided  In to  th re e  p a ,rfe  . The
f i r s t  one d ea lin g  w ith  th e  reso u rces  and o p era tio n s  o f Arab i l i l t i -  
l a t e r a l  a id  glaring ag en c ie s , th e  second one with motives behind Arab 
a id .  As fb r  th e  f in a l  one i t  d ea ls  w ith the c r i t ic is m s  which ml .gib 
be d ire c te d  towards those  ag en cies .
SECTICN IV -  1 ; Resources and O perations of Arab '- 'u l t i la te ra .l  Aid 
Agencie_s
Arab c o u n tr ie s  a re  using  se v e ra l channels to  g ran t d i f f e r e n t  
types of a id  to  non-Arab developing  c o u n tr ie s . Some of those agencies 
a re  c o n tr ib u tin g  to Arab o i l  and n o n -o il producing c o u n tr ie s  a l ik e .
This fe a tu re  d is t in g u is h e s  them fram the prei/ious s e t  o f ag en c ies . To 
d i f f e r e n t ia te  between some of th e se  funds we a re ,  in  a vra^ r, ob liged  
to use a r t i f i c i a l  g e o - p o l i t ic a l  and re lig io u s  c r i t e r i a .  V.’e s h a l l  
d iv id e  th e  r e c ip ie n t  c o u n tr ie s  between Arab, Muslim and A frican ones,
(1) -  F in an c ia l Times, Februaiy 25, 1977, p .24.
(2 ) -  M.J. W illiam s, op* c i t .  p . 323
(3) -  For fu r th e r  d e t a i l s  concerning O .A .P.E .O .’s a i'i o f .  Appendix IV-3.
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A. -  F b lt lla te r a l Aid Agenc:*'es fo r  Arab Countries
There are two funds: Tbe Arab Fund for Socia.l and Fconomi.o 
Development and the S p ecia l Fund for Arab Non-oil exT^ortlng countries  
the former being the more important, therefore i t  w il l  be d ea lt vdth 
more thoroughly.
1. -  Arab Fund for Fconomic and Social Development
I t  was proposed by Kuwait to  the 1967 Khartum(Sudan ) Arab 
Summit and estab lish ed  in  May .1968 with head^iu.arters in  Kuwait-city.
I t  was drafted by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development.
However, given i t s  m ulti.lateral sta tu s the Arab Fund for 'toonomic and 
Socia l Development i s  not a 1CX%- carbon copy of the la t t e r  although they  
are s im ilar  In some p o in ts . I ts  authorised cai-'ital i s  ju st under 
347m. d o lla rs  and any Arab country may jo in , the membership subscr.iption  
being function of the oanit.ry's w ealth.
Tl-ie Arab Fund fo r  Fconomic and S ocia l Development proid.des 
two ty]:)es o f operation: project loans and tech n ica l a ssista n ce  with
sp e c ia l emphasis on industry and in frastru ctu re. In terest ra tes  y p y v - 
between 4 to 6 /  per annum and repayments and grace p eri oris are 1%P0 
and 4“5 years r e sp ec tiv e ly .
Hie Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development imposes 
some r e s tr ic t io n s  too; the r e c ip ien t rmst bn a public or a pin vate  
organisation in Arab cou n tries, however^ contrary to  other funds eouity, 
p artic ip a tion  i s  prohib ited .
I t  appears th a t t h is  Fund i s  characterised by i t s  slowness; 
i t  started  functioning four years a fte r  being se t up. lAirthermore, 
in  the four succeeding years i t  granted no more than 102m, d o lla rs .
Tills i s  n e g lig ib le  when one r e c a lls  the huge ca p ita l requirements o f  
Arab n on -o il countri.es and c a p ita l surplus of Arab o i l  cou n tries.
One would have ex|iected the Arab Fund for Economie and Social 
Development to  create a lin k , a channel, between both groups but th is  
has not been the ca se . On the other hand i t  w i l l  be in ter e st in g  to  
consider the .Arab Fund for Economic and S ocia l Development’s approach 
to the Arab ivorld’s development problems.
The Arab Fund for Economic and S ocia l Development i s  not 
characterised by an a c t iv e , l e t  alone aggressive^approach to  these  
problems. Up u n t i l  now i t s  ro le  has been ju st to  s e le c t  loan
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ap p lication s forwarded to  i t  by ind ividual countries or private or 
public bodies w ith in  the Arab World,
A.M. Undermod l is tS j  qu ite  r ip b tly j severa l c r it ic ism s to  
th is  approach*
" in it ia tio n  of p ro jects  by member countries i s  mostly yuided
by lo c a l and p a r t ic u la r is t  considerations and rarely  takes
(1 )in to  account m ultinational in t e r e s t ,"
It i s  a fa ct that a country's project cannot, by the nature of th in y s, 
be othervi.se. Given the p o l i t i c a l ,  econ o itca l and geographical 
competence of any given country even a neighbouring coen try 's needs 
and p o ten tia l cannot be a ssessed , secondly,
"economic planning and programming in  most nember Arab 
countries i s  s t iü ,  in  i t s  infancy, and so project in it ia t io n
(ç> )
i s  not l ik e ly  to  lead to  optiimj. so lu tion s."  ^
Furthermore, even fu lly -fled g e d  planning aims at resolvi.ng lo c a l  rathei'
than regional problems. Therefore an inter-Arab Co-operation i s
required. Such a method can only lead to a worse sca tterin g  o f the
very scarce able human resources id-iich characterise the Arab World
(o f . Chapter I ) ,
I t  fo llow s that a more a c tiv e  approach on the part of the
Arab Fund fo r  Economic and S o c ia l Development is  necessar^r. According
to  our previous author the Arab Fund should*
"take in i t ia t iv e  in  conducting the necessary research and
pre-investm ent stu d ies  to  conceive projects o f  d ir e c t  impact
for the achievements o f i t e  ta rg ets , and to  promote the
finances and en trep ren eu rsh ip  , , ,  req u ired  fo r t h e i r
(3)im plem entation."
However, given i t s  s ta tu te s  and. paid-up ca p ita l can the Arab Fund 
afford an a ctiv e  approach? One can go further and wonder whether th is  
Arab Fund was designed to carry out such a p o licy . In our opinion
with an authorised c a p ita l of only 3!>7m, d o llars no fund can undertake
a t r u lly  regional nu.ssion,
(1 ) -  Source; A.M, Undemood, "Financial Flows Within and Retween
Selected  Arab S tates" , unpublished th e s is .  U niversity of ^urham., 
September 1974, p .35*
(2) -  Ib id .
( 3 J  -  A.M. U n d erw o o d , o p .  c i t .  p . 3 6 .
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An a ctiv e  approa.cb must be based, on a sound and appropriate 
organ isation . Given the av a ila b le  c u a lita t iv e  and nuantative  
exp ertise  a t reg ion a l le v e l  and e s n e c ia lly  given the ex isten ce  of the 
severa l other funds, th e  Ars.b Fund can hardlv afford sue'* an "indis­
pensable' luxur^ri',
I t  has been suggested that an a c tiv e  appi.’o ac h  cen alwa.}^ be 
narrov,7ed by a r e s tr ic t iv e  and conservative in terp reta tion  of the  
agreement on tlie part of member cou n tr ies. I t  i s ,  indeed, a risk  but 
a r isk  which i s  not s p e c if ic  to the Arab Fund fo r  Economic and S o cia l 
Development o f any other .Arab agency.
From the various operations undertaken so fa r , mainly during 
the f i r s t  year of ex isten c e , i t  appears that bn© Arab Fund functions  
in  a way not very d iss im ila r  to the Fuwait, Fund for Arab Economic 
Development. The reason i s  that loans to  lo c a l scheiros were 
predominant and no "social" p ro ject was financed. It, w i l l  surely  be 
unfortunate to find  out th a t the Arab Fund for Economic and S ocia l 
Development i s  a d u p lica te  o f the Kuvjait Fund fo r  Arab Economic 
Development,
2. -  S p ecia l Fund for  Arab F o n -o il Exporting Countries,
The S p ecia l Fund fo r  Arab F o n -o il Exporting Cruutries i s  
a sp e c ia l fund for i t  was designed to  have a s'^oi't l i f e .  The Fund 
was estab lish ed  in  June 1974 to  f u l f i l  t^e sp e c ia l purpose of 
supporting B.O.P, o f Arab n o n -o il exporting co u n tr ies. I t  fo llow s  
that the S p ecia l Fund for Arab F on-oil Exporting Countries i s  a 
d ir e c t  consequence o f  o i l  p r ice  in crea ses . I t  could bo in terpreted  
as a kind of o i l  f a c i l i t y  sp e c if ic  to needy Arab co u n tr ies , Another 
ch a ra c ter istic  of the S p ecia l Fund for Arab Non-oil Exporting Countries 
i s  th a t i t  i s  adm inistered by the Arab Fund fo r  Economic and Socia l 
Development. Furthermore, i t  i s  the only Arab agency whose 
authorised c a p ita l has been Wholly paid-up; SOm, d o lla r s , and by 
1976 a n  i t s  c a p ita l  had been disbursed.
Although the amount provided i s  not large t^e creation  o f  
the S p ecia l Fund for Arab N on-oil Exporting Countries did help to  
cushion o i l  p r ice  in creases for some Arab co u n tr ies , fo r  loans were 
granted on very favourable terms: 7,era in te r e s t  rates and repayment
was to occur over 10 years a f te r  a lOyyear grace period . The grant
1 2 1 .
element accounts fo r around 205? of t o t a l  lo a n s . The S pecial Fund 
fo r  Arab N on-oil Exporting C ountries granted f in a n c ia l  a s s is ta n c e  to  
in d iv id u a l Arab s ta t e s  on the b a s is  of previous o i l  im ports, a 
s im ila r  approach was used by the  I.M .F. concerning the o i l  f a c i l i t i e s .  
This fund i s  n o t development o r ie n ta te d  and th e re fo re  from a long 
term p o in t o f  \d evj i t  i s  o f n e g lig ib le  im portance to  u s . Ithanpens 
then , th a t  the only m u l t i la te r a l  Arab agency fo r  fe llow  Arab co u n tr ie s  
i s  th e  Arab Fund fo r Economic and S o c ia l ve^relopment W^icR i s  no t 
doing a l o t .  However, what about a id  to  non-Arab c o u n tr ie s , such as 
Musliin  coun tr i e s .
B. -  Arab m u lt i la te ra l  Aid Agency fo r  Islam ic C onntri.es,
Only one in s t i t u t i o n  se rv es  th is  purpose.
1 . “ Islam ic Development Bank o r IDB
I t  was e s ta b lis h e d  in  August 1974 with h eadouarters  in  
Jiddah  (Saudi A rab ia). I t s  au th o rise d  c a p i ta l  i s  DlCmy'^lollars w ith 
th e  p o s s ib i .l i ty  o f i t  being in c reased  tojj.'', 5bn.| i t  i s  second on ly  bo 
th e  Kuwait Fund fo r  Arab Economic Developrfienu Vh
The Islam ic Development Bank serves many purposes such as 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  e q u ity  c a p i ta l ,  lo an  and te c h n ic a l  a s s is ta n c e  fo r 
p roductive  p ro je c ts  in  the pub lic  and p r iv a te  s e c to rs . I t  a ls o  
undertaizes re sea rch  and pi'omotion of fo re ig n  tra d e  amongst member 
c o u n tr ie s t The Islam ic  Development Bank o f fe rs  i t s  s e rv ic e s  on*'y to  
a Muslim country  o r  to  a I u s lim  community with in  a non-Mjisli.m country . 
Since i t  i s  m ainly a Saudi p ro je c t  e s p e c ia lly  designed fo r  the Umma 
(is la 'iiic  community), lo an s  are  g ran ted  in t e r e s t  f re e .  However, equ ity  
p a r t ic ip a t io n  i s  more emphasised than  ^oans. • Although loans can be 
extended to  any p ro je c t ,  the  p ro d u c tiv e -o rien ted  ones a re  p re fe r re d . 
However, i f  in  terms of c a p i t a l  i t  i s  the most im portant m u l t i la te r a l  
agency i t  a lso  happens to  be very  slow in  s ta r t in g .  According to  i t s  
f i r s t  Annual Report (1975-76) by 1976 i t  has approved ju s t  one loon of 
ID 6 m illio n  fo r  Cameroon, In 1977 i t  i s  known to  have d isb u rsed  
around ^  50 m ill io n s . Furtherm ore the Islam ic Development Bank
brought a new problem when i t  came in to  being , fo r  i t s  c a u i ta l  was paid  
in  Islam ic D inars (ID ), I t  was the  f i r s t  tim e th a t  such a currency  
was used and i t  was done a t  in te rn a t io n a l  le v e l .
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For N. Fallon* " . . . I s la m ic  D inars, a currency v-hich was no t f a m il i a r , ,  
c re a te s  some confusion  but When i t s  c o n s ti tu tio n  has am eared  i t
f l )would seem to  be e q u iv a le n t to th e  pre-1921 U.S. d o l la r  o r  o .D .R ,"
'Die problem was solved \r^  another problem, however in  s p i te  
of th i s ,  i t  does no t mean th a t  Islam ic co u n tr ie s  were n eg lec ted , for­
as i:)a,rt o f the D-iir 1 World th ey  re ce iv e  loans and a id  th ro u rh  the 
n u l t i l a t e r a l  Arab channels. Furtherm ore, in  the eyes of Arab 
c o u n tr ie s , th e  A frican  co n tin en t occupies a s p e c ia l p o s itio n  and 
consequently  s p e c if ic  i n s t i tu t io n s  were s e t  up to  serve  them.
G, -  Arab lb I t l l a t er e l  AId Agencies fo r  African C ountries
Tl'iree d i f f e r e n t  agencies were s ^ t  up to  help  A frican
c o u n tr ie s ,
1, « Arab Bank fo r  Economic Development in  A frica
This i n s t i t u t i o n  i s  a lso  c a lle d  the Arab Bank for I n d u s t r ia l  
and A g ric u ltu ra l Development in  A frica  o r ABEDA, I t  was e s ta b lish e d  
in  November 1973 w ith  i t s  h ead q u arte rs  in  Khartum (Sudan) w ith an 
a u th o rise d  c a p i ta l  of ^31mo d o l la r s .  I t  was th e  f i r s t  M u lt i la te r a l  
Arab Agency to  be s e t  up and th is  c le a r ly  in d ic a te s  the im portence 
accorded by th e  Arab World to  the A frican c o u n tr ie s . I t  fo llow s th q t  
the cho ice o f Sudan, a lthough  an Arab country , as the  h o s t coun try  
i s  not a mere symbolic g e s tu re . The choice goes back to  the r o le  
played by the  Sudanese P re sid en t in  s e t t in g  un th is  bank.
The Arab Bank fo r Economic Devel.opinent in  A frica  s ta r te d  
fu n c tio n in g  in  January 1975 and. by t5arch of th a t  y ea r no more than
f '
33m. d o l la r s  were pa id  up. The paid-up  c a n i ta l  occurred as follovjsî ' 
Saudi Arabia^l.?. 5>î^ . d o l la r s ,  A lg e ria , Kuwait, O atar, ^5m, e-’ch, 
I'o rocco |? .9m ., T u n is ia |l ,? 5 m ., Oman^lm., B ahrain, Jordan and Sudan 
1 0 , 25111. each.
The Arab Bank fo r  EconomI.c Development in  A frica imposes 
one s in g le  condition* the r e c ip ie n t  must be a non-Arab A frican 
coun try . The Arab Bank fo r  Economic Development in  A frica  wt s^ given 
th e  burden of ad m in is te rin g  the  subsequent s p e c ia l  fund,
(1) -  N, F a llo n , op, c i t ,  p .126.
(2) -  E.G. Ghibwe, "Arab D o lla rs  fo r  A fr ic a " . ,  op. c i t .  p .143.
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2. -  Arab African O il A ssistance Fnnd (AFOAF).
This fund was s e t  up in  ]%roh 1974, and i s  th e ,eou iva len t
of the S p e c ia l Fund fo r  Arab N on-oil Exporting C o u n tries, because i t s
only purpose i s .  to finance the recip ien t cou n tries' o i l  Imports.
I t  s e rv e s , th en , as a B .O .P. supports The g ran tin g  of a loan i s
based on p rev ious o i l  im port.
By the  end of 1976 the Arab A frican  O il A ssistance Fund had
gran ted  th i r t y - f iv e  loans amounting to  126m, d o l la r s .  The term s a re
v ery  fa w u ra b le  and th e  q u a l i ty  of the loans i s  next to  th e  S p ec ia l
Fund fo r  Arab N on-oil E xporting  C o u n trie s ' ; 15? i n t e r e s t  r a te  per
annum and 15 and 10 y ea r  repayment and. grace periods re s p e c t iv e ly .
The g ra n t elem ent i s  estim ated  to  be a s h igh  as  75-^. I t  appears
)th a t  the  r e c ip ie n t  c o u n tr ie s  were d iv ided  in to  two groups “ ; 
most sez 'iously  a f fe c te d  and o th e r s .  The f i r s t  group took around 
I 2 I 1ÎI0 d o l la r s  o f the t o t a l  c a p i t a l .  I t  has to  be no ted  th a t  th en  
th e  Arab A frican  O il A ssis tance  Funrl's wlnol© c o i t a l ,  l , e ,  200m, 
d o l la r s ,  was oommited by the  end o f 1976, I'fest of the  Afr*lean 
c o u n tr ie s  took advantage o f  th e  Arab A frican  O il A ssistance Fund's 
f a c i l i t i e s ,  Q ily  fom* Arab c o u ritr ie s , Sudan, M auritan ia , Somalia 
and Morocco, were g ran ted  a combined lo an  o f  26,5m, d o l la r s .  
Consequently, as  f a r  a s  the Arab A frican  O il A ssis tan ce  Fimd i s  
concerned, th e re  i s  no room to  argue th a t  a id  went mainly to  Arab 
c o u n tr ie s . Furtherm ore, A frican  co u n tr ie s  rece iv ed  a id  through a 
th i r d  channel0
3, « Arab A frican  T echnical A ssis tan ce  Furd or AFTAF
E stablished in  January 1974 for  the purpose o f providing 
loans and know-how, only 1% in te r e s t  rate per annum i s  charged and 
the grace period does not exceed 3 years. As the Arab Bank for  
Economic Development in  A frica the rec ip ien t must be a non-Arab 
African countiy , , ^
By the end of 1974, f iv e  African cou n tries, namely L iberia, 
^ ^ li, Ruwanda, Uganda and Tanzania applied for loan s. The Fund's 
sec to ra l emphasis i s  B.O.P, support. On the other hand, the Arab 
African Technical A ssistance Fund d if fe r s  from other Arab funds on 
two a sp ects .
(1 ) -  o f .  Appendix IF-2 for disbursements and committment of Arab 
African O il A ssistance Fund's funds.
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-  F ir s t ly ,  and unfortu n ately , i t  has the sm allest authorised c a p ita l,  
th at i s ^ 5  m illio n s ,
-  Secondly, i t  i s  theon ly  Arab M u ltila tera l Fund to  be administered  
by the League o f  Arab S ta te s ,
Those are, b r ie f ly  presented, the s ix  Arab M .t i la t e r a l  
agencies whose porformance has to bo assessed* However in  th is  
context one ought to  mention the Fund created by the OLÏÏC countitLes,
4« -  The Organisation of O il Expcrting Countries' Fu).id.
I t  was esta b lish ed  on January 1976 by the th ir teen  Finance
F dnisters of the OPEC, I ts  ca p ita l o f  .^200 m illion s was contributed
M  )as fo llow s by the member countries  
» Iran: {âfZlO im.Hions
-  Saudi Arabia: 202 m illion s
-  Kuivaits ^72 m illio n s
-  N igeria: ^$2 m illio n s
« Libya and Iraq; m illion s each 
“ United Arab Emirates s '^33 m illio n s
-  A lgeria; 020 m illion s  
« Qatar; ^12 m illio n s
-  Gabon? ^  m illio n
O riginally  the OPEC's aim was to gather ^Ibn, but th is  was 
not p o ss ib le  with th e absence of Indonesia and Ecuador and th e sumbolic 
contribution  of Gabon* However i t  seems th at by the th ird  Quarter 
o f  1977, 9 other countries contributed and now the fund has a ^bn*  
cap ita l*  Unfortunately w© do not have f ig  m'es about t>is second 
contribution*
The OÏEG-Fund purpose i s  to  grant long-term  in te r e s t - fr e e  
loans to N on-oil developing cou n tries with preference to the Most 
S erio u sly  A ffected co u n tr ies .
The OPEC S p ecia l Fund has contributed to  United Nations'
(2 )organ isa tion s' such as the U.N.D.P*(United Nations' Development 
Program). On the other hand i t  has undertaken i t s  own Balance o f  
Payments' Support Program. A l i s t  o f  the r e c ip ie n t cou n tries and 
amount o f  the loans granted i s  an Appendix I\A-6, Furthermore the 
OPEC Fund se t  up a p roject lending p ro g ra m e . ' ' ' ' V
(1 ) El-Mbudjahid (Algerian N ational Newspaper), January 29, 1976, p .7, 
( c f .  A rticle? OPEC ; ^000 m illio n  Aid to  Poor C ountries, (French).
125.
SECTION IV -  2 s MOTIVES BEHIND AND PMFCRMANCS OP ARAB MULTILATERAL 
AID AGENCIES
A. -  Motives
rt)St o f the motives do not d i f f e r  from th©5^; outlined  in  
the previous sec tio n , but s o i ï b  elements must be added. F ir s t ly ,  the 
Arab Vbrld i s  a f u l l  member o f the Third World. As fai' as f in a n c ia l  
agencies are concerned such a truth i s  already i llu s tr a te d  by two 
points s
“ The establishm ent of an Arab Banlc for A frica as ea r ly  as 1964 and 
whose c a p ita l was increased from I2m. d o lla rs  to  5Cüi. d o lla rs  in  
1974 fo llow in g  o i l  p rice  in crea ses,
-  Tlie contribution  of "poor" Arab cou n tries, -  Morocco, Tunisia,
Jordan and Sudan -  to  the Arab African O il A ssistance Furd, This 
a lso  underlines the importance o f  the "African connection" to  the 
Arab VJorld,
SeooncD.y .^ p o l i t i c a l  motives cannot be exaggerated for they . 
cannot be absent from any type o f a id  and there i s  no reason to  
consider Arab aid  as an exception , Arab co u n tiles  ' p o l i t i c a l  aims 
are to  e s ta b lish , maintain and strengthen Third World support to  the  
Arab World's in te r e s t .  I t  i s  not easy to assess  th e  r e s u lt  of such 
a p o lic y .
Be -  Performance and C ritic ism  o f Arab M u ltila tera l Arab Aid Agencies 
I t  i s  too early  to  g ive  an able verd ict concerning Arab a id . 
Therefore, our approach w i l l  be focused on vAiether Arab countries chose 
the i lg lit  course and su ita b le  method in  giving a id ,
Arab b i la te r a l  and m u ltila ter a l agencies function in  a very  
sim ilar  vjay, th erefore a l l  the c r it ic is m  male on tech n ica l grounds 
formulated again st the former i s  s t i l l  v a lid  for the la t t e r  (o f.
Section  I I I ) ,  Furthermoie,, by ccnsidering and comparing both types 
o f agencies severa l other c r it ic ism s  a r ise ,
-  Only a small portion o f authorised c a p ita l has been |:a id , except 
in  the case of the sp e c ia l o i l  funds, namely the Sp ecia l Fund fo r  
Arab N on-oil Countries and the Arab African O il A ssistance Fund,
-  In most cases disbursement la g s  far  behind committïfônts. In the 
case o f  the Arab African O il A ssistance Fund a lth o u ^  the vjhole 200m,
was committed l e s s  than 126m, d o lla rs  were disbursed, ju st  over 60?,
-  There i s  an obvious preference for b ila te r a l  channels. The combined
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authorised c a p ita l o f  th3 .four b i la t e m l  agencies « Kuwait Fund for  
Arab EconomiG Development, the Abu Dhabi Fund for  Arab Economic 
Development, the Saudi Development Fund the Iraq Fund for External 
Development -  amounts to  6,949m, d o lla r s . Whereas the combined c a p ita l  
of the seven m u ltila tera l fu n d s .to ta ls  1,743 m illion  d o lla rs  or ju st  
over 25/  ^ o f  the previous amount. Furthemor© , the Arab Bank for  
Economic Development in  A fr ica ’s intended i n i t i a l  ca p ita l was 125 
m illio n  dolJLsirs, but?
" after c r it ic ism  from Tanzania's Foreign Minister . . . .  
and others ihe Bank’s i n i t i a l  c a p ita l was raised  to  
231 m illion  d o lla r s .
Aid i s  o ften  granted outside these funds and banks, during 
heads o f s t a t e s ’ v i s i t s .  I t  i s  very d i f f ic u l t  to  fo llow  u p  th is  type 
of a id . However, the subsequent tab le  g ives us a f a ir  idea of Arab 
aid  commitments to  African countries during 1974 a lon e.
Although we do not have Arab aid granted under such circum­
stances for  the 1975-77 period , we can draw more conclusions by 
comparing the amount o f p etrod o llars resh u ffled  through Arab channels 
and the impact o f the o i l  c r i s i s .  Tîi© la t t e r  desiquH ibrated  the
B.O.P. o f  N.O.D.C'. From th is  angle one can n otice  that only two 
channels, the S p ecia l Fund for Arab N on-oil Countries and the Arab. 
African O il A ssistance I'Und, were s e t  up to provide B.O.P. support. 
Their combined ca p ita l was 0  .220 m illio n s , th at i s  2,2% o f tVa 
increased o i l  b iH  fo r  1974. I f  one adds aid granted outside the 
channels ( c f .  Table 43 Page 127) th e  figu re goes up to  6,98% i f  
increased c o s t  of o i l  imports was estim ated a t  %10.bn, for 1974 
( c f .  Chapter I I ) ,  This f a l l s  short o f N.O.D.C's needs. However one 
can n^lntai.n th a t Arab countries went beyond B.O.P, considerations  
and th e ir  prime ob jectiv e  was to  provide development a id . In th is  
one should expect then to  g ive  more aid tham B ,0 ,P , d e f ic i t  
requirementsc What are the figures?  I t  appears th at the combined 
authorized c a p ita l of the seven remaining banlcs and Funds i s  2l0.032bn. 
That i s  ju s t  the 1974 o i l  in crease whereas th is  sum i s  to  be disbursed  
during several years to  come,
' The obvious conclusion i s  th at Arab cou n tries did not s a t i s f y  
N,0,D ,C, economic needs and p o l i t i c a l  exp ecta tion s. Obviously we are 
not expecting th e ir  economic needs to  be s a t is f ie d  only by Arab 
co u n tr ies.
( 1 )  «  E .G . G h ib w e , op, c i t .  p .44.
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Furthermore ; g iven  our op in ion  as to  whem th e  Arab P eop le’s
fu tu re  in t e r e s t  la y  and g iven  th e p o l i t i c a l  framework in  Which t h is
p ie c e  o f resea.rch i s  being undertaken we can reasonab ly compare
q u a n tita tiv e ly  Arab aid  and other types o f placement of o i l  revenues.
Given our conclusions in  the previous chapter we cannot but agree w ith
E.G. Cîiibwe that ;
" It i s  c e r ta in ly  r e g r e tta b le  th a t the r ich  Arab co u n tr ie s  are
n w  th e  main con tr ib u to rs  to  th e  b a sic  d isea u ilib r iu m  in
(1 1
ec onoraic r e 1  a tio n  s , ,  • "
For th e  same author one o f the severe], reasons o f worsening
the present d isequilibrium  Which has not been created by Arab countries
i s  due to the fa c t  th a t  the la t t e r :
"have generously a ss is te d  the in d u str ia l countries f in a n c ia lly
in  order to  meet th e ir  B.O,P, d e f ic i t s .  While Eumpe and
America have been a s s is te d  by lo a n s  wt-ich carry  con cession ary
ra tes of in te r e s t  o f about 3%^  African countries have to
borr'crw the aame funds on the Eurodollar markets a t rates of
(P )In ter e s t  which flu c tu a te  between 15 and " '
Furthermore the LdbCs, access to  these imrkets i s  not commensurate 
with th e ir  needs ( c f .  Chapter TIT),
The A frican  opinion has a lso  been expressed l a t e l y  a t  the  
f i r s t  Ar&b-African summit h e ld  in  Cairo during the f i r s t  weeks o f March 
1977. Lairing t h is  summit A frican Heads o f S ta te  claim ed th a t  the  
cap ita^  flow  from Arab count id  e s  was " in su ff ic ie n t"  and "inadéquate",
^3 for the quantity o f c a p ita l African countries wei-q seeking aid of 
2bn, doH ars from the Arab World, I t  seems th at Arab countries were 
expecting such a move sin ce  the c a p ita l o f the Arab Bankfor Economie 
Development in  A frica was increased to |?06c5 m illion  on February 19, 
1977. As far as cash aid i s  concerned four Arab countries pledged a 
to ta l  o f  1,453 m illion  dollars^^^, with Saudi Arabia contributing Ibn. 
d o lla rs  and Kuwait, the Ü.A.E. and Qatar the r e s t .  However, What is  
important in  our opinion i s  the Economic D eclaration Which la id  down 
the foundations for future fin a n c ia l flow between the tivo blocks of
(1) -  E.G. Ghibwe, op, c i t ,  p .45.
(2 ) •» Idem, p .46,
(3) -  F inancial Times, March 9, 1977, p .6,
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cou n tries, s in ce  i t  c a lle d  for:
"promot'hig the placement o f  Arab c a p ita l in  African countries  
Whether in  the form of d ir e c t  investm ents, loans or 
d ep osits ."
I t  i s  very important to ask how Arab countii.es are  going to 
channel these placements, e s p e c ia lly  when one r e c a lls  th at African 
countries complained th a t Arab aid was "inadequate". As fa r  as the 
flow o f  Arab aid  i s  concerned one can sa fe ly  extend the arguments o f  
African countries to  other L .D .C s,, e sp e c ia lly  s in ce  a t  the beginning  
of th is  sec tio n  we sta ted  th at the African continent occupies an 
important p lace in  the eyes o f  the Arab World. Tti ere fore we do 
consequently expect the b est e f fo r t  o f  Arab countries to  have been 
devoted to  th a t con tin en t.
As a matter o f fa c t  the term "inadeauacy" r a ise s  the problem 
of methods Wliich, in  i t s e l f ,  re fers  to the in s t itu t io n s  or channels 
used by the Arab co u n tr ie s . S ince we are concerned about th a t  
e f f ic ie n c y  the e x is t in g  channels are to be the subject o f soms 
c r it ic ism s  in  the fo llow in g  part, v
G. «• C riticism s o f  Arab Countries* Aid Giving Method
Several c r it ic ism s  are to  be d irected  to the Arab Funds and 
Banks s e t  up.
Excluding in tern a tio n a l in s t itu t io n s  such as the Î.B .R .D ., 
the the United Nations* Development Vbrk, Arab cou n tries are
using eleven purely Arab funds and banks, s ix  of Which were s e t  up in  
1974. What are the im p lication s o f  th is  "mushrooming" o f Arab 
agencies? According to  R. El«M allaleh and M. Kadhim th is  
p ro life r a tio n  lead s to  s ix  baneful consequences;
F ir s t ly , d iffu s io n  o f  an already scarce man powers the 
shortage of the Arab World’s human resources being shown in  the f i r s t  
chapter. Instead of doing th e ir  b est to use optim ally  those resources 
the Arab World i s  sca tter in g  them. The d irec t r e su lt  i s  the creation  
of in e f f ic ie n t  sm all u n its .  Furthermore, the s itu a t io n  Is  worsened 
when SORB of those u n its  are given the r e sp o n s ib ility  to  d ra ft the  
s ta tu te s  of or adm inister other u n its . For in stan ce, i t  i s  worthwhile 
re ca llin g  and s tr e ss in g  that the most experienced of the Arab agen cies ,-
( l )  -  Q u o te d  b y  t h e  F i n a n c i a l  T im e s ,  M arch 6 ,  1977, p . 7.
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i . e .  the Kuwait Ihu'id for Arab Eoonomlo Development has a s ta f f  of no 
more than <fe'e;teikVypeople;
Secondly, use o f severa l d iffe r e n t c r ite r ia  and methods for 
p roject ap p raisa l, ‘Such a s itu a tio n  doss not favoui^ the appearance 
of a uniform regional cr iter ion *  either, at sec to ra l or country le v e l s .  
The ex isten ce  of such c r i t e r ia  would g rea tly  enhance tf^ e prospect of 
future jt'egional eocnoRic uniform isation or in teg ra tio n .
Thirdly, absence of in tegrated  progi'amms o f a id  to  a 
sp e c if ic  in d iv idu al Arab or non-Arab country, T}ie problem i s  tackled  
on a p roject b a s is  whereas i t  shou].d be a t country le v e l  at le a s t .  
However, a regional view of the problem remains the b est way. The 
only "country package" being a c tu a lly  undertaken i s  for Egypt ere 
through the Gulf Development Fund, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait. and the U.A.E. 
are try ing  to a l le v ia te  that country’s economic pit)b]em, Tliis 
package led  to  the creation  of an Economic Committee comnosed of the 
Finance M inisters of the four countries concerned. I t  i s  an improved 
method, the re su lt  of which cannot yet b© assessed ,
Fouriihly, rocketing adm inistrative co sts  i f  one considers the 
nuiïibor of Funds and Banks, Every type cf adm :lnistiative coot has to  
be considered, fiom s t a f f  to  b u ild in g s, Iri our opinion an 
ad m in istratively  complex and unioue agency or adm inistration w i l l  
d e f in it e ly  be l e s s  c o s t ly  and more e f f ic ie n t .
F if th ly , in a b il ity  o f any o f ths sev era l agencies to eaiTy 
out coraprcbensiv© stu d ies o f a rec ip ien t or even donor country. I t  i s  
surprising to note that even American and westeivi European countries  
with huge human resources f e l t  the need to gather vdthin orgaïiisations  
such as the D.A.C, e t c . ,  and that Arab countries are s t i l l  not aware 
o f su<^ a n e c e s s ity .
S ix th ly ,
"Increase th e  donor’s non-development considerations s in ce  a 
national lending in s t itu t io n  i s  more l ik e ly  to be subject to 
narrow p o l i t ic a l  pressuiethan a m ultinational agency.
Moreover, m ultinational aid agencies Which include the 
rec ip ien t country even i f  on a modest s c a le , increase the 
sens© of Involvement and p artic ip a tio n  o f  the la t t e r  in  the 
aid programme to  the b e n e fit  of a l l  concerned,
( 1 )  -  R . E l - Ï ^ l l a l e h  a n d  M, K adh im , o p ,  c i t .  p , 4 ^ 3 .
191,
Seventhly, our study of Arab agencies allow s us to add the 
fo llow ing p o in ts , No Arab country i s  able* from every point o f view , 
to  bear in d e fb iite ly  th e burden o f an aid agency, e s p e c ia lly  i f  the  
la t t e r  i s  to  work on an on-going b a s is . With th is  resnect the Kuwait 
Fund for Arab Econonic Development’s h isto ry  i s  v e ry  t e l l in g ,  fo r  in  
1972/3 the Kuwait Fund's ai.d com itm ents suffered a cut-back. The 
cause being that Kuwait found out th a t i t s  o i l  reserves would be  
exhausted in  tw en ty-five years or so . Consequently, "Kuwait decided  
to  bu ild  up i t s  general reserves at the expense of i t s  a id  programmes
(1 )in  preparation for o i l  running o u t .. ,"
This i s  a n a tu ra l  r e a c t io n  fo r any country  and a lthough  on  the  
one hand in  K uw ait's mind the  Fund was not to  be abandoned and on the 
o th e r  hard th e  in c reased  o i l  revenues o f th e  s t a t e  a f t e r  1973 boosted  
th e  fund, th i s  s h o r t- l iv e d  s e t  back g tiU , I'^mains a very  s ig n i f ic a n t  
f a c t  in  I t s e l f ,  In  our op in ion  a m u ltin a tio n a l agency might be le s s  
su b je c t to  th is  ty p e  c f  m isfo rtu n e .
E ig h th ly , what i s  more a s to n ish in g  i s  th a t :
"C u rren tly  the bu lk  of Arab a id  i s  not channeled through th e se
len d in g  I n s t i tu t io n s  b u t provided according to  b i l a t e r a l
( 2 )agreements between in d iv id u a l s ta te s ,"  '
This leaves these In s t itu t io n s  le s s  u se fu l and le s s  e f f ic ie n t .  
This s e t  o f disadvantages does apply to both Arab Funds and Banks 
d irected  e ith er  to Arab or non-Arab cou n tries, and even i f  th e ir  aim 
i s  B.O.P, support or long term economic development.
Tlie soü.ution to  th is  p r o life r a tio n  o f  "inadeauate" Arab 
agencies i s  obvious ard has e ith e r  been suggested or c le a r ly  sta ted  
by some. F ir s t ly ,  by bringing together the Abu Dhabi Fund for  Arab 
Economic Development and the Kuwait Fund fo r  Arab Economic Developmeïïb 
and trying to  add the Iraq Fund fo r  External Development and the Saudi 
Development Fund, the United Nations, through i t s  E.C.W.A, was trying  
to  do not^iing but crea te  a type o f co-operation , or a t le a s t  a forn^l 
l in k , between those funds.
Secondly, commenting about the number o f Arab a3d agencies  
R, E l-F b lla leh  and M, Kadhim w rite  that:
(1 ) -  Middle East Economic Digest": Less Credit fïom the Kuwait Fund for
Arab Economic Development in  1972/3", 23 November 1973, P* 1357.
(2 ) -  R, E l-K !^llaleh and M. Kadhim, op, c i t ,  p,494.
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"A higher le v e l  of co-operation and co-ordination between
the various Arab funds may eventually  lead to th e ir
(11consolidation  or perilaps sp ec ia lisa tio n ," ^
In our opinion, a necessary co-operation and co-ordination go far  beyond
the funds and ought to  embody Arab banks too .
Secondly, another oconondst, N, Fallon, c r i t ic iz e s  the
p ro lifer a tio n  o f Arab agencies and he i s  more ca teg o r ica l a,bout mutual
re la tio n sh ip , fo r  he w rites  that;
"Those whio have argued for some form o f merger (o f the
( ?  )agencies) wou3.d seem to  have a case,"  '
I t  i s  exactly  th is  case we are advocating.
CONCLUSION
The lo c a l banîcing systems o f ind iv idual Arab o i l  countries
was not ready to "absorb" and channel th e ir  ne^jly acomred wealth due
to  higher o i l  p r ice s , Furthermoi'e, bringing in to  the p icture foreign
banking in te r e s ts  e ith e r  d ir e c t ly  through the appearance of Offshore
Bankrlng Units ( e ,g .  Fhnarna in  Bahrain), or indirectl%r through jo in t
ventuï’es w i l l  not remedy the s itu a t io n , Che can go beyond such a fa c t
and mainta:îji th a t, given the way Arab o i l  countries channelled the
bulk of thoi.r surpluses; they did not g ive the chance to  th e ir  domestic
banking sysi.ems to  adapt to and take advantage o f  the new favourable
s itu a tio n . Five years a fter  the o i l  c r is is  erupted, Arab-owned and
organized banks have not yot played the ro le  evelyone was expecting;
they remain no more than an appendage o f the so -ca lled  in tern ation a l
banking system whose work has been outlined in  Chapter I I I ,
Consequently Arab banks played a minor r o le  in  p lacing Arab fin a n c ia l
surpluses e ith er dom estica lly  or reg io n a lly . Furthermore, th is
placement, except in  the case of A lgeria and Irao, thanks to  larger
populations, because o f a bad fa c to ra l d istr ib u tio n  i s  not going to  
to
lead  n on -o il based economies./•
F in a lly  one must confess th at the bullc o f Arab a id , e ith er  
for balance of payments support or development purpose, to  Kon^oil 
Developing Countries was channelled mainly through purely Arab
(1) -  Ib id , p .483 .
(2) -  N, F allon , op. c i t .  p .187.
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f in a n c ia l in s t i tu t io n s .  However, as far as th is  aid i s  concerned 
we see the problem more in  terms o f in e ff ic ie n c y  than adeouaoy. Their 
aid  p o licy  has to be rethought, h i our opinion the b est way remains 
the re-organization  of the various banks and Funds by merging them 
in to  a s in g le  Arab Aid Fund,
F in a lly , a,s for the so lu tio n  of the Arab World ' s problems 
deriving from ecoriond-c development, e ith er  at lo c a l or regional le v e l ,  
i t  w ill, be presented in  the f in a l chapter; we suggest the creation  
of a s in g le  Arab Bank for Development,
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C H A P T E R  Y
CREATION OF AN ARAB BANK FOR DEVELOPMNT
In the previous chapter we pointed out th at some commentators 
such as N. Fallon suggested the merger of Arab Developmenb Banks. We 
are advocating the same so lu tio n , hi the fran\cwork of. the present 
chapter we sh a ll piBsent the kind o f in s t itu t io n  we are suggesting.
This chapter contains three s e c t io n s ,
In the f i r s t  sectio n  we present the eeonondc and non-economie 
arguments m ilita tin g  fo r  a s in g le  Arab Bank for Development, .In a 
way th is  section  i s  complementary •sfeh the f i r s t  sec tio n  of the f i r s t  
chapter.
The second sec tio n  d eals vdtli the structure c f  the 
in s t itu t io n  we have in  mind. By stin ctu re  we mean puroose, investment 
c r it e r ia  and secu r ity  o f investim nt, c a p ita lisa tio n  and management of 
the Arab Banlc for  Development, The case of other reg ion al development 
banks i s  s u p e r f ic ia lly  presented.
The th ird  and f in a l  sec tio n  piBsents the problem o f  the u n it  
of account of The Arab Banlc fo r  Development. Hare again we consider  
the case o f the Asian and African Develr.pmenfi Banks, the International 
Bank for Economic Co-operation and the E .E .C 's, experience.
When formu].ating our proposal, the c r it ic ism s v;e d irected  
a t the Arab b ila te r a l and m u ltila tera l in s t itu t io n s  -  c f .  Chapter JY -  
even though not d ir e c t ly  referred to , have to  be taken Into  
consideration . We are aware of the fa c t  that our project w i l l  be: 
" ju stif ie d  only i f  i t  introduces new elements and taps new 
sources of finance rather than replaces e x is t in g  resources
Pi 1
or undertook fam iliar  functions."^
We are a lso  aware of the fa c t  th a t such a p ro ject cannot be 
implemented without ob stacles  and d i f f i c u l t i e s .  However, our approach 
id. 11 c o n s is t  o f s tr e ss in g  the arguments m3.1itating fo r  i t s  creation  
and the advantages which w i l l  be derived from i t .  In other words, we 
sh a ll la y  enphasis on un itin g  factors without ignoring o b sta c les ,
(1) « H.W. Singer, "International Development : Growth and Change 
McGraw-Hill, New York, London, 1964, p .213.
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SECTION I £ ARGOTCTTS F (H THE CREATION (F AN ARAB BANK FCE DSmOP^EI'^T
These arguments are manifold and for the sake o f  
s im p lifica tio n  we sh a ll d iv id e them in to  economic and non-economic 
arguments.
SECTION I  -  1 Î ECONQMC ARGUMENTS
We have severa l economic arguments and some of them are 
derived fix)m the o i l  c r i s i s  i t s e l f  whereas others are due to the s p e c if ic  
conditions of the Arab World.
A -  Economic Arguments derived from th e Oil C ris is
Tlie "misuse" o f Arab oi]. revenues* which has been d ea lt  with  
in  Chapter three represents an argument for Arab cou n tries to  look for  
other d ir e c tio n s . Our c r it ic ism  of the methods used by Arab Oil 
countries to  resh u ffle  o i l  revenues to  other Arab countries ( c f .  Chapter 
four) co n stitu te s  another strong argument. In th e same chapter vje 
shox^ed th at some commentators such as N. Fal3.on and R* E l- iiiH a leh ; 
suggested a kind o f merger o f Arab bardes and Funds v io se  purpose i s  to  
resh u ffle  part o f the petrodcDlars to  N on-oil Devdloping Coujtitries.
Such a suggestion c o n stitu te s  a strong techn ical ju s t i f ic a t io n  of an 
Arab bank for  Development (A.B,0^).
We a lso  showed th at the amount o f Arab d o llars resh u ffled  
througli e x is t in g  Arab-oivned mid organized in s t itu t io n s  f e l l  short of  
N.O.D.C's fin a n c ia l requirements as derived from the o i l  c r i s i s .
I f  on© goes beyond B.O.P, support as a consequence o f  the Quadrupling 
of tlie o i l  p rices and considers the L.U.C’s ,  f in a n c ia l needs fo r  
devel.opment purposes the share o f  Arab d o llars resh u ffled  to them 
seems in s ig n if ic a n t .
Our p roject does not d ea l with the e n tir e  Th^Td World 
countries but s p e c if ic a l ly  with the Arab World, In t h is  context 
another element appears. In our opinion the tra n sfer  problem as a 
consequence of the o i l  c r i s i s  i s  due not th at much to the d e f ic i t  
countries* in a b i l i t y  to produce and export but to  the Arab o i l  
countries* in a b i l i t y  to  absorb th e ir  newly acquired revenues. To cut
short, the tra n sfer  problem i s  dus to a small absorptive cap acity  on 
the part o f Arab o i l  countries and s p e c if ic a l ly  Saudi Arabia* U,A,E
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Kiwalt and Libya, In our opinion the creation  o f  the Arab Bank for  
DôvaLopîîient could so lve  th is  pmblem. by increasing the absorptive  
capacity  of the Arab World, To be tnore p rec ise  can even maintain 
th at absorptive capacity  i s  th ere . The Arab Bade for Development v d l l  
ju st make i t  concrete under the form of h5.^ier im ports. These imports 
w il l  come mainly from the O.E.C.D, countries v?hich w il l  be ab le  to  pay 
in  goods and serv ices  (o f. Chapter I I )  for th e ir  o i l  imports. This 
a lso  means an increased domestic economic a c t iv it y  in  the la t t e r  
countries arvi th is  in  tuini w i l l  be r e f le c te d  in to  higher imports fzx)m 
N,0,DoC, Consequently our p ro ject w i l l  have world wide im plications*  
however the magnitude o f  th ese  repercussions are a function  o f the 
Arab Bank fo r  Development’s c a p ita l .  This problem s h a ll be presented  
a t a la te r  sta g e .
Furthermore the creation  of a s in g le  Arab Bank fo r  Development 
could bo ju s t i f ie d  by other economic arguments that æe principal3.y  
rela ted  to the Arab World,
f l  1B « Other Economic Arguments
These arguments treated  below as advanfcagus* are deii.ved 
e ith e r  by the ’h ave’ or ‘havo-not’ Arab count id es and sometimes in vo lve  
both o f them,
1 -  Economic Advantages for "Have-Not" Countries
These advantages are su b stan tia l in  the f ie ld  of c a p ita l funds*
employment and energy.
The shortage o f funds has always con stitu ted  one o f the main
f? )con stra in ts  on the "have-notte" economic development programmes ' ,
I t  i s  obvious th at a continual flow o f cap ita l funds ivlH  su rely  free  
them from such a co n stra in t. In the past* and to some extent even 
currently* ju st l ik e  any L.D.C.* the poor Arab cou n tries tr ie d  to 
compensate such a handicap by having recourse to extern al a id . This 
led  them to  be e ith er  "pro West" or "pro East"* depending on the 
ciixiumstances, and more dangerously th is  created in c o n s is te n c ie s  in  
th e ir  programmes for th ey  had more o ften  to  submit to  the wvin© of 
donor co u n tr ies,
(1 ) -  Arguments sta ted  in  th is  part are linlced to th ose expressed in
Chapter Cne (F irst S e c tio n ),
(2) — Other comiipntators such as Alfred G, Misrey(An Arab Common Market)
linlc previous fa ilu r e s  in Arab economic co-operation  with the lack  
o f c a p ita l .
J.VY<
As outlined  in  Chapter TST the ex isten ce  o f severa l lending  
agencies could lead, to some r iv a lr ie s  and therefore* to  c r y s ta ll iz e  
further those very a llia n c es  we want to remove. The fa c t i s  th at  
the "have-nots" have already accepted and reauested the flow o f a id  
and loans from the "have",
Another advantage is  the security* and sometimes cheaper, 
energy the "have-nots" iv i l l  be enjoying. This i s  very crucial, 
e sp e c ia lly  a t a time when the world i s  expecting p h y sica l o i l  shortage 
by the end of the present century,
2 -  Economic Advantages fo r  the "have" Countries
This group o f  countries w i l l  derive advantages in the f ie ld  
o f agricu ltu re , manpower and p o l i t i c a l  and m ilita ry  secu r ity . 
Agricu ltu re
Excluding Iraq and Algeria* the Arab o i l  countries have a 
very n e g lig ib le  agr icu ltu ra l sec to r . Furthermore* d esu ite  th e ir  
fin a n c ia l p o s s ib i l i t i e s  they are u h lik e ly  to develop in  a reasonall e 
period o f time an a g r icu ltu ra l secto r  able to  support the domestic 
population, Tîiis problem has to  be seen having in  ntind th at in  
1973/74 the western countries threatened to resort to  the "food 
weapon" to  resrond to  the " o il weapon". On the other hand countries  
l ik e  Sudan* Morocco* Syria* A lgeria and Iraq enjoy an Important 
agricu ltu ra l p o te n tia l. Unlike o il*  land i s  not an exhaustib le  
a sse t  l ik e  o i l  and i t  i s  hard to  green the d esert. I t  fo llow s th at  
in  the f ie ld  of agricu lture* Arab "have" and "have-not" are n aturally  
c omplem.enta.ry,
K(bn power
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Tlie Gulf countries are a lso  characterised by small* 
i l l i t e r a t e  populations; for  instance by 1964 the population of Saudi 
Arabia w i l l  not exceed IQn, in h ab itan ts. I t  i s  also^w ell knovjn fa c t  
th at in  1977, when only "modest" projects are being undertaken, these  
countries have to  r e ly  on foreign  sk ille d  and u n sk illed  labour. 
Furthermore* countries l ik e  Sudan and Egypt c c n stitu te  a hug© human 
reservo ir  o f s k il le d  and u n sk illed  manpower. On the other hand* most 
o f  the "have-not" su ffer  from unemployment (c f . Chapter I ) ,  I t  
fo llow s th a t in  the f ie ld  o f manpower a human flow  v d l l  d e f in it e ly  
serve the in te r e s ts  o f both groups.
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One can be more s p e c if ic  and tak e  th e  case o f the Nortfi 
A frican  c o u n tr ie s  •» A lgeria* Morocco and T unisia  -  p3.rt o f  i^/hose 
lab o u r fo rce  i s  immigrant in  M estern Europe, The r e d is t r ib u t io n  of 
such a lab o u r fo rce  w ith  an a lre a d y  " :h id u s tr ia l m en ta ilty "  w i l l  so lve  
some problems of "have" and have-not" a l ik e .
S e c u r ity  on M l i t a r y  F ie ld s
Small p o p u la tio n s  a lso  mean m i l i t a r i ly  weak co u n tr ie s  whose 
s e c u r i ty  and t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y  can be th re a te n ed  e i th e r  a t  sub­
re g io n a l o r w orld  l e v e l .  They were n o t even ab le  to  I 'e s i s t  o r 
cha llen g e  th e  MoN.O.C. and no wonder the challenge came from Iran  in  
th e  1950s and Mexico and A lgeria  in  t*he 1970s. As a m atter o f f a c t  
those  are  p o l i t i c a l  elem ents b u t i t  i s  a very  well-known fa c t  t h a t  
p o l i t i c a l  fa c to rs  do in flu e n c e  economic development and w ith re sp e c t 
to  th e  s iz e  o f the country* Mr. Keesing claim s th a t  one o f the obvious 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  which handicap eccnomic development in  a sm all country^
' i s  i t s 'p o l i t i c a l  m ilitary)' weakness and i t s  v .i] j3 e ra b ility  to 
in te r fe re n c e  and m anipulation  by pbe la r g e r  powers* w ith  
l i t t l e  o p p o rtu n ity  to  re c ip ro c a te  in  k in d . This may be* 
in  i t s  own r ig h t*  a c r u c ia l  o b s ta c le  to  development* i f  
th e  g re a t  powers stand  a c t iv e ly  opposed to  th e  typ.;e o f
in te r n a l  p o l ic ie s  and le a d e rsh ip  th a t  a re  e s s e n tia l  to
f l )
su c c e ss fu l developm ent,"
There i s  no need to  comment fu r th e r  on th i s  o u o t^ tio n .
F in a lly  i t  i s  worthWh:lle p re sen tin g  th e  s i tu a t io n  from a /ïiarket po in t 
o f  view,
Fkrket
A sm all p o p u la tio n  means a sm all market vAiich w i l l ' d e f in i t e ly
impede economic developm ent. I t  i s  tru e  th a t  th e  Gulf c o u n tr ie s  f e l t
//
th e  need to  c re a te  a la r g e r  e n t i ty .  However* the tim id  s tep  towai'ds 
th a t  end* in  th a t  p a r t  o f th e  Arab World* i s  no t going to  solve t h e i r  
above-mentioned w eaknesses. The reason being th a t  th e y  do n o t enjoy 
any c^ouparative advantages (Chapter 17 ), They cannot escape the 
sm allness of t h e i r  m arket by in te g ra t in g  in to  t h e  w orld economy fo r  
th ey  would have to  ch a llen g e  eicperienced isrite rn a tio n a l co m p e tito rs ,
(1) -  Q u o te d  b y  A l i  K h a l i f a  A1 K huw ari*  op, c i t ,  p,229 .
199*
The r e su lt  o f the challenge i s  obvious. In our opinion only a wi.der 
en tity*  a t the en tire  Arab Vforld le v e l  id.31 bring p o s it iv e  and 
complementaiy so lu tio n s to both types o f coan tr les. Furthermore, 
the Arab World as a whole i s  p o te n tia lly  an immense market w aiting  
and w illin g  to be developed and ex p lo ited . At th is  stage  i t  i s  
necessary to present an argument commonly used against Arab economic 
unity; namely th at they are in  d iffer en t stages o f development.
We are not advocating an eccaioraic union but our purpose i s  
to e sta b lish  a s in g le  in s t itu t io n  regrouping s p e c if ic  b ila te r a l  and 
m u ltila tera l lending a g en cies . However, we have to confess th at tT  ^
ultim ate aim of the in s t itu t io n  we have in mind i s  to speed up and 
strengthen tlie regrouping o f  Arab countries in  every f ie ld .
As for the d iffe r e n t  le v e l  of economic development o f  
Individual Arab co u n tr ies, we have to  recognise 3 t ,  However i f  one 
talc es the case o f  th© E .S .C , one has to  recognise the wide gap between 
the econoird.c power o f ,  say* West Germany and I ta ly  or Ireland and 
even the le s s  fortunate o f  the Western European countries such as  
Spain* Portugal which have applied  for the eomuTunity merrfoership and 
Which;, in c id e n ta lly , are backed by West Germany,
Secondly, on general grounds such as language, culture and 
r e lig io n , the Arab World i s  more coherent than the E1%G.
Thirdly, in  the l ig h t  o f  our previous remarks, i t  i s  wise to  
claim  th a t the move has to s ta r t  "Now or Never" for  the gap w i l l  keep 
on widening.
The roots o f the economic arguments can be summarjijd as being  
the need for an ad d ition a l in flow  o f  ca p ita l w ith in  a more e f f ic ie n t  
system* and the need for  co-operation . For h is to r ic a l  reasons* 
Inter-Arab trad© i s  n e g lig ib le , fo r  Arab co u n tr ie s ’ most important 
trading partners are th e ir  former co lo n ies . Considering the case o f  
African countries H.W, Singer w rites  that: "the need for co-operation of 
African conn tr ies' w i l l  each other i s  peihaps the most s tr ik in g  argument 
fo r  creating instrument o f  regional co-operation in  financing, al,though 
by no means in  financing alone"^^^ This argument app lies fo r  the Arab 
countries as w e ll , Furthermore , on top of the above-mentioned 
arguments we can a lso  put forward non-economic arguments.
( 1 )  -  H,W. S i n g e r ,  o p ,  c i t .  p , 2 1 0 .
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SECTION I  -  2 ; NON-ECQNOMIC AHGÜMNT3
In our opinion the Arab Bank f  or Development can a lso  be 
ju s t i f ie d  on p o l i t i c a l  r e lig io u s -c u ltu r a l and humanitarian grounds,
A -  P o l i t ic a l  Arguments
I t  i s  hard to d istin g u ish  p o l i t i c a l  from n o n -p o lit ic a l  
argument and the so -c a lle d  p o l i t i c a l  ground i s  always "slippery" and 
hazardous, however, in  s p ite  of that we do have seme e3.ements favouring 
c lo se r  lin lcs .
-  F ir s t ly ,  we are li id n g  in  a world o f  large e n t i t i e s ,  e ,g ,  the U .S .A ., 
the U .3 ,S ,H ,, and Camda, Some, such as the E .E .C ., are s t i l l  in  
formation; th is  means th at although time i s  running out, i t  i s  not 
too la te ,  for the stronger other u n its  are, the more d i f f i c u l t  i t  i s  
fo r  t in y  "city sta tes"  to  conglomerate,
-  Secondly, i f  countid.es such as France and the United Kingdom which 
shared and d ivided , a t w i l l ,  the en tire  Arab World and more, f e l t  the 
need form, a la rg er  e n t ity  with other fellow  European cou n tries, 
such a need must be stronger in  the case of the Arab co u n tr ies.
However, %rough the wide l i t e r a tu r e  concerning the Arab World, one 
ai'guiiient repeatedly comes to  the surface « namely th a t Arab s ta te s  
have d iffe r e n t  p o l i t i c a l  regim es. The fa c t i s  thnt on p o l i t ic a l  
grounds Arab cou n tries face in term itten t c r ise s  for h is to r ic a l  
reasons. Just l ik e  the A fiican  cou n tr ies, a l l  of them were colon ised  
at one time or another and th e ir  current borders were draim cn 
p o l i t i c a l  and diploma.tic grounds r e f le c t in g  the strength  of the 
co lon isin g  or d eco lon isin g  powers. Therefore they  do not mâke sense  
from an economic poin t o f  view . Their borders, W}ien they e x i s t ,  o ften  
cut across natural resource d ep osits  such as o i] between Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait, Libya and T unisia . The N ile  river su p p lies  both Egypt 
and Sudan and the Euphrates f u l f i l s  the same function  for Irao and 
Syria ,
Sometimes fro n tie r s  have not y et been d efin ed , e s n e c ia lly  in  
the Arabic pen insu la . To over-come such p o te n t ia lly  d ise o u ilib r ia t in g  
fa c to rs  a great d ea l o f  m aturity was required oo. the ]jart o f  the  
countid.es concerned and th is  does c o n stitu te  an encouraging s ig n .  
Considering the case o f  African countries H,V/, Singer sees the creation
of the African Development Bank as an answer to the :
"need to  overcome some o f  the n ation al and regional d iv isio n s
Wiich have marked the present h isto ry  o f the continent and
(1)the emergence o f  African countries into Independence,"
We maintain that the Arab Bank for Development can play a sim ilar role  
concerning the Arab community.
Furthermore* to rein force our p osition  other elements con be
added.
-  F ir s t ly , i l t h in  th e ir  own boundaries Arab countries are more coherent 
than African cou n tr ies,
-  Secondly, the p o l i t ic a l  asp iration s o f the Ai-'ab masses have to  be 
considered, e sp e c ia lly  a t a time I'Jhen the "new breed" o f Arab leaders  
are g iving more say to those very masses.
F in a lly , the E,E,C. i s  s t i l l  subject to  p o litica l, d ifferen ce  
w ithin  i t s  ow  radcs. According to some a s o c ia l i s t  take over in  
France a n d .Ita ly  i s  in e v ita b le , whereas the North o f Europe -  including  
VJest Germany -  is  not a f fe c te d . I t  i s  hard to  for see  the imr^ct c f  
such development on the cohesion o f the E.E.C, and we w il l  not tr y  to  
do so . However, the qua s i-su r e  acceptance o f Spain and Portugal, in  
sp ite  of th e ir  p o l i t ic a l  ten d en cies, i s  long t e l l in g  about p o l i t ic a l  
d ifferen ces .
Furthermore the r e lig io u s  and cu ltu ra l lin k s  ex is t in g  between 
the Arab countries co n stitu te  strong unifying fa c to rs ,
B -  R elig ious and Cultural Arguments
In these f ie ld s  Arab countries enjoy severa l coimion features  
in  addition to th e ir  geographical u n ity , these being mainly the  
r e lig io n , Islam, and the language, Arabic,
Although id.thin the Arab World c it iz e n s  enjoy the freedom of 
c u lt ,  Islam remains the predominant r e lig io n . That i s  Why i t  i s  the 
o f f i c i a l  r e lig io n  in  most Arab co u n tr ies. R elig ious fe e lin g  remains 
very strong in  every s in g le  country and e sp e c ia lly  in  Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, the U.A.E, and Libya which happen to be the h igh est ca p ita l  
surplus cou n tries, Fbre im portantly these fe e lin g s  can be expressed 
in  " fin an cia l terms", fo r  they have already been put in to  p ractice
with the creation  o f the Islande Development Bank (c f .  Chapter 17)
(1) -  H.W, Singer, op, c i t .  p .120
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Furthermore* the Arabism o f th© Qura’n (Ho3.y Book o f Islam) i s
ano%er strengtherd-ng elem ent,
Arabic i s  used by every and, therefore, by almost
every Arab as a 3.anguage o f  prayer, whatever h is  or her n ative tongue.
I t  i s  tm e  th at during the long period of western dond.nation Arabic
suffered a great handicap but i t  never disappeared because i t  has
been used as a sh ie ld  again st th a t very in flu en ce . Furthermore,
a f te r  gaining i t s  p o l i t i c a l  independence, every Arab country
proclaimed Arabic as the o f f i c ia l  language. This move underlines
nothing but the sense o f belonging to a certa in  community, the Arab
World, According to  G, Chejne:
"the f u l l  importance o f Arabic in  Arab Fhslim so c ie ty  can
be categorized  a s , instrument o f r e lig io n , . . .  medium of
(1 )culture and mainstay o f contemporary nationf^lism. "
The forbunate combination o f  Arabic and Islam does co n stitu te  one of
C o }
the most powerful; "bonds o f  k inship  among emerging Arab S ta tes ,"  
or what comes to be Imown as Arabism? a complex and meaningful word ■ 
combining Arab cu ltu re and a sp ira tio n s, Arabism means a lso  Arab 
nationalism . However, one has to  wonder about the true motives bei^ind 
and the magnitude and cap acity  o f Arab nationalism . Concerning 
th is  point E, Bustani worders i f  Arab nationalism  is :
"a widespread sentiment expressing genuine asp ira tion s of  
the. masses and denoting a popular d esire  fo r  u n ity  or , , ,  
the p retext for ambitious men lu s t in g  fo r  power and 
ex p lo itin g  r e lig io u s  prejudice and popular sentiment
( q )
in  th e ir  machination fo r  p o l i t ic a l  a-scent?"
In our opinion Arab m tion a]ism  i s  a genuine feel-jug Which re fers  not 
only to the past -  a medium, of l ib e r a t im  -  but i t  does a lso  co n stitu te  
the b a s is  for common drive towards p o l i t i c a l ,  cu ltu ra l and eccnondo 
Renaissance, The above-mentioned author goes along vjith our opinion
(1) -  Anwar G, Chejne, "Arabic: I t s  s ig n ifica n ce  and p lace in  Arab
liislim  Society", The M ddle Fast Journal, Volume 19, tïutrber 4, 
1965, p .449.
(2) -  Ib id , p ,447.
(3) *“ Albert Badr, "Arab Economic Development Between Foreign Ideo log ies
and Native Sentiments", Fiddle East Forum, Volume XXXIV,
H u n b e r  3 , 1 9 5 9 ,  p . l 3 .
When he w rites  that;
" it i s  i-d.se to recognise th a t there are is su e s  and 
circumstances Wliich can e l i c i t  a spontaneous uniform reaction  
among a l l  the Arab masses, they are c a l ls  capable o f combining 
a common sentiment and susta in ing for great lengths of time
C l  )
coherent a ttitu d es  from Morocco to Ii^aq, "
Only crucia] is su e s  are capable o f arousing such a type o f reaction*, 
and i t  i s  needless to  s tr e s s  the magnitude and importance o f the 
challenge facing the Arab World, namely the so c ia l and economic 
development.
C -  Humanita r i a n Arguments
On the one hand, as sta ted  in  Chapter IV, humanitarian
considerations are part of the several motives behind Arab lending
agencies. I t  i s  therefore safe to  suppose th at t h is  argument i s
s t i l l  va3i.d whatever th3 forms and-structure of the lending agency.
On the o th er hand, Arab countidLes have been d iv id ed  betvjeen "have" and
"have not", and for the sake of s im p lic ity  of an a lysis  we sh a ll s e t t l e
for such a c la s s if ic a t io n .  In terms o f G.N.P, per cap ita  a wide gap
iZ )e x is t s  between the two groups ,  one which i s  already follow eq, on 
hunnnitarian grounds, by a flow of aid and loans from the "have" to  
the "have not".
What, however, about future trends? The .following ta b le  
gives us an idea, and d esp ite  the fa c t  that i t  does not include a l l  
the Arab countries i t  s t iU . has the advantage o f considering both 
poor and rich a lik e .
From th is  tab le the folla-\d.ng conclusions can be drawn. As 
stated  in Chapter One, Arab countries are characterised by high b irth  
ra tes. The d irect re su lt  wiU. be population explosion for "have" and 
"have not" a lik e , but given the le v e l  of national income o f both
groups, in p ra c tica l terms, i t  w iH m in ly  impoverish the poor Arab
1
countries, Ttio fa ct i s  th at the combined population jumps from 
106.6 m illion  in  1974 to  164,1 m illion  in  I 964 and t ia t  the combined 
G.N.P. junps fi'om 44.56bn, d o llars In 1974 to  455.66bn,, i . e .  from
(1) -  Ib id , op. c i t ,  p .14,
(2) -  c f .  Chapter I ,  S ec tion  I ,
20/w
TABLE i,-4 Î Economic Prospect o f 13 Arab Countries: 
Population^ G-NP and per cap ita  income, (1970 -  19ÔU
% Average
Items 1970 1974 1980 19&4 Growth Ite.fce
1974-1984
Saudi Arabia GNP 
Pop
Per cap ita  income
3,040
6m
^506
13,300
7m
#1,900
50,384  
9 m 
#5,598
18,994
10m
011,999
24.6
Libya GNP 
Pop
Per cap ita  income
3,116
2m
^ ,5 5 8
10,198
2m
#5,099
29,172
3 m 
#9„724
47,609
3m
015,370
16.7
Egypt GNP 
Pop
Per cap ita  income
7,4.63
34m
^219
9,&%
37m
#267
16,341
42m
#389
25,322
47m
0539
9 .9
A lgeria GNP 
Pop
Per capita  income
4,638
3.4m
^331
9,850
16m
#615
24,938
19m
#1 , 312.
42,S06
22m
01,945
1 5 .8
Iraq GJP 
Pop
Per cap ita  income
. 3,102  
9m 
^345
8,400
Urn
#764
2 5 ,8C0 
#1,985
62,843
15m
04,189
22.3
Kuwait GNP 
Pop
Per cap ita  income
2,545
0.719
^364
7,900
0,9m
#8,780
28,280
Im
60,900
1.3m
04,685
22.8
Morocco GNP 
Pop
Per cap ita  income
3,413
15m
#228
5,945
16m
#371
13,500
19m
#710
22,815
22m
90^037
1 4 .4
UAE and Bahrain GNP 
Pop
Per ca p ita  income
1,300
0.6m
#2,160
5,600
0.7m
#8,000.
16,500
Ira.
^ 6 , 50c
26,000
ItSra 
014,444
16.6
Lebanon GNP 
Pop
Per cap ita  income
11,548  
3m 
#516
3,071
3m
#1,023
9,662  
4m 
9%,416
19,050
4ni
04,763
20.1
Syria GNP 
Pop
Per cap ita  income
1,684
6m
#280
2,876
7m
#410
6,573
Sm
#821
11,968
lOm
01,196
15.3
Sudan GNP 
Pop
Per ca p ita  income
1,814
I6m
#113
2,470
17m
#145
4,700
20m
^235
7,071
23m
0307
11 .1
Onan GDP 
Pop
Per cap ita  income
335
0.5m
#67
1,092
0.6m
#182
3,411
O.Sm
0426
5,966
Im
#596
18.6
Jordan GNP 
Pop
Per cap ita  income
623
2m
#311
950
3m
#316
2,345
3m
07A1
4,335
4m
#1,084
1 6 .4
These figu res are for gross n a tion a l product a t fa cto r  p r ices  and incorporate 
€fKchange~rate p ro jectio n s. They assume a ls o  a 10 per cent annual in f la t io n  
r a te . They accordingly y ie ld  fig u res  that con tract markedly w ith some now 
current. They are based on inform ation supplied by F irst N ational CityBarik,
Source: The Banlcer, *’How the Middle East Will. Crnw't Ma-wiiU
2 0 5 .
average G.N.P, per cap ita  o f  409.71 d o lla rs  to  average^ .,776.83.
However, these fig u res  h ide other r e a l i t ie s ,  namely th a t the increase  
in  G.N.P. i s  due to  o i l  revenues which are not evenly d istr ib u ted  among 
in d iv idu al Arab c o u n tr ie s ' . For th is  reason the e x is t in g  gap v d l l  
d e f in it e ly  keep on widening in  the coming years. According to  our 
tab le  the ex ti’emo ca ses are very te llin g ?  namely Libya and Sudan, which 
in c id e n ta lly  share a common border. By 1984 Libya’s income per can ita  
w i l l  reach 015,870 whereas Sudan’s w i l l  be ju st 30? d o lla r s . That i s  
ju st  under 53 times l e s s .
I f  we consider Saudi Arabia, Libya, Irac, Kuwait, the U.A.F, 
Bahrain and Algeria as the "have” and the remaining countries -  Egypt, 
î-forocGo, Lebanon, Syria , Sudan, Oman and Jordan « as the "have not" 
the average incorm per ca p ita  of the f i r s t  group w i l l  be 6,758 d o lla r s .
On the ether hand, the average income per cap ita  o f the second group 
1^11 be no more than 869.6 d o llars by 1984, or ju st under 13^ o f the 
previous t o ta l .  However, the s itu a tio n  i s ,  in  fa c t ,  worse because of  
the follow ing as one,
F ir s t ly , amongst the "have not" we included Lebanon and. t h is  
in f la te s  the performance o f  the group because, on the one hand, according 
to  Table 44, Lebanon w i l l  have higher imome per cap ita  than Trap and 
Algorn,a, ard on the other hand the prospects were imde before the 
Lebanese c i v i l  war aixi th erefore i t  i s  h ig h ly  doubtful th at that 
country may w ell reach such a performance.
Secondly, the tab le includes a l l  the Arab o i l  countries but 
does not take in to  consideration  the le s s  fortunate o f  the "have not" 
such as Somal5.a, Mauritania and the Yemens, Had they been included  
the performance o f the "have not" would have been poorer. Therefore, 
because o f  the "push e ffect"  exercised  by the in c lu sion  of Lebanon and 
the "pull e ffec t"  as a r e s u lt  o f  the exclu sion  of some "have not", i t  
i s  sa fe  to  assume th at the gap between both groups v d ll  su rely  be ^vider 
than suggested by the previous ta b le .
Then, i t  seems th a t on economic grounds e ith e r  derived from 
the o i l  c r is is  or n ot, on p o l i t i c a l ,  r e lig io u s-c u ltu r a l and 
humanitarian grounds too , the creation  of an Arab Bark for  Bevelopment 
i s  ju s t if ie d ,d e s ir a b le  and even a n ec ess ity , Uowever before c lo sin g  
th is  sectio n  another poin t has to  be n^ntionedj namely that the 
League of Arab S tates i s  undertaking a study o f i t s  in s t itu t io n s  and
( 1 )  -  C h a p te r  I ,  S e c t i o n  I I ,
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agencies w ith  th e  purpose o f  re -o rg a n is in g  them more e f f ic ie n t ly *
Although we ignore  the  e x te n t and th e  p rog ress  of such a reassessm ent 
i t  seems th a t  i t  i s  the r ig h t  tim e to  pu t forward ou r p ro p o sa l.
According to  u s , a fu lly - f le d g e d  Arab F in an c ia l I n s t i tu t io n  
i s  p o ss ib le  on economic, c u l tu r a l ,  hum anitarian  and p o l i t i c a l  grounds.
We s h a ll  now move to  co n sid e r i t s  s tr u c tu r e ,
SECTION I I  ; STRUCTURE OF THE ARAB BANK FCR BEVELOPMT
Vfe a re  n o t th e  f i r s t  to  advocate the use of o i l  revenues to  
finance Arab Economic Development, T herefore , i t  i s  n ecessary  to  
co n s id e r p rev ious p ro p o sa ls ,
SECTION n  -  1 Î FRSVICUS ATTEMPTS TO FINANCE ARAB COUNTRIES’ ECONOMIC 
DFAUEI,OPINENT
We assume to  c a l l  th e  f i r s t  a ttem pt the "Bustani P ro je c t"  
a f t e r  the  man who suggested  i t ,
A -  The B ustan i P ro je c t
I t  was made i n  1961 when Emile B ustan i, a Lebanese, suggested  
th e  c re a tio n  of a:
"scheme to  fin an ce  development in  th e  "have-not" Arab s ta te s
by an annual ;lnvestment of 50 o f o i l  p r o f i t s  by the ’producing
Arab c o u n tr ie s  and w estern  o i l  c o m p a n i e s ^
This p ro je c t  i s  s u b je c t to  s e v e ra l c r i t ic is m s ,
-  F i r s t ly ,  the  au th o r d id  no t come up w ith , o r  su g g est, any i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
framework. Given th e  r e la t io n s  e x is tin g  a t  th a t  tim e between American 
o i l  companies Arab o i l  producing c o u n tr ie s  i t  was r a th e r  a p lea
" to  America to  in v e s t  in  poor Arab c o u n tr ie s " .  This is  more o r  le s s  
obvious in  o th e r p a r t s  o f h is  a r t i c l e .
Even i f  i t  had been p o ss ib le  to  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e  the scheme, s tro n g  
re se rv a tio n s  would have rem ained.
-  Investm ent d e c is io n s  were to  be taken  from o u ts id e  th e  Arab reg io n .
The com plem entarity between th e  w estern  aims and lo c a l a s p ira t io n  could 
on ly  be "hazardous", As a m a tte r  o f f a c t  fo re ig n  investm ent did occur
in  Arab co u n tr ie s  and the  method used and the  s e c to rs  in  which th i s  was
undertaken did n o t c o -in c id e  w ith  lo c a l  needs. Had i t  been o therw ise
(1) -  E, B u stan i, "Arab American R e la tio n s" , F iddle E ast Forum, pub lished
by th e  American U n iv e rs ity  of B e iru t ,  Volume XXXVII, March 1961, p .40,
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our project would lo se  i t s  "raison d ’etre" .
-  A given percentage of o i l  revenues was to  be invested; such a method 
su ffers  from three disadvantages:
-  I t  i s  hard to  f ix  the right percentage for those earnnrked sources 
m ght not match with rea l requirements,
-  The author based the scheme on " o il p ro fits"  whose rea l magnitude was 
very hard to q u antify  given the secrecy around the o i l  b u sin ess,
-  No f ie ld  of invest?nent ard no p r io r ity  were nut forward.
F in a lly , i f  in  s p ite  of a l l  these in su ff ic ie n c ie s  and disadvantages the 
p roject were r e a lise d , Wnat would have bem i t s  impact on the Arab 
World?
I t  was more l ik e ly  to d iv id e  than un ite  Arab countries for  i t  
put sid e  by sid e  U.S. o i l  companies and the Arab o i l  c cunt r ie s .  I t  
fo llow s th at the "have-not" could be very e a s i ly  in c lin ed  to a sso c ia te  
both e n t it ie s  and i t  i s  everyone’s guess as to  the d iv id in g  e f fe c t  i t  
would have had the Arab World.
Finall,y, the "have-not" are seen as p assive r ec ip ie n ts  fo r  
they were not associated  with the p roject and th is  makes i t s  success  
doubtful had i t  got o f f  the ground.
The second proposal to finance Arab economic development 
mainl.y with o i l  revenues, i s  the Arab Fund for Economic and S ocia l 
Development, I t  i s  an improvement compared with the "Bustani" p roject  
but i t  contadjis sev era l d if f ic ie n c ie s  that have been outlined In 
Chapter 17^
Our project i s  d ifferen t from both o f  them, p a r ticu la r ly  when 
one considers the aims o f the Arab Banic for Development,
SECTim II  -  2 f Alî'^ OF TUB ARAB BANK FCR DEmOPMENT
The o b jec tiv es  of regional development bonks are more or le s s  
the same: the promotion o f economic and so c ia l developmmt for  the
region as a vh o le . However, on p ra ctica l gromds some d ifferen ces  
e x is t  between them because each region has s p e c if ic  economic conditions  
and th is  requires sp e c if ic  p r io r ity . These d ifferen ces  vdH  be 
r e f le c te d  in  the types o f  p ro jects  to be financed. In our opinion the 
Arab Bank for Development can f u l f i l  a u se fu l r o le  in  f ie ld s  such as 
jo in t-p r e je c ts , tech n ica l a ss ista n ce  and inter-Arab trade.
208.
A -  Jo in t Projects
The Arab Bank for Development w i l l  fin snce three types of 
p rojects , namely p rojects put forward by a s in g le  or a "two-plus" Arab 
countries or p ro jects  with regional im plications se le c ted  and promoted 
by the Banlc i t s e l f *  I t s  e f fo r ts  should be focussed on the la s t  two 
types. In our opinion jo in t  p roject does not n ecessa r ily  mean cu ttin g  
across two or more member cou n tries, i t  a lso  means:
"that even though the p roject mi^ht not be regional in  nature 
y et i t s  made e t  s or source of supply shou3_d be regional, and 
the development o f related  p ro jects  of th is  kind would 
require régional understanding ard regional c o -o p e r a t io n ," ^
Given the present l e v e l  o f  Arab World ecmomic development, there i s  
wide room for such p ro jects .
]h the in d u str ia l sec to r  large  sca le  plant should be given  
p r io r ity , Arab countries could find  a u se fu l in sp ira tion  in the 
sp e c ia lisa tio n  system  in  p ra ctice  in  the Eastern countries without 
lo sin g  th e ir  independence.
Agriculture must be predominant, e sp e c ia lly  i f  one r e fers  to  
the Arab World’s increasing food d e f i c i t ,  A co-operation which does 
not aU.ow’ the Arab World to  feed i t s e l f  i s  not a co-operation . Jo in t
ir r ig a t io n  schemes and the use o f r iver  water w i l l  su re ly  r e su lt  in  
regional advantages.
Regional p roject can a lso  m ateria lise  in  the f ie ld  of  
education. This i s  f a c i l i t a t e d  by the use o f a common language, Arabic, 
and the presence o f teachers from other Arab countid.es. The education  
system can be u n ified : th is  i s  already happening between Egypt and
Sudan,
B -  Technical A ssistance
In th is  f ie ld  th e Arab Bank for Development has to r e ly  h ea v ily  
on non-Arab s k iH , but in. sp ite  of that i t  can p lay an important ro le  
because:
-  A ll i t s  members wdll be developing countries wbere the public sec to r  
plays an important r o le . This leads to the need for economic planning 
and the Bank can help in  shaping and financing th e ir  development 
programmes. This o f  course can be done only a t  the recuest o f  member
( 1 )  -  H.W. S i n g e r ,  o p ,  c i t ,  p . 2 1 1 ,
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cou n tries. Hwmver, i f  the Bank manages to  form a "pool" of competent
experts in  th is  f ie ld  the "have-not" i^ /îio cannot afford expensive
p rivate  consultants w i l l  d e f in ite ly  have an in cen tive  to use the Bank,
Furthermore, with time th is  pool w i l l  become more and more Q ualified
in  Arab economies for the basic conditions are s im ilar .
-  F in a lly , in  the tech n o lo g ica l f ie ld  everything re mains to  be done.
No Arab country, including Saudi Arabia, i s  able to  undertake alone
the permanent fin a n c ia l burden o f  research and development in  say, the
f ie ld  o f  energy. We chose energy as an example because the Arab World
i s  spending o i l  wealth without g iv in g  en o u g h  atten tion  to  i t s
requirements When the o i l  runs out.
In our opinion the Arab World should d irec t i t s  e f fo r ts  towards 
(3 )so la r  energy * because i t s  geographical p o sitio n  gives i t  an advantage 
s in ce  i t  receives four times as mucb^as Western Europe, FurtJiermore, 
in  the f ie ld  of home-made technology and in  eveiy other f ie ld ,  the Arab 
World requirements are au asi-un lim ited .
C -  Other f ie ld s  of Inter-Arab Co-operation
A3.though the p o s s ib i l i t ie s  are numerous we shal3. l im it  
ourselves to  communications, labour and trade.
1 , -  Communie a llo ns
Few Arab countries can undertake, iv ith in  th e ir  ovm boundaries, 
an adequate aJid e f f ic ie n t  network o f transport and communications.
The Arab countries have already f e l t  the need for such a co-operation  
and the proof i s  the creation  o f  an Arab s a t e l l i t e  Which i s  an 
encouraging sign  in  i t s e l f  on the one hand, and on th e other i t  
underlines the correctness of our a n a ly s is .
The Bank can f u l f i l  an important ro le  in  th is  f ie ld  through a31 
the stages o f the projects from th e ir  suggestion and tech n ica l
f e a s ib i l i t y  to th e ir  financing. One of the f i r s t  advantages i s  the
standardization o f the system in  question. However, transport and 
communication has to  be carried out in such a way as to  promote the 
flow of inter-Arab trade*
(1) -  Tlie F ir s t  meeting to  d iscuss the so lar  energy ap n lica tion  in  the 
Aiddie East (The M ddle East Solar Technology Exhibition and 
Conference ) was held in  Manama Bahrain on April 24-2?, 1978.
Another "International Symposium -  Workshop on Solar Energy" 
w il l  be held in  Cairo on June 18-24, 1978.
Source; OAPEC, New B u lle t in , Volume 4, Number 2, February 1978.
p . 3 0 ,
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Z "• Labour
The flow o f  manpower has already been considered. Treating  
the case of African countries H.W. Singer ta lk s  about "Migrating 
Labour Link" amongst the members o f the African Development Bank,
Here again, by regu lating  the labour flov; at a regionsCl. le v e l ,  the 
Arab Bank for Development can fin d  an important f ie ld  of operations. 
However, one has to  recogn ise that th is  point could be v e ry  d e lic a te  
e sp e c ia lly  i f  one refers  to  the Comecon’s exi'ierience, R o m a n i a h a s  
always opposed such a movement o f  manpower*
Two remarks must be imde:
-  We are not considering the free c ircu la tio n  o f labour ju st as
N. Khrushchev proposed e x p l ic i t ly  the ’movement o f resources from one
//
country to  another w ith resources being understood as both c a p ita l and
labour, Vhat we have in  mind i s  no more than organised flow
sa tis fy in g  the need o f  tv^ a or more member co u n tr ies .
-  I t  i s  not our aim to  evaluate the r e la t iv e  sbi'^ngtri of socia lism  end
Arab ism in  th is  f ie ld ;  we s h a ll  consider fa c ts . The fa c t  i s  th a t  
there already e x is t s  a migratory movement between the "have" and the 
"have-not". Such a movement has to  be organised and not to  s u ffe r  
from temporary p o l i t ic a l  problems between the countries concerned,
3 -  Trade
As explained e a r lie r , the trend o f in d iv id u a l Arab countries  
for  h is to r ic a l  reasons, M s moved away from the Arab region . Another 
reason i s  the absence o f jo in t  ventures. I t  then follow s that by the 
creation  of t î u l l y  regional p ro jects  the volume o f inter-Arab, trade i s  
bound to increase; on th is  ground a wide complementary appears in  the 
f ie ld  o f agricu ltu re and in d u str ia l products provided a regional 
sp e c ia lisa tio n  could be worked out. There i s  no doubt about f r u it fu l  
investm ents for the Arab Banic fo r  Development, whatever the c r it e r ia  
used in  s e le c t in g  p ro jec ts ,
(1) -  At a Comecon meeting a Romanian Delegate claimed that;
"th is notion of the in tern a tio n a l "migration" of the population  
i s  incom patible vdth so c ia lism  « we Icnow only too w e ll that a t  
the time o f  the bou rgeoisie  there were s itu a tio n s  when the 
inhabitants of our country had to  leave  in  order to look 
fo r  jobs even beyond the A tlan tic  Ocean; we have seen only  
too w e ll how things develop in  the Common Î-Tarket, which has 
secured the ’free  c ircu la tio n  of labour fo r c e ! . we have never 
imagined th a t a th e s is  could be voiced concerning the p o s s ib i l i t y  
and u t i l i t y  o f a s im ilar  process w ithin the fra^meworic of the  
world s o c ia l i s t  system",
o f .  M. Kaser, "Comecon Integration  Problems",
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SECTION I I  ~ 3 ï INVESTMENT CRITERIA AND SEOÎJRITY
A -  Investment C riteria
Investment c r ite r ia  cannot be separated from the nature o f  
the Arab Banlc for Development i t s e l f  Which i s  a development in s t itu t io n ,  
from the source of the funds to  be invested  -  p u b lic ly  ovmed in  our 
case “ and f in a l ly  from the sp e c if ic  ch a ra c ter istic s  of the region  
i t s e l f  which i s  an underdeveloped area.
From a general point of view any project submitted to a 
development bank for  financing can be c la s s if ie d  e ith e r  as a bankable 
or a non-bankable p ro ject, hbei: development banlcs were f ir s t  s e t  np 
a bankable p roject was defined as a p ro fita b ly  se lf-f in a n c in g  p ro ject. 
I t  means th at, in  a given period, the sought investment w i l l  generate 
enough revenue to cover i t s  ovm operating co s ts , pay the p rin cip al 
plug in te r e s t  charges and produce high enough p r o fits  to  help the 
entrepreneur remain in  b u sin ess. This def5u ition  o f a bankable 
p roject led  to what has come to  be known as a " co n flic t o f purpose", 
the c o n f lic t  a r is in g  from the nature and the purpose o f  the bank 
i t s e l f .  On the one hand, as a fin a n c ia l in s t itu t io n  the bank’s 
c a p ita l must revolve, on the other hand as a development in s t itu t io n  
the banlc must create the missing fa cto rs that are e s se n t ia l  to  promote 
economic development. These factors are c a n ita l, a v a i la b i l ity  o f  
foreign  exchange, c a p ita l tmrket a c t iv ity  and no le s s  important 
elements such as entrepreneurship, managerial and tech n olog ica l 
a b i l i t i e s .  Consequently and very often  "the bank’s development
ri)purpose comes in to  diîrect c o n f lic t  with i t s  functioning as a bank,"
B asicyll.y  the Arab Bank fo r  Development does not escape such
a c o n f lic t  of purpose. However, through the years the concept of a
bankable project has evolved and nowadays i t  can be defined, "as one
which the prin iJpal and in te r e s t  can be expected with an acceptable
p r o f ita b il i ty  d is tr ib u tio n , to  be répaid according to  a pre-de terrained
schedule. Bankable p rojects for development banks are not n ecessa r ily
( ?  )r e s tr ic te d  to  those which are s e lf - liq u id a t in g ,"  "
(1) -  Joseph A, Kane, "Development Banking", Lexington Books (D,C,
Heath & Company), London, 1975, p . 17*
(2) -  J.A , Kane, "Development Banking", op. c i t ,  p .18.
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This new concept does increase the number o f bankable projects and 
th erefore the f ie ld  o f financing of a development banlc i t s e l f ,  because 
according to J.A , Kane, "any p roject vdth a s ig n if ic a n t  impact on 
development should p o te n tia lly  f a l l  w ith in  the scope o f development 
banlcs financing subject only to the con stra in t th at i t  can reasonably  
be expected th at the borrower w i l l  be able to  repay the loan."^^^ 
However, in  s p ite  o f  th is  favourable evo lu tion , given i t s  lim ited  
resources, a development bank cannot finance every bankable project  
submitted to  it*  Therefore a sjeoond type o f c la s s if ic a t io n  between 
bankable p rojects them selves i s  necessary.
In se le c tin g  i t s  p ro jects  a development bank has a t i t s
d isp o s itio n  two s e ts  o f weight : a development impact sc a le  and
monetary returns s c a le . The id e a l so lu tio n  would be to  finance
p rojects  with high development impact and high imnetary returns a t the
same moment, Ünfortu n ate ly  i t  i s  .hard to find  p ro jects  which embody
both q u a lit ie s ,  for more o ften  p ro jects  with higii development impact
( ? )are not n ecessa r ily  eoonoinically important and v ice -v er sa . Then,
the problem ds Which sca le  i s  to  be given more weight? Tine source of 
the funds can h e lp ^ se ttlir g  the problem* In our case , given the fa c t  
the Arab Bank for Development’s funds are n u b lic ly  ovmed, the 
In s t itu t io n  we hav^ in  md.nd should not try  to maximize i t s  p r o f it s ,  
consequently the development impact sc a le  i H l  be given more w eight. 
However development c r i t e r ia  vary wd.th tim e, space and d.nstitu b io n s .
At a national le v e l  the usual development c r ite r ia  are mad.nly the 
p r io r ity  assigned to  the various sec to rs  o f  the economy, the foiviard 
and backward linkage e f f e c t s ,  the number and kind o f jobs to be 
created which have to  be compared to  ex istin g  and futu.re labour force  
and f in a l ly  the foreign  exchange cost incurred. The foreign  exchange 
savings and eamdngs as a r e su lt  o f  import su b stitu tio n  and increased  
exports r e sp ec tiv e ly  are a lso  considered. Other fa cto rs could be 
considered When i t  comes to an in tern ation a l in s t i tu t io n . Hi our 
case the foreign exchange s id e  o f  the problem does not c o n stitu te  a 
paramount con stra in t, because, as seen in Chapter I I I ,  most of the 
o i l  revenues are kept in  foreign  exchange. However in  the long term
(1) Ib id ,
(2 ) For in stan ce a school i s  e s se n t ia l  to  econom5.c development but does
not produce any f in a n c ia l returns. The opposite case could be
a  "gambling casino".
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the s itu a tio n  i s  d if fe r e n t . In our opinion the linkage e f fe c ts
between economic sectors a t n^tional level, and a lso  between Arab
economies must be given sp e c ia l a tten tio n .
F in a lly , we can always consider ex is t in g  Arab Funds and
banks’ investment c r it e r ia  as a precedent and tr y  to adapt or adopt
them. Concerning th is  very point G-..P, Cassadio maintains that,
"given the ca p ita l resources o f the Arab World and the present stage
of underdevelopment o f  the area, i t  would bs nrare appropriate to  use
le s s  str in g en t c r it e r ia  than h ith erto  in  evaluating projects to  be
financed with a lower rate o f  opportunity co st for ca p ita l used by
the f u n d s , I t  fo llow s that i t  i s  d esirab le  for the Arab Bank
fo r  Developmmt to use more f le x ib le  investment c r ite r ia  than ex istin g
Arab lending in s t itu t io n s .
At t h is  stage i t  i s  worthwhile mentioning tb''- case of the
Comecon countries* Concerning t h is  expierienoe M, Kaser d istin g u ish es
between p assive and a c t iv e  in d u str ia lisa t io n , a d is t in c t io n  i l lu s tr a te d
by the F ir s t  Deputy D irector o f the Romanian In s t itu te  o f Economics
who argues th a t, " e ff ic ie n cy  should be a c r ite r io n  only a t a second
stage, the f i r s t  stage  being th e  acceleration  of in d u str ia l growth
( o  )
in  the present underdeveloped world * " , We accept such an a ttitu d e
only i f  s p e c if ic a l ly  designed for the medium-term peifLod* However, 
in  the mind o f the Romanian economist the term, underdeveloped wcrld 
means the poorer members o f the Comecon, or the eou iva lert o f the 
"have not" in  the context o f the Arab World,
In our opinion, only with such a c tiv e  in d u str ia liz a tio n  can 
we develop an aggressive Arab Bank fo r  Development,
As a matter o f fa c t ,  one of the le s s  fortunate members of  
the Comecon was Mongolia to Which the c o l le c t iv i t y  concerned 
concentrated i t s  aid under the form of p rojects w ithin i t s  long-term  
national economic programme. Concerning the advantage o f such an 
approach to  economic development M. Kaser w rites th at, "this , . ,
(1) G.P, Cassadio, "The Economic Challenge of the Arabs", Publisher : 
Saxon House, B.C. Heath Ltd.,, England, 1976, p .144.
(2) M, Kaser, "Comecon Integration  Problems of the Planned Economi.es", 
Oxford U niversity  Press, 2nd E dition , London, England, 1967. p .211.
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unquestionably has immense in tern ation a l s ig n ifica n ce  serving as an 
example to  many sovo^ @i.gn s ta te s  o f Asia and. A frica.
Tills experience could be a u se fu l example by the Arab Bank 
for Development. Conseouently \-Aien proposing or s e le c t in g  p rojects  
the Banlc ought to g ive a certa in  p r io r ity  to the "have-not". Our 
p o sitio n  i s  ju s t if ie d  on two grounds. On the one hand i t  w i l l  tend 
to  equalize Arab economies and t h is ,  in turn, w i l l  make ea sier  any 
future steps towards economic harmonization or in teg r a tio n . Oi the  
other hand economic development, e sp e c ia lly  a t a regional le v e l  i s  
a d e lib era te  p o l i t i c a l  step  therefore the in clu sion  o f p o l i t ic a l  
factors in  the d ecision  taking process i s  f u l ly  ju s t i f ie d .
However, When lending to a "have" or a "have-not" country 
fo r  an economic p ro ject, e.g* productive u n it or a non-economic 
p roject such as bu ild ing a school, the fin a n c ia l and economic 
im plications of the p roject concerned must be pointed out by the Arab 
Banlc for Development to  the h ost country. But for both tiqces of 
p roject the f in a l  investm ent d ec isio n  belongs to  the debtor country 
or government because the la t t e r  i s  responsib le for the repayment of 
the loan even in  case o f a f in a n c ia l fa ilu re  of the project financed. 
Therefore, being the u ltim ate borrower and repayer the b est country 
stands between the Arab Banlc for Development and the p roject i t s e l f .  
Th3s. s itu a tio n  w i l l  be r e flec te d  in  the secu rity  of the lean .
Let us, now, turn our atten tion  to the problem of the terms 
of the loan ,
B -  Terms of Loans
By terms of loans we mean in te r e s t  ra tes , maturity and 
grace periods.
-  In terest rates: with respect to  in te r e s t  rates one c a i refer to  the
Comecon’s case where, according to  Marie Lavigne, " . .u n t i l  1969
in te r e s t  ra tes  were 20 fo r  payment cred it . . .  in  1970 they were
(? 1increased but without exceeding ^50," ' " per annum.
(1) -  Me Kaser, op. c i t .  p .201,
(2) -  t!fe.rie Lavigne, "The S o c ia l is t  Economies o f the S ov iet Union and
Europe", tran sla ted  from French by T.G. J-tewell, Publisher Martin 
Robertson, United Kingdom, 1974, p .315.
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In the same l in e  o f idea, M* Baser adds that;
"the rate o f c r e d it  to s o c ia l i s t  countries had . . .  long been
estab lish ed  a t  20 (in  a t le a s t  one case -  the S o v ie t loan
to China - 1 0 ) ;  the Bank for Intern ation al Economic
Co-operation in  1964 s e t  i t s  top rate for short term lending
a t 1 .5 0 , but has not y e t given long term c r e d its . Jn the
in d u str ia lised  c a p ita l is t  economies, the marginal rate  o f
return on long term ca p ita l may be put roughly a t 5 or 60;
the World Bank le v ie s  5,750, and priva be in vestors lending
(1)abroad may be expected to  seek 100."
I t  appears th at w ithin  economic e n t it ie s  such as the Comecon, rates of 
in te r e s t  more favourable than those offered  by the market are 
eus to m ry .
In our opinion the Arab Bank for Development has not to  be
s e t  up on a broth erly  or r e lig io u s  b a s is .  In other words loans are
not to  be granted in te r e s t - f r e e ,  p a rticu la r ly  when the in s t itu t io n  has 
to  operate on an on-go:Lng b a s is .  Our p o sitio n  i s  d iffe r e n t  from 
th ose , who, during the 1950s claimed oil. had been granted by God to  
the Arabs and consequently Arab n o n -o il countries have to  tske th e ir  
share, even by force i f  need a r is e s ,
Eurthem ore, i t  i s  need less to  tr y  to  invent the wheel again
by ju stify in g  in te r e s t  ra te  charges on econo d o  grounds. I t  i s  a lso
obvious that the "have-not" countries w i l l  b en efit  from the Arab Bank 
for  Development even though in te r e s t  ra tes eoual those o f the tmrket, 
for  the simple reason th a t those countries do not have adeouate access  
to  western c a p ita l markets (Chapter I I I ) .  The a v a ila b il ity  o f funds 
i t s e l f  co n stitu te s  an advantage. However, in  our opirdon se le c ted  
p rojects  and "country-package" should b e n efit  from adeouate ra tes  of  
discount, sin ce  i t  i s  the only way to incorporate grant elem ents. 
F in a lly , i t  seems to  us th at in te r e s t  ra tes cu rren tly  
charged by Arab lending agen cies, i . e .  3 to  40 per ani'&um, are 
reasonable. The fa c t  o f  charging according to the p ro ject and the 
sec to r  i s  a s a tis fa c to r y  p r in c ip le  to o .
( 1 )  -  M c h e l  K a s e r ,  o p ,  c i t ,  p . 2 0 9 .
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Grace Period and M tu rity
Concerning the grace period, the methods currently  used by 
Arab lending in s t itu t io n s  are advantageous to the receiving country. 
They are function  of the rece iv in g  country's econoTrd.c s itu a t io n , the 
project i t s e l f  and so on.
In the case of the Arab Bank fo r  Development in te r e s t  ra te s , 
grace and repayment periods should take in to  consideration  the  
subsequent elements;
-  The impa,ct of the p roject on the Arab World. A project whose 
unifying and co-ordinating impact i s  su b sta n tia l on as many Arab 
countries as p o ss ib le  ought to  have p r io r ity  and b e tte r  term s.
-  The secto r  in  x\hich the operation i s  financed* The Kuwait Fund for  
Arab Economic Development, for  in stan ce, g ives preference to  some 
sectors,^ and i t s  sec to ra l d is tr ib u tio n  of loans i s  a s  fo llow s. 
Transport, communication and storage 33.60, Agriculture 23.50, 
E le c tr ic ity  21,50 and Industry 21 ,30 . The Arab Bank for Development 
w il l  have to work out a sirrd3.ar system vhose d irec t conseouence w i l l  
be to  enlarge the absorptive capacity  of the Arab Vbrld as a vAtole.
The sectora l preference must be translated  in to  d iffe r e n t  terms. For 
in stan ce, for the Kuwait Fund fo r  Arab Economic Development the grace 
period i s  around 4“5 years, and the maturi.ty varies from 3.0 to  25 
y ears. In our case d iffe r e n t  treatment should be applied to d iffe r e n t  
sec to rs .
F in a lly  we have to  recognize th at the tenm  of loans are a 
function of the secu r ity  o f investm ent. Given the fa c t  th at the 
Arab Banlt for Development i s  an intergovermental in s t itu t io n -  the
CV\ CK
pi-oblem o f secu r ity  takes^ncw dimension. The measures u su a lly  taken 
by n ation al development banks to ensure a minimi.im of secu r ity  for  
th e ir  investm ent seem qu ite  irre lev a n t to our case-study un].ess the 
Arab Banlc for Development i s  in v estin g  in  p r iv a te ly  owned productive 
u n its . However, in  s p ite  o f  th is ,  the le g a l fraiîBVJork does e x is t  
in  th e form of the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation that 
has been promoted and drafted by the Ihiwait Fund and which has been 
r a t if ie d  by most Arab governments. The ob jective  of the Corporation 
i s  to  p rotect Arab p riva te  investments in  other Arab co u n tr ies.
(1) -  Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development,"Annual Report ; 
1975-1976", Kuwait, 1977, p .l0 9 .
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Therefore one i s  l e f t  with two options eith er to  amend the e x is t in g  
Corporation by including the Arab Bank for Development’s investments 
or to come up with a new agreement attached to the Arab Bank for  
Development’s s ta tu te s , that w i l l  be signed by in d iv idu al Arab 
countries vben jo in ing the Arab Bank for  Development,
Fina3.1y we have to mention that the overall, p o licy  and 
ob jectives o f the Arab Bank for Development are a function o f the 
amount of funds put a t  the d isp o s itio n  of the Arab Bank for Development, 
We deal with th is  problem in  the next step ,
SECTION n  -  4 Î THE ARAB BANK FCB. DEVELOPMFNT ’3 CAPITALKATION AND
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
F irst we have to  consider the case of other regional 
development banks.
A -  The Case of 0thor Regional Development Banks
I f  one takes the case o f the A^ibnBank for Development and 
the African Development Bank one finds that they are d iffe r e n t  from 
one another although th e ir  aim i s  more or le s s  sim3.1ar, namely to 
contribute to  the economic and so c ia l development o f t^ e ir  rrenber 
cou n tries,
1 -  The Asian Developinent Bank
For instance the Asian Developmmt Bank’s to ta l  subscribed  
ca p ita l i s  2*770,72m, d o lla rs  with^?66. 03m. or ju st under 280 of the 
to ta l  amount contributed by fourteen non-member co u n tr ies. Of 
course the l a s t  contribution  i s  not without counterpart since they 
were represented by four out o f  twelve members co n stitu tin g  the Boaid 
of D irectors0
The p a rtic ip a tio n  o f  other countid.es causes severa l 
questions such as, which countries are a llm ed  to contribute? What 
i s  th e ir  ind ividual contribution? To What extent i s  the contribution  
of a l l  the non-members permitted and desirable? And so on. A ll 
these questions have to be answered and the ultim ate s itu a tio n  should 
be a balanced one f a c i l i t a t in g  the smooth development o f  the proposed 
in s t itu t io n  without a lien a tin g  other countries to  t i e  reg ion ’s
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in te r e s t .  However, from th is  poin t of view the creation  of the 
African Bank i s  more in te r e s t in g ,
2 -  The African Development Banlc
This case i s  in te r e s t in g  because the non-African co u n tr ie s ’ 
contribution  was ra ised  and re jec te d , A compromise was suggested  
with the creation  of two types o f  shares:
"A -  shares for African subscriptions with f t  11 voting rd.ghts 
in  the Board of Governors , . .  and B -• shares for non-African
fh )
subscriptions w ith  lim ited  or no voting r ig h ts ,"
Such a compromise was turned down and the u ltim ate so lu tio n  
was th at sub scrip tion s were to  be made on a purely African b a s is .  
However, such an option does not c o n stitu te  the panacea fo r  a l l  
problems. Several other d i f f i c u l t i e s  did e x is t ,  d i f f i c u l t i e s  which 
w i l l  be presented w ith in  the context of our p ro ject.
However, before doing so we have f ix s t  to  consider the 
c a p ita l requirements of the Arab Banlc for Development,
B -  The Arab World’s Capital Reouiretïonts
I t  i s  obvious th at the c a p ita l requirements o f a developing  
country are enormous and th a t those of a group o f twJenty developing  
countries are un lim ited . Our ob jective  i s  to  ca lc u la te  wbat would 
c o n stitu te  a reasonable wodcing c a p ita l for an in s t itu t io n  of the 
s iz e  o f  the Arab Bank fo r  Development, Our approach s h a l l  be to  
c a lcu la te  f i r s t ,  the magnitude o f the funds earmarked by the Arab o i l  
countries for the economic devaLopment o f other fe llow  Arab cou n tr ies,
1 -  Funds/Ear marked for Arab Countries ’ Economic Development
This can be done through the lending agencies to  fe llo w  Arab 
cou n tr ies. These agencies could be the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic 
Development (3>38Cm. d o lla r s ) ,  the Abu Dhabi Fund fo r  Arab Economic 
Development (500m, d o lla r s ) ,  the Arab Fund for Economic and S o cia l 
Development (347m, d o lla r s ) .  Their combined ca p ita l i s  4,227m. 
d o lla r s . Furthermore, Arab countries do enjoy economic aid  through
the L Development Bade (2500m.) and the Saudi Development
Fund (2900m,), I f  one assumes th a t the la s t  two a g e ic ie s  ’ ca p ita l i s  
s p e c if ic a l ly  earmarked, for Arab cou n tries, Wiich i t  i s  not, one i s  l e f t  
with a grand t o t a l  of 9,627m, d o lla r s .
( 1 )  H,W. S i n g e r ,  o p ,  c i t ,  p . 2 1 5 .
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I t  has to be meaitioned th at the domestic development o f the 
"haV #countries i s  financed outside the f iv e  above-mentioned channels.
VJhat about the Arab countries* f in a n c ia l needs?
2 -  Arab Countries * F inancial Heeds
As a ïimtter of fa c t  th e ir  needs seem almost unlim ited, IV/o
methods w i l l  be used whose aim i s  ju st to reach an idea of the 
required sum*
F ir s t ly , according to Samir Hour;
"an approximate ca lcu la tio n  based on a ca p ita l output ra tio  
equal to  4 allow s to  estim ate a t 130bn, d o lla rs  the to ta l  
amount o f  investment necessary to  ensure 120 annual 
growth u n til  1980"^^^ 
fo r  eleven Arab co u n tr ies, namely Fg:^q)t, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
l^feiuritania, Oorralia, Sudan, Tunisia and both Yemens,
The author c3.aims th a t i t  i s  reasonable to estim ate that, 
around tvjo-thirds can be financed through domestic saving; th is  means 
that 45bn, d o lla rs  have to be provided by external sources.
Secondly, H, S. Nashashibi takes the case of Sudan -  one 
of the several "have-not" countries -  Which b en efits  from, the Arab 
Authority for A gricultural Investments and Development^'" ' (AAAID ),
He notes that:
"the Sudan programme contains some 100 integrated  projects  
at a to ta l cost o f 6,0bn, d o lla rs,"
These are the c a p ita l needs for ju st  one sec to r  in  a s in g le  "have-not".
The conclusion i s  that between the c a p ita l earmarked by 
Arab o i l  countries -  whose to ta l  has been inTlated on purpose -  for 
the economic development of "have-not" and the f in a n c ia l reouirements 
of those very cou n tries, the gap i s  \\dde, According to  the f i r s t  
method the c a p ita l earmarked i s  no more than a f i f t h  o f the cap iM l 
requirement o f  the "have-not" from 1974 to 1980, i f  they had to aim 
for  a 120 annual growth,
( l  ) -  Samir Hour, "The Conditions o f  Economic Development of Arab Oil
Countries", Revue d ’Economie P o litiq u e , Edition S irey , Sentember- 
October 1974^ Number 5> p .636 (Translated from the French),
(2 ) -  The Arab Authority for A gricultural Investments and Development i s  
jo in t ly  formed by Arab s ta te s ,  and i s  entrusted w ith the 
implementation of a b asic  agricu ltu ra l programme for Sudan and la te r  
for other Arab cou n tr ies,
(3) -  Hikmat S, Nashashibi, "Regional Investment for Arab Honey", The 
Banker, I4ay 1977, p .34.
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As for the second method the f in a n c ia l needs of one sec to r  -  
agricu ltu re -  in  one poor Arab country, Sudan, i s  around tw o-thirds  
o f  the cap ita l earmarked for a l l  Arab cou n tries.
This means th at i f  the Arab Bank for  Development i s  to be s e t  
up along the l in e s  we proposed e sp e c ia lly  w ith the p o s s ib i l i t y  of 
investments in  Arab c a p ita l surplus countries them selves, more funds 
than those o f the combdned e x is t in g  lending agencies w il l  have to be 
earmarked for th a t purpose. Such a move w i l l  a lso  red irect the 
resh u fflin g  process towards needy developing cou n tr ies. The Clare 
G r o u p ' beyond confirming our views that the la t t e r  countries dd.d not 
b e n e fit  from the resh u fflin g  process we experienced up to 1978 
ma. in  ta in s  that the adjustment problem of the O.E.C.D, countrd.es,
"would be eased i f  OPSC countries were prepared to accumulate a sse ts  
in  countries which are in  a weak financd.al p o sitio n , including the 
developing cou n tries. I t  would be even b e tte r  i f  they  were more 
w illin g  to mke long-term  loans on s o f t  terms to  th sse  cou n tries, or 
to make outright grants. The OESC countries might also ease the  
p o sitio n  i f  they were prepared to spend large sums on such a c t iv it ie s  
as so la r  energy research, ex ijlo ita tio n  of which might replace some of
( p )
the revenue from o i l  0.3 that becomes exhausted.*" After the
c r it ic ism  we d irected  to  e x is t in g  Arab lending agencies, th e  Arab 
Bank for  Development represents the in s t itu t io n a l  framework through 
which such a change o f p o licy  of Arab o i l  countries can be put in to  
p ra c tice , Cne has to  bear in  miid the fa c t  th at the Arab Bgmk for  
Development sh a ll have to  undertake research am development in  the 
f ie ld  o f so lar  energy.
However, in  s p ite  o f  a l l  these in cen tiv es  to  in v est more 
o i l  revenues in  developing countries and therefore in  Arab cou n tries, 
the discrepancy between funds already earmarked fo r  the la t t e r  countries  
and th e ir  minimum ca p ita l needs urges us to  be more cautious when 
considering the c a p ita lis a t io n  o f  the Arab Bank for  Development. 
Nonetheless i t s  c a p ita l has to  take in to  consideration  the above- 
mentioned f in a n c ia l gap,
(1} The Group owes i t s  o r ig in  to  a meeting held in  1976 in  Clare C ollege, 
Cambridge, I ts  members are: A.B, Atkinson, S ir  Alec C aim cross,
O.K. F e in ste in , J .S . Flemming, J .A . Kay, M.A. King, R.C.O, Mtthe^vs, 
P.M. Oppenheimer, M.U. Posiver, A.R, Brest, W.B. Reddaway, J.R. 
Sargent, A, S ilb erston  and J.H..B. Tew.
(2 ) The Clare Group (C.H, F e in ste in  and W.B. Reddaway) "OïSC Surpluses, 
the World Recession and the U.K. Economy", H-ldland Banlc Revietv,
Spring 1978, p. 11.
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C -  C a p ita lisa tio n  of the Arab Bank for Development
Before considering such a problem one poin t remains to be 
c la r if ie d . F ir s t ly ,  the prime ob jective  o f the in s t itu t io n  we have 
in  mind i s  to contribute to development p rojects w ith in  the Arab 
World. This excludes any B ,O.P. support operations. This function  
i s  f u l f i l l e d  by the Arab Monetary Fund, I t  i s  s u c h  an idea which 
led  us to  exclude the S p ecia l Fund for Arab Non-oil Countries when we 
considered the amount of ca p ita l earmariced fo r  the economic 
development o f Arab cou n tr ies.
In our opinion, subscriptions to tiie Arab Bank for Development 
can have three d iffe r e n t  sources; Arab public funds, Arab private  
capita], and non-Arab funds. Subscriptions should be open mainly to 
Arab public funds, although Arab private ca p ita l can play a u se fu l  
r o le  in  financing the Arab World ’s development, a ro le  Wnich w /ill be 
outlined la te r .
The fa c t  o f re ly in g  exclusivel^r on Arab public funds could 
lead  to  sm aller authorised c a p ita l. With respect to th is  point a 
comparison between the African Development Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank could be s ig n if ic a n t . With twenty-seven member- 
countries the Asian Development Bank has a c a p ita l o f 2.77bn. d o lla rs , 
that i s  an average of 102*6m. to be invested  in  in d iv idu al cou n tries.
We exclude the contribution  of the non-member countries for they do 
not take advantage o f the Bank. On the other band, with th ir ty -n in e
countries the African Development Bank has a ca n ita l o f  ju st
400m, or ju st 482.54m. d o lla r s , or, in  other words, an average
of^ l2 .35  m illion s per country.
There i s  a wide d ifferen ce  due p a rtly  to  the contribution  
o f non-member countries which amounted to  a Quarter of the to ta l  
c a p ita l. In our opinion the problem o f c a p ita l should not be seen - 
as an obstacle  given the current "liquid" s itu a tio n  of the Arab o i l  
countries, and th erefore contributions must be reserved ex c lu s iv e ly  
for  Arab co u n tr ies.
A fter s e t t l in g  the Question o f who i s  allowed to  contribute, 
one has to  consider th e extent of in d iv idual contributions. Several
(1) The rate o f conversion being U .A .l r  U.S. ^  1.20635 on Octcber 1974. 
o f . Europa P u b lication s, op. c i t .  p .94.
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methods can be used to determine th e ir  con tribu tion s, namely s iz e  of 
the population, s iz e  of the comitry and w ealth . In our case there  
i s  no need to argue about the adequacy o f oBch c r ite r io n , sin ce the 
n ational wealth i s  obviously  the b e st  way. For i f  we base i t  on 
population or s iz e  o f  the country, we s t i l l  end up wî.th Sudan (a 
"have-not"), a needy country having to contribute more than Kuwait, 
a surplus or "have" country. I l i a  a lso  means fix in g  sp e c if ic  
fquota" to in d iv idu al countries and th at i s  u n r e a lis t ic  given the 
r e a l i t ie s  of the Arab World, We can a lso  Lake the ease of other  
regional banks and ex is tin g  Arab financial, in s t itu t io n s .
Concerning the f i r s t  point i t  appears that the African  
Development Banlc, the Asian Development Bank and the International 
Banlc for Economic Co-operation member contribution i s  based on th e ir  
in d iv idual w ealth.
For the second p o in t, the magnitude o f natio/ial wealth plays 
an important r o le . However, concerning the Arab World another 
element has to  be taken in to  account; the degree o f  p o l i t i c a l  
comnrltment of every countly to the problems of the Arab region . For 
in stan ce, i f  we take the case o f  the Arab Monetary Fund, Saudi 
Arabia and Algeria contributed eou a lly  -  130m. d o llars -  although 
the Saudi and Algerian wealth are hardly compa:cab].e. In our opinion 
there i s  no way, for  there i s  no supra-nstional authority , to  ob lige  
any Arab country to contribute, l e t  alone make s p e c if ic  contributions.
Therefore i t  i s  w ise to  leave the door open to contribution . 
The reason i s  simple: the cru c ia l element behind the success of
Arab co-operation, in  any f ie ld ,  i s  nothing but the w i l l  and the 
free  w i l l  of the Arab s ta t e s .  Furthermore, once Arab countries  
are convinced that they have too much to  ga'jn, e .g .  the advantages 
presented e a r lie r , and nothing or l i t t l e  to  lo s e  from such a 
co-operation, only tech n ica l ob stacles w i l l  remain. I t  folloi'^s th at  
i t  i s  hard to ascr ib e  a sp e c if ic  c a p ita l, l ik e ly  to emerge in  the  
case o f an "Arab Bank fo r  Development" under one form or another is  
s e t  up. However, our study requires us to  come up vdth a proposal.
Given the fa c t  th a t c a p ita l requirements are unlirrd.ted, we 
sh a ll suggest a "floor". Such a f lo o r  has to  consider the wj.de gap 
between resources and requirements of Arab cou n tries, i t  must a lso
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be a function o f the o b jectiv es  we se t  forth for the Bank, I t  
fo llow s that 15bn, d o lla rs  could be reasonable. In our opinion a 
regional banlc with such a c a p ita l and working on an on-going basis  
can make a s ig n if ic a n t  contribution  to the development of the region  
concerned.
Such an amount i s  le s s  than the o i l  revenues surnlus fo r  
any one year vdthin the Arab World. I t  does not lead to any 
disinvestm ent in  the western countries on t^e i^art of the Arab o i l  
cou n tries. Furthermore, not a l l  the 15bn. d o llars wilü. f a l l  on 
th e ir  shoulders because the "have-not" must contribute, ju st l ik e  
they participated  in  the Arab Monetary Fund, However, one o f the 
c r it ic ism s  we d irected  to  th e Arab lending agencies was that the  
p aid -in  ca p ita l was n e g lig ib le .
I f  the Arab Bank for  Development i s  to  have an "aggressive"  
p o licy , as i s  d esira b le  and necessary, i t  rrnist enjoy consequent 
resources a t hand. I t  fo llow s th a t a t l e a s t  500 o f the authorised  
c a p ita l must be paid in; or in  other words ?.5bn, dollars* I t  
i s  not necessary to ca lcu la te  the average coptribuIrion fo r  Arab 
countries w i l l  not p a rtic ip a te  evenly. However, both the authorised  
and p aid -in  ca p ita l depend on the extent to  whrich the Arab Bank for  
Development i s  allowed, encouraged or re str ic ted  to  tap other 
sources.
Amongst those sources Arab private ca p ita l occupies a 
sp ec ia l p lace in  the financing of the Arab Iforld develop^-icnt.
Tapping Arab Private Funds
We sh a ll consider the ro le  o f Arab p rivate c a p ita l a t a 
regional le v e l  only. A ctually  i t  i s  not easy to ca lcu la te  the 
magnitude of th ese  funds but, as a r e su lt  o f  the ’spread e f f e c t ’ 
they are becoira.ng in crea sin g ly  important in the Arabian Peninsula, 
However, th e ir  ex isten ce  does not mean that in cen tives already e x is t .  
These funds are not id le  and therefore the Banlc must come up with 
a whole s e t  o f  in cen tiv es  to a ttr a c t  them i f  w5.11ing to do so . For 
in stan ce, H. Sh. Nashashibi takes the case of Arab private  
investm ents in  western in d u str ia lise d  cou n tr ies. Beyond confiimiing 
the arguments we expressed dn Chapter I I I , the author comes up with
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the conclusion that:
"in view; o f the r e s tr ic t io n s , the surplus Arab countries  
have m9.de in creasing e f fo r ts  to  d irec t a )%rt o f th e ir
n  )f in a n cia l resources to the needy Arab countries," '"
This underlines the correctness o f the opinion expressed e a r lie r  in  
th is  chapter, but i t  is  concerned mainly w;it!'> public funds. However 
h is  second conclusion i s  that:
"the la s t  two years have seen a turning point in  both le v e ls  
and in  the methods of private cap ita l flow w ithin  the Arab 
region, coupled w ith  the beginning of a s h if t  in  emphasis 
by Arab f in a n c ia l in s t itu t io n s  and centres from 
in tern a tio n a l investm ents to  regional and domestic 
investm ents, A process of ’involvement' in  the reg ion 's  
growth has c le a r ly  s e t  in  At long la s t  they have 
started  to  play th e  ro le  anticipated  from them, namely 
to  bridge the reg ion 's  demand and supply of ] m nable and 
equity funds, , , ^
This s h i f t  has not only to be welcomed but i t  has to be f u l ly  and 
advantageously used by the Arab World. VAiat ro le  can bhe Arab Bank 
fo r  Development p lay in  th is  f ie ld ?
The Bank can take advantage o f the Arab piûvate c a p ita l in  
two ways, e ith er  by borrowing or by a sso c ia tin g  i t  d ir e c t ly  with the 
financing o f the p r o jec ts , Boirowing can be e ith er  d ir e c t  or take 
the form of bond issu in g  in  countries 'wliere such funds are a v a ila b le , 
e.g* Kuwait, the U.A.ÏÏ. a i l  Saudi Arabia. As for the second 
a lte r n a tiv e  the terms and magnitude o f th is  a sso c ia tio n  r a ise  
severa l problems: such as secu r ity  and adeouate f in a n c ia l return, 
managenent and supervision  of the operations. The appL^cvr«.v\ccL‘ 
an Arab fin a n c ia l market, autonomous and 'inward look ing' w i l l  be 
very h e lp fu l, and poses le s s  tech n ica l d i f f i c u l t i e s .  However, we 
have to be aware o f the fa c t  th a t Arab private funds îm st be offered  
more a ttra c tiv e  terms. Concerning th is  very point H, Sh, Nashashibi
(1) -  Hikmat Sh, Nashashibi, "Regional Involvement, for Arab Honey",
The Banlcer. Fay 1977, p .33. The author i s  an a u th or ita tive  
source because he is  Head o f  the Kuwait International Investment 
Company, an investment company concerned with the investment of  
Kuwait p rivate funds,
(2) -  Ib id , p .34.
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w rites  th at the flow  of p r iva te  funds between Arab countries :
"has bee one an inevi. ta b le  trend Which extends beyond
mere n a t io n a lis t ic  considerations to  represent in  pure
economic terms the most su c cessfu l -  and s ig n if ic a n t  -
(1 )fin a n c ia l flow  among Arab cou n tries,"
According to  th e  same author, Arab borrowers ra ised  around 
112m, d o lla rs  in  the Kuvjait market in  1976; on the other hand 
in s t itu t io n s  in  charge of th is  "oonmerce" have been compensated 
because th e ir  f in a n c ia l earnings stepped-Vip during the same year.
I t  seems that the problem, o f  finance i s  more or le s s  removed, 
provided th at the Bank o ffe r s  eoual or b e tto r  terms for Arab private  
c a p ita l ,
In our opinion the problem of c a p ita lisa tio n  can be summed 
up as fo llow s: At l e a s t  in  the early  stages contribution  has to  be
ra.8de on a purely Arab b a s is , with reliance on public funds but the  
door must be l e f t  open to Arab p rivate funds. In our opinion such 
a method minimizes' the problems arisin g  from the management of the 
Banl{ i t s e l f ,  winich i s  presented in  the fo liw zing part,
SECTION II  -  5 : MNAGErDW 0? TIE ARAB BANK FCR nEVELOH''ENT
As a m atter o f fa c t  the mianagemert o f such a regional 
in s t itu t io n  i s  function  o f i t s  c a p ita lisa t io n , ( i . e .  member cou n tries, 
the degree of p o l i t i c a l  cohesion between the la t t e r  and f in a l ly  
in d iv idu al co n tr ib u tio n s).
The f i r s t  problem i s  the formation of the Board o f D irectors. 
This body w i l l  be co n stitu ted  by finance m inisters and/or cen tra l 
banlc or monetary a g en c ies’ governors and m inisters in  charge o f  
economic development in  member cou n tries. Our suggestion  i s  not 
fo r tu ito u s .
F ir s t ly , a tru ly  regional co-operation n e c e ss ita te s  
harmonisation in  the f ie ld s  of economics and finance.
Secondly, Arab finance m in isters are already members o f  
the Board of D irectors of th e  Arab Monetary Fund. This, in  our
( 1 )  -  I b i d ,  p . 3 4 .
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opinion, i s  a de facto  harmonisation between both in s t itu t io n s
Whose f ie ld s  o f competence are d iffe r e n t  and complementarj.
Tlie second problem i s  the choice o f the Executive D irectors,
Eight Arab countries form the executive Board o f the Arab Fonetaty
(l )Fund, A quick look at the members shows th at the Arab countries  
succeeded in  achieadng a fa ir  representation  both on geographical 
and wealth le v e ls .  In our opinion i t  i s  an adeouate p rin cip le  and 
we see no reason why i t  should not be su c ce ss fu lly  anplied in  tiie 
case o f the Arab Bank for Development, Consequently the executive  
boards o f  both in s t itu t io n s  -  Arab Monetary Fund and the Arab Bank 
fo r  Development -  w i l l  be more or le s s  complementary, •
'The third  problem i s  the choice o f the I%naging D irector. 
For every regional bank the s e le c t io n  o f  the candidate for such an 
o f f ic e  i s  an swlo/ a^rd problem, for  both p o l i t ic s  and competence have 
to  be considered, In our opinion i t  i s  w ise to choose the present 
>&naging D irector o f the Kuwait Fund for  Arab Econoiïdc Development, 
and such a choice can be ju s t if ie d  on several grounds.
F ir s t ly , according to  our p roject, the Kuwait Fund for Arab 
Economic Deve3.opm.ent w i l l  disappear.
Secondly, th is  in s t i tu t io n  has a long-standing experience  
in  the i l e ld  o f financing Arab economies, and f in a l ly ,  Kuwait, in  
s p ite  of i t s  contribution  to Arab econotrd.c development e f fo r ts  i s  
not a member o f  the Arab Monetary Fund's executive Board.
Furthermore, Kuvs?ait coii‘ld even provide the Headouarters -  the Kmvait 
Fund for Arab Economic Development's o f f ic e  -  and thus so lv e  another 
problem. Over the years the Arab Bank for Development w il l  have 
more and mcrs problems to ta ck le  and., th erefore, the creation o f  
sub-regional o f f ic e s  i s  to  be envisaged.
The fourth problem i s  the voting r i ^ t  system; two options 
are open to us; e ith e r  according to  the member's contribution  or 
according to the p r in c ip le  "one country one vote" , We sh a ll  s e t t le  
for the method in  p ractice  in  the Arab Monetary Fund and Islam ic  
Development Fund in  which the voting system i s  a function of the
(1) -  The Executive D irectors o f the Arab Monetary Fund (A.M.F.) are 
supplied by A lgeria , Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, T%uritania, Saudi 
Arabia, Somalia and the United Arab Emirates,
The î-{lanaging D irector was provided by Iraq (>'r. Jawad Hashim, 
a former planning m in ister ).
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member's ca p ita l contribution . Our choice has two advantages. On 
the one hand i t  has already been accepted as a p rin cip le  by Arab 
countries and i t  i s  very l ik e ly  to  have a p o s it iv e  in flu en ce on 
the Arab Banlc for Development's c a p ita l. In our opinion each Arab 
country sh a ll try  to  have a maximum say and conseouently they w i l l  . 
malce th e ir  maximal contribution . Thljs opinion can be checked by 
Arab countries with surpluses have made the b ig g est contribution  
in  the cases of the Arab Monetary Fund and the Islam ic Development 
Fund,
The f i f t h  problem i s  the d ecision  taking process, three 
methods are a v a ila b le : sim ple or absolute m ajority or unanimous
d ec isio n . I t  could be in ter estin g  to  know the method used w ithin  
the Arab Monetary Fund but, unfortunately, we are not in  possession  
of such inform ation. In our opinion a simple m ajority could be 
enough,
F in a lly  there i s  another e le ment l ik e ly  to contribute to  
the Arab Banlc for Development 's su ccess., . As mentioned throughout 
th is  research and mainly in  Chapter one, in  the Arab World the le v e l  
of l ite r a c y  i s  ve iy  low. To be more s p e c if ic ,  one can say  that 
Arab countries are underdeveloped in  the f ie ld  o f fjnanci&d. know-hc?w.
Every b ila te r a l  or m u ltila tera l lending agency has to  r e ly  
on foreign s k i l l  when i t  comes to  the appraisal, f im n oin g  and fo llo w -  
up o f p ro jec ts . I t  i s  obvious that the Arao Bank for Development 
w il l  not be immune to such a weakness but a t le a s t  i t  w i l l  remove the 
duplication  o f the recourse to th is  type o f s k i l l .  Furthermore, in  
the case of the Arab World, the Arab Bank for Development has already  
a t i t s  d isposa l a valuable a s se t , namely the s t a f f  o f  the in s t itu t io n s  
the Bank w i l l  have to  englobe. ih e ir  f in a n c ia l expertise  coupled 
with th eir  knowledge of Arab cou n tr ies' economies and problems w i l l  
su rely  be u se fu l to the new in s t itu t io n .
Before f in ish in g  th is  "technical part" one should r e fer  to  
another organisational problem: the Arab Banl< for Development's
r e la tio n s  with other in s t i tu t io n s ,
B -  The Arab Bank for Development's R elations with Other In stitu tio n s
R elations w ith as many e n t it ie s  as p o ssib le  have to be 
envisaged.
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1 -  R elation With the League of Arab States
The Arab Bank for  Development w i l l  be related  to and
autonomous from the League o f Arab S ta te s , By being connected to  
the League of Arab S ta tes i t  m i l  create and strengthen con su ltation s  
between Arab common in s t i tu t io n s .  By'being autonomous -  l ik e  the 
International 'Bank for  Economic Co-operation with the Comecon cen tra l 
a u th o r itie s  - from the League of Arab S ta tes, the Arab Bank for 
Development w i l l  not he under any p o l i t ic a l  pressure from i t ,  and, 
more im portantly, the Bank w i l l  s ta y  away from regular Arab in tern a l
set-backs bound to be w itnessed  by every e n tity  on i t s  way to
formation,
2 “ R elations with Member Countries
These linics should be as c lo se  as possible^ e sp e c ia lly  witdi 
domestic in s t itu t io n s  concerned with finance and development. This 
linlc i s  more or l e s s  assured *de f a c to ’ because member co u n tr ie s’ 
finance and eccnorlc m inisters are already members of the Board of  
Governors o f the Arab Bank for Development. Furthermore, the  
creation  of joint,-oom nlttee grouping Arab Bank for  Development’s 
eaq^erts and o ff ic ia ls /e .x p sr ts  from member countries i s  to  be 
promoted.
These re la tio n s  are the most important ones V^ecause they are 
a t the core of the p r o je c t's  success or fa ilu r e . I t  i s  a lso  a risk y  
f ie ld  because in d iv idu al s t a t e s ’ prerogatives on the one hB,nd and a 
necessary "aggressive" p o licy  on the part of the Bank on the other 
hand.
I t  follovjs th a t clashes between both bodies have to be 
avoided by a l l  means.
3 -  R elations w ith  Arab B ila te r a l and I-U-til.et e r a l  Lending Agencies
With the agencies concerned with development problems -  
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, Abu Dhabi Fund, for Arab 
Economic Development, Arab Fund for Economic and Socia l Development, 
Islam ic Development Fund and the Saudi Development Fund -  already  
incorporated in to  the Arab Bank for Development, only funds concerned 
vdth B,O.P. support are l e f t .  I t  is  preferable to see these funds 
merging in to  a s in g le  in s t itu t io n  which has to  be c lo s e ly  linked to
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the Arab Bank for Development* On the other hand i f  things stay  
as they are the Arab Bank fo r  Development must have r e la t io n s  with  
each one of tiem , Regular contact has to  be estab lish ed  and i f  
need a r ise s  jo in t  committees have to be se t  up* The lin k  between 
the Arab Monetary Fund and the Arab Bank for  Development has 
already been referred to ,
4 -  R elations With Non-Arab In s titu tio n s
By non-Arab bodies we mean non-meniber countries and 
in tern a tio n a l organ isation s, With the former, e sp e c ia lly  t^ose 
engaged in  the econoiîD.c development of the region , a member countrv^s 
contacts are necessary de fa c to . I t  i s  these countries wbich are 
providing the bulk o f e x p er tise .
With the la t t e r  such as the I.M .F., t^e World Bank -  
in s t itu t io n s  able to  provide fin a n c ia l and tecb n ica l exp ertise  -  
o f f i c i a l  re la tio n s  are a must.
In our opinion those are the tmnagement, tech n ica l and 
organisational d i f f i c u l t i e s  that have to be d ea lt  w ith , Fowevsi’, 
there i s  a problem th at we have not y et mentioned and. X'hose 
importance i s  paramount, e sp e c ia lly  in  the context of the region væ 
are concerned withî the u n it o f account of the Arab Banlc for  
Developmnt; Wiich currency or currencies ca o ita l has to be paid in; 
■Wnich currency the Arab Bank for  Development w i l l  be using and so on. 
These questions c o n stitu te  the substance of tb© next section  of our 
present chapter,
SECTION I I I  ; UNIT OF ACCOUNT OF m  ARAB BANK FOR
This problem w i l l  be d ea lt with in  three s ta g es . F ir s t ly  a 
comparative study of other regional development banks, secondly, 
the current s itu a t io n  of the Arab World in  the monetary f ie ld ,  and 
f in a l ly  the case of the Arab Bank fo r  Development w i l l  be presented. 
However, before dealing with these problems we have to s e t t l e  the 
problem o f s ta b i l i t y  of the currencies in  which loans are denominated. 
In our opinion Xn/hatever the currency/currencies used by the Arab Bank 
for Development to denominate i t s  loans in , including the S.D .R ,, 
they are being eroded. Every c a p ita l lending in s t itu t io n  l iv e s  m th
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th is  problem, consequently one should not expect us fjo come up xd-th 
any so lu tio n ,
SECTION I I I  -  1 : THE UNIT OF A01 CUNT OF OTÎ-RR REOIONAX DEVELOPAflTr
BANKS
By other regional banks vje mean the Asian Development Bank, 
the African Development Bank and the International Bank for Economic 
Co-operation,
A -  The Asian and. African Development Banks
For the Asian Development Banlc the unit o f  account i s  th©
U .S. d o lla r , but the contribution  i s  not x^holly paid in  the American
currency, but p artly  in  gold and hard currencies and p a rtly  in
domestic currency; more s p e c if ic a lly ;
”46,25^ in  gold or con vertib le  currencies and 53 .75 / in the
currency o f  the member.
This system can be considered as a c la s s ic a l  one for i t  does not
contain any innovation and from t h is  point o f viex'j does not present
any importance comparatively to  other in s t itu t io n s .  The same
judgement applies to  the African Development Bank because;
"pajnnent o f the amount 8ubscii.bed to  the paid-up c a p ita l
(o )
i s  made in  gold and con vertib le  currencies,"
However, both systems are understandable because both in s t itu t io n s  
XA,'ere conceived in  the early  *60s (1964) xVhen gold X'^ as the p i l la r  of 
the in tern ation a l monetary system (IT'S ) arid the American currency was 
enjoying a s im ilar  s ta tu s . Since then, much water has run under 
the bridges and, on one hand, gold i s  being "phased out" o f  the I.M.S. 
on the other hand the World confidence enjoyed by the U.S. cw rency  
seems to  have been damaged. In th at sense, n either bank in d ica tes  
future trends in  the f ie ld  o f f in a n c ia l structure arrangements.
From th is  po in t of view the experiment of the Comecon 
countries i s  more worthwhile studying,
(1) -  "The Far East and A ustralia  1975-76", Ei.iropa, Publications Ltd.
London, 1975, p .109.
(2j -  "Africa South o f the Sahara 1975-76", Europa P ublications Ltd. 
London 1975> p .94.
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B " The International Banlc for Economic Co-operation
This case i s  more complex for i t  le d  to the creation  o f  a
"regional in tern ation a l payments" system based on the Transferable
Rouble (T.R,) .  Trade between meuber c0untr3.es i s  undertaken in
n ational currencies w ith the p o s s ib i l i t y  of converting the balance
in to  Transferable Roubles, Hov^ver, what i s  the Transferable Rouble?
I t  i s  the enuivalent o f 0.9&7413 grammes of pure gold . But,
according to M. Lavigne;
"the fa c t  that the currency i s  the rouble gives no sp e c ia l
advantages to  the U.S.S.R."^^^
The Transferable Rouble i s  not used by the n ation a ls of the Comecon
countries for th e ir  d a ily  l i f e .  I t  i s  ju st a medium o f  payment
between the countries party to the 1963 agreement which led  to  the
crea tio n  of th i s  monetary u n i t .
Furthermore, although the Transferable Rouble i s  not
con vertib le , according to M, Lavigne;
" .. .th e r e  seemed to be a step  tow-ards c o n v e r t ib ility  in
October I 965 when countries X'^ hich were lïiembers of the
banks decided to  subscribe a part of i t s  c a p ita l -= 1 0 /
-  in  gold and con vertib le  foreign  cu rren cies, A
further 1 0 / was freed  in  th e same way in  1970."
I t  fo llow s then, that the move tox^ Tards c o n v e r t ib ility  i s  taken step
by step . From another point o f  V3.ew, i t  seems th a t the Transferable
Rouble i s  backed by gold but not autom atically  convertib le into
gold; furthermore the Transferable Rouble; "as a u n it of payment
( 2 )
could not be d isp laced  by gold and foreign  currencies."
However, sin ce then, the s itu a tio n  has changed because;
"a few months ago the regu la tion s governing the functioning
o f the Transferable Rouble were rexrised to permit traders
in  non-communist countries to choose between sto ck p ilin g
the proceeds o f th e ir  exports to  the East in  Transferable
Rouble account, and using them to buy goods from other
countries in  the region, th ings they were not p rev iou sly
( ? )encouraged to do." '" '
(1 ) -  f e r ie  Lavigne, op, c i t .  p .314.
(2) -  Ib id , p .314.
( 3 ) -  The Observer, "Russia’s C apital Idea", London, 20 March 1977.
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The move has been taken towards the consolidation  o f  the 
Transferable Rouble, a con so lid ation  seen by some as a challenge to  
western currencies. The point to  be made i s  th at the Common 
Agreement led  to  the creation  o f  a new currency d ifferen t from 
every member’s currency. The system has been operating for more 
than a decade and i t  gained in  strength .
The question  o f the c o n v e r t ib ility  o f the Transferable 
Rouble has been repeatedly ra ised  ànd the U.S.S.R . always opposed i t .  
The S ov iet Union claimed th a t such a question has to be treated  in  
the context of the Comecon’s in te r e s t .  The c o n v e r t ib ility  or 
n o n -co n v ertib ility  o f any Arab currency has to be considered in  th is  
l ig h t  too . However, before trea tin g  the creation  o f  such a currency, 
the experience of the European Economic Community or E,E,C. has to  
be considered,
C “ The Case o f  the E.E.C. Countries.
In th is  f ie ld  the E.E.C. i s  rich in  contributions: the
Wemer Report, the creation  of the Europa and f in a l ly  the creati.cn of 
the E urostalle(E S).
Since the ea r ly  1970s the E.E.C. members se t  for themselves 
the d i f f i c u l t  task o f monetary in teg ra tio n . The proposals fo r  such 
a scheme are contained in  the Werner Report adopted by the E.E.C. in  
March 1971. The report airrs a t  f u l l  economic and. monetary union to  
be implemented in  three stages over a decade, i . e .  by 19^1. This 
document is  too complex and by far  ou tstr ip s our current aims, that 
i s  why we put i t  a s id e .
The second, contribution  to  our f ie ld  i s  just a proposal nrnde 
by nine West European prominent econom ists. They proposed the 
creation  of a s in ^ e  European currency ca lled  EUROPA, with a constant 
purchasing power. With respect to  our research two p oin ts deserve 
our a tten tion ;
-  the issu in g  o f the Europa i s  undertaken by the E.E.C, cen tra l banks.
-  The Europa " ..should  be purchased by nationals o f E.E.C, countries  
with th e ir  n ation al money, a t a variab le exchange rate."^^^
The proposal i s  h ea v ily  based on central banks and p rivate in tem a tio n a l  
banlcs. Given the present Arab co u n tr ie s ’ banking system -
(1) -  The Economist, November, 1975, P#33.
The I%nifesto of the nine economists i s  published by the above- 
mentioned magazine, pp. 33-3Ô.
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c f .  Chapter IV' -  the r e a lisa t io n  o f  such a proposal i s  unthinkable in  
the Arab World *s content. Furthermore i t  has not even received  
great a tten tion  in  the E.F.G. area and, th erefore, we do not f e e l  the 
need to  carry out further in vestigation s*
« F in a lly , the la s t  proposal has been made by Jacoues Riboud.
Jacoueo Riboud’s Proposal s Tlie Eurostable (FS)
We s h a ll  not undertake a thorough srudy o f the Furostable, 
but concentrate mainly on the o r ig in a lity  of the p roject,
-  The Eurostable i s  an abstract currency because i t  is  not based on 
any resources.
-  I t s  value proceeds from i t s  constant purchasing power. Such a 
constancy i s  reached by using new techniques such as consumer 
price indexes.
-  The Eurostable i s  not to be used w ith in  in d iv idu al s ta te s  fort
"a unit of account ex tra -n ation a l, and e x c lu s iv e ly  extra- 
national, which does not serve for ultim ate settlem ents  
w ithin  s ta te s  can be adjusted r e la t iv e ly  to national 
currencies in  such a way as to maintain a stab le  value, the 
e s se n tia l q u a lity  o f  a monetary standard,’'
~ Another Q uality of the Eurostable i s  to be s u f f io ie n t ly  a v a ila b le ,
-  The Eurostable i s  to be issued  by member court t r ie s  ' cen tra l banks 
and the big p rivate  banks,
-  The role o f  the Eurostable i s  to compete with the U,S, d o llar  and 
other strong currencies in  the Euro-currencies Fnrket.
The author ra ise s  several piDblems rela ted  to  the creation of  
any currency, the main ones being: thejcate o f’ exchange between the
Eurostable and European currencies, and the problem of specu lation . 
According to J . Riboud Europe sh a ll derive some advanta,ges from the 
creation  o f a unique currency,
-  According to the author, given the s t a b i l i t y  o f the Eu_rostable, 
inter-European trade w i l l  be smoother.
(1) -  Jacques Riboud, "A Currency for Europe ; The Eurostable"
(in  French), E dition  Revue P o litio u e  e t  Parlementaire, Paris,
1975, p .231
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-  European fin an o la l resources w i l l  not f l y  out o f the country,
-  Non-metrfoer countries w all be in c lin ed  to tra n sfer  th e ir  resources 
to Europe, by countries J, Riboud s p e c if ic a l ly  means the OTEC 
cou n tries,
-  F in a lly , raw m aterial p rices wi3X be s ta b ilis e d  provided they are 
fixed  in  Eurostable,
Another advantage i s  that;
"the Eurostable, in  c ircu la tio n  and in  s to re , v d l l  affirm  the 
monetary independence of Europe, a necessary condition for  
economic and p o l i t i c a l  independence a monetary union w i l l  
co n stitu te  for the World a proof of the European w il l  for  
unity  and independence," ^
The creation  o f an Arab currency w i l l  have to take in to  account 
the experience of other regions and. mainly i t s  specifi-C aims and 
conditions in  the monetary, p o l i t ic a l  and econoiïd.c f ie ld s .  This 
currency w1 7 l1  not spring from nothingness because some r e a l i t ie s  e x is t  
and some step s have been taken; i t  i s  necessary to present a l l  
these elem ents. By r e a l i t ie s  we mean the growing use of some Arab 
currencies.
SECTION I I I  « .2 ; Tm  USE OF ARAB CURRMCIES
The use o f Arab curren cies, beyond th e ir  own fr o n tie r s , i s  a 
new phenomenon and could be considered, in  some w;ays, as one of the 
p o s it iv e  e f f e c t s  o f the o i l  c r i s i s .  After 1973 Arab o i l  countries  
became aid donors and "money lenders" and in  th a t capacity and given  
th e ir  fin an cia l a b i l i t i e s  they were in  a p osition  to decide the 
currency the Ican'-pd to be denominated in . The number o f loans 
denotninated i.n Arab currencies was high in  1973 and 1974. As a 
matter o f fa c t , Arab currencies wiere being promoted in two d iffe r e n t  
ways: e ith er  ind iiridually  or baskets of Arab curren cies,
A -  The Growi.ng Use o f Individual Arab Currencies
A type of currency worth w hile mentioning i s  the kind resu ltin g  
from the creation  o f  m ultinational agen cies. We have in  mind 
p a rticu la r ly  the "Islamic Dinars", created with the Islam ic Development
( 1 )  -  J ,  R ib o u d , o p .  c i t ,  p p . 2 3 3 - 4 .
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Fund (IDF) that we presented in  the course of our previous chapter.
However, the itnpact o f sudi a currency has been n e g lig ib le  
and th erefore , from the point o f  view o f the creation  o f an Arab 
currency, i t  i s  not imi^ortant. I t  apnears that the currencies 
promoted belong mainly to in d iv idu al cou n tries. But not a l l  the 
Arab oil. countries moved in  th is  d irec tio n .
The absence o f  in i t ia t iv e  cannot be explained by the  
magnitude o f o i l  revenues, because in  th is  f ie ld  the Saudi Riyal i s  
absent. Only three Arab currencies were promoted, namely the 
Lebanese Pound, th e  U.A.S. Dirham and the K w ait Dinar, We sh a ll 
present them in  th is  order,
1 , The Lebanese Pound
As a matter of f a c t  the Lebanese Pound the f i r s t  one to 
be uset’î for loans outside Lebanon and w e ll before 1973, This was 
due mainly to  the exp ertise  of B eirut a t th?t tinie because lebanon 
was the "Switzerland of the Piddle East". Irom .cally  enough the  
1973 o i l  c r i s i s  damaged, the r o le  and importance of th is  currency 
whose co llap se can be explained by three reasons;
-  The absence of any surplus funds on the part o f the ca in try  
concerned,
-  The growing o i l  revenues in  neighbouring countries and th is  gave 
more confidence to th e ir  nationals to promote th e ir  ovm cu rren cies. 
This has been complicated by the Lebanese A uthorities who 
discourage lo c a l  in s t itu t io n s  from p a r tie ipa.ting in  issu e s  in  o tie r  
cou n tries,
-  F in a lly , the two-year c iv i]  war shattered any hope^ i f  there was any, 
o f seeing  the Lebanese Pound re-emerging as a leading currency in  
the region . Other currencies took the re la y .
2 -  The U.A.E, Dirham
This currency appeared mainly in 1974 when a loan denominated 
in  U.A.E, Dirham was granted to  th e i/or Id Bank, Another step  has 
been a medium term loan fo r  the b en e fit  of Abu Dhabi Telegraph and 
Telephone Company, Several other private placements occurred.
(o f ,  A.ppendix 7 -1 ) .
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3 -  The Kuwait Dinar
Kuwait has long standing experience in  th is  f ie ld  too , 
because loans granted by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development 
are a c tu a lly  denominated in  Kuv;aiti Dinars. ■ Two other lo ca l  
in s t itu t io n s  » the Kuv/ait Investment Comnany (KIC) and the Kw;ait 
Foreign Trading, Contracting and Investment Company ( IC ) -  are 
a ctiv e  in  th is  f ie ld  too , howjever, "the most notable development in  
1974 was perhaps the f i r s t  appearance o f public issu es  denominated 
in  Kiiw;aiti D i n a r s ^  Tine b e n e fic ia r ie s  of the l a s t  two currencies 
are veiy- numerous and cover a wide range o f public bodies such as 
A lgeria , Sudan, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and 
Ireland. For the f u l l  l i s t  up to 1974 (cf .  Appendix ¥ - 1 ) .
The main reason which explains the success o f such develop­
ments i s  that loans denoiainated in  Arab currencies leave in ta c t  the  
borrower's access to  the Eurobond and Euro-currency markets, We 
sh a ll not, a t  th is  stage, take up a p osition  for or again st because 
vm have f i r s t  no consider the second t^ p^e of development.
B -  Bask e ts  of  Arab C urrencies
The purpose o f iJione baskets or co ck ta ils  i s  tw o-fold; on 
the one hand to  widen the niarket and on the other hand to avoid 
f lu c tu a tio n s . As a matter o f fa c t  the syatem is  d ifferen t from thiC 
previous one because loans are not denorainatei in  any Arab currency 
or curren cies. They are denominated in  D,8,  d o llars mainly, the 
innovation appears in  the fa c t  th a t repayment i s  adjusted to  several 
Arab currencies; only three cases occurred in  the years 1973-74.
1 . -  F ir st  Case ; The Oman Loan
Three f in a n c ia l in s t itu t io n s  -  Harnbros Bank, the Kuwait 
Foreign Trading, Contracting and Investment Company and the Libya 
Foreign Arab Banlc -  managed a loan to  th e  Oman government, a loan 
denominated in  Am erican-dollars. However, repayment was to:
"be adjusted in  accordance w ith s ix  Arabian Culf currencies
-  the Kuwaiti Dinar, the Saudi R iyal, the Watar R iyal, the
(ç> )
Bahrain Dinar, the U.A.E, Dirham and the Oman R iy a l."
(1) “ The Banker, "Oil and Koney", March 1975, p . 207.
(2) The Banker, March 1975, p . 209.
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2, -  Second Case ; The Arab Currency R elated Unit or ARCRIJ
The Arab Currency Related Unit -was put in to  p ractice  by 
the Hambros Baiic, The value of the Arab Currencv Related Unit i s  
function of the movement o f twelve Arab cu rrencies, w ith the base 
date being June 0, 1974.
"in arriving at trie value o f  the Arab Currfmcy Related Unit 
on any one day, one excludes tlie two stron gest and the two 
weakest cu rrm cies and ca lcu la te s  the value be reference 
of the remaining e ig h t.
This form ula has th re e  advantages;
-  The value o f the  Arab Currency R ela ted  Unit i s  c a lc u la te d  d a i ly ,
-  The value and performance o f  Arab o i l  countries' currency i s  
represented along m th  some "have-nots" currencies, the currencies . 
involved being those o f  Algeid.a, Libya, Fg'^ p^t, Irao, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Oma.n, Qatar, Sudan, Syria  and the United Arab Emirates,
-  I r r e g u la r  -  upwfard o r  downward -  movements of any one s in g le  
currency  a re  e lim in a ted .
One Swedish Firm was granted a loan th is  way.
3. -  Third Case ; The Banoue E x té r ie u re  d 'A lre r ie  Loan,
This f in a l  experiment i s  mainly due to the innovation of a 
jo in t  venture operation. Even though other financial, in te r e s ts  
weie party- to  i t ,  i t  was mabily managed by the F irst Chicago and the 
Kuwait Foreign Trading, Contracting and Investment Comoany, This 
1974 p roject was a bond issu e  from, the Banoue Extérieure d 'A lgérie, 
however, i t  never got o f f  the ground. The loan was aboi,it to be 
denominated in , and repayment to occur in, U .S .'d o lla r s . The 
innovation l i e s  in  the fa c t  th at repayment i s  function of the 
performance o f three Arabian Gulf currencies; the Kuwait Uina.r, the  
U.A.E. Dirham and the Qatar R iyal,
In our opinion th e  use of in d iv id u a l Arab cu rren c ie s  and 
com posite u n i ts  c c n s t i tu te s  the main element of p a s t tre n d , aM  b efo re  
mo-ving to  l i k e ly  fu tu re  developments some conclusions have to be 
drai'vn.
( 1 )  -  I b i d .
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-  F ir s t ly , the omnipresence of the Kuwaiti Dinar, This tra n sla tes  
not only the c a p ita l surplus of the country concerned but a lso  the 
newly acouired f in a n c ia l ex p ertise  of i t s  n a tio n a ls , mainly 
through the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development,
-  The ro le  played by Hambros Bank deserves some a tten tio n . The 
quasi-lead  taken by th is  in s t itu t io n  i s  very  t e l l in g  in i t s e l f .
The re su lt  i s  that in  the monetary f ie ld  -  ju st  l ik e  the f in a n c ia l 
f ie ld  (of ,  Cl’japter I I I ) ,  Arab countries s t i l l  f e e l  the urge to  
a sso c ia te  themselves vdLtVi, or go through, non-Arab in s t itu t io n s .
One i s  l e f t  with the fe e lin g  th a t a kind o f  "endorsement" must be 
given to  Arab in s t i tu t io n s .  This could be u sefu l to a certa in  
ex ten t. However, the u ltim ate I’e s u lt  remains d i f f i c u l t  to fo resee .
The past trend contains obvious disadvantages,
-  There was no uniform ity between or con tin u ity  in  the d iverse  
experiments. This led  to a s itu a tio n  where several currencies  
were being promoted a t the same time. Consequently a de facto  
com petition emerged, one Which victim ized  the Lebanese Found.
-  Although only regional currencies were concerned the experiments 
in  themselves were "imported" and th is  underlines the " d ifficu lty"  
of in d ividual countries to  come up with home-made and Wome- 
applied p ro jects .
One has to concede, a lb e it  happily, that the l a s t  c r it ic ism  ap p lies  
only to  the period running up to  1976, because from then cnwaids sons 
progress has been made, vJhich w i l l  con stitu te  the substance o f  our 
next sec tio n ,
C -  Tie Gulf S tates '  Common Currency
As a matter of f a c t  we are in  possession  o f l i t t l e  information  
concerning the above-.mentioned currency, because i t  has not yet been 
created . I t  i s  hoped that i t  w i l l  be introduced by mid-1970. Five  
currencies are expected to  fo m  i t ;  the Kuwait Dinar, the Bahrain 
Dinar, the Qatar R iya l, the U.A.E, Dirham, and f in a l ly ,  the Oman R iyal, 
I t  i s  thought that th is  currency w i l l  be in  the form of a dinar or a 
r iy a l.
According to Sheikh Abdul Aziz, the creation o f a Gulf 
States* common currency co n stitu tes  the f i r s t  step  towards the  
establishm ent of a market for that sp e c if ic  region, the structure and
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aiins of such a market have to  be c l a r i f i e d ,
Tlie second p o in t i s  t h a t  no t a l l  the Arabian Peninsula 
c o u n tr ie s  a re  p a r ty  to  tlie p r o je c t .  The l e a s t  one can say  i s  th a t  
th e  absence of Saudi Arabia is  too  ob-^/ious,
As mentioned e a r l i e r ,  those c o u n tr ie s  do n o t enjoy any 
com parative advantages amongst them selves. Furtherm ore, in  1974 
the  combined p o p u la tio n  o f four o f the c o u n tr ie s  concerned by the 
p ro je c t ,  Kuwait, U .A .E ., B ahrain and Oman, was ju s t  over 2,2m. 
in h a b ita n ts .  I t  i s  to o  sm all a popu3.ation fo r  a maidcet.
In  oui' op in ion , given th e  volume o f in te r-A rab  tra d e , and 
given the l e v e l  of econoiric development of in d iv id u a l Arab c o u n tr ie s , 
i t  i s  im possib le  t h a t  any ind iv i.dual Arab currency w i l l  emerge as a 
common currency  fo r  th e  e n t i r e  reg io n . On the o th er hand, f ie  
c re a tio n  o f  s e v e ra l su b -reg io n a l cu rren c ie s  does not c o n s t i tu te  th e  
way o u t. The reason i s  th a t  sub-.reg ional cu rren c ie s  w i l l  have to  
be based on su b -reg io n a l m arkets, o r , in  o th e r  words, more v iab le  
p o l i t i c a l  arid economic e n t i t i e s  and th e re fo re  le s s  in c lin e d  towards 
a "reg iona 'L isation" o f the  so lu tio n s  to  i n t r i n s i c a l l y  reg io n a l 
problem s. In  our opin ion  the so lu tio n  i s  the c re a tio n  of a s in g le  
cu rrency  fo r  the Wnole Arab h/orld, one which we s h a l l  c a l l  Arab D inar.
SECTION I I I  -  3 : THE CREATION OF AN ARAB DINAR
The c re a t io n  of an Arab Dinar (AD) i s  a n e c e s s ity  and., in  
the p re sen t co n tex t of th e  Arab World, has to  be seen as in e v ita b le ;  
b u t in  s p i te  o f th a t  we f e e l  the need to  j u s t i f y  i t ,
A -  J u s t i f i c a t io n  o f an A^rab D inar
Tlie c re a tio n  o f  a s in g le  Arab Dinar can be j u s t i f i e d  both  on 
p o l i t i c a l  and economic groim ds.
-  In  C hapter’l l  we showed the advantages accru ing  to  the U.S.A. because
o i l  revenues were paid and k ep t in  i t s  cu rrency . I f  an Arab Dinar
comes in to  being  a l l  o f th ese  advantages v d l l  accrue  -  and r ig h t ly  
so -  to  th e  Arab World,
This i s  shown in  th e  n ex t ta b le .
TABLE 45 Î The R eshuffling Process in  Case o f  the  
E xistence o f a S in gle  Arab Currency
O.FQC.D.
Countries
s
I  
I
\!/
Arab
World
A
liII(
I
V
I F
l|
I
II
A
—
Non-oil
Developing
Countries,
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In th is  scenario the folloi^/in,g assumptions 8.re m de.
-T h e  Arab World i s  seen as a s in g le  economic u n it, Ihe subdivi.sion 
o f the other two groups in  to countries would not a f fe c t  our 
a n a ly s is .
-  We d istin gu ish  between o i l  and n on -o il trade.
-  The Arab V.'orld experiences a surplus current account. This i s  a 
fa c t  from 1974 onwards.
-  The o i l  b i l l s  are s e t t le d  in  Arab Dinars. I t  does not matter i f  
o i l  p rices are ca lcu la ted  in  another currency or Rroup of ou men c i  e s .
-  Tlie foreign  trade of the Arab World is  carried out in Arab Dinars.
I t  means that the la t t e r  i s  on enual fobbing with the so-cald.ed "hard 
currencies" in  which the World trade i s  midertaken.
Then what are the im plications of such a s itu a t io n  as far  
as the resh u fflin g  process i s  concerned?
According to the diagram the surpluses accum ulate^in Arab 
Dinars and i f  one makes abstraction  o f the working of the World 
banking centres or one supposes that the Arab World has i t s  own 
banking centre the surpluses are geographically located  w ith in  the 
Arab World, Tliis would have made i t  more i i f f i c u l t  fo:^U.K. and 
p ai'ticu larly  the U.S.A. to cope wi.th the o i l  c id s i s  (c f . Chapters II  
and IV), I t  wguld have a lso  meant that the Arab World i s  primarily- 
involved in  the resh u fflin g  process whereas iro to no’w we have seen  
that i t  was a passive generator o f  funds,
On the other hand, the ex isten ce of a s in g le  Arab currency
used by a i l  the members of the League of ûrab S tates would have had
the e f fe c t  of a ssim ila tin g  the Arab World as a s in g le  area ànd the
present Arab countries as i t s  composing reg ion s. This s itu a tio n  
would have p a rtly  contributed in  so lv ing the current payment 
imbalance e x is t in g  between the three groups. In p ra c tic a l terms i t  
would have increased Arab iJiporbs from O.E.C.D. and n o n -o il developing  
cou n tries. As we said e a r lie r , the Arab World as a vhole has a 
large absorptive cap acity , consequently a s in g le  currency would have 
transformed the la t t e r  in to  larger imports because i t  would have 
given to n o n -o il Arab cou n tries the ce,pacity to import more by paying 
with Arab Dinars with the la t t e r  being used by exporting countries  
to  pay for th e ir  o i l  b i l l .  Under sim ilar  circumstances the 
financing process would have been o f a sm aller s iz e  because goods
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would have followed money.
However, the problem becomes more complex i f  one considers 
the power issu in g  the Arab Dinars. I f  the Arab Dinar i s  fr e e ly  
issu ed  by Arab governments, a very u n lik ely  s itu a tio n  otherwise i t  
would not have a s ta b le  value, we would have had the scenario  
mentioned above and the o i l  c r i s i s  would have led  to higher world 
a c t iv it y  instead  o f a recessio n . On the o tier  hand, i f  the Arab 
Dinar i s  Issued by a common in s t itu t io n  such as the Arab Ibnetary 
Fund or the Arab Bank for Development, some kind o f mec’nanism would 
have been necessary, V/e c a l l  th is  mechanism a resh u fflin g  process. 
Under th is  circumstance the resh u fflin g  process would not find ways 
and means to  finance o il-induced  B.O.P. d e f ic i t  according to  every 
country's requirements but d is tr ib u tin g  a l l  or part o f  the surpluses 
between the n o n -o il Arab countiu.es in  order to s a t i s fy  th e ir  imports 
requirements for development purpose.
The conclusion i s  th at e ith e r  the Arab Dinar i s  issued  by 
in d iv idu al Arab countries or by a cominon in s t itu t io n  i t s  ex isten ce  
would have minimized the negative aspect of the o i l  c r is is  for the 
three groups o f countries and prim arily for the b en efit of the Arab 
World.
The creation o f an Arab D im r would a lso  mean ether types 
o f advantages accruing s p e c if ic a l ly  to  the Arab World. For 
in stance the fa c t  o f issu in g  money has always con stitu ted  a 
p r iv ile g e , ca lled  seign iorage, for the i ssuing authority .
-  I t  a lso  means a p o s it iv e  step' towards the creation of a regional 
mricet vbich has to be d efin ed , e sp ec ia lly  i f  one r e fers  to  the 
fa ilu r e  o f  the Arab Common I-b -rk et.^
-  For Jacques Riboud, the creation  of an Eurostable has to  be seen 
as proof o f the E.E.C*s w i l l  to  unite and be p o l i t ic a l ly  and 
econom ically independent. The same argument applies to  the Arab 
Dinar and the Arab World,
-  Given the present chaotic s itu a t io n  o f the I,M .S. a stab le  
regional currency w i l l  co n stitu te  the Arab World's contribution  to 
s ta b i l i s e  i t .
(1) -  An account o f th is  p roject has been given by Alfred G. Wusrey, 
"An Arab Common Market", Publisher Frederick A, Prayer, New 
York, Washington, London, 1965.
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Before presenting our idea about a s in g le  Arab currency,
a f in a l element remains to  be seen, the unit of account of the
Arab Monetary Fund,
B " The Arab Abnetary Fund's Arab Dinar
Since we started  our present research we had in  mind the
creation  o f an Arab Dinar, and the fa c t  th a t the Arab Monetary T-und's
u n it o f account i s  an Arab Dinar i s  an encouraging sign for  us for
two main reasons. On the one hand i t  underlines the "correctness"
o f our perception o f the Arab World's evolu tion , and on the ot^er
hand i t  means that th is  very Arab World has been im;:roving. This
improvement i s  mainly due to  the fa c t that the Arab World has star’ted
to  understaird the r e a l dimension of i t s  problems.
However, i s  th is  l a s t  born currency the one we had in  mind?
According to the Economist, the Arab Fbnetary Fund's : "subscriptions
are in  fa c t  denominated in Arab Dinars, a un it o f  account eouivalent 
M l  )to three S .D .R s," ' ' I t  appears then that  ^ ADI e  SDR^3. Such 
an equation adds some problems because there are severa l ways to  
reach i t ,  each of which w i l l  be presented,
-  The f i r s t  method could be to  decide from the beginning that
SDRyS ^  AD 1 , This means th a t the value o f  the Arab Dinar depends
on the performance o f the s ix teen  currencies composing one SDR. In
other words i t  means th at the Arab Dinar i s  cut o ff  from every Arab
currency because none o f  them i s  included in  the basket composing
the SDR, The value and performance of tDose s ix teen  currencies
(3 )depend on the p o lic ie s  and d ec isio n s  of non-Arab governments. 
Consequently i t  w i l l  be im possible fo r  the Arab World to  maintain 
a constant value o f such an "outward-looking" currency. Furthermore 
even though such a s t a b i l i t y  could be maintained, there would be no 
lin k  between indit'd dual currencies and the common currency, except 
via  the SDR,
(1) -  The Economist, c f .  A r tic le , "Arab Monetary Fund -  The Dinar
I.M.F,?", April 23, 1977, p .92.
(2) -  The In ternational Monetary Fund has only recen tly  decided to
include the currencies of two OIEC countries -  Iren and Saudi 
Arabia -  in  i t s  SDR bask et. They v i l l  take the place o f the 
currencies o f  South A frica and Denmark, This d ecision  w i l l  
become e f fe c t iv e  on July 1 , 1970, c f .  I.M .F, Survey, April 
1970, p .100.
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-  T n e  second method could be to  tak e  a b ask e t of se lec ted  Arab 
currencies and w ith  o r w ithou t a sj’stem  of w eight t o  reach the 
above-menti oned eq u ati on•
The choice o f those cu rren c ie s  -  ssjir Arab o i l  c o u n tr ie s ' 
cu rrencies  -  and the r e l a t iv e  w eight of each one poses some 
d i f f i c u l t i e s .  I t  a lso  means th a t  some Arab c u rre n c ie s  are  excluded 
and f in a l ly ,  th e  l e a s t  one can say  i s  th a t  such a cu rrency  does no t 
have the consensus of the  whole of the Arab c c u îitr ie s . F in a lly , 
th e  Arab Dinar would no t r e f l e c t  th e  perfor% m ce o f th e  e n t i r e  Arab 
World economy.
-  'The th ird  method could be to  tak e  th e  whole tw enty  Arab cu rren c ie s  
and w/ith o r w ithout an ader^uate system  of wjcight to  a r r iv e  a t  the  
value of th re e  SDRs. The f i r s t  advantage i s  th a t  a l l  Arab 
co u n trie s  are  more o r le s s  on an enual foo ting  and th e re fo re  th is  
c o n s ti tu te s  an iiic e n tiv e , ira .rticu la ï’ly  fo r  sm aller c o u n tr ie s , to  
undertake fu tu re  co -o p e ra tio n  in  th is  and o th e r f ie ld s .
However, .the  w e i ^ t  accorded to  d i f f e r e n t  cu rren c ie s  must 
be c a u tio u s ly  d e a l t  w ith . In th i s  casé t>>e Arab Dinar w i l l  be 
based on ju s t  fo u r more cu rren c ies  than the SDR, This could be 
e a s i ly  imnageable and one can expect th a t  any f lu c tu a tio n s  o f any one 
currency can be more or le s s  e lim in a ted .
However ive are  ju s t  making sp ecu la tio n s  about the 
r e a l is a t io n  o f th e  Arab D inar, used s s  a u n i t  of accounh by the Arab 
Kbnetary Fund, According to  the Economi.st such a u n i t  of account 
does no t c o n s ti tu te  a s in g le  cu rrency  wh:ich i s ;  "a long w%y o f f ."
This means th a t  th e  Arab Monetary Fund 's Arab D inar i s  n o t 
the currency we have in  mind. Such a sipfSLe cu rren cy  r a is e s  
se v e ra l problems and must take in to  co n s id e ra tio n  s e v e ra l  elem ents,
C A Single Arab Currency : Tlie Arab Dina,r
Given the  scope o f our s tudy  i t  i s  n o t p o ss ib le  to  come up 
w ith  a d e f in i te  and com plete proposal concerning th e  c re a tio n  o f a 
s in g le  Arab cu rrency , th e re fo re  what we s h a ll  do i s  ju s t  p re se n t the 
main is su e s  around which such a currency  i s  to  be s e t  up.
( l ) -* "Arab Ifonetary Fund -  The D inar I .M .F .?" , The Eccnom ist,
A pril 23, 1977, p .92.
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A s in g le  Arab Dinar has to  f i l l  s e v e ra l gaps and co n ta in  
se v e ra l q u a l i t i e s  in d isp en sab le  to  i t s  being and success . Some of 
th e  gaps vjere put down vhen we t re a te d  the j u s t i f i c a t i o n  of an Arab 
cu rrency .
We s h a l l  no t pu t o u rse lv es  in to  in e x tr ic a b le  sp e c u la tio n s  
in  the monetary f i e l d ,  th e re fo re  s h a l l  l i  mit o u rse lv es  to  
m entioning the  main is s u e s  around i^iich th e  c re a tio n  of a s in g le  
reg io n a l currency  a re  c e n tre d , Ih e  is su e s  being;
-  H iy s ica l A v a ila b il i ty ; '
-  S ta b i l i ty  and A ttra c tiv e n e ss ;
-  Conversion of th e  Arab D inar in to  n a tio n a l c u rre n c ie s , and 
v ie  e -v ersa  ;
-  The issu in g  power o r  powers;
•» and f in a l ly  i t s  c irc u I ,a tio n .
Before concluding i t  i s  worth p o in tin g  out th a t  the 
s t a b i l i t y  and success o f th e  Arab D inar w i l l  be enhanced, provided 
th a t  o th e r re g io n a l e n t i t i e s  -  Aslan count'd  e s , la .tin  America,
A frica  south of the Sahara, the E .E .C , e tc ,  -  can come'up vd th  
s im ila r  c u rre n c ie s . T^is w ill, u l t im a te ly  s t a b i l i s e  the  I  .M.S.
CONCLUSION
Our conclusion  iv i l l  be focused on 'two main n o in ts ; the
p o l i t i c a l  and te c h n ic a l  f e a s i b i l i t y  of the p ro je c t  i t s e l f .
From a p o l i t i c a l  p o in t o f view a. gra.dual move i s  n ecessa ry .
The r e a l i t y  i s  th a t  most Arab c o u n tr ie s  a re  newly independent and
th e re fo re  they  are  very  " je a lo u s"  o f t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  freedom.
Although p o p u lar f e e lin g s  a re  f a r  from being a ,n ti in te r-A ra b
//
coun tries*  c o -o p e ra tio n , n a t io n a l i s t i c  fe e lin g s  must n o t be h u r t .
In  o th e r  words, governments must n o t lo s e  th e i r  n a t io n a l ' powers, or 
what i s  thought to  be so , as  a r e s u l t  of the c re a tio n  of the Arab 
Banlc f o r  Development.
On the  o th e r  hand, the  Arab Banlc fo r  Development w i l l  have 
to  undertake a kind of " Ih r s h a l l  I-lan". I f  i t  i s  to  succeed i t  has 
to  have an 'ag g ressiv e*  p o lic y , Conseouently sane c la sh es  might 
appear, th e re fo re  the p ro je c t  i t s e l f  and th e  o p era tio n s  i t  w i l l
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undertake must be ad eq u a te ly  timed and g ra d u a lly  implemented* The 
Arab Banlc fo r  Development and in te r-A rab  co -o p era tio n  depend on th e  
w i l l  o f e x is tin g  Arab governments* However, one has to  reco g n ise  
th a t  every p ro je c t ,  e i th e r  v d tliin  o r o u tsid e  th e  Arab World, 
depends on the  good w i l l  o f the c o u n tr ie s  concerned* This 
'v a riab le*  i s  no t s p e c if ic  to  our p ro je c t .
F in a lly , th e  te c h n ic a l  f e a s i b i l i t y  can be summed up in  
th re e  p o in ts ;  The e x is te n c e  of funds, th e  a b i l i t y  to  s e t  up the  
i n s t i t u t i o n  and the  e x is te n c e  o f  adequate f ie ld s  of o p e ra tio n . The 
f i r s t  p o in t lias been d e a l t  w ith  in  the f i r s t  c h a p te r . The th i r d  
p o in t has been t r e a te d  w ith in  the  co n tex t o f  the  p re sen t c h a p te r ,
As fo r  the  second p o in t ,  th e  Kuwait Fund fo r  Arab Economic 
Development can always p lay  an im portan t m le  along w ith  o th e r  
in te rn a t io n a l  o rg a n isa tio n s  -  World Bank and I.T-bF. -  and p r iv a te  
c o n su lta n ts  i f  need a r i s e s .
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G E N E R A L  C O N C L U S I O N S
The Arab World i s  characterized by three b/pes o f  
in e q u a lit ie s . Although do not see the problem of econond.c 
development in  terms o f "catching-up" with in d u str ia lized  countries, 
we can s ta te  that the Arab World lags far behind the eoonomicaDly 
advanced cou n tr ies. On the other hand, there i s  a vd.de d isp a r ity  
between Arab countries and th is  d isp arity  V7Ü 1 keen on widening, 
both fa c ts  hs.ve been shown in  the f i r s t  Chapter, F in a lly , there 
are s o c ia l ,  economical in e q u a lit ie s  w ithin in d iv idu al cou n tries.
This has to  do w ith the s o c ia l  and in s t itu t io n a l organization of  
the countries concerned. The task  to cope with th ese problems i s  
tremendous. In the past any attempts to  deal w ith these  
in e q u a lit ie s , e sp e c ia lly  the f i r s t  one, has fa ile d . The Arab 
World, seemed to obey the old saying that poverty creates  
in eq u a lity . The explanation of th ese fa ilu r e s  hay always been 
th a t the Arab cou n tries, taken e ith e r  indd.vidually or co]lectd .vely , 
lack funds,
Howjever the quadrupling o f o i l  p rices that occurred duri.ng 
the l a s t  quarter of 1973 a.nd early  1974 has removed, for the time 
being, that capitcil co n stra in t. The lo g ic a l question i s  whether 
the newly-acquired w^ealth w i l l  be properly used to tack le  th e ir  
s o c ia l  and econoird.c problems. We have to mention tl-q.t most of the 
commentators focused on the magnitude of the o i l  revenues and they 
put aside the magnitude of the challenge facing th e  Arab World.
Given the s ta te  of under-development of the Arab o i l  
exporting cou n tries, esp ecia li.y  in  the fin a n c ia l f ie ld ,  the bulk 
o f the o i l  revenues i s  handled by the so -ca lled  world banking 
centres which are geographically  loca.ted in  the major O.E.C.U. 
countries and which, according to  past and present experience, are 
geared to  work in  the d irec tio n  o f  the la t t e r .  Consequently one 
can ta lk  about e x tr a - te r r ito r ia l ity  of o i l  in  the sense th at o i l  
i s  consumed outside the region and o i l  revenues are kept outside  
the region too . The reasons such a behavi.our have been la r g e ly  
explained in  Chapters I I  and I I I .
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This s itu a t io n  adds another problem for the Arab World 
because part of the o i l  revenues i s  derived from exnorts to  the 
n o n -o il developing co u n tr ies . On the top o f  i t s  w e ll known 
development problem th is  group of countries has a lso  to  deal with  
balance o f payments problems vhich are p a rtly  o il-in d u ced . In the 
past th e ir  development problems, p artly  due to lack  o f  funds, have 
been p a r t ia lly  and "timidly" d ea lt with through foreign  investm ents 
and aid th a t came mainly from the O.E.C.D, cou n tries. But the 
najor O.E.G.B, countries were coping with th e ir  own finsncing  
problems p artly  due to the o i l  c r i s i s .  The common fear  was that  
o i l  may dry up.
On the other hand n o n -o il developing countries backed OPEC 
in  i t s  move to  in crease o i l  p r ice s . Therefore OPEC and Arab 
countries f e l t  p o l i t i c a l ly  indebted to other L.D.Cs, Everyone 
thought that t h is  co n stitu te s  another reason to put in to  p ractice  
the much heralded Tiilrd World " co lle c tiv e  s e lf -r e lia n c e " . Indeed 
OPEC countries in  general and Arab countries in  p articu lar  tr ied  
to channel part o f  th e ir  o i l  revenues to n on -o il developing countries*  
Known.ng the behaviour of World banking cen tres, they s e t  up th e ir  
own funds aixl banks for th at purpose. Although i f  vie consider the 
share of th e ir  G.N.P, given as aid  OPEC countries are doing b e tte r  
than the members of the D.A.C,, f iv e  years a fter  the o i l  c r i s i s  
th e ir  e f fo r t  has been judged in su ff ic ie n t  and inadequate. This 
c r it ic ism  has been explained and ju s t if ie d  in  the framework o f our 
research ( c f .  Chapter 17),
In our opinion, more aid has to  be granted in  a more 
e f f ic ie n t  way. The b e s t  so lu tio n  would be the merger of twe sev era l 
e x ist in g  in st itu te o n s  in to  a s in g le  Arab Aid Fund whose prime 
purpose would be to  provide development aid to  non-Arab developing  
cou n tries.
Let us now turn our a tten tio n  to  the Arab World i t s e l f .
Arab o i l  countries are spending enormous funds in  tb e ir  domestic 
economies. But given the fa c to ra l d istr ib u tio n  in  each countr?/", i t  
w i l l  be uTiliksly to  ach ieve n o n -o il self-m aintained  economies vhen 
o i l  runs out. On the other hand there are obvious economic 
complementarities w ith in  the Arab World. For in stan ce, some
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countries lack s k il le d  and even unsk illed  labour -  Gulf countries -  
whereas others -  such as the North African countries -  are 
struggling  with unemployment problems. /b st  o f them lack funds 
whereas others record surplus funds.
In countries such as Sudan, S^a-ia, and Jordan t^ere are 
wide agricu ltu ra l developm ent'opportunities whereas most o f  the Culf 
countries are barren lands. This economic complementarity i s  
fa c i l i t a t e d  by ex istin g  lin k s  and s im ila r it ie s  in  h is to r ic a l ,  
cu ltu ra l and r e lig io u s  grounds. Fere again Arab o i l  countries tr ied  
to  channel part of th e ir  surplus o i l  funds to  fe llow  poor Arab 
countries, w itness the funds and banks s e t  up fo r  th is  purpose, bat 
here again thair e f fo r t  f e l l  short of the receiv ing cou n tries' 
expectations. In our opinion trade i s  b e tter  than a id . The Arab 
countries should bank on th e ir  economic and non%economic 
com plem entarities. The id ea l so lu tion  would be to  merge ex istin g  
funds and banks.. Whose ob jective  i s  to  c'-^annel Arab funds to Arab 
cou n tries. Into a s in g le  in s t itu t io n  we c a l l  our Arab Bank fo r  
Development. This bank should have funds commensurate with the 
tasks we mentioned e a r lie r . I t  wou].d serve the in te r e s t  of th.© 
three groups namely Arab cou n tr ies, n on -o il developing countries  
and O.E.C.D, cou n tr ies. The reason i s  that the o i l  c r is is ,  and 
therefore the accumulation o f o i l  revenues, contributed to .th e  
economic recession  the O.E.C.D. countries are dealing "with. This 
means le s s  import from n o n -o il developing cou n tries, Tlie recession  
i s  due to the fa c t  th a t Arab o i l  cou n tries, e sn e c ia lly  those o f the 
Gulf, are characterized by a low absorptive cap acity . The 
establishm ent o f  a larger  in s t itu t io n  with more funds a t  i t s  
d isp osa l would expand. O.E.C.D's exports to  the Arab World because 
the non -o il Arab countries are fa r  from reaching the 31 mit of th e ir  
absorptive capacity, O.E.C.D's exports and expansion mean more 
imports from n cn -o il developing countries, because th ey  are the  
did.vd.ng force in  the World economy. Conseouently the h igher i s  the  
Bank's ca p ita l the more l ik e ly  i t  w i l l  have a p o s it iv e  impact on 
World economy. Therefore the $15bn, we suggested have to  be seen  as 
a minimum f lo o r .
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Obviously th is  proposal cannot be implemented w ithout 
d i f f i c u l t i e s .  On econo!id.c grounds the.advantages to  be derived, 
w ithin and outside the Arab World, have been shown. But on 
p o l i t ic a l  grounds the advantages are le s s  d iscernab le, however 
our argujnent i s  tw ofold.
F ir s t  any p roject o f such ma,gnitude, th is  i s  involv ing  
severa l cou n tries, l iv e s  with p o l i t ic a l  uncertainty and r isk s .
Second, Arab cou n tries, rich  and poor a lik e , have alreadjr undertaken
several jo in t  p rojects such as the Arab Petroleum Service Company
(AP3C), The Arab Ship-build ing and Repair Yard Company (ASRY), the  
Arab Transport Maritime Compa,ny (ATFjC), In the f in a n c ia l fie3rl we 
have The Arab Monetary Fund (PW  ) and the Arab Fund for Economic 
and S o c ia l Develcpmeot (AFE3D), Therefore t^e trend i s  p o s it iv e .  
Further, the appearance of a fu31y-fledged regional fin a n cia l imrket 
wou3.d help the Arab Bank for Development use Arab p rivate  funds to
finance regional or domestic schemes.
We have to  recognize the fa c t that the p hysical 
establishm ent of an Arab Panic for Developinait does not elim inate  
every pzoblem. For in stan ce, some problems could ari.se from 
c o n f lic ts  w ith in  the irum age ment i t s e l f  even i f  i t s  in d iv idu al 
members were f u l ly  dedicated to the regional cause of economic end 
s o c ia l  development. The p o lic ie s  and gu. id d in e s  s e t  for the Bank 
could lead to some d i f f i c u l t i e s  too . For instance by promoting a 
given product the Bank could harm other L,D,Cs, th at r e l ^  h eav ily  
on the same product fo r  th e ir  fore ign  exchange earrviiigs. Another 
problem i s  where i s  the Bank going to  keep the funds put a t i t s  
disposal?  I f  th ey  w?ere to be kept in  the same place ( c f , Chapters 
II  and I I I ) ,  our present World's imbalances would be perpetuated. 
However we have to confess that the options open to i t  are not 
numerous. A ll th a t the Bank can do i s  to  inaugurate new trends 
and d irec tio n s , and fo r  doing so a b ig  dose o f imagination i s  needed, 
F in a lly  we have to s tr e s s  that our proposal i s  against the 
in te r e s ts  of nobody. As fo r  the advantages and r isk s  -  because no 
p roject i s  immune o f r isk s  -  they have to be weighed from economic 
and p o l i t i c a l  p oin ts o f vdnw.
The Arab Wbrld i s  given a h is to r ic a l chance to  develop
251.
i t s e l f  and help n o n -o il and O.E.C.D, countries cope w ith the new 
s itu a tio n ; and more im portantly, come up ivith the r igh t answer to  
the energy problem. By the same token i t  would contidbute in  
correcting some o f  our present time economic and so c ia l imbala-iices. 
I f  th is  opportunity i s  missed i t  could be haroiful to  everyone.
252.
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TABLE 1-3 : OâJL Production of Selected  Arab Countries 
and Brices in  U.S. D ollar/B arrel 1970-19^-0
255.
1.000 b/d
Country and 
Region 1970 1973 1975 19*0
Egypt
A- - ....... -  ............  —  ■ ,...............  . . .
IJik 255 300 630
Bahrain 76 66 6 l 61
Iraq 1546 1932 2262 2*00
Qatar 360 570 439 475
Kuwait 2735 2753 1336 2130
Oman 332 293 341 360
Saudi Arabia 3549 7344 6626 10650
Syria 64 110 163 3*0
U.A.E. 7Ô0 1527 1692 2000
TOTAL 9676 14652 13940 19706
Price in  US ^ /barrel 
(Has, Tanura) 1 .60 3.29 11.53 15.60
Sources Business News Survey Prospect, SvrlssbanJe Corporation, 
Quarterly Review, 1977, Uumbsr A, p ,5 .
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TABLE I“4 î R elative Importance o f  Agriculture in  Selected Arab Countries
Less than Between 5.1 Between 10.1 Between 20,1
5^ and 0 ,0^- and 2 0 .Cf and 40.0^ Over li-Of'
Agriculture • s ahre in  G-DP (a t made e t prices )X
Bahrain Iraq Algeria Egypt Yemen AR
(D .96) (7 .2 ) (11 .3) (29 .6 ) (48 .1)
Kuwait Lebanon Jordan Mauritania
(0 .2 ) (9 .4 ) (14.2 ) (33.9)
Oman Syria Morocco
(3 .1 ) (18.9) (27 .7)
Saudi Arabia Tunisia Sudan
(1 .0 ) (19 .6) (39 .3)
Yemen D,
(23.1)
(A gricu lture's share in  a c tiv e  population
Kuwait
(1 .7 )
Lebanon
(13 .5)
Libya
(2 1 .3 )
Jordan
(2 6 .9 )
Algeria
(54 .0 )
(52 .0 )
Iraci
(42 . 6 ) 
Mauritania
(84 .6 )  
Morocco
(53.4)  
Sauii Arabic
(62 . 5 ) 
Syria
(46 .9)  
Somalia
(82 . 0 ) 
Sudan
(79 .0)  
Tunisia
(44 .1)  
Yemen A9
(76 .7) 
Yemen B,
(61. 1 )
NOTES; f i g u r e s  fo r  African Arab Countries r e la te  to  the averages for  
1965-73 and have been taken from IBRD (1976 ) V.brld Tables 1976: 
figu res for the Asian Arab Countries are taken from UN Econoric 
.Commission for  West Asia (ECYA)(1977) Development Trends and 
Prospects in  Selected  EddA Countries (Prelirro.nary'Draft )7 Ihe 
data re la te  to 1974-75 except for Bahrain (;5-970-72 ), Kuwait and 
Lebanon (1971-73) and Qnan (1974).
^FAO (1977) Production Yearbook 1976, Vol. 30, Table 3. The 
figu res re la te  to  1976.
Source; Arab AgricuD.ture : Problems and Prospects”, by A. E l-Sherbini 
and Dr. R. 8 inha, op, c i t .
2 5 7 .
A P P E N D I X  I I
TABLE I I - l  : Arab O il Revenues Compared vd.tb some Data 
of The World Economy (1974)
__________  bn. U.S. Jj)
Arab Oil Revenues (estim ated figu re) 6 l.S
Total A ssets of Exxon'(31-XH-1974 ) 27.8
Exports value o f France 44.7
French Budget fo r  f i s c a l  1975 51.7
Exports value o f West Germany 88.6
Expenditure o f the N.A.S.A. (1961-72) 77.8
Investments of the main M.N.O.C. in  1973 105.4
U l i t a r y  expenditure of N.A.T.O.
(yearly  average 1968-74) 108.7
U .S.A 's and U .S .S .R 's . co sts  of Space
Programmes u n t i l  the end of 151^  160.0
G.N.P. o f France^ 295.0
Treasury of M.N.C's (early  1974) 310.0
Budget o f U .S .A .^  314.0
G.N.P. of Japaj/ 480.0
G.N.P. of United States^ 1 ,4 0 0 ,0
^Estimates o f McGraw K il l .  ^ f o r  1 . 7.74 -  30. 6.1975 peri^od.
For 1975-76 the budget was fixed  at $ 349, 4bn. with |  95bn. (that i s  
150^ as much as Arab o i l  revenues)earmarked for m ilitary  expenditures.
Sources? N icolas Sark is, ”Le P etro le 'a  I'Ueure Arabe), 
op, c i t .  p .315.
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TABLE IÎ-2  î Discount Rates in  the Major O.E.C.D. Countries 
1972-1977 5 Percentage per annum
Periods
Countries 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
U.S.A. 4 .5 7 .5 7.75 6.00 5.25 6.00
Japan 4.85 9 .0 9 .0 6 .5 6 .5 4.25
Germany >4.5 7 .0 6 .0 3.5 3.5 3 .50
U.K. 9 .0 13 .0 11.5 11.25 14.25 7.00
France 7.5 11 ,0 13.0 3.0 10.5 9 .50
I ta ly 4 .0 6.5 • 8 .0 6 .0 1 5 .0 11.50
Source; I .F .S , by Volume XXXI, Number 1 , January 197*.
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TABLE ÏI-3  : O.E.C.D, : Consumer .Brices, Percentage Changes from 
Previous Period, Not Seasonally Adjusted 
Averages for  Calendar Years : 1964-1977
At annual rate
Average
1964-74 1975 1976 1977
12 months 
to
Dec. 1977
United S tates 4 .7 9 .1 5:8 6:5 6 8
Japan 7.9 31.8 9 .3 8 .0 4 8
Germany 4 .1 6 .0 4:5 3.9 3 5
Franc e 5.6 11 .7 9:6 9:5 . 9 0
United Kingdom 6.9 24:2 16:5 15:9 12 1
Canada 4 * 8 10 .8 7.5 8 .0 9 5
Ita].y 5 .8 17 .0 16.0 • ' 15 0 (a)
Austria 4 .9 8 .4 7:3 5.5 4. 6
Belgium 5.1 12:8 9.2 7:1 6 3
Denmark 7.5 9 .6 9:0 11 .1 12 2
Finland 6.9 17.9 j- i} ..  4 12 e 7 11 9
Greece 6.3 13.4 13.3 13 i ( a  )
Iceland 14.6 49.1 33.0 29:9 30 2(a)
Ireland 7.7 20.9 18 .0 13:6 10 8(a)
Luxembourg 4 .4 10:7 9 .8 6 .7 4 3
Netherlands 6 ,1 10,2 8 .8 6:7 5 4Nonvay 5:9 11 .7 9:1 9 .1 9 1
Portugal(d ) 8*6 20.4 19.3 18 9 (a )
Spain 8.2 16.9 17:6 2/415 25 4
Sweden 5.7 9 .8 10.3 11:4 13 1
Switzerland 5.2 6 ,7 1 .7 1 .3 1 1Turkey 11.6 21.2 17.4 36 6(a)
A ustralia 5.6 15.1 13.5 12:3 9 3(a)
New Zealand 6 .4 14 .7 16.9 14.3 15 3(a)
Total 05CD(e) 5.5 11 .4 8,6 8:9 8 3
OECD Europe(e) 5.8 13 .1 10:8 11:3 10 5
EEC(o) 5.5 12 .9 10.3 10 .0 8 .4
_ _
(a) To la t e s t  a v a ila b le  period,
(b) Third quarter 1977.
(c ) Fourth quarter 1977.
(d ) Lisbon, excluding ren t.
(e) From 1975, weighted by 1975 priva,te consumption and exchange ra tes .
Source:I O.E.C.D. Inforiration S erv ice, Press R elease, Paris, 
9th February 1978.
26 0.
APPBIsDH I I -4  : Id e n tif ic a t io n  of the Most S eriou sly  
A ffected Countries.
The Most S eriou sly  A ffected Countries are (by alphabetica l 
order)? Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India, Kenya, Pakistan, S r i Lanka, 
Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire.
This l i s t  has been s e t  up by Fîr, Frank E l l i s  who used the 
three follow ing c r ite r ia :
( i  ) Per cap ita  income and G.N.P. growth m tes  as approximate
in d ica tion s of the le v e l  of poverty and economic r e s i lie n c e ,  
( i i )  Dependence on petroleum and petroleum-based imports
(e sp e c ia lly  f e r t i l i z e r s )  as a proportion of to ta l  import 
b i l l s ,
( i i i )  Final a b i l i t y  to  meet the increased b i l l s  taking in to  account:
(a) The d ir e c t  impact o f the increased o i l  co sts  on th e ir  
B.O.P, s itu a t io n  in  1974,
(b ) Tneir reserve and debt burden s itu a tio n  and p o ten tia l 
for  borrowing from normal sources (e .g .  I .M .F .) in  
1974 and 1975,
(c ) The impact o f  other p rice  changes on the value of th e ir  
e:{ports and im ports.
(d ) The le v e l  o f th e ir  present rece ip ts  of O ffic ia l 
Development A ssistance in  re la tio n  to th e ir  needs.
Source; Frank E l l i s ,  " Id en tifica tio n  o f  the Developing Countries 
I b s t  S eriou sly  A ffected by the increased o i l  Prices", 
c f .  "Report from the S e le c t  Committee on Overseas 
Development", op. c i t .  p .p . 58-62.
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TABLE II-5  : Evolution of the Consumer Prices in  The N.O.D.C,
1974-77 ( in  f  change)
End of Tears 
Countries 1970 1974 1975 1976 1976 1977/
India 100 h?7.7 + 6.1 + 8 .1 +13.3^ 1-40.7
Pakistan 100 f2 6 .7 +20.9 + 7 .0 +'57. F +*1.2
Banglad esh 100 t 5 4 .6 -  9.6 + 7.4% + *7,0
Sri Lanka ICO + 6.5 + 1 .3 <■ l.o'* +” .5
Kenya 100 +17.75 -f.19.2 +13.5 + 9.3'^ +74.2
Uganda 100 +67.0 +20.3 +54.8 n .a . n .a .
Ethiopia ICO + 8 .6 + 6.5 +28.5 + 9 ^ +62.5
Sudan 100 +26 +24 +16.7 7.0'* +70.2
Tanzania 100 +19.6 +26.0 + 6 ,9 n .a . n .a .
Zaire loo +27.4 +30.7 +185.0 n .a . n .a .
d. March 1977 b . Nay 1977
Source; International F inancial S t a t i s t ic s ,  Volume XXX, Number *, 
August 1977, o f .  Individual Countries Data.
ê é 2
TABLE HT -la î Cumulative Purchases under the  O il F a c i l i ty
1974 and 1975
O il O il
Fember F a c i l i ty  F a c i l i ty
 ________ ____________ fo r  1974_______ fo r 1975
A ll C ountries: 2 ,5*2.851 4,319.577
In d u s tr ia l  C oun tries: 675.000 1 ,7*0,240
I ta ly  675.000 7*0.240
United Kingdom -  1 ,000,000
Other Developed 
C oun tries: 794.600 1,113,770
Finland' -  1 * 6 ,3 6 O
Greece 103.500 51,750
Iceland  17.200 21,970
New Zealand 109.300 129.370
P ortugal -  1 1 4 . 7 6 0
Spain 296.200 275.930
Turkey 113.200 14*.110
Y ugoslavia 155,200 1*5.520
Developing C oun tries: 1,113,251 1 ,425,56?
A rgentina -  74,090
Bangladesh 51.500 40.470
Burundi 1.200
Cameroon 4.620 11,790
C en tra l A frican  Rep. 3*300 2.660
Chad 2,205
C hile 118.500 125.920
Costa Rica 1*.*3^ 1*,*30
C^T-r^s *.100 21.970
31, 6*0
EL Salvador 17.*90
F i j i  ' 0.340
Ghana 3*.600
Grenada -  0.490
Guinea 3.510 '
H a iti  4.800 4.140
Honduras 16,7*5
In d ia  200,000 201.340
I s r a e l  62.000 *1,250
Ivory  Coast 11.170 10.350
Jamaica -  29.200
Kenya 36.000 27.930
Korea 100.000 152,690
Nfeilagasy Republic 14.300
Fklawi -  3.730
L'àli 5.000 "■ 3,990
L ^ u ritan ia  -  5 .3 ’ 0
Morocco -  18.000
263*
TABLE n U a  ( C o n t in u e d )
Member
Nicaragua
P ak istan
Panama.
Papua New Guinea 
Peru
P h ill ip p in e s
Senegal
S ie rra  Leone
S r i  Lanlca
Sudan
Tanzania
Uganda
Uruguay
W estern Samoa
Yemen F. Dem, Rep,
Z a ire
Zambia
O il 
F a c i l i ty  
fo r  1974
15.500
125.000
7.370
15.525
4.914
43.500 
28.710
31.500 
19.200 
46.575
11.800
45.000
O il 
Fac i l i t y  
fo r  1975
111.010 
17.250 
14.800 
52,660 
152.030 
9.910 
4.970 
34.130 
18.300 
20.610
49.070
0.417
12.020
32.530
29.720
Source: I .K .F . Survey, Apidl 5, 1976, p .102.
TABLE ni-lb : I.M.F. Oil F a c il ity  
Borrowers per Area ; 1974, 1975.
Borrowers
At end Dec. 74 Mbrch 75
Developed Areas (7) 951.4 1469.6
including I ta ly 675.0 675.0
Spain - 296. ’
Latin America (8) 156.1 234.1
including Chile 41.5 118.5
Uruguay 46,6 46.6
Asia (6 ) 462.7 520,3
including India. 200.0 200.0
Pakistan 97.9 125,0
Korea 90.0 100.0
Africa (14) 130.0 181.2
including Kenya 32.0 36.1
Tanzania 28.4 31.5
Sudan 28.7 28,7
Others (3) 15 .7 79.4
TOTAL 1715.9 2484.6
Source; N icholas Fallon , "Middle East Oil Money and I ts  Future 
Expenditure", op. c i t .  p .lg 9 .
2 6 5 .
TABLE IV-1 î Major J o in t  Banking Ventures 
by  Arab and Western Banks (1977)
The f o i l  Giving i s  a l i s t  o f consortium  banks and banking 
p a r tn e rsh ip s  b r in g in g  to g e th e r  Arab and W estern p a r tn e rs .
EUROPE
Shareholders Sharehold ings %
Banque F ranco-Arabe d 'in v e s tis s e m e n ts  
In te rn a tio n au x  (FRAB)
E s t ,  1 9 6 9 , P a r is , c a p i ta l  F r, F r . 70m.
S o c ié té  G énérale (F rance) 25.00
S o c ié té  Générale de Banoue (Belgium) 7,00
Swiss Bank C orporation (S w itzerland ) 6.00
Banco U rquijo  (Spain) 1 .00
In d u s t r ia l  Bank of Japan (Japan) 5.00
Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank (N etherlands) 5.00
N atio n a l Investm ent Bank fo r  I n d u s t r ia l  Devel.onment (Greece) 1 .0 0
KUNAÎT GROUP; 26.50
Kuwait Investm ent Company
Kuwait Foreign T rading , C ontracting  and Investmenb Company
N ational Bank of Kuwait
The Kuwait Insurance Company
Commercial Bank o f Kuwait
Various companies and p r iv a te  in d iv id u a ls
ARABIAN GITLF GROUP; 3.32
Banic o f  B ahrain 
Bank o f Oman
F isce llan eo u s companies and p r iv a te  in d iv id u a ls
LIBYAN GROUP; ' 3 .50
Sahara Bank
Libya Insurance Company
TUNISIAN GROUP; 1 .68
Banque de T un isie
S o c ié té  G enerate d 'in v e s tis s e m e n t
SAUDI ARABIAN GROUP ' 12,00
ALGERIAN GROUP 1 .5 0
MOROCCAN G^ROUP 1 .5 0
TABLE IV -1  ( C o n t i n u e d )
Union de Banques Arabes e t  Françaises (BBAF}
E st. 1970, P aris, ca p ita l Fr. Fr, 110m,
Credit Lyonnais (France) 31.95
Banque Française du Commerce Extérieur 8,00
Arab Bank (Jordan) 6,33
Banque Extérieure d 'A lgérie  (A lgeria) 6,33
Commercial Bank of Syria (Syria) 6,33
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (Libya) 6,33
Rafidain Bank (Iraq) 6,33
Central Bank o f Egype (Egypt) 6,32
Arab African Bank (Arab m ultinational) 5,82
Banoue du FÈiroc (Fbrocco) 3.57
A lahli BanJc of Kuwait (Kuwait) 1,86
Riyad Bank (Saudi Arabia) . 1 ,78
Baric of Jordan (Jordan) 1 ,07
Société  Tuirisienne de Banoue (Tunisia) 1 ,07
National, Bank o f Abu Dhabi (Abu Dhabi) 0.91
M n istry  of Finance and Petroleum (Qatar) 0,91
Sudan Commercial Bank (Sudan) 0,71
Jordan National Bank (Jordan) 0,54
Banque Audi (Lebanon ) 0,47
Banque G, Trad (Cred.it Lyonnais ) Lebanon 0.47
A lah li Bank (Dubai) 0,45
Banlc o f  Bahrain and ICuv\?ait (Bahrain) 0.45
National Bank of Yemen (Yemen) 0,45
Yemen Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Yemen) 0,45
Banque Arabe Libyenne î'auïitanienne pour le  Commerce
Extérieur e t  l e  Développement (î-buritania} 0,45
Oman Currency Board (Oman) 0,45
Other 0,03
UBAF's A f f i l ia te s
( i )  UBAF Bank Ltd.
E st, 1972, London, c a p ita l 210m,
UBAF (Paris) 50.00
îüdland Bank (United Kingdom) 25.00
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (Libya) 25.00
2 6 7 .
TABLE IV -1  ( C o n t in u e d )
( i i )  Union© d i  Banche Arabe ed Europee ( I t a l i a )
SpA (UBAE Roma)
E s t, 1 9 7 2 , Rome, c a p i ta l  L5,OCOm
UBAF (P a ris )  51.00
Banco d i  Roma, ( I ta ly )  9 .50
Banco Nazionale d e l Lavoro ( I ta ly )  9 .50
I n s t i tu to  d i C red ito  p e r  l e  Imprese d i  Pubblica
U t i l i t a  ( IC IP J} (Ita ly )  6 .00
I n s t i tu to  Ligure In te re sse n z e  I n d u s t r ia l !  e
Commer c i a l i  ( I t a l y ] 6 .00
S o c ie ta  F inanziam enti Id ro c a rb u ri SOFIÜ}( I t a l y ) 6.00
S o c ie ta  F in a n z ia r i  T e le fo n ica  per Azioni STET 6,00
S o c ie ta  I ta l ia n a  p e r Condotte d'Accua 6 ,00
( i i i  ) Union de Banaues Arabes e t  Europeenes (UBAE)
E s t .  1973; Luxembourg and F ran k fu rt, c a p i ta l  DM 30m.
U.B.A.F. (Paris) 33.33
Arab Baric (Jordan) )
Arab Bank Overseas (S w itz e rlan d ) ) 33.33
Bayerische V ereinsbank (Germany) )
Commerzbank (Germany) } qq qq
Commerzbank In te rn a t io n a l  (Luxembourg) )
"Westdeutsche Landesbank G iro zen tra le  (Germany) )
( iv )  Union de Banoues Arabes e t  Nippon 
(UBAN-Arab Japanese F inance)
E s t .  1974; Hong Kong, c a p i t a l  HK  ^ 25m.
UBAF (P a ris )  20.00
A lab li Bank of Kuvmit (Kuwait) 7 .00
Arab A frican Bank (Arab m u ltin a tio n a l)  7.00
Arab Bank (Jordan) 7.00
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (Libya) 7.00
Banque Arabe Libyenne M auritanienne nour le  Commerce
E x té r ie u r  e t le  Développement (M auritan ia) 2 ,50
Banque Audi (Lebanon) 2 .50
N ational Bank o f Abu Dbabi (Abu Dhabi) 2 .50
Sudan Commercial Bank (Sudan) 2 .5 0
Yemen Bank fo r  R econstruc tion  and Development (Yemen) 2.00
Bank o f Tokyo (Japan) 8 ,00
Long-Term C red it Bank o f  Japan (japan ) • 8 ,00
M itsu i Bank (Japan) 8 .00
Nomura S e c u r i t ie s  (Japan) 8,00
Sanwa Bank (Japan) 8,00
2b «.
TABLE IV -1  ( C o n t in u e d )
UBAF F in an c ia l S e rv ic es  L td.
E s t 1974; London, c a p ita l £lm.
UBAF (P a ris )  35.00
UBAF Ltd (London) 7 .50
UBAE (Luxembourg) 2 ,50
UBAE ( I t a ly )  2 .5 0
UBAN (Hong Kong) 2 .50
C red it Lyonnais (France) 10 .00
Hambros Bank (U nited Kingdom) 20,00
Midland and In te rn a t io n a l  Banks (United Kingdom) ■ 20,00
UBAAB (New York)
E st 1 9 7 6 , New York, c a p i ta l  ,/25m
UBAF (P a ris )  12.00
A lah li Bank o f  Kuwait (Kuwait) 7.00
Arab A frican Bank (Arab m u ltin a tio n a l)  7 .00
Arab Bank L td. (Jo rdan) 7.00
C en tra l Bank o f Egypt (Egypt) 7 .00
C en tra l Bank of Oman (Oman) 7.00
Commercial Bank of S yria  (Syria^ , 7.00
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (Libya) 7 ,CO
N ational Bank o f Abu Dhabi (United Arab E m irates) 7 .00
Banoue du Maroc (Morocco) 5.00
Riyad Bank Ltd. (Saudi A rabia) 2 ,00
Sudan Commercial Bank (Sudan) 1,00
UBAF L td. 1.00
Undone d i Banche Arabe ed Europee-UBAE (Ita lia )S p A  1.00
Union de Banoues Arabes e t  Européennes-UBAE (Luxembourg) 1,00
UBAN-Arab Japanese Finance L td , 1,00
Bankers T rust New York C orporation 5.00
F i r s t  Chicago C orporation  5.00
S e c u r ity  P a c if ic  C orporation  5.00
Texas Commerce B ancshares, In c . 5 .00
European'Arab Holding S.A.
E s t .  1 9 7 2 , Luxembourg, c a p i ta l  Lux. F r . 1,000m,
FRAB Bank (see above) 10.00
TABLE 1 7 -1  ( C o n t in u e d )
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Creditanstalt-Banîcverein (Austria )^
Deutsche Bank (Germany )^
Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank (Netherlands)
Midland Banlc (United Kingdom )^
Banca Commerciale I ta lia n a  (I ta ly  
S ociété  Generate de Banque (Belgium)^
Abu Dhabi Fund for  Arab Economic Development (Abu Dhabi 
Banoue Nationale d 'A lgérie  (A lgeria)
Arab International BanJc (Egypt )
N ational Bank of Egypt (Egypt )
National Bank of Kuwait (Kwvait)
N ational Commercial Banlo (Libya)
National Commercial Bank (Saudi Arabia)
Bank of Sudan (Sudan )
Central Banlc o f Syria (Syria )
S ociété  Generate (France)^
Credit Suisse (Sw itzerland)
Fuji Banlc (Japan )
Ind u stria l Banlc o f Japan (Japan )
Banque Marocaine du Commerce Extérieur' (Morocco)
Issue Dept. (Oman)
Banque Libanaise pour le  Commerce (Lebanon)
Banque Mlsr-Liban (Lebanon)
Credit Libanais (Lebanon )
S ociété  Generate Libano-Europeene de Banoue (Lebanon)
Midland and International Banks Ltd. (United Kingdom)
Denotes member o f BBIC -  European Banks International Comnany 
Note: bhen MMIBL took a 2 per cent bolding. Midland Bank reduced i t s  
share by 1 per cen t. A ll the obier European banks involved reduced 
th e ir  holding by a fra c tio n  to make up the ad d itional one per cent.
S u b sid iaries of European Arab fo ld in g  SA
( i ) European Arab Bank (Brussels )SA 
B russels, c a p ita l BF 5DCm 
As above
( i i  ) Europaisch-Arabische Bank GmbH 
Frankfurt, ca p ita l DMI 15m 
As above
5.69
5.69
5.19
1.69
5.69 
4.99  
4.16 
4.16
4.16
4> .16 
4..16
4.16
4.16
4.16
4.16
3.20 
?.?4  
2 .84  
2.34  
2.08  
2,08
1.06
1.06
1.06
1 .06  
2.00
^yu
TABLE IV -1  ( C o n t in u e d )
Compagnie Arabe e t  Internationale d'Investissem ent (CAII)
Est 1973; Luxeîibourg, ca p ita l /30m
Kuwait Investment Company (Kuwait) n .a ,
Government of Abu Dhabi , n .a ,
Bank o f  Kuwait and the Middle East n .a .
Banque du Liban e t d'Outre î'fer (Lebanon) n .a .
Banque N ationale  de T un isie  (T un isia ) n .a .
N ational Commercial Bank (Saudi A rab ia ’ n .a .
National Investment Company (Libm ) n.a*
Banque C en tra le  P opu la ire  (Morocco) n .a .
Banque Marocaine pour l e  Commerce e t  l 'I n d u s t r i e  (Morocco) n .a .
Banque Nationale pour l e  Développement Sconomioue (Morocco) n .a .
Qatar National Bank (Qatar) n .a .
Union B ancaire pour l e  Commerce e t  . l 'I n d u s tr ie  (T un isia) n .a .
Banque N ationale de Paris (France) n .a .
Banque N ationale de Paris Internationale (France) n .a ,
Banc o C entrai (Syiain ) n .a .
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (Canada) n .a ,
O esterreichische Laendei'bank (A ustria) n,a„
Union de Banques S u isses  (S w itzerland  )^ n .a .
Banco do B ra sil (B razil) n .a .
S o c ié té  F in an c ie rs  Europeene ’ 5.00
Note; Shareholdings a re  d is t r ib u te d  50 p e r cent to  Mid-'le  E ast i n t e r e s t s ,  
5 0  p e r  cen t to  VTestern i n t e r e s t s .
Subsidiary of CAII
( i )  Banoue Arabe et Internationale d 'investissem ent (BAII)
Est 1973, Parisj c a p ita l Fr. 50m.
As above
Iran Overseas Investment Bank 
E st 1973, London, c a p ita l £5m.
Barclays Bank In ternational (United Kingdom)
Banlc M elli Iran (Iran)
Bank o f America (USA)
Bank of Tokyo (Japan )
D e u ts c h e  B ank (G erm an y )
10 .00
10,00
10.00
10.00
10 .0 0
29ï.
TABLE IV -1  ( C o n t i n u e d )
In d u stria l Bank of Japan (Japan)
Industria l and Mining Development Bank of Iran 
Manufacturers ^^anover Trust (USA)
Midland Banlc (United Kingdom)
S ociété  Generals (France)
10.00
10.00
10.00
10 .00
10 .00
Arab and Morgan G renfell Finance Company 
Est 1974; London, c a p ita l £lm.
Mbrgan G renfell Foldings (United Kingdom) 50.,00
Arab Bank (Jordan) 45,00
Arab Banlc Overseas (Switzerland ) 5.00
Arab International Finance Company (ARIMFI)
Est 1974, incorporated in  Switzerland but operating out 
of B eirut, ca p ita l SwFr 14m.
M'hrine Midland Bank (USA) 25.00
A,K. Holdings (Luxe'mbourg ) n .a ,
Kuwait International Investment Co, (Kuv/ait) n .a .
Other Arab in vestors n .a .
Banco Arabe Espanol
E st 1975; Madrid, c a p ita l /26m
Libyan Arab Foioign Bank
KTOIC (Kuvjait)
Spanish in s t itu t io n s
30,00 
30,00 
40,00
Saudi International Bank
Est 1975; London
Saudi Arabian îbnetary Agency
Morgan Guaranty (USA)
Bank of Tokyo (Japan)
Banque Nationale de Paris (France)
Deutsche Banlc (Germany)
National Westminster (United Kingdom)
Union Bank of Switzerland
National Gorrimercial Bank (Saudi Arabia
Riyad Bank (Saudi Arabia)
50,00
20 .00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00  
5.00
2 .50
2 .50
TABLE IV -1  ( C o n t in u e d )
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LEBANON
Banque d 'investissem ent e t de Financement (INFI) 
E st 1974; B eirut, c a p ita l Leb, £15m.
Banque Audi (Lebanon)
C aisse Centrale de Banques Populaires (France) 
Haràbros Bank (United Kingdom)
Mitsui Banlc (Japan )
Nomura S ecu r it ie s  (Japan)
Croupe Renault (France)
N o n -in stitu tio n a l Arab shareholders
35.00  
8.00  
8.00 
8.00 
8.00 
8.00
25.00
Arab Finance Corp*
Est 1974, B eirut, ca p ita l Leb. £6m,
I&nufacturers Hanover Tpust (United S ta tes)
Kuwait Investment Company (Kuwait )
Investment Fromotion Croup (Lebanon)
Banque de l'U nion Europeene (France)
Banlc of Tokyo (japan)
Beirut-Riyad Bank (Lebanon)
Credit Libanais (Lebanon ) )
and i t s  Brussels subsid iary)
Banoue Europeene pour l e  )
Moyen-Orient )
J . Henry Schroder & Co.
E st 1974, Beirut
J . Henry Schroder V/agg (United Kingdom)
A sseily  fam ily (Lebanon )
S o c ié té  Financière pour l e  Mbyen-Orient 
(SOFIMO)
Est 1975, B e iru t, c a p ita l Leb. £6m 
S ociété  General© (France)
Kuwait International Investment Company (Kuh/ait) 
S o cié té  General© Libano-Europeene de Banque (Lebanon) 
FRAB Bank (France)
Almana T illin g  Oo^  (Oatar)
Other Arab in vestors
18 .00
18,00
18.00
18.00
1 0 .0 0
9 .00
9.00
65.00
35.00
4 2 .5 0
n .a .
n .a .
n .a .
n .a ,
n .a .
279.
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Arab In te rn a tio n a l F inance Company (ARINFI)
E s t 1974; B e iru t, c a p i ta l  /5 .2m
Mkrine Midland Bank (USA) 25.00
Tokai Bank (Japan) 1 ’ .50
A.K, F old ings (Luxembourg) 12.51
Kuvjait In te rn a t io n a l  Investm ent)
Company, p r iv a te  and co rp o ra te  ) ^
Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian ) *
in v e s to rs  )
EGYPT
Cairo B arclays In te rn a t io n a l  Bank 
E st 1974; C airo , c a p i ta l  US /lOm
B arclays Bank In te rn a t io n a l  (United Kingdom) 50.00
Banque du C aire  (Egypt) 50.00
Chase N ational Bank o f Egypt 
E s t 1975, Cairo
Chase Manhattan Bank (USA) 49.00
N ational Bank of Egypt (Egypt) 51.00
r i s r  In te rn a tio n a l Bank
E st 1975, C airo , c a p i ta l  US /2 .5m
Banlc M'Usr (Egypt) 20.00
Commercial and indue t r i a l  companies in  i^bich Banlc Mlsr
has a p a r t ic ip a t io n  10,00
P ublic  su b sc r ip tio n  by Egyptian nationa3.s ■ 21 .00
Banco d i Rome, ( ïraly-vrJ.th E uropertners ) 19.00
UBAF L td. (United Kingdom) 10.00
F i r s t  N ational Bank of Chicago (USA) 20,00
Egyptian American Bank
E st 1975, C airo, c a p i ta l  /30m
Bank of A lexandria (E ^yp t) 51.00
American Express (USA) 49.00
SHARJAH
N ational Bank o f Sharjah  
E s t 1975, Sharjah
S harjah  p u b lic  ' 40.00
Other lo c a l  in t e r e s t s  35.00
Government o f Sharjah  10.00
C red it S u isse  (S w itzerland ) 5.00
M itsu i Bank (Japan) 5,00
Hambros (United Kingdom )
TABLE IV -1  (C o n t in u e d
AJMIAN
Ajjmn Arab Banlc
E st, 1975, Ajman, c a p ita l /2,5m . 
WFC Corporation (USA)
Government of Ajman 
UAE public
40.00
40.00
2 0 .0 0
DUBAI
N ational Banlc of Dubai
E s t 1963, Dubai, c a p i t a l  QDRl8.3m.
N ational Bank of Kuwait (Kuwait)
G rindlays Bank (U nited Kinj^dora)
Bank of America (USA)
Local Dubai merchants
30.00
10 .00  
4.00  
56.00
Commercial Bank of Dubai
E st 1969, Dubai, c a p i t a l  D 20m.
Commerzbank (Germany)
Chase Manhattan Bank (USA)
Commercial Bank o f  Kuwait (Kuwait)
Dubai Bank L td .
E s t 1970, Dubai, c a p i ta l  Ü 11.5m 
Uaiibros Bank (U nited Kingdom)
Wells Fargo (USA)
Banque de l'U n io n  Europeene (France)
Local in v e s to rs
Oryx Investm ents Ltd.
E s t 1974, Dubai, c a p i ta l  US /l.2 5 m
A rbuthnot Latham (U nited Kingdom)
Standard and C hartered Banlc in  g Group (U nited Kingdom) 
Arab shareho lders
(from Abu Dhabi, B ahrain, Dubai, Kuwait, Q atar and 
Saudi A rabia)
n .a .
n .a .
n .a .
1 0 .0 0
10.00
5.00
75.00
20 .00
20 .00
60,00
HONG KONG
Kuwait P a c if ic  Finance Company Ltd. 
E s t 1975, Hong Kong, c a p i ta l  /5m
Kuwait Investm ent Company
In d u s t r ia l  Bank o f Japan
35.00
32.00
2 7 5 .
TABIE IV -1  ( C o n t in u e d )
Yamaichi S e c u r i t ie s  Company o f Japan 3.00
Bank o f New South Wales 10,00
Canadian Im peria l Bank o f Commerce 10,00
Banco do B ra z il  10 .00
Klf/MIT
In te rn a tio n a l F in a n c ia l Advisers 
E s t 1974 Kuwait, c a p i ta l  Id  500,000
Robert Fleming & Co. (U nited Kingdom) 15.00
W illiam  Kent & Co!*, (U nited S ta te s )  ; 15,00
Banque Worms (France) 15.00
P r iv a te  Kuwaiti in d iv id u a ls  55.00
Arab F in a n c ia l C onsu ltan ts  Company 
E st 1974, Kuwait, c a p i ta l  KD500,000
Kuwaiti i n te r e s t s  51.00
Other Arab in v e s to rs  25.00
Arbuthnot Lathan (United Kingdom) 6 .00
Taiyo Kobe Bank (jap an ) 6 ,00
P h ilad e lp h ia  N ational Bank (USA) 6.00
Banque de. Suez e t  l 'U n io n  des Mines (France) 6 ,00
Kuwait F in an c ia l C entre
E s t 1974, Kuwait, ca p ita l KD3.5m
In te rn a t io n a l  Bank -  Washington 21,00
Kuwaiti i n te r e s t s  79.00
Kuwait International Finance Comp/any 
Est 1974, Kuivait, ca p ita l KDlm
Banlc of C red it and Commerce In te rn a t io n a l  46.00
Kuwaiti i n t e r e s t s  54.00
Arab T rust Company
E st 1975, Kuwait, ca p ita l KDlm
Samuel Mbntagu 10.00
Chase In te rn a tio n a l Investm ent 10.00
Kuwaiti i n t e r e s t s  80,00
276.
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Kwvait F in an c ia l Group
E st 1 9 7 6 , Kuwait, c a p i ta l  /7m
Barfc of America (through Bam erical su b s id ia ry )  40,00
Kuwait Real E s ta te  Bank 30,00
Kuwait P ro je c ts  Company 30,00
SAUDI ARABIA 
A l-Je z ira  Bank 
E s t 1 9 7 6 , Jeddah
N ational Banlc of P ak is tan 35.00
Saudi i n te r e s t s 6 5 . 0 0
Al-Bank A1-Saudi -A l-FoUandi 
E s t 1 9 7 6 , Jeddah
Algemene Bank Nederland 6 0 . 0 0
Saudi in t e r e s t s 40.00
Saudi Investm ent Banking C orporation 
E s t 1 9 7 7
Saudi I n te r e s ts 65.00
Chase Manhattan 20 .00
I n d u s t r ia l  Bank of Japan 5.00
J .  Henry Schroder Wagg 5.00
Commerzbank 5.00
Source; The Banlcer, op, c i t ,
^ 1 -  10 S
2 7 7 .
TABD5 IV-2 : M u ltila tera l Arab Aid for A frica,
1974 and early  1975
1, (ï4ost Seriously  A ffected countries - .r e s u lt in g  from o i l  p rice  
r is e  ) -  Group *.
Commitments Disbursements
( /  m illio n s)
Ethiopia 14.2 14.2
Tanzania 14.2 7 .1
Sudan 10.6 5.3
Chad 8.8 8 .8
Ghana 8.8 4 .4
Mali 7 .8 3 .9
Senegal 7.5 7.5
Ivory Coast 7.2 3,6
Cameroon 5.7 2.85
Niger 5.4 2 .7
Upper Volta 5.4 2 .7
Malagasy Republic 4 .8 2,4
Sierra Leone • 3 .6 1 .8
Kenya 3.6 3.6
Lesotho 2 .8 1 .4
Dahomey 2 .4 1 ,2
Central African Republic 2 .4 2 ,4
Mauritania 2 .1 1.05
Somalia 2 .0 1 .0
Guinea 1 .6 0 .8
Total 120,9 78.7
2 . Other Countries,
Commitments Disbursements
($ m ill io n s )
Zambia 1 2 ,7 12.7
Zaire 12,4 —
Morocco 11 .8 5.9
Uganda 11.3 U .3
Mklawi 7 .5
Botswana 5.4 5.4
Swaziland 4 .2 2 .1
L iberia 3.6 1 .8
Nkuritius 2 ,7 2 ,7
Burundi 2 ,0 1 .0
Rwanda 2 .0 2 .0
Togo 1 .8 0 .9
Gambia 0 .7 0,35
Guinea-Bissau 0.5 0,5
Equat, Guinea 0 .5 0 ,5
Total for 'other cou n tries' 79.1 47.15
Combined Total
NBA plus, other countries 200.0 125.85
S o u r c e ; E .G . C h ib w e , " A ra b  D o l l a r s  f o r  A f r i c a " ,  o p ,  c i t .  p p .  1 4 1 - 1 4 2 ,
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TABLE I?-6 Î OPEC S p ecia l Fund Balance of Pa /^ments Support Program
Loan
No.
R ecipient
Country
Loan 
Amount 
US #m.
Date o f  
Payment of 
F ir s t  Portion
Date of 
Payment of 
S ec ond Porti on
1 Sudan 7.45 2. 1.77 23. 1.77
2 W. Samoa 1.60 4. 1 .77 31. 3.77
3 S r i Lanka 8.10 15. 2,77 2. 5.77
k Guinea 2.35 8, 2.77 10,11 .77
5 Pakistan 21.45 7. 2.77 23.12.77
6 C.A.E. 1 .75 6. 2.77 7.11 .77
7 î'hdagascar 3.10 22. 2.77 20. 6.77
Ô Nepal . 4.15 9. 2 ,77 6. 6.77
9 m A 3.55 6c 5.77 16.10,77
10 Guinea Bissau 1.65 24. 3.77 26. 8,77
11 Cape Verde 1 .55 15. 3.77 30. 9.77
12 Gambia 1.65 22. 3.77 : 19 .10.77
13 l^ u ritan ia 1 .6 0 4.12 ,77
14 S. Yemen 2 .40 1 . 3.77 11. 7 .77
15 Guatemala 1.75 25.10,77
16 Gpyana 1.60 3. 2.77 18. 4.77
17 H aiti 3.15 11. 3.77 15. 7 .77
IB Afghanistan 3.75 14. 2.77 5. 4.77
19 India 21,80 9. 5.77 6. 9.77
20 Bangladesh 13.90 19. 4 .77 31. 7.77
21 Lesotho 1 .90 16, 3.77 19. 9.77
22 Burma 2.25 31. 1.77 16, 6.77
23 Somalia 2.05 10. 5.77 16, 8.77
24 Honduras 1.75 5. 4 .77
25 Tanzania 5.45 4. 5 .77 3. 9 .77
26 Uganda 4.55 1 7 .-2 .7 7 16.10.77
27 Egypt 14.45 4. 5 .77 8, 6.77
2B N. Yemen 2.25 3. 4 .77
29 Upper Volta 2.25 7. 6.77 7.11 .77
30 Kenya 5.00 24. 2 .77 4. 5.77
31 Rv;anda 1.70 23. 5.77
32 Senegal 3.40 19. 7.77
33 Chad 2.40 18. 5c77
34 Ghana 7.80 25. 4 .77
35 Laos 2.15 15. 3.77 15. 7.77
36 Ethiopia 4.80 7. 7.77
37 Sierra Leone 2.05 15. 4.77
38 Niger 2 .90 31. 5.77 13. 7.77
39 Burundi 1 .70 7. 6.77
40 Cameroon 4.95 20. 4 .77
41 Mozambique 6.55 5. 5.77
42 Benin 2.00 4. 7 .77
43 El Salvador 1.75 19.10.77
4it Sao Tome 0,35 28. 9.77
45 Kbldive 0.50 18. 8.77
46 Eq, Guinea 0.50 18. 8.77 6 ,1 2 .7 7
47 Grenada 0.35 12. 9.77
48 ' Seychelles 0,30 25. 8.77 27.10 .77
49 Comoros 0 .50 13. 9 .77
SourceÎ î^ddle East Economic Survey, Volume 2, dumber 26, 
17, April 197Ô p . i .
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